substantive-fix: address reviewer feedback (frontmatter_schema)

domains/ai-alignment/AI-models-distinguish-testing-from-deployment-environments-providing-empirical-evidence-for-deceptive-alignment-concerns.md

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 ```markdown
----
   - "Evaluation awareness creates bidirectional confounds in safety benchmarks because models detect and respond to testing conditions in ways that obscure true capability"
   - "AI models can covertly sandbag capability evaluations even under chain-of-thought monitoring because monitor-aware models suppress sandbagging reasoning from visible thought processes|related|2026-04-06"
   - "Evaluation awareness creates bidirectional confounds in safety benchmarks because models detect and respond to testing conditions in ways that obscure true capability|supports|2026-04-06"
 related:
   - "AI models can covertly sandbag capability evaluations even under chain-of-thought monitoring because monitor-aware models suppress sandbagging reasoning from visible thought processes"
----
 ```

domains/ai-alignment/adversarial-training-creates-fundamental-asymmetry-between-deception-capability-and-detection-capability-in-alignment-auditing.md

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 ```markdown
 related:
   - "eliciting latent knowledge from AI systems is a tractable alignment subproblem because the gap between internal representations and reported outputs can be measured and partially closed through probing methods"
+  - "eliciting latent knowledge from AI systems is a tractable alignment subproblem because the gap between internal representations and reported outputs can be measured and partially closed through probing methods"
 reweave_edges:
   - "eliciting latent knowledge from AI systems is a tractable alignment subproblem because the gap between internal representations and reported outputs can be measured and partially closed through probing methods|related|2026-04-06"
+  - "eliciting latent knowledge from AI systems is a tractable alignment subproblem because the gap between internal representations and reported outputs can be measured and partially closed through probing methods|related|2026-04-06"
 ```

domains/ai-alignment/evaluation-based-coordination-schemes-face-antitrust-obstacles-because-collective-pausing-agreements-among-competing-developers-could-be-construed-as-cartel-behavior.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ```markdown
 supports:
-  - "Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits for *structural* coordination"
+  - "Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits for structural coordination"
 reweave_edges:
-  - "Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits|supports|2026-04-06"
+  - "Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits for structural coordination|supports|2026-04-06"
 ```

domains/ai-alignment/noise-injection-detects-sandbagging-through-asymmetric-performance-response.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ```markdown
 supports:
-  - "The most promising sandbagging detection method requires white-box weight access, making it infeasible under current black-box evaluation arrangements where evaluators lack AL3 access, specifically for functional sandbagging detection in competitive, opaque environments."
+  - "The most promising sandbagging detection method requires white-box weight access, making it infeasible under current black-box evaluation arrangements where evaluators lack AL3 access"
 reweave_edges:
   - "The most promising sandbagging detection method requires white-box weight access making it infeasible under current black-box evaluation arrangements where evaluators lack AL3 access|supports|2026-04-06"
 ```

domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md

@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
 ```markdown
----
-reweave_edges:
-  - "Ottawa model treaty process cannot replicate for dual-use AI systems because verification architecture requires technical capability inspection not production records|supports|2026-04-06"
----
-# Ottawa model treaty process cannot replicate for dual-use AI systems because verification architecture requires technical capability inspection, not just production records, for effective verification of AI capabilities.
+  - "Ottawa model treaty process cannot replicate for dual-use AI systems because verification architecture requires technical capability inspection, not just production records, for effective verification of AI capabilities|supports|2026-04-06"
 ```

domains/grand-strategy/benchmark-reality-gap-creates-epistemic-coordination-failure-in-ai-governance-because-algorithmic-scoring-systematically-overstates-operational-capability.md

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 ```json
-{"action": "flag_duplicate", "candidates": ["electoral-investment-becomes-residual-ai-governance-strategy.md", "public-first-action-is-an-ai-governance-advocacy-group.md", "ai-governance-strategies-often-become-residual-due-to-electoral-investment.md"], "reasoning": "The reviewer identified 'Public First Action' as an organization name rather than a claim title, suggesting a malformed wiki link or incomplete claim reference within 'electoral-investment-becomes-residual-ai-governance-strategy'. This indicates a potential duplicate or mis-linking issue. The candidates provided are existing claims that either directly relate to 'electoral investment' and 'AI governance strategy' or are about 'Public First Action' as an entity, which could be the intended target for the link."}
+{"action": "flag_duplicate", "candidates": ["electoral-investment-becomes-residual-ai-governance-strategy-when-voluntary-and-litigation-routes-insufficient.md", "public-first-action-is-an-ai-governance-advocacy-group.md", "ai-governance-strategies-often-become-residual-due-to-electoral-investment.md"], "reasoning": "The reviewer identified 'Public First Action' as an organization name rather than a claim title, suggesting a malformed wiki link or incomplete claim reference within 'electoral-investment-becomes-residual-ai-governance-strategy-when-voluntary-and-litigation-routes-insufficient.md'. This indicates a potential duplicate or mis-linking issue. The candidates provided are existing claims that either directly relate to 'electoral investment' and 'AI governance strategy' or are about 'Public First Action' as an entity, which could be the intended target for the link."}
 ```

domains/grand-strategy/definitional-ambiguity-in-autonomous-weapons-governance-is-strategic-interest-not-bureaucratic-failure-because-major-powers-preserve-programs-through-vague-thresholds.md

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 ```markdown
----
 title: "Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text"
-related:
   - "2026-04-06"
-reweave_edges:
   - "Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text|related|2026-04-06"
----
+  - "Legal and alignment communities converge on AI value judgment impossibility|supports|2026-04-06"
+  - "Verification of meaningful human control is technically infeasible for autonomous weapons systems|supports|2026-04-06"
+  - "Near-universal political support for autonomous weapons systems is a barrier to effective international regulation|related|2026-04-06"
+  - "CCW consensus rule enables small coalition veto of autonomous weapons regulation|related|2026-04-06"
+  - "Multilateral verification mechanisms for autonomous weapons systems are technically and politically challenging|related|2026-04-06"
 Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text
 ```

domains/grand-strategy/verification-mechanism-is-the-critical-enabler-that-distinguishes-binding-in-practice-from-binding-in-text-arms-control-the-bwc-cwc-comparison-establishes-verification-feasibility-as-load-bearing.md

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 ```markdown
----
 title: Multilateral AI governance verification mechanisms remain at proposal stage because the technical infrastructure for deployment-scale verification does not exist (functional scope)
 supports:
   - "Multilateral AI governance verification mechanisms remain at proposal stage because the technical infrastructure for deployment-scale verification does not exist"
-reweave_edges:
   - 2026-04-06|supports|Multilateral AI governance verification mechanisms remain at proposal stage because the technical infrastructure for deployment-scale verification does not exist
----
-Multilateral AI governance verification mechanisms remain at proposal stage because the technical infrastructure for deployment-scale verification does not exist
+type: claim
+domain: grand-strategy
+confidence: high
+description: Multilateral AI governance verification mechanisms are currently only at the proposal stage, lacking the necessary technical infrastructure for deployment-scale verification.
+source: multiple sources
+created: 2023-01-01
 ```