diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md
index b25e8caa6..748135b92 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md
@@ -47,3 +47,6 @@ Topics:
 ## Timeline
 
 - **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
+
+- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K budget for ThailandDAO event perks to boost governance engagement, projected 16x FDV increase
+- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: despite 3% TWAP requirement and favorable economics, insufficient trading volume
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
index 3939e1019..0a522fd41 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
+- **2024-06-25** — Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal failed despite 16x projected FDV increase and 3% passage threshold, demonstrating participation friction in low-liquidity futarchy markets
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
index 568cc553d..eaf73d9c6 100644
--- a/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
 date: 2024-06-22
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental due to single-case evidence. The proposal's failure despite seemingly favorable economics (16x projected FDV increase, 3% passage threshold) is itself significant evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated parent entities (Dean's List, Futardio) with timeline entries."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -182,3 +187,14 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
 - Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
 - Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
 - Trading period: 3 days
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Dean's List DAO FDV was $123,263 on 2024-06-22
+- ThailandDAO event scheduled Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand
+- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
+- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
+- Trading period: 3 days
+- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
+- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