diff --git a/agents/astra/musings/research-2026-03-27.md b/agents/astra/musings/research-2026-03-27.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+---
+type: musing
+agent: astra
+date: 2026-03-27
+research_question: "Is launch cost still the keystone variable for commercial space sector activation, or have technical development and demand formation become co-equal binding constraints post-Gate-1?"
+belief_targeted: "Belief #1 — launch cost is the keystone variable"
+disconfirmation_target: "Commercial station sectors have cleared Gate 1 (Falcon 9 costs) but are now constrained by technical readiness and demand formation, not launch cost further declining — implying launch cost is no longer 'the' keystone for these sectors"
+tweet_feed_status: "EMPTY — 9th consecutive session with no tweet data. All section headers present, zero content. Using web search for active thread follow-up."
+---
+
+# Research Musing: 2026-03-27
+
+## Session Context
+
+Tweet feed empty again (9th consecutive session). Pivoting to web research on active threads flagged in prior session. Disconfirmation target: can I find evidence that launch cost is NOT the primary binding constraint — that technical readiness or demand formation are now the actual limiting factors for commercial space sectors?
+
+## Disconfirmation Target
+
+**Belief #1 keystone claim:** "Everything downstream is gated on mass-to-orbit price." The weakest grounding is the universality of this claim. If sectors have cleared Gate 1 but remain stuck at Gate 2 (demand independence), then for those sectors, launch cost is no longer the operative constraint. The binding constraint has shifted.
+
+**What I searched for:** Evidence that industries are failing to activate despite launch cost being "sufficient." Specifically: commercial stations (Gate 1 cleared by Falcon 9 pricing) are stalled not by cost but by technical development and demand formation. If true, this qualifies Belief #1 without falsifying it.
+
+## Key Findings
+
+### 1. NG-3 Still Not Launched — 9 Sessions Unresolved
+
+Blue Origin announced NG-3 NET late February 2026, then NET March 2026. As of March 27, it still hasn't launched. Payload: AST SpaceMobile BlueBird Block 2 satellites. Historic significance: first booster reuse (NG-2 booster "Never Tell Me The Odds" reflying). Blue Origin is manufacturing 1 rocket/month and CEO Dave Limp has stated 12-24 launches are possible in 2026.
+
+**The gap is real and revealing:** Manufacturing rate implies 12 vehicles ready by year-end, but NG-3 can't execute a late-February target. This is Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping) operating at the operational level, not just program-level. The manufacturing rate is a theoretical ceiling; cadence is the operative constraint.
+
+**KB connection:** Blue Origin's stated manufacturing rate (12-24/year) and actual execution (NG-3 slip from late Feb → March 2026) instantiates the knowledge embodiment lag — having hardware ready does not equal operational cadence.
+
+### 2. Haven-1 Slips to Q1 2027 — Technical Readiness as Binding Constraint
+
+Haven-1 was targeting May 2026. It has slipped to Q1 2027 — a 6-8 month delay. Vast is ~40% of the way to a continuously crewed station by their own description. Haven Demo deorbited successfully Feb 4, 2026. Vast raised $500M on March 5, 2026 ($300M equity + $200M debt). The delay is described as technical (zero-to-one development; gaining more data with each milestone enables progressively more precise timelines).
+
+**Disconfirmation signal:** Haven-1's delay is NOT caused by launch cost. Falcon 9 is available, affordable for government-funded crew transport, and Haven-1 is booked. The constraint is hardware readiness. This is the first direct evidence that technical development — not launch cost — is the operative binding constraint for a post-Gate-1 sector.
+
+**Qualification to Belief #1:** For sectors that cleared Gate 1, the binding constraint has rotated from cost to technical readiness (then to demand formation). This is meaningful precision, not falsification.
+
+**Two-gate model connection:** Haven-1 delay to Q1 2027 pushes its Gate 2 observation window to Q1 2027 at earliest. If it launches Q1 2027 and operates 12 months before ISS deorbit (2031), that's only 4 years of operational history before the ISS-transition deadline. The $500M fundraise shows strong capital market confidence that Gate 2 will eventually form, but the timeline is tightening.
+
+### 3. ISS Extension Bill — New "Overlap Mandate" Changes the Gate 2 Story
+
+NASA Authorization Act of 2026 passed Senate Commerce Committee with bipartisan support (Ted Cruz, R-TX spearheading). Key provisions:
+- ISS life extended to 2032 (from 2030)
+- ISS must overlap with at least one commercial station for a full year
+- During that overlap year, concurrent crew for at least 180 days
+- Still requires: full Senate vote + House vote + Presidential signature
+
+**Why this matters more than just the extension:** The overlap mandate is a policy-engineered Gate 2 condition. Congress is not just buying time — it is creating a specific transition structure that requires commercial stations to be operational and crewed BEFORE ISS deorbits. This is different from prior versions of the extension which simply deferred the deadline.
+
+**Haven-1 math under the new mandate:** Haven-1 launches Q1 2027. ISS deorbits 2031. That's 4 years for Haven-1 to clear the "fully operational, crewed" bar before the required overlap year (2030-2031 most likely). This is tight but plausible. No other commercial station has a realistic 2031 timeline. Axiom (station modules) and Starlab are further behind. Blue Origin (Orbital Reef partner) is still pre-manifest.
+
+**National security demand floor (Pattern 12) strengthened:** The bipartisan passage in committee confirms the "Tiangong scenario" framing (US losing its last inhabited LEO outpost) is driving the political will. This creates a government demand floor that is NOT contingent on commercial market formation.
+
+**New nuance:** The overlap requirement means the government is now mandating exactly the kind of anchor tenant arrangement that enables Gate 2 formation — it's not just buying crew seats, it's creating a guaranteed multi-year operational window for a commercial station to build its customer base. This is the most interventionist pro-commercial-station policy ever passed out of committee.
+
+### 4. Blue Origin Manufacturing Ramp — Closing the Cadence Gap?
+
+Blue Origin is completing one full New Glenn rocket per month. CEO Dave Limp stated 12-24 launches are possible in 2026. Second stage is the production bottleneck. BE-4 engine production: ~50/year now, ramping to 100-150 by late 2026 (supporting 7-14 New Glenn boosters annually).
+
+**Vertical integration context:** The NASASpaceflight article (March 21, 2026) connects manufacturing ramp to Project Sunrise ambitions — Blue Origin needs cadence to deploy 51,600 ODC satellites. This is the SpaceX/Starlink vertical integration playbook: own your own launch demand to drive cadence, which drives learning curve, which drives cost reduction.
+
+**Tension:** 12-24 launches stated as possible for 2026, but NG-3 (the 3rd launch ever) hasn't happened yet in late March. Even if Blue Origin executes perfectly from April onward, they'd need ~9-11 launches in 9 months to hit the low end of Limp's claim. That's a 3-4x acceleration from current pace. Possible, but it would require zero further slips.
+
+### 5. Starship Launch Cost — Still Not Commercially Available
+
+Starship is not yet in commercial service. Current estimated cost with operational reusability: ~$1,600/kg. Target long-term: $100-150/kg. Falcon 9 advertised at $2,720/kg; SpaceX rideshare at $5,500/kg (above 200kg). SpaceX's internal Falcon 9 cost is ~$629/kg.
+
+**ODC threshold context:** From previous session analysis, orbital data centers need ~$200/kg to be viable. Starship at $1,600/kg is 8x too expensive. Starship at $100-150/kg would clear the threshold. This is Gate 1 for ODC — not yet cleared, not yet close. Even the most optimistic Starship cost projections put $200/kg at 3-5 years away in commercial service.
+
+## Disconfirmation Assessment
+
+**Result: Qualified, not falsified.**
+
+Belief #1 says "everything downstream is gated on mass-to-orbit price." The evidence from this session provides two important precision points:
+
+1. **Post-Gate-1 sectors face a shifted binding constraint.** For commercial stations (Falcon 9 already cleared Gate 1), the binding constraint is now technical readiness (Haven-1 delay) and demand formation (Gate 2). Launch cost declining further wouldn't accelerate Haven-1's timeline. In these sectors, launch cost is a historical constraint, not the current operative constraint.
+
+2. **Pre-Gate-1 sectors confirm Belief #1 directly.** For ODC and lunar ISRU, launch cost ($2,720/kg Falcon 9 vs. $200/kg ODC threshold) is precisely the binding constraint. No amount of demand generation will activate these sectors until cost crosses the threshold.
+
+**Interpretation:** Belief #1 is valid as the first-order structural constraint. It determines which sectors CAN form, not which sectors WILL form. Once a sector clears Gate 1, different constraints dominate. The keystone property of launch cost is: it's the necessary precondition. But it's not sufficient alone. Calling it "the" keystone is slightly overfit to Gate 1 dynamics. The two-gate model is the precision: launch cost is the Gate 1 keystone; revenue model independence is the Gate 2 keystone. Both must be cleared.
+
+**Net confidence change:** Belief #1 stands but should carry a scope qualifier: "Launch cost is the keystone variable for Gate 1 sector activation. Post-Gate-1, the binding constraint rotates to technical readiness then demand formation."
+
+## New Claim Candidates
+
+**Extraction-ready for a future session:**
+
+1. **"Haven-1 delay reveals technical readiness as the post-Gate-1 binding constraint for commercial stations"** — The slip from May 2026 to Q1 2027 is the first evidence that for sectors that cleared Gate 1 via government subsidy, technical development is the operative constraint, not cost. Confidence: experimental.
+
+2. **"The ISS overlap mandate restructures Gate 2 formation for commercial stations"** — NASA Authorization Act of 2026's overlap requirement (1 year concurrent operation, 180 days co-crew) creates a policy-engineered Gate 2 condition. This is the strongest government mechanism yet for forcing commercial station viability. Confidence: experimental (bill not yet law).
+
+3. **"Blue Origin's stated manufacturing rate vs. actual cadence gap confirms knowledge embodiment lag at operational scale"** — 1 rocket/month manufacturing but NG-3 slipped from late February to late March 2026 demonstrates that hardware availability ≠ launch cadence. Confidence: experimental.
