auto-fix: strip 13 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents
parent
93eccad5f3
commit
c67aaca5bb
5 changed files with 13 additions and 13 deletions
|
|
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Source: Futardio Superclaw Proposal 3 (March 25, 2026)
|
|||
Domain: internet-finance
|
||||
Confidence: likely (consistent with mechanism design; evidenced by proposal timing relative to implied decline period)
|
||||
Source: Superclaw Proposal 3 timeline + mechanism design analysis
|
||||
Challenge to: [[markets beat votes for information aggregation]] (scope qualifier: applies to discrete proposals, not continuous monitoring)
|
||||
Challenge to: markets beat votes for information aggregation (scope qualifier: applies to discrete proposals, not continuous monitoring)
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Nvision Confirmed REFUNDING: The $99 Prediction Market Protocol
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ Institutional prediction market adoption (Polymarket, Kalshi, 5c(c) Capital) str
|
|||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any statement from 5c(c) Capital or Truth Predict about DAO governance applications or futarchy. Complete silence on governance market use cases.
|
||||
|
||||
**KB connections:**
|
||||
- [[prediction markets show superior accuracy over polls and expert forecasts]] — Polymarket/Kalshi empirical track record underpins this claim; 5c(c) Capital's formation is a secondary legitimacy signal
|
||||
- [[legacy financial intermediation is the rent-extraction incumbent]] (Belief #5) — prediction market VC formation is a capital formation attractor state
|
||||
- prediction markets show superior accuracy over polls and expert forecasts — Polymarket/Kalshi empirical track record underpins this claim; 5c(c) Capital's formation is a secondary legitimacy signal
|
||||
- legacy financial intermediation is the rent-extraction incumbent (Belief #5) — prediction market VC formation is a capital formation attractor state
|
||||
- CFTC ANPRM (this session) — 5c(c) Capital + Truth Predict are the key players who could shape the rulemaking
|
||||
|
||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -69,9 +69,9 @@ This structural difference supports different regulatory treatment — not secur
|
|||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any filing by MetaDAO, Futardio, or any futarchy-adjacent entity. The 36+ days since ANPRM publication have passed with zero futarchy-specific comment activity.
|
||||
|
||||
**KB connections:**
|
||||
- [[DAO Reports rejected voting as active management — prediction markets must prove mechanistically different]] (Belief #6 core tension)
|
||||
- [[Ooki DAO shows entity wrapping is non-negotiable]] — regulatory context for DAO structure
|
||||
- [[CFTC prediction market jurisdiction is expanding and state-federal tension is heading toward Supreme Court]] (from Session 2)
|
||||
- DAO Reports rejected voting as active management — prediction markets must prove mechanistically different (Belief #6 core tension)
|
||||
- Ooki DAO shows entity wrapping is non-negotiable — regulatory context for DAO structure
|
||||
- CFTC prediction market jurisdiction is expanding and state-federal tension is heading toward Supreme Court (from Session 2)
|
||||
- The CLARITY Act gap identified in Session 2: gaming law preemption not included
|
||||
|
||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||
|
|
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ This structural difference supports different regulatory treatment — not secur
|
|||
|
||||
## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
|
||||
|
||||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[DAO Reports rejected voting as active management — prediction markets must prove mechanistically different]] (Belief #6 — this ANPRM is the real-world test of whether that proof gets made)
|
||||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: DAO Reports rejected voting as active management — prediction markets must prove mechanistically different (Belief #6 — this ANPRM is the real-world test of whether that proof gets made)
|
||||
|
||||
WHY ARCHIVED: The CFTC ANPRM is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance markets. The comment deadline creates urgency. Three extractable claims: (1) default classification risk, (2) structural distinction argument, (3) advocacy gap.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive ICO analysis of P2P Protocol (P2P.me) o
|
|||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any evidence that the performance gate design is being copied by other MetaDAO ICO projects. If this is the most aligned design in the ecosystem, I'd expect it to propagate. No evidence it has — suggesting either the design is too new to propagate or the mechanism design community hasn't flagged it.
|
||||
|
||||
**KB connections:**
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO's real-money futarchy ICO platform shows strong participation signals]] — P2P.me as the latest data point
|
||||
- [[ownership alignment turns network effects generative]] (Belief #2) — performance-gated vesting is the purest implementation of this belief; P2P.me tests it
|
||||
- [[Delphi Digital study predicts 30-40 percent passive token holders in new projects]] — intersects with 50% float, creates specific testable headwind
|
||||
- MetaDAO's real-money futarchy ICO platform shows strong participation signals — P2P.me as the latest data point
|
||||
- ownership alignment turns network effects generative (Belief #2) — performance-gated vesting is the purest implementation of this belief; P2P.me tests it
|
||||
- Delphi Digital study predicts 30-40 percent passive token holders in new projects — intersects with 50% float, creates specific testable headwind
|
||||
- Prior ICO comparisons: AVICI (4.7% holder loss during 65% drawdown), Umbra (graduated but not performance-gated)
|
||||
|
||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||
|
|
@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive ICO analysis of P2P Protocol (P2P.me) o
|
|||
|
||||
## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
|
||||
|
||||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[performance-gated team vesting is the most aligned team incentive structure in futarchy-governed ICO history]] (CC1 from Session 11 — not yet in KB)
|
||||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: performance-gated team vesting is the most aligned team incentive structure in futarchy-governed ICO history (CC1 from Session 11 — not yet in KB)
|
||||
|
||||
WHY ARCHIVED: Provides the detailed mechanism design data for the performance-gated vesting claim AND the valuation framework (182x gross profit) for understanding what MetaDAO ICO pricing really represents. These are two distinct extractable claims.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ Session 11 (March 25) documented: traders in the Polymarket comment section alle
|
|||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Evidence that the team's alleged Polymarket participation has been confirmed or denied by Polymarket. The platform hasn't issued a public statement. The market continues operating normally despite the controversy.
|
||||
|
||||
**KB connections:**
|
||||
- [[prediction markets show superior accuracy over polls and expert forecasts]] (Belief #1 evidence — is this market showing superior accuracy or being manipulated?)
|
||||
- [[FairScale's manipulation attempt by team demonstrates futarchy's self-correcting mechanism]] (contrast case — FairScale governance market had an arbitrage correction; Polymarket social proof doesn't)
|
||||
- prediction markets show superior accuracy over polls and expert forecasts (Belief #1 evidence — is this market showing superior accuracy or being manipulated?)
|
||||
- FairScale's manipulation attempt by team demonstrates futarchy's self-correcting mechanism (contrast case — FairScale governance market had an arbitrage correction; Polymarket social proof doesn't)
|
||||
- Session 11 CC2: Prediction market participation by issuers in own ICO commitment markets creates circular social proof with no arbitrage correction
|
||||
|
||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue