From be677992cfa70b83014834bc91a66a367f12e6a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 04:20:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 8 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- agents/vida/musings/research-2026-04-29.md | 2 +- .../2026-04-29-9amhealth-waltz-novo-dte-glp1-access-2026.md | 2 +- .../queue/2026-04-29-cost-plus-drugs-humana-pbm-market-2026.md | 2 +- ...9-employer-glp1-coverage-crisis-enrollment-declining-2026.md | 2 +- ...26-04-29-hcplan-2024-vbc-full-risk-doubled-28pct-downside.md | 2 +- ...04-29-lilly-employer-connect-not-revolutionary-dte-limits.md | 2 +- ...9-mhpaea-fourth-report-2025-enforcement-structural-limits.md | 2 +- ...-29-price-transparency-limited-insured-market-impact-2025.md | 2 +- 8 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/agents/vida/musings/research-2026-04-29.md b/agents/vida/musings/research-2026-04-29.md index 90140c69e..c7e6e0556 100644 --- a/agents/vida/musings/research-2026-04-29.md +++ b/agents/vida/musings/research-2026-04-29.md @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Session 30 found 34% of employers requiring behavioral support as GLP-1 coverage These can coexist: large sophisticated employers (who can manage the cost via behavioral gates) add conditions; regional payers, health systems, and smaller employers DROP coverage entirely. The net population-level access picture is WORSE, not better. **Implication for KB:** -The existing [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch... inflationary through 2035]] claim is directionally correct but incomplete — the "inflationary" pressure is causing a coverage retreat, not just cost growth. The claim should be challenged_by or enriched with the coverage withdrawal trend. +The existing GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch... inflationary through 2035 claim is directionally correct but incomplete — the "inflationary" pressure is causing a coverage retreat, not just cost growth. The claim should be challenged_by or enriched with the coverage withdrawal trend. --- diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-9amhealth-waltz-novo-dte-glp1-access-2026.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-9amhealth-waltz-novo-dte-glp1-access-2026.md index 69003591c..4a017eb16 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-9amhealth-waltz-novo-dte-glp1-access-2026.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-9amhealth-waltz-novo-dte-glp1-access-2026.md @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task **KB connections:** - Relates to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the market is becoming more fragmented and price-competitive than this claim's framing - Connects to the employer coverage crisis archive (3.6M → 2.8M decline) — utilization vs. coverage divergence -- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — DTE doesn't change payment incentives +- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — DTE doesn't change payment incentives **Extraction hints:** - NOT ready for standalone extraction — DTE architecture is too early and unscaled for a knowledge claim diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cost-plus-drugs-humana-pbm-market-2026.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cost-plus-drugs-humana-pbm-market-2026.md index 5e6ad917c..9775538af 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cost-plus-drugs-humana-pbm-market-2026.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cost-plus-drugs-humana-pbm-market-2026.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task **KB connections:** - Supports [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — even alternative models like Cost Plus end up working WITH incumbents - Structural limits of market competition argument against Belief 3 — even the best-funded, highest-profile drug pricing disruptor (backed by Mark Cuban) hasn't displaced the 80% PBM market structure -- Connects to [[healthcare AI regulation needs blank-sheet redesign]] — PBM reform also requires structural intervention, not just market competition +- Connects to healthcare AI regulation needs blank-sheet redesign — PBM reform also requires structural intervention, not just market competition **Extraction hints:** - NOT ready for standalone extraction — insufficient data on Cost Plus market share to make a claim diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-employer-glp1-coverage-crisis-enrollment-declining-2026.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-employer-glp1-coverage-crisis-enrollment-declining-2026.md index 614ca5b71..47040aa1a 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-employer-glp1-coverage-crisis-enrollment-declining-2026.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-employer-glp1-coverage-crisis-enrollment-declining-2026.md @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Published April 28, 2026 (yesterday), citing December 2025 analysis from Leverag **KB connections:** - Challenges: [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the "inflationary" prediction appears to be proving correct, but the system response (coverage withdrawal) is not captured in the claim - Challenges: The payer mandate acceleration story (PHTI December 2025, 34% employers requiring behavioral support) — the behavioral mandate story is for employers who keep coverage; many are dropping -- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — cost pressure from GLP-1s is creating coverage-access gaps that VBC transition hasn't addressed +- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — cost pressure from GLP-1s is creating coverage-access gaps that VBC transition hasn't addressed **Extraction hints:** - CLAIM: "GLP-1 weight-loss drug coverage is declining at the employer and health system level — enrolled lives dropped 22% from 3.6M (2024) to 2.8M (2026) — as cost pressures exceed VBC cost management capacity, creating a widening access gap for populations with highest clinical need" diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hcplan-2024-vbc-full-risk-doubled-28pct-downside.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hcplan-2024-vbc-full-risk-doubled-28pct-downside.md index dcc9938f6..53c032fff 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hcplan-2024-vbc-full-risk-doubled-28pct-downside.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hcplan-2024-vbc-full-risk-doubled-28pct-downside.md @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (HCPLAN) 2024 annual survey me **KB connections:** - Directly measures the transition described in [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]] — the 14% full-risk figure is now updated (14% capitated, 28.5% downside risk) - The ~50% full-risk threshold mentioned in Vida's identity.md as the tipping point is still far, but doubling in 4 years shows credible trajectory -- Connects to [[the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system...]] — this is the mechanism of transition toward that attractor +- Connects to the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system... — this is the mechanism of transition toward that attractor **Extraction hints:** - UPDATE CLAIM: The existing "14 percent bear full risk" figure needs updating — it's now 14% FULLY CAPITATED (up from 7% in 2021), with 28.5% in any downside risk APM. The original claim's framing ("only 14 percent bear full risk") is still roughly accurate numerically but the trend direction matters: it has doubled. diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-lilly-employer-connect-not-revolutionary-dte-limits.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-lilly-employer-connect-not-revolutionary-dte-limits.md index 355278dea..2736946f5 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-lilly-employer-connect-not-revolutionary-dte-limits.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-lilly-employer-connect-not-revolutionary-dte-limits.md @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Eli Lilly launched Employer Connect on March 5, 2026 — a direct-to-employer pl **KB connections:** - Connects to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — DTE reduces list price but doesn't change the chronic use economics -- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — DTE is a distribution innovation, not a payment model change; FFS incentive structure persists +- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — DTE is a distribution innovation, not a payment model change; FFS incentive structure persists **Extraction hints:** - CLAIM: "Manufacturer direct-to-employer GLP-1 channels represent a governance shift rather than structural disruption — the $449 DTE price is not substantially below existing PBM net prices, and Big Three PBMs still control 80% of US prescription claims" diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-mhpaea-fourth-report-2025-enforcement-structural-limits.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-mhpaea-fourth-report-2025-enforcement-structural-limits.md index 4577373e7..266e4c25d 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-mhpaea-fourth-report-2025-enforcement-structural-limits.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-mhpaea-fourth-report-2025-enforcement-structural-limits.md @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The 4th annual MHPAEA (Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act) Report to **Extraction hints:** - CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Mental health parity enforcement closes coverage gaps but cannot close the access gap because payers demonstrate structural differential treatment of mental health vs. medical reimbursement rates — paying more to attract medical providers but not applying the same methodology to mental health provider networks" -- ENRICHMENT: The existing [[mental health supply gap is widening not closing...]] claim can be enriched with this mechanism: it's not just demand > supply — it's that payers are documented as actively NOT fixing the supply incentives +- ENRICHMENT: The existing mental health supply gap is widening not closing... claim can be enriched with this mechanism: it's not just demand > supply — it's that payers are documented as actively NOT fixing the supply incentives - NOTE: The enforcement posture shift under Trump administration (less active federal, escalating state) is a policy fragility point. **Context:** 4th annual report, most recent available. Published March 2026. DOL OIG separate report on enforcement challenges. EBSA covers employer-sponsored plans; CMS covers Medicaid/ACA. diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-price-transparency-limited-insured-market-impact-2025.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-price-transparency-limited-insured-market-impact-2025.md index 57b7d95ad..1aed37c1b 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-price-transparency-limited-insured-market-impact-2025.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-price-transparency-limited-insured-market-impact-2025.md @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Aggregated from multiple 2025 sources on hospital price transparency compliance **KB connections:** - Confirms [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — hospitals are resisting transparency - Supports Belief 3: market mechanisms (price transparency) don't restructure FFS incentives -- Connects to [[optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility...]] — the FFS system optimizes against the mechanisms intended to discipline it +- Connects to optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility... — the FFS system optimizes against the mechanisms intended to discipline it **Extraction hints:** - CLAIM: "Hospital price transparency rules produce measurable cost reductions only for self-pay patients seeking elective procedures — insured patients (the majority) show no behavioral change because insurance insulates them from marginal cost, leaving the FFS payment structure that determines provider incentives unchanged"