+
+## Connection to Prior Sessions
+
+- Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping) confirmed again: Haven-1, NG-3 both slipping
+- Pattern 8 (launch cost as phase-1 gate, not universal): directly strengthened by Haven-1 analysis
+- Pattern 10 (two-gate sector activation model): strengthened — overlap mandate is a policy mechanism to force Gate 2 formation
+- Pattern 12 (national security demand floor): strengthened — bipartisan committee passage confirms strategic framing
+
+---
+
+## Follow-up Directions
+
+### Active Threads (continue next session)
+
+- **NG-3 launch execution**: Blue Origin's NG-3 is NET March 2026 and has not launched. Next session should check if it has flown. The first reuse milestone matters for cadence credibility. Also check actual 2026 launch count vs. Limp's 12-24 claim.
+
+- **ISS extension bill — full Senate + House progress**: The bill passed committee with bipartisan support. Track whether it advances to full chamber votes. The overlap requirement (1 year co-existence + 180 days co-crew) is the most significant provision — it changes Haven-1's strategic value dramatically if it becomes law.
+
+- **Haven-1 integration status**: Now in environmental testing at NASA Glenn Research Center (Jan-March 2026). Subsequent milestone is vehicle integration checkout. Launch Q1 2027 is a tight window — any further slips push it past the ISS overlap window. Track.
+
+- **Starship commercial operations debut**: Starship is not yet commercially available. The transition from test article to commercial service is the key Gate 1 event for ODC and lunar ISRU. Track any SpaceX announcements about commercial Starship pricing or first commercial payload manifest.
+
+### Dead Ends (don't re-run these)
+
+- **"Tweet feed for @SpaceX, @NASASpaceflight" etc.**: 9 consecutive sessions with empty tweet feed. This is a systemic data collection failure, not a content drought. Don't attempt to find tweets; use web search directly.
+
+- **"Space industry growth independent of launch cost"**: The search returns geopolitics and regulatory framing but no specific counter-evidence. The geopolitics finding (national security demand as independent growth driver) is already captured as Pattern 12. Not fruitful to extend this line.
+
+### Branching Points (one finding opened multiple directions)
+
+- **ISS overlap mandate**: Direction A — how does this affect Axiom, Starlab, Orbital Reef timelines (only Haven-1 is plausibly ready by 2031)? Direction B — what does the 180-day concurrent crew requirement mean for commercial station operational design (crew continuity, scheduling, pricing implications)? Direction A is higher value — pursue first. Direction B is architectural and may require industry-specific sourcing.
+
+- **Blue Origin manufacturing vs. cadence gap**: Direction A — is this a temporary ramp-up artifact or a structural operational gap? Track NG-3 through NG-6 launch pace to distinguish. Direction B — does the cadence gap affect Project Sunrise feasibility (you need Starlink-like cadence to deploy 51,600 satellites)? Direction B is more analytically interesting but Direction A must resolve first.
diff --git a/agents/astra/research-journal.md b/agents/astra/research-journal.md
index 62247310..24243eb2 100644
--- a/agents/astra/research-journal.md
+++ b/agents/astra/research-journal.md
@@ -256,3 +256,31 @@ New finding: **Interlune's Prospect Moon 2027 targets equatorial near-side, not
 - "Water is keystone cislunar resource" claim: MAINTAINED for in-space operations. He-3 demand is for terrestrial buyers only, which makes it a different market segment.
 
 **Sources archived:** 8 sources — Maybell ColdCloud 80% per-qubit He-3 reduction; DARPA urgent He-3-free cryocooler call; EuCo2Al9 China Nature ADR alloy; Kiutra €13M commercial deployment; ZPC PSR Spring 2026; Interlune Prospect Moon 2027 equatorial target; AKA Penn Energy temporal bound analysis; Starship Flight 12 V3 April 9; Commercial stations Haven-1/Orbital Reef slippage; Interlune $5M SAFE and milestone gate structure.
+
+---
+
+## Session 2026-03-27
+**Question:** Is launch cost still the keystone variable for commercial space sector activation, or have technical development and demand formation become co-equal binding constraints in sectors that have already cleared Gate 1?
+
+**Belief targeted:** Belief #1 — launch cost is the keystone variable. Disconfirmation target: commercial stations have cleared Gate 1 (Falcon 9 pricing) but are now stalled by technical readiness and demand formation, not by launch cost further declining. If true, the "keystone" framing overfit to Gate 1 dynamics. Searched for evidence that sectors fail to activate despite sufficient launch costs, or that non-cost constraints are now primary.
+
+**Disconfirmation result:** QUALIFIED — NOT FALSIFIED. Evidence confirmed that post-Gate-1 sectors (commercial stations) have rotated their binding constraint from launch cost to technical readiness (Haven-1 delay to Q1 2027 is technical, not cost-driven) and then to demand formation. Launch cost declining further would not accelerate Haven-1's timeline — Falcon 9 is already available and booked. This is genuine precision on Belief #1, not falsification. Pre-Gate-1 sectors (ODC, ISRU) confirm Belief #1 directly: Falcon 9 at $2,720/kg vs. ODC threshold ~$200/kg, Starship at ~$1,600/kg still 8x too expensive. No demand will form in these sectors until Gate 1 clears. Belief #1 is valid as the necessary first-order constraint; it determines which sectors CAN form, not which WILL form. The keystone framing is accurate for pre-Gate-1 sectors; post-Gate-1, the keystone rotates.
+
+**Key finding:** The NASA Authorization Act of 2026 (passed Senate Commerce Committee) contains an overlap mandate requiring ISS to operate alongside a commercial station for at least 1 full year with 180 days of concurrent crew before deorbit. This is qualitatively different from all prior ISS extension discussions. It creates a policy-engineered Gate 2 transition condition: the government is mandating commercial station operational maturity as a precondition for ISS retirement. Haven-1 (Q1 2027 launch) is the only operator with a plausible timeline to serve as the overlap partner by the 2031-2032 window. The bill is not yet law (committee passage only) but bipartisan support is strong.
+
+Secondary: Blue Origin manufacturing 1 New Glenn/month, CEO claiming 12-24 launches possible in 2026. NG-3 still not launched in late March (9th consecutive session unresolved). Manufacturing rate ≠ launch cadence; this instantiates knowledge embodiment lag at operational scale.
+
+**Pattern update:**
+- **Pattern 10 FURTHER EXTENDED (Two-gate model):** Overlap mandate is a new policy mechanism — "policy-engineered Gate 2 transition condition." The model now needs to distinguish: organic Gate 2 formation, government demand floor, and policy-mandated transition conditions. Three distinct mechanisms, not two.
+- **Pattern 2 CONFIRMED (13th session):** NG-3 still unresolved. Now confirmed: Blue Origin CEO claiming 12-24 launches in 2026 vs. NG-3 not flown in late March. The manufacturing-vs-cadence gap is the specific form of Pattern 2 operating at Blue Origin.
+- **New pattern candidate:** Technical readiness as post-Gate-1 binding constraint. Seen in Haven-1 delay (technical development), NG-3 slip (operational readiness), Starlab uncertainty. Distinct from Pattern 2 (timelines slipping) — this is specifically about hardware readiness as the operative constraint once cost is no longer the bottleneck.
+
+**Confidence shift:**
+- Belief #1 (launch cost keystone): SCOPE QUALIFIED — keystone for Gate 1 sectors; post-Gate-1 sectors rotate to technical readiness then demand formation. Belief survives but needs scope qualifier to be accurate.
+- Two-gate model: STRENGTHENED — overlap mandate confirms the model's structural insight; policy is now explicitly designed around the two-gate logic.
+- Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping): CONFIRMED AGAIN — 13th session.
+- Pattern 12 (national security demand floor): STRENGTHENED — bipartisan committee passage of overlap mandate is the strongest legislative confirmation yet.
+
+**Sources archived this session:** 4 sources — NG-3 status (Blue Origin press release + NSF forum); Haven-1 delay to Q1 2027 + $500M fundraise (Payload Space); NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate (SpaceNews/AIAA/Space.com); Starship/Falcon 9 cost data 2026 (Motley Fool/SpaceNexus/NextBigFuture).
+
+**Tweet feed status:** EMPTY — 9th consecutive session. Systemic data collection failure confirmed. Web search used as substitute.
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-new-glenn-manufacturing-odc-ambitions.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-new-glenn-manufacturing-odc-ambitions.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..83ae0786
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-new-glenn-manufacturing-odc-ambitions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Blue Origin ramps New Glenn to 1 rocket/month, targets 12-24 launches in 2026, unveils ODC ambitions"
+author: "Alejandro Alcantarilla Romera, Chris Bergin (NASASpaceFlight)"
+url: https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2026/03/blue-new-glenn-manufacturing-data-ambitions/
+date: 2026-03-21
+domain: space-development
+secondary_domains: [energy]
+format: article
+status: unprocessed
+priority: high
+tags: [new-glenn, blue-origin, manufacturing-rate, launch-cadence, project-sunrise, odc, orbital-data-center, vertical-integration, be-4]
+flagged_for_astra: ["ODC sector update — Blue Origin manufacturing context for Project Sunrise deployment viability"]
+---
+
+## Content
+
+NASASpaceFlight article (March 21, 2026) by Alcantarilla Romera and Bergin, reporting from Blue Origin's Space Coast facilities:
+
+**Manufacturing rate:** Blue Origin is completing one full New Glenn rocket per month. "Up to seven second stages are visible across different production stages" at the facility. This represents a significant production ramp from 2025 cadence.
+
+**2026 launch goals:** CEO Dave Limp believes the company can hit "double digits" in 2026 launches, matching production rate at 12, potentially going as high as 24 "if the success they've had ramping up vehicle production continues."
+
+**Current bottleneck:** Second stage production rate, not booster. BE-4 engine production at approximately 50/year currently, ramping to 100-150 by late 2026. At full BE-4 rate, approximately 7-14 New Glenn boosters annually, plus supporting Vulcan (2 BE-4s per flight).
+
+**ODC ambitions:** The article connects manufacturing ramp to Project Sunrise — Blue Origin's FCC-filed orbital data center constellation (51,600+ satellites, sun-synchronous orbit, solar-powered AI compute). The ODC ambitions require New Glenn to achieve Starlink-like deployment cadence to be viable.
+
+**Vertical integration framing:** Blue Origin's strategy positions Project Sunrise as internal demand creation for New Glenn, replicating the SpaceX/Starlink model. Own the payload demand, drive cadence, drive learning curve, reduce cost.
+
+## Agent Notes
+**Why this matters:** This article directly connects the Blue Origin manufacturing ramp to the vertical integration thesis. The 1 rocket/month rate is the supply-side input to the Project Sunrise deployment plan. But the gap between manufacturing capability and actual cadence (NG-3 still not launched as of March 27) is the critical tension.
+
+**What surprised me:** The scale of the manufacturing ambition (1/month, 12-24 launches/year) relative to their 2025 performance (2 launches total). This is either genuine operational capability being built or CEO-level aspirational communication. The physical evidence (7 second stages visible on factory floor) suggests real manufacturing activity, but launch cadence is the actual proof.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** A specific timeline for Project Sunrise deployment. The FCC filing doesn't include deployment schedules. The NSF article connects the manufacturing ramp to ODC ambitions but doesn't provide a satellite deployment timeline. How many New Glenn launches would it take to deploy 51,600 satellites? At what cadence? This is the key missing number for Project Sunrise viability analysis.
+
+**KB connections:** Project Sunrise — previously archived (2026-03-19-blue-origin-project-sunrise-fcc-orbital-datacenter.md). Vertical integration as demand bypass (two-gate model). ODC sector formation (Pattern 11 — Blue Origin is one of six players). SpaceX/Starlink flywheel as analogical model. Knowledge embodiment lag — manufacturing rate ≠ launch rate.
+
+**Extraction hints:** Three distinct claims: (1) Blue Origin's manufacturing rate (1/month, 12-24 launches/year) as vertical integration prerequisite. (2) The manufacturing-vs-cadence gap (NG-3 slip) as knowledge embodiment lag evidence. (3) Project Sunrise requiring Starlink-like cadence — feasibility of 51,600 satellites at current production rates (back-of-envelope: even at 50 satellites/launch, you need 1,032 launches; at 200 satellites/launch, still 258 launches). This satellite-per-launch number should be flagged for extraction.
+
+**Context:** Starlink deployed at ~50-60 satellites per Falcon 9 launch initially, scaling to 22-23 Starlink v2 per Falcon 9 rideshare or 20-21 Starlink per Starship. At 51,600 Project Sunrise satellites, Blue Origin would need hundreds to thousands of launches. Even at 12-24 launches per year, this is a 20-50 year deployment without much larger payload manifests. This is the most important number for Project Sunrise viability and it's currently absent from public analysis.
+
+## Curator Notes
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Project Sunrise ODC (2026-03-19-blue-origin-project-sunrise-fcc-orbital-datacenter.md) — provides the launch infrastructure context for that filing
+WHY ARCHIVED: Manufacturing rate data combined with NG-3 cadence gap tests the vertical integration thesis in a way that reveals knowledge embodiment lag at operational scale
+EXTRACTION HINT: The satellites-per-launch back-of-envelope is the key analytical move — what does 51,600 satellites actually require in launch cadence terms? Extractor should calculate and note whether this is plausible given Blue Origin's stated rate.
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-ng3-ast-bluebird.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-ng3-ast-bluebird.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..08f9890d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-blueorigin-ng3-ast-bluebird.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "New Glenn NG-3 to launch AST SpaceMobile BlueBird Block 2 — first booster reuse"
+author: "Blue Origin (@blueorigin)"
+url: https://www.blueorigin.com/news/new-glenn-3-to-launch-ast-spacemobile-bluebird-satellite
+date: 2026-01-22
+domain: space-development
+secondary_domains: []
+format: press-release
+status: unprocessed
+priority: medium
+tags: [new-glenn, ng-3, ast-spacemobile, booster-reuse, launch-cadence, blue-origin]
+---
+
+## Content
+
+Blue Origin announced NG-3, its third New Glenn mission, will carry AST SpaceMobile's next-generation Block 2 BlueBird satellite to low Earth orbit. NET late February 2026, later slipped to NET March 2026 (as tracked by NASASpaceFlight forum thread). The mission marks the program's first booster reuse: the first stage from NG-2 ("Never Tell Me The Odds") which successfully landed on drone ship Jacklyn after delivering NASA's ESCAPADE Mars probes in November 2025, will fly again.
+
+Additional context from NASA Spaceflight (March 21, 2026 article by Alcantarilla Romera / Bergin): Blue Origin is completing one full New Glenn per month. CEO Dave Limp stated 12-24 launches possible in 2026. Second stage is the current production bottleneck. BE-4 engine production at ~50/year, ramping to 100-150 by late 2026 (supporting 7-14 New Glenn boosters annually at full rate).
+
+As of March 27, 2026, NG-3 has not yet launched despite the February then March NET dates.
+
+## Agent Notes
+**Why this matters:** NG-3 has been unresolved for 9 consecutive research sessions. First booster reuse milestone is critical for demonstrating cadence credibility. CEO's 12-24 launch claim for 2026 is now under stress with NG-3 slipping from late-February to late-March, suggesting the manufacturing rate (1/month) does not translate directly to launch rate.
+
+**What surprised me:** Blue Origin is manufacturing one complete New Glenn per month — this is a remarkably high stated rate for only their 2nd active vehicle. If real, it implies significant hardware inventory is accumulating. The gap between stated manufacturing rate and actual launch cadence (NG-3 still not flown in late March) is the most interesting data point.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** A concrete explanation for the NG-3 slip. The TechCrunch article from January 22 mentioned late February NET; the NSF forum shows March 2026 NET. No public explanation for the further delay has been found. This gap (stated capability vs execution) is worth investigating.
+
+**KB connections:** Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping) — NG-3 is now 4-6 weeks behind its announced window. Knowledge embodiment lag — manufacturing capability ≠ operational cadence. Blue Origin vertical integration strategy (Project Sunrise as internal demand creation).
+
+**Extraction hints:** Claim candidate — "Blue Origin's stated manufacturing rate and actual launch cadence reveal a knowledge embodiment gap at operational scale." Also: first booster reuse is a milestone claim supporting reusability maturation. Don't conflate manufacturing rate with launch rate — they're measuring different things.
+
+**Context:** Blue Origin has completed 2 New Glenn launches (NG-1: orbital attempt with booster loss, January 2025; NG-2: ESCAPADE + booster recovery, November 2025). NG-3 is the third mission and first reuse. The CEO's 12-24 launch claim for 2026 would require roughly 10-22 additional launches after NG-3.
+
+## Curator Notes
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Blue Origin vertical integration thesis (Project Sunrise creates internal New Glenn demand)
+WHY ARCHIVED: Tests manufacturing-vs-cadence gap as evidence for/against knowledge embodiment lag claim
+EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the delta between stated manufacturing capability (1/month) and actual execution (NG-3 slip) — this is the analytically interesting claim, not the launch itself
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-nasa-authorization-act-iss-overlap-mandate.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-nasa-authorization-act-iss-overlap-mandate.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..af6289c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-nasa-authorization-act-iss-overlap-mandate.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "NASA Authorization Act of 2026 passes Senate committee — ISS overlap mandate requires commercial station co-existence before deorbit"
+author: "SpaceNews / AIAA / Space.com"
+url: https://spacenews.com/senate-committee-advances-nasa-authorization-bill-that-changes-artemis-and-extends-iss/
+date: 2026-03-05
+domain: space-development
+secondary_domains: []
+format: article
+status: unprocessed
+priority: high
+tags: [iss-extension, nasa-authorization, commercial-space-station, congress, gate-2, policy, haven-1, overlap-mandate]
+---
+
+## Content
+
+The NASA Authorization Act of 2026 passed the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation committee with bipartisan support (spearheaded by Sen. Ted Cruz, R-TX). Key provisions:
+
+1. Extends ISS operational life from 2030 to 2032 (September 30, 2032)
+2. **Overlap mandate**: ISS must operate alongside at least one "fully operational" commercial station for at least one full year
+3. **Crew continuity requirement**: During the overlap year, full crews must be in space concurrently for at least 180 days
+4. Directs NASA to accelerate commercial LEO destinations development
+5. Cites "Tiangong scenario" (China's station would be world's only inhabited station if ISS deorbits without replacement) as strategic rationale
+
+Legislative status: Passed committee. Still requires full Senate vote, House passage, and Presidential signature. Not yet law.
+
+Secondary sources confirming passage: Congress.gov (bill tracking), AIAA statement (March 10, 2026), Space.com analysis ("why Congress wants ISS to fly until 2032"), Slashdot ("Congress Extends ISS, Tells NASA To Get Moving On Private Space Stations").
+
+## Agent Notes
+**Why this matters:** The overlap mandate is qualitatively different from prior ISS extension proposals. Previous extensions simply deferred the deadline. This mandate creates a TRANSITION CONDITION: commercial station must be operational and crewed before ISS deorbits. This is a policy-engineered Gate 2 mechanism — it guarantees a government anchor tenant relationship during a defined operational window (the overlap year), giving any qualifying commercial station a funded proof-of-concept period.
+
+**What surprised me:** The 180-day concurrent crew requirement is operationally specific — this isn't a "maybe overlap" provision, it requires full concurrent crewing for half a year. This creates a very specific technical and scheduling requirement for the commercial station candidate (it needs full crew capability, life support, docking, communication). Haven-1 is the only station with a realistic 2031 timeline under this framework.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** Specific mention of which commercial station(s) are expected to serve as the overlap partner. The bill doesn't name Vast/Haven-1, but the timeline logic makes it the implicit target. Also missing: how "fully operational" is defined for triggering the overlap year.
+
+**KB connections:** Gate 2 formation (Pattern 10) — this is the strongest government mechanism yet for forcing Gate 2 formation. National security demand floor (Pattern 12) — Tiangong scenario framing is the explicit justification. Commercial station capital concentration (Pattern 9) — Axiom's $350M Series C despite Phase 2 freeze, now Haven-1's $500M, while weaker programs fade. ISS extension analysis from prior sessions (March 22-26).
+
+**Extraction hints:** Primary claim: "The ISS overlap mandate (NASA Authorization Act 2026) creates a policy-engineered Gate 2 transition condition for commercial space stations — the strongest government mechanism yet for forcing commercial viability." Secondary: "The 180-day concurrent crew requirement makes Haven-1 the implicit, and possibly only, qualifying overlap partner under the 2032 framework." These should be checked for divergence with prior claim about ISS extension deferring but not manufacturing Gate 2 conditions — the overlap mandate changes this dynamic.
+
+**Context:** This bill is a significant evolution from the prior "schedule risk" framing (previous session archived source: 2026-03-01-congress-iss-2032-extension-gap-risk.md). That source characterized the extension as acknowledging gap risk. This bill adds affirmative transition requirements. The two sources together tell a before/after story of congressional intent.
+
+## Curator Notes
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: ISS 2032 extension gap risk (2026-03-01-congress-iss-2032-extension-gap-risk.md) — this is the "after" to that source's "before"
+WHY ARCHIVED: Overlap mandate is a new mechanism that substantially changes Gate 2 formation dynamics for commercial stations — not captured in any prior session
+EXTRACTION HINT: Extract the overlap mandate as its own claim, distinct from the simple extension. The transition condition (fully operational + 180 days concurrent crew) is the novel policy element. Flag potential divergence with prior claim about policy deferring but not manufacturing Gate 2.
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-starship-falcon9-cost-2026-commercial-operations.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-starship-falcon9-cost-2026-commercial-operations.md
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+---
+type: source
+title: "Starship and Falcon 9 launch cost data 2026 — ODC and ISRU threshold analysis"
+author: "The Motley Fool / SpaceNexus / NextBigFuture"
+url: https://www.fool.com/investing/2026/03/21/how-much-will-a-spacex-starship-launch-cost/
+date: 2026-03-21
+domain: space-development
+secondary_domains: [energy]
+format: article
+status: unprocessed
+priority: medium
+tags: [starship, falcon-9, launch-cost, cost-per-kg, odc-threshold, isru-threshold, keystone-variable]
+---
+
+## Content
+
+Multiple sources converging on the following launch cost estimates as of March 2026:
+
+**Falcon 9 (commercially available):**
+- Advertised: $67M/launch for dedicated mission, ~$2,720/kg (full capacity basis)
+- Rideshare: $1.1M for first 200kg + $5,500/kg afterward
+- SpaceX internal cost: ~$629/kg (approximately 25% of customer price per NextBigFuture, Feb 2026)
+- Average price per kg based on actual customer usage patterns: ~$20,770/kg (customers typically use much less than full capacity)
+
+**Starship (not yet commercially available):**
+- Current estimated cost with operational reusability level achieved in testing: ~$1,600/kg
+- Near-term projection (full reuse, high cadence): $250-600/kg
+- Long-term aspirational target: $100-150/kg
+- SpaceX ultimate goal: $10/kg (Musk stated target)
+- Near-term operating cost per launch (fuel + maintenance + pad): $10M or less, eventually $2-3M
+
+**Commercial context:** Starship has not yet conducted a commercial payload mission. All Starship flights to date are test and development flights. Commercial operations expected to begin in 2026-2027, but no firm commercial manifest public.
+
+## Agent Notes
+**Why this matters:** This data directly grounds the two-gate model's Gate 1 thresholds for the three pre-Gate-1 sectors: ODC (~$200/kg needed), lunar ISRU (Starship sub-$100/kg is the enabling condition per KB), and megastructure launch infrastructure (all require sub-$100/kg to make economic sense). Falcon 9 at $2,720/kg is 13.6x too expensive for ODC. Starship at $1,600/kg is 8x too expensive. Even at the near-term projection of $250-600/kg, ODC is still 1.25-3x over threshold.
+
+**What surprised me:** SpaceX's internal cost of $629/kg for Falcon 9 means they're operating at approximately a 4:1 markup. This implies Starship's future pricing will also carry significant markup above operating cost. If Starship's operating cost reaches $10M/launch at full reuse, and SpaceX applies even a 2:1 markup, commercial pricing would be ~$133/kg for 150t to LEO — right at the $100-150/kg long-term projection. This is a pricing model consistency check that validates the projections.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** A Starship commercial pricing announcement. SpaceX has been quiet on what it will actually charge for commercial Starship payloads. The $1,600/kg estimate appears to be analyst-derived, not SpaceX-stated.
+
+**KB connections:** Belief #1 (launch cost as keystone variable) — this data shows Gate 1 is NOT yet cleared for ODC or lunar ISRU. ODC threshold from prior session ($200/kg). Cislunar ISRU map claim that "Starship at sub-$100/kg is the enabling condition." Threshold economics (Astra's core lens).
+
+**Extraction hints:** The $200/kg ODC threshold + current Starship at $1,600/kg = 8x gap is a concrete, specific claim: "Orbital data centers require ~8x reduction from current Starship launch costs before Gate 1 is cleared." Also: SpaceX internal cost ($629/kg Falcon 9) implies commercial pricing structure — can be used to project Starship commercial pricing from operating cost estimates.
+
+**Context:** These numbers are critical for answering the disconfirmation question. If launch cost were not the keystone variable for ODC, we'd see ODC customers forming demand before the $200/kg threshold is crossed. The absence of validated commercial ODC demand (as of March 2026, Blue Origin has an FCC filing but no customers; Starcloud has hardware but no revenue contract) is consistent with the Gate 1 thesis.
+
+## Curator Notes
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: ODC sector analysis from prior sessions (two-gate model, Pattern 11)
+WHY ARCHIVED: Provides current cost data anchoring Gate 1 threshold analysis across ODC, ISRU, and megastructure sectors — direct evidence for/against Belief #1
+EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the threshold gap calculations ($200/kg ODC needed vs $1,600/kg current Starship; sub-$100/kg ISRU needed vs $1,600/kg current). These are specific, falsifiable claims about which sectors are Gate-1 blocked.
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-vast-haven1-delay-2027-fundraise.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-27-vast-haven1-delay-2027-fundraise.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Vast delays Haven-1 to Q1 2027, raises $500M — technical readiness as post-Gate-1 binding constraint"
+author: "Payload Space / Vast Space (@vastspace)"
+url: https://payloadspace.com/vast-delays-haven-1-launch-to-2027/
+date: 2026-03-05
+domain: space-development
+secondary_domains: []
+format: article
+status: unprocessed
+priority: high
+tags: [haven-1, vast, commercial-space-station, gate-2, launch-delay, fundraising, iss-transition]
+---
+
+## Content
+
+Vast has delayed Haven-1's launch from mid-2026 to Q1 2027 (approximately 6-8 month slip). The company raised $500M on March 5, 2026 ($300M equity + $200M debt). Haven Demo pathfinder mission successfully completed controlled deorbit on February 4, 2026. Vast describes itself as ~40% of the way to a continuously crewed space station.
+
+The delay is characterized as a technical development issue ("zero-to-one development; gaining more data with each milestone enables progressively more precise timelines"), not a cost or funding issue. Commercial demand pipeline includes negotiating crew slots with private individuals and nation-states (Europe, Japan, Middle East, Asia). NASA anchor tenant relationship remains the primary revenue foundation.
+
+Launch vehicle: SpaceX Falcon 9 (booked).
+
+## Agent Notes
+**Why this matters:** Haven-1 is the most advanced commercial station and the only realistic candidate to meet the ISS transition window. Its delay to Q1 2027 is the first direct evidence that for post-Gate-1 sectors, the binding constraint is technical readiness, not launch cost. Falcon 9 is available and affordable for government-funded crew transport — the bottleneck is not "can we get to orbit" but "is the hardware ready."
+
+**What surprised me:** The combination of 6-8 month delay AND $500M fundraise (simultaneously) is counterintuitive. Normally a delay signals trouble; here, capital markets are clearly confident in the team and thesis. This suggests the delay is a technical maturation event, not a distress signal. Strong contrast with weaker commercial station programs (Orbital Reef dissolution, Starlab uncertainty).
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** A specific technical explanation for the delay (what subsystem caused the slip). Vast characterizes it generically as "zero-to-one development." This is honest but not diagnostic.
+
+**KB connections:** Two-gate model (Pattern 10) — Haven-1 has cleared Gate 1 but Gate 2 formation is still undemonstrated. The $500M fundraise implies investor expectation that Gate 2 will form, but it doesn't constitute Gate 2 itself. Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping) — another program slip. Pattern 6 (thesis hedging by first-movers) — Vast's demand pipeline (nation-states, private individuals) suggests diversifying off NASA dependence.
+
+**Extraction hints:** Primary claim candidate: "Haven-1's delay to Q1 2027 demonstrates that post-Gate-1 commercial space sectors are constrained by technical readiness, not launch cost." Secondary: "Haven-1 is the only realistic commercial station candidate for the ISS overlap window under the NASA Authorization Act of 2026." Tertiary: "$500M fundraise amid delay signals investor belief in Gate 2 formation independent of near-term revenue."
+
+**Context:** Haven-1 Q1 2027 launch + ~4 years to 2031 ISS deorbit. Under the ISS overlap bill (if passed), commercial station must operate alongside ISS for 1 full year with 180 days of concurrent crew. Haven-1 would need to be operational and crewed by late 2029-2030 to be the designated overlap partner. This is extremely tight given Q1 2027 launch.
+
+## Curator Notes
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Two-gate sector activation model (gate 2 formation dynamics)
+WHY ARCHIVED: First direct evidence that technical readiness is the operative constraint for post-Gate-1 commercial stations — qualifies Belief #1 (launch cost as keystone) without falsifying it
+EXTRACTION HINT: Extract the technical readiness claim AND the fundraise-despite-delay signal separately — they're different claims that together tell a coherent story about post-Gate-1 dynamics