From cc3bd3399ae9b53f11afcaf855ca393f422f5678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 08:53:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...t platform for ownership coins at scale.md | 6 +++ ...thmic meritocracy in token distribution.md | 6 +++ ...onomies-without-governance-intervention.md | 38 ++++++++++++++++ ...emand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md | 36 ++++++++++++++++ ...overnance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md | 38 ++++++++++++++++ ...coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ entities/internet-finance/futardio.md | 2 + ...osal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md | 20 ++++++++- 8 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md create mode 100644 entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md index af4a788c..fea4514a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md @@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform (challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +COAL's Meta-PoW proposal (passed 2025-11-10) demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond simple fundraising into complex game-theoretic token economies. The proposal introduces a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing mechanisms (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), decay functions (4% daily), and treasury accumulation logic—all governed through futarchy conditional markets. This extends the platform's scope from 'should we fund this?' to 'should we adopt this complex economic architecture?' showing that MetaDAO's conditional markets can handle sophisticated mechanism design decisions, not just binary funding choices. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md index 927f8815..9fc01eba 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr - If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming - Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +Meta-PoW implements a hybrid emission model combining fixed halving bands with dynamic access control. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25M with emissions halving every 5% of supply added (1.25M COAL bands), but access to those emissions is gated by pickaxe ownership and tool power. The daily emission rate R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) is deterministic, but individual miner rewards depend on maintaining tool power through repair. This creates a performance-based distribution layer on top of a fixed emission schedule—miners who maintain their tools capture emissions, while those who let tools decay see their share diminish at 4% per day. The mechanism ties token distribution to measurable player behavior (tool maintenance) without making total supply elastic. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a3004a5f --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "COAL's c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p formula adjusts pickaxe crafting cost based on COAL/ORE price ratio with cubic sensitivity" +confidence: experimental +source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttling in token economies without governance intervention + +Meta-PoW introduces a dynamic license fee for crafting pickaxes that automatically adjusts based on the COAL/ORE price ratio, using the formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. With default parameters of c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, and p = 3, the license fee exhibits cubic sensitivity to price changes. + +This creates automatic supply throttling: when COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license fee drops, making pickaxe crafting cheaper and encouraging more mining activity. When COAL weakens (y increases), the license fee rises sharply due to the cubic exponent, discouraging new pickaxe creation and reducing pressure on COAL emissions. + +The mechanism is clamped between c_min = 1 and c_max = 300 COAL to prevent extreme values. The cubic exponent (p = 3) means the fee is highly responsive to price changes—a 2x increase in the ORE/COAL ratio results in an 8x increase in the license fee, creating strong economic pressure against crafting during COAL weakness. + +Critically, this operates without governance intervention. The price ratio is derived from an EMA-smoothed TWAP oracle, and the formula executes automatically on-chain. This is a form of algorithmic monetary policy embedded in the token mechanics themselves. + +The license fee is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a deflationary mechanism rather than a revenue stream. Its purpose is purely regulatory—to modulate mining tool supply in response to market conditions. + +## Evidence +- Formula specification: "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max" +- Default parameters: "c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300" +- Price sensitivity: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, more picks are economically viable. When COAL is weak (y high): c(y) increases, crafting slows" +- Governance independence: "The system self-throttles without intervention" +- Oracle design: "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP" + +## Challenges +The cubic exponent creates high sensitivity, which could lead to instability if price volatility is extreme. The EMA smoothing is intended to dampen this, but the smoothing window is not specified in the proposal. Additionally, the mechanism assumes rational player response to price signals—if players craft pickaxes for non-economic reasons (speculation, gaming the system), the throttling effect may not work as intended. This is a proposed mechanism not yet deployed. + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md b/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..258920c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement to stabilize mining tool demand" +confidence: experimental +source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair cost undercuts replacement creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow + +COAL's Meta-PoW mechanism introduces "evergreen" pickaxes that decay at 4% per day when not repaired but never permanently break. The daily repair cost is calibrated at 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD—deliberately set below the cost of crafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + dynamic COAL license fee). This creates a structural incentive for players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting. + +The evergreen design solves a core problem in token-based gaming economies: churn-driven volatility. When tools break permanently, demand for crafting materials spikes and crashes unpredictably. By making repair cheaper than replacement, Meta-PoW creates continuous, predictable demand for INGOT—which can only be produced by smelting (burning 100 COAL + paying ~12.10 ORE to the treasury). + +The mechanism ties this to a calibration target: each fully maintained pickaxe is designed to drive approximately 1 ORE per day into the COAL treasury through repair-driven INGOT demand. This creates a direct relationship between active player count (measured in maintained pickaxes) and treasury ORE accumulation. + +The 4% daily decay rate is the key tuning parameter. Too slow and players ignore repairs; too fast and the system feels punitive. At 4%, a pickaxe that goes unrepaired for a week drops to 73% power, creating meaningful pressure to maintain without forcing daily engagement. + +## Evidence +- Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "Each pick has power p between 0 and 1. If repaired for the day, p stays at 1. If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p" +- Repair cost calibration: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" versus crafting cost of "1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL burned as license" +- Design intent: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it" +- Treasury flow target: "A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury" + +## Challenges +This is a proposed mechanism that passed governance but has not yet launched. Real player behavior may deviate from the economic model—players might abandon tools during COAL price crashes, or bot farms might exploit the repair economics in unexpected ways. The 1 ORE/day calibration assumes rational maintenance behavior and stable INGOT demand, both untested assumptions. + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] +- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md b/domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..60da2652 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Meta-PoW channels all ORE payments through INGOT smelting making treasury inflow directly measurable via on-chain INGOT mints" +confidence: experimental +source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# Separating ORE payment to smelting only creates single choke point for treasury inflow measurement and governance in multi-token game economies + +Meta-PoW's architecture makes ORE payment occur at exactly one point in the system: smelting INGOT. To smelt 1 INGOT, a player must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently ~12.10 ORE) directly to the COAL treasury. No ORE is charged at pickaxe crafting, repair, or any other action. + +This design choice creates a single, auditable choke point for treasury inflow. Every INGOT minted on-chain represents a verifiable ORE payment. Since INGOT is required for both crafting and repairing tools, all economic activity that drives the game ultimately flows through this smelting bottleneck. + +The architectural benefit is measurement precision. In complex token economies with multiple burn mechanisms and fee structures, tracking actual value accrual to the treasury becomes difficult. By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, Meta-PoW makes treasury inflow directly observable: count INGOT mints, multiply by μ. + +This also creates a governance lever. The parameter μ (ORE per INGOT) can be adjusted to change the rate of treasury accumulation without touching the game's other mechanics. If the treasury needs more ORE inflow, increase μ. If ORE becomes too expensive and chokes off activity, decrease μ. The rest of the system (repair costs, crafting recipes, decay rates) remains unchanged. + +The proposal calibrates μ so that "a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow," creating a direct relationship between active player count (measured in maintained pickaxes) and treasury ORE accumulation. + +## Evidence +- Smelting specification: "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury" +- Exclusivity: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair" +- Measurement property: "INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee" +- Calibration target: "μ is chosen so a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow. Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT" +- Treasury flow: "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury" + +## Challenges +Concentrating ORE payment at smelting creates a potential bottleneck. If INGOT demand collapses (due to player exodus or economic imbalance), treasury inflow stops entirely. The mechanism has no fallback revenue stream. Additionally, the 1 ORE/day per pickaxe calibration is theoretical—actual player behavior may not match the model's assumptions about repair frequency and tool maintenance. This is a proposed mechanism not yet deployed. + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md b/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c5b1c4df --- /dev/null +++ b/entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +--- +type: entity +entity_type: decision_market +name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol" +domain: internet-finance +status: passed +parent_entity: "[[futardio]]" +platform: "futardio" +proposer: "coal project" +proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg" +proposal_date: 2025-11-07 +resolution_date: 2025-11-10 +category: "mechanism" +summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model for COAL with evergreen tools, dynamic license fees, and ORE treasury accumulation" +tracked_by: rio +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol + +## Summary +Meta-PoW establishes a multi-token game economy for COAL where mining power resides in pickaxes (not miners), crafting requires burning COAL and paying ORE to the treasury, and tools decay at 4% per day but are cheaper to repair than replace. The mechanism creates a loop: COAL emissions → pickaxe demand → INGOT smelting (burns COAL + pays ORE) → treasury accumulation. A dynamic license fee c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p automatically throttles pickaxe crafting based on COAL/ORE price ratio, with cubic sensitivity (p=3) creating strong economic pressure against crafting during COAL weakness. + +## Market Data +- **Outcome:** Passed +- **Proposer:** coal project +- **Created:** 2025-11-07 +- **Resolved:** 2025-11-10 +- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg + +## Significance +This proposal demonstrates futarchy's ability to govern complex mechanism design, not just binary funding decisions. Meta-PoW introduces: +1. **Evergreen tool economics** with 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement +2. **Dynamic license fees** using price ratio exponents (cubic sensitivity) for automatic supply throttling +3. **Single-point ORE payment** at INGOT smelting, creating auditable treasury inflow measurement +4. **Calibrated treasury flow** targeting ~1 ORE/day per maintained pickaxe + +The mechanism is notable for embedding algorithmic monetary policy in token mechanics—the license fee adjusts automatically via on-chain price oracles without governance intervention. The proposal also specifies that "parameters can be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," showing pragmatic flexibility within futarchy governance. + +## Relationship to KB +- [[futardio]] - governance decision on economic model +- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - demonstrates platform scope expansion +- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - hybrid emission model with performance-based access \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md index 3939e101..75a08366 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status +- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Multi-token game economy with evergreen tools, dynamic license fees, and ORE treasury accumulation +- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: COAL adopts Meta-PoW economic model ## Competitive Position - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms." diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md b/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md index f4ca1430..ba608fbb 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md @@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA date: 2025-11-07 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: processed tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-11 +claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md", "separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md"] +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "Meta-PoW is a sophisticated multi-token game economy proposal that passed futarchy governance. Extracted three mechanism design claims around evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and single-point treasury inflow. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched two existing claims about MetaDAO's platform scope and dynamic token distribution. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governing complex economic architecture, not just binary funding decisions." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -265,3 +271,15 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged. - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2025-11-10 - Ended: 2025-11-10 + + +## Key Facts +- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens with halving every 5% of supply (1.25M bands) +- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day +- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL burned + ~12.10 ORE to treasury +- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license fee +- Daily repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per tool +- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired +- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL +- Axe output: w0 WOOD per day (3-5, governance-set) +- Proposal passed: 2025-11-10