diff --git a/domains/health/GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035.md b/domains/health/GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035.md index ae6a234d6..fb1a15b80 100644 --- a/domains/health/GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035.md +++ b/domains/health/GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035.md @@ -19,19 +19,19 @@ The competitive dynamics (Lilly vs. Novo vs. generics post-2031) will drive pric ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2024-08-01-jmcp-glp1-persistence-adherence-commercial-populations]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* +*Source: 2024-08-01-jmcp-glp1-persistence-adherence-commercial-populations | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* Real-world persistence data from 125,474 commercially insured patients shows the chronic use model fails not because patients choose indefinite use, but because most cannot sustain it: only 32.3% of non-diabetic obesity patients remain on GLP-1s at one year, dropping to approximately 15% at two years. This creates a paradox for payer economics—the "inflationary chronic use" concern assumes sustained adherence, but the actual problem is insufficient persistence. Under capitation, payers pay for 12 months of therapy ($2,940 at $245/month) for patients who discontinue and regain weight, capturing net cost with no downstream savings from avoided complications. The economics only work if adherence is sustained AND the payer captures downstream benefits—with 85% discontinuing by two years, the downstream cardiovascular and metabolic savings that justify the cost never materialize for most patients. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2025-06-01-cell-med-glp1-societal-implications-obesity]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2025-06-01-cell-med-glp1-societal-implications-obesity | Added: 2026-03-15* The Cell Press review characterizes GLP-1s as marking a 'system-level redefinition' of cardiometabolic management with 'ripple effects across healthcare costs, insurance models, food systems, long-term population health.' Obesity costs the US $400B+ annually, providing context for the scale of potential cost impact. The WHO issued conditional recommendations within 2 years of widespread adoption (December 2025), unusually fast for a major therapeutic category. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal | Added: 2026-03-15* MA plans' near-universal prior authorization creates administrative friction that may worsen the already-poor adherence rates for GLP-1s. PA requirements ensure only T2D-diagnosed patients can access, effectively blocking obesity-only coverage despite FDA approval. This access restriction compounds the chronic-use economics challenge by adding administrative barriers on top of existing adherence problems. diff --git a/domains/health/value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md b/domains/health/value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md index eda25c4f9..106bbf166 100644 --- a/domains/health/value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md +++ b/domains/health/value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md @@ -19,19 +19,19 @@ The Making Care Primary model's termination in June 2025 (after just 12 months, ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2014-00-00-aspe-pace-effect-costs-nursing-home-mortality]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* +*Source: 2014-00-00-aspe-pace-effect-costs-nursing-home-mortality | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* PACE represents the extreme end of value-based care alignment—100% capitation with full financial risk for a nursing-home-eligible population. The ASPE/HHS evaluation shows that even under complete payment alignment, PACE does not reduce total costs but redistributes them (lower Medicare acute costs in early months, higher Medicaid chronic costs overall). This suggests that the 'payment boundary' stall may not be primarily a problem of insufficient risk-bearing. Rather, the economic case for value-based care may rest on quality/preference improvements rather than cost reduction. PACE's 'stall' is not at the payment boundary—it's at the cost-savings promise. The implication: value-based care may require a different success metric (outcome quality, institutionalization avoidance, mortality reduction) than the current cost-reduction narrative assumes. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2024-08-01-jmcp-glp1-persistence-adherence-commercial-populations]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* +*Source: 2024-08-01-jmcp-glp1-persistence-adherence-commercial-populations | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* GLP-1 persistence data illustrates why value-based care requires risk alignment: with only 32.3% of non-diabetic obesity patients remaining on GLP-1s at one year (15% at two years), the downstream savings that justify the upfront drug cost never materialize for 85% of patients. Under fee-for-service, the pharmacy benefit pays the cost but doesn't capture the avoided hospitalizations. Under partial risk (upside-only), providers have no incentive to invest in adherence support because they don't bear the cost of discontinuation. Only under full risk (capitation) does the entity paying for the drug also capture the downstream savings—but only if adherence is sustained. This makes GLP-1 economics a test case for whether value-based care can solve the "who pays vs. who benefits" misalignment. ### Additional Evidence (confirm) -*Source: [[2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal]] | Added: 2026-03-15* +*Source: 2025-03-01-medicare-prior-authorization-glp1-near-universal | Added: 2026-03-15* Medicare Advantage plans bearing full capitated risk increased GLP-1 prior authorization from <5% to nearly 100% within two years (2023-2025), demonstrating that even full-risk capitation does not automatically align incentives toward prevention when short-term cost pressures dominate. Both BCBS and UnitedHealthcare implemented universal PA despite theoretical alignment under capitation. diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md index f6d0bdf00..3669307e5 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through - **2024-03-02** — [[metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction]] passed: completed Dutch auction and liquidity provision, moving all protocol-owned liquidity to Meteora 1% fee pool - **2025-01-27** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] proposed: Theia offers $500K for 370.370 META at 14% premium with 12-month vesting - **2025-01-30** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] passed: Theia acquires 370.370 META tokens for $500,000 USDC -- **2023-11-18** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] proposed: first product development proposal requesting 3,000 META to build Votium-style validator bribe platform for MNDE/mSOL holders -- **2023-11-29** — [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] passed: approved LST Vote Market development with projected $10.5M enterprise value addition +- **2023-11-18** — metadao-develop-lst-vote-market proposed: first product development proposal requesting 3,000 META to build Votium-style validator bribe platform for MNDE/mSOL holders +- **2023-11-29** — metadao-develop-lst-vote-market passed: approved LST Vote Market development with projected $10.5M enterprise value addition - **2023-12-03** — Proposed Autocrat v0.1 migration with configurable proposal slots and 3-day default duration - **2023-12-13** — Completed Autocrat v0.1 migration, moving 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to new program despite unverifiable build - **2024-01-24** — Proposed AMM program to replace CLOB markets, addressing liquidity fragmentation and state rent costs (Proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG)