From cc06009b28ba0c9a7344e0e4d518f27958e95a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 11:17:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 7 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md | 10 +++++----- .../2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md b/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md index bb759f11e..30fc59f16 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ tracked_by: rio created: 2026-03-11 last_updated: 2026-03-11 founded: 2020-06-01 -founders: ["[[shayne-coplan]]"] +founders: ["shayne-coplan"] category: "Prediction market platform (Polygon/Ethereum L2)" stage: growth funding: "ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) invested up to $2B" @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ key_metrics: monthly_volume_30d: "$8.7B (March 2026)" daily_volume_24h: "$390M (March 2026)" election_accuracy: "94%+ one month before resolution; 98% on winners" -competitors: ["[[kalshi]]", "[[augur]]"] +competitors: ["kalshi", "augur"] built_on: ["Polygon"] tags: ["prediction-markets", "decision-markets", "information-aggregation"] --- @@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ Polymarket proved prediction markets work at scale. The 2024 election vindicatio ## Relationship to KB - [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — core vindication claim - [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — mechanism theory Polymarket demonstrates -- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID) +- decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID) --- Relevant Entities: -- [[kalshi]] — primary competitor (regulated) -- [[metadao]] — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction) +- kalshi — primary competitor (regulated) +- metadao — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction) Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]] diff --git a/inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md b/inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md index 372aaeee7..431187e19 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking.md @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Sidley Austin analysis (February 2026): **Why this matters:** CFTC rulemaking is the most promising near-term resolution to the state-federal prediction market crisis. If the CFTC establishes clear rules encompassing governance prediction markets, futarchy can operate under a single federal framework. **What surprised me:** The speed — imminent rulemaking signal in Feb 2026, while litigation is still ongoing. The CFTC is trying to establish facts on the ground before courts resolve the jurisdiction question. **What I expected but didn't find:** Specific scope of proposed rulemaking — does it cover all event contracts or only specific categories? The distinction matters enormously for futarchy. -**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. [[Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available. +**KB connections:** [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Polymarket's success is what triggered both state pushback and CFTC defense. Optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles — regulatory framework determines which mechanisms are legally available. **Extraction hints:** Claim about CFTC rulemaking as resolution path for futarchy regulation. **Context:** Sidley Austin is a major law firm with strong CFTC practice. Their analysis carries weight.