auto-fix: strip 6 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-04-24-38ag-massachusetts-sjc-bipartisan-amicus-cftc-preemption.md

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ A bipartisan coalition of 38 state attorneys general filed an amicus brief in th
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — if 38-AG theory prevails, the two-tier architecture crystallizes further in MetaDAO's favor
-- [[CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets]] — this filing is the most significant challenge to that preemption since the 3rd Circuit win
+- CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets — this filing is the most significant challenge to that preemption since the 3rd Circuit win
-- [[Living Capital vehicles likely fail the Howey test for securities classification]] — the Dodd-Frank federalism argument does not affect the Howey analysis; these are separate regulatory vectors
+- Living Capital vehicles likely fail the Howey test for securities classification — the Dodd-Frank federalism argument does not affect the Howey analysis; these are separate regulatory vectors
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Primary claim: "38-state bipartisan AG coalition opposing CFTC prediction market preemption signals that the state-federal conflict is a states' rights issue, not a partisan issue — making SCOTUS resolution less predictable even for a court that historically favors federal preemption"

inbox/queue/2026-04-24-cftc-massachusetts-sjc-amicus-federal-preemption.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The CFTC filed an amicus brief in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. KalshiEx LLC
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any extension of the preemption argument to non-registered on-chain platforms. The CFTC's entire legal strategy is DCM-centric. Non-registered protocols (MetaDAO) remain invisible to CFTC's litigation posture.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets]] — this filing confirms the scope limitation in real time
+- CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets — this filing confirms the scope limitation in real time
 - The Rule 40.11 self-defeat risk is documented in existing KB claims; this filing does not resolve it
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -45,6 +45,6 @@ The CFTC filed an amicus brief in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. KalshiEx LLC
 **Context:** Paired with the 38-AG filing. The Massachusetts SJC case has now become the most consequential active state court proceeding — both the federal government and 38 state AGs are filing amicus briefs to influence a state supreme court ruling.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets
 WHY ARCHIVED: The same-day adversarial amicus briefing structure confirms the Massachusetts SJC is now the focal point of the state-federal prediction market conflict. Sets context for when the SJC ruling comes.
 EXTRACTION HINT: No standalone new claim from this source. Use as supporting evidence for the two-tier architecture claim and the Massachusetts SJC case significance.

inbox/queue/2026-04-25-wisconsin-ag-sues-prediction-markets-tribal-gaming.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Wisconsin Attorney General Josh Kaul filed suit on April 25, 2026 against Kalshi
 
 **KB connections:**
 - Pattern 23 (tribal gaming as distinct regulatory threat vector) — this is the first empirical confirmation of that pattern as an actual enforcement action, not just an amicus filing
-- [[CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets]] — Wisconsin's IGRA theory provides a federal law hook for enforcement that doesn't depend on CFTC preemption failing
+- CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets — Wisconsin's IGRA theory provides a federal law hook for enforcement that doesn't depend on CFTC preemption failing
 - The IGRA track is genuinely separate from and potentially more durable than state gambling law arguments
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-04-26-rio-original-analysis-metadao-twap-endogeneity-cftc-event-contract.md

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ CFTC could argue that MetaDAO conditional markets ARE "event contracts" because
 **KB connections:**
 - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — the mechanism being analyzed
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — related structural separation argument (SEC context, not CFTC)
-- [[CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets]] — the two-tier architecture this analysis extends
+- CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets — the two-tier architecture this analysis extends
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Primary claim: "MetaDAO conditional governance markets are structurally distinguishable from enforcement-targeted event contracts because TWAP settlement against an endogenous token price signal — rather than an external observable event — may place them outside the CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C) 'event contract' definition" [confidence: speculative]