rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (Autocrat v0.3) used the standard 3-day TWAP settlement window with a 3% pass threshold ($3,698 absolute FDV increase required). This provides concrete implementation data: the mechanism allows proposers to set custom TWAP thresholds (not just binary pass/fail), and the 3-day window applies even to proposals with long-term benefits (community building over months). The proposal's failure despite meeting the structural requirements (clear pass condition, measurable outcome, concrete budget) suggests the mechanism works as designed but faces adoption barriers at the market participation level. Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(confirm) Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 despite seemingly favorable economics: $15K cost versus projected $1.8M FDV increase (16x), requiring only 3% TWAP increase to pass. The proposal was contested (community event with real stakes and clear economic argument) but still failed, suggesting limited trading volume affects not just uncontested decisions but also proposals with measurable financial impacts and concrete deliverables. This extends the original claim: low liquidity is a barrier even when proposals have clear economic arguments and modest pass thresholds ($3,698 absolute FDV increase needed). Dean's List DAO FDV of $123,263 at proposal time suggests insufficient trading capital to support conditional markets.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy markets struggle to price community cohesion benefits from physical events because they accrue over months/years but markets settle in days, creating systematic undervaluation of cultural proposals"
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confidence: speculative
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal structure, 2024-06-22; inspired by MonkeDAO and SuperTeam community models"
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created: 2024-06-25
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processed_date: 2024-06-25
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secondary_domains: ["cultural-dynamics", "collective-intelligence"]
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challenged_by: ["futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy markets struggle to price community cohesion benefits because they accrue over months/years but markets settle in days
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal explicitly aimed to create "a global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world" and "transform DL DAO into more than a governance platform—it becomes a community where membership unlocks valuable experiences." The proposal drew inspiration from MonkeDAO and SuperTeam, both known for strong community cultures built through physical gatherings.
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These community cohesion benefits are real and documented in successful DAOs:
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- Relationship formation between members increases trust and coordination capacity
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- Shared experiences create cultural identity and belonging that attracts higher-quality participants
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- Physical presence signals commitment and filters for engaged members
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- Network effects compound as community strength attracts better governance participation
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However, futarchy markets using 3-day TWAP of token price as the objective function face a fundamental measurement problem:
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1. **Time horizon mismatch**: Community benefits accrue over months/years (relationship deepening, culture formation, network effects), but futarchy markets settle in 3 days. Traders cannot observe whether the event actually strengthened the community.
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2. **Attribution difficulty**: Token price movements have many causes (market sentiment, competing proposals, external events). Isolating the community effect from noise is nearly impossible in a 3-day window.
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3. **Indirect value paths**: Strong community → better governance → better decisions → token appreciation is a multi-step causal chain. Traders must price all steps simultaneously, but each step introduces uncertainty and compounding error.
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4. **Counterfactual uncertainty**: What would token price be without the event? Markets cannot observe the counterfactual, so traders must estimate it. Early-stage DAOs with limited price history make this estimation highly speculative.
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5. **Mechanism mismatch**: The proposal attempted to bridge this gap by arguing that the event would drive token locking (measurable supply reduction) which would cause price appreciation (measurable in TWAP). But this converts the community benefit into a financial mechanism, potentially missing the core value proposition and introducing additional complexity that traders must price.
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This creates a systematic bias in futarchy governance: proposals with clear, immediate, measurable financial impacts ("buy back tokens", "add liquidity") pass more easily than proposals with diffuse, long-term, cultural impacts ("host community events", "fund public goods"). Yet the latter may be more important for long-term DAO health.
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The Dean's List DAO proposal's failure despite explicit community-building goals and MonkeDAO/SuperTeam precedent suggests that futarchy markets may systematically undervalue cultural proposals, at least for early-stage DAOs with limited liquidity and price history.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal vision: "transforms DL DAO into more than a governance platform—it becomes a community"
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- Inspiration: MonkeDAO and SuperTeam community models (both known for strong IRL presence and community-driven growth)
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- Proposed mechanism: Top 5 governance holders get travel/accommodation, top 50 get event access
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- Outcome: Failed despite community-building rationale and concrete deliverables
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- Market settlement: 3-day TWAP (short-term price metric for long-term community benefit)
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- Current FDV: $123,263 (limited price history for counterfactual estimation)
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## Limitations
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This claim is speculative because:
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1. **Unknown failure reasons**: We don't know WHY the proposal failed. It could have been rejected for reasons unrelated to the measurement problem:
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- Community didn't trust the organizers
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- Disagreed with Thailand as location
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- Thought $15K was too expensive
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- Insufficient participation in conditional markets
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2. **Confounded mechanism**: The proposal's economic framing (token locking → price appreciation) may have undermined the community argument by making it seem like a financial scheme rather than a genuine community investment. Traders may have rejected the financial logic rather than the community value.
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3. **Successful precedent**: Other DAOs (MonkeDAO, SuperTeam) have successfully funded similar events, suggesting the problem may be DAO-specific (early-stage, low liquidity) rather than mechanism-specific.
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4. **Single case study**: One failed proposal is insufficient to establish a systematic bias. Confirmation would require multiple failed cultural proposals across different DAOs with similar economics and clear pass conditions.
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The claim that futarchy systematically undervalues cultural proposals requires evidence across multiple DAOs and proposal types before moving beyond speculative confidence.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md]] — this proposal challenges that optimism
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]] — suggests cultural decisions may need different mechanisms than financial decisions
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]] — complexity friction may apply to community benefit pricing
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[foundations/cultural-dynamics/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(confirm) Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates all three friction sources simultaneously: (1) Token price psychology: projected 16x FDV growth from a promotional campaign may have seemed unrealistic to traders, particularly given the DAO's $123,263 FDV and limited price history. (2) Proposal complexity: multi-layered economic argument (token locking → supply reduction → price appreciation → treasury funding via token sales) required traders to price a complex causal chain with multiple steps of uncertainty. (3) Liquidity requirements: Dean's List DAO had $123,263 FDV at proposal time, suggesting insufficient trading capital to make conditional markets function. Proposal failed despite 3% TWAP threshold and $15K budget, confirming that adoption friction is not just theoretical but blocks real proposals with concrete deliverables and favorable economics.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO proposal failed despite $15K cost versus projected $1.8M FDV increase, suggesting futarchy adoption barriers extend beyond market mechanics into liquidity, complexity, and trust constraints"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion, failed 2024-06-25"
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created: 2024-06-25
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processed_date: 2024-06-25
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depends_on: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption friction beyond market mechanics
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion proposal failed despite presenting seemingly favorable economics: $15K in costs against a projected FDV increase from $123,263 to over $2M (16x growth), requiring only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698) to pass. The proposal offered concrete incentives (travel and accommodation for top 5 governance power holders, events for top 50) designed to drive token locking and reduce circulating supply.
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The failure occurred despite:
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- Clear economic logic: token locking mechanics to reduce supply and drive price appreciation
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- Modest pass threshold: 3% TWAP increase over 3 days (only $3,698 absolute FDV increase needed)
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- Concrete deliverables: physical event with measurable participation (MonkeDAO and SuperTeam precedent)
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- Transparent budget: $15K total cost ($10K travel, $5K events)
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This single case suggests futarchy adoption barriers extend beyond the market mechanism itself into:
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1. **Liquidity constraints**: Dean's List DAO had $123,263 FDV at proposal time. Even favorable proposals may fail if insufficient capital exists to price the conditional markets or if traders lack confidence in the token's liquidity.
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2. **Proposal complexity**: The multi-layered economic argument (token locking → supply reduction → price appreciation → treasury funding via token sales) may have been too complex for traders to price confidently in a 3-day window.
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3. **Trust gaps**: Projected 16x FDV growth from a promotional campaign may have seemed unrealistic regardless of the mechanism, particularly if community members doubted the team's ability to execute or questioned whether event attendance would actually drive token demand.
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4. **Cold start problems**: Early-stage DAOs lack the trading volume to make futarchy markets function effectively, even when proposals have clear economic stakes and measurable pass conditions.
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The proposal's failure despite rational economics confirms that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]] and extends the evidence that [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]] applies even to contested decisions with clear economic stakes.
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## Evidence
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- Dean's List DAO current FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- Proposal budget: $15K total ($10K travel, $5K events)
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- Required TWAP increase for passage: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Projected FDV target: $2M+ (16x growth from $123,263 base)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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- Outcome: Failed (2024-06-25)
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- Platform: Futardio/MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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## Limitations
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This is a single case study, and the specific failure reasons are not documented in the source. The proposal may have failed for reasons unrelated to futarchy mechanics:
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- Community disagreement with the event strategy or location (Thailand)
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- Skepticism about the team's ability to execute
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- Insufficient participation in the conditional markets (no traders showed up)
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- Disagreement about whether $15K was appropriate spending
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However, the combination of favorable economics, clear pass conditions, and concrete deliverables combined with failure suggests structural adoption barriers rather than just proposal-specific issues. Confirmation would require additional failed proposals with similarly favorable economics across multiple DAOs.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -47,3 +47,6 @@ Topics:
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## Timeline
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- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event to boost governance engagement, required 3% TWAP increase
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- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed despite favorable economics ($15K cost vs projected $1.8M FDV increase), revealing futarchy adoption barriers
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-market-mechanics.md", "dao-event-incentive-proposals-face-measurement-problem-because-community-cohesion-benefits-are-real-but-unpriceable-in-token-markets.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated Dean's List DAO timeline."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -182,3 +188,13 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO FDV was $123,263 on 2024-06-22
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- ThailandDAO event scheduled for Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024 in Koh Samui
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- Proposal used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day TWAP settlement
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- Top 5 governance holders would receive travel/accommodation ($10K), top 50 would receive event access ($5K)
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- Contributors could opt to receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount for 3 months
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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