rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Dean's List ThailandDAO proposal provides implementation specifics for Autocrat v0.3: the proposal required 3% TWAP increase over exactly 3 days to pass, with settlement occurring on 2024-06-25. The pass condition was explicitly defined as 'a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV)' with 'the trading period for this proposal will be 3 days.' The proposal account (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) and DAO account (9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ) show the on-chain structure. This confirms the 3-day TWAP window is a consistent parameter across Autocrat implementations, not just a theoretical design choice, and shows how pass conditions are specified as percentage-based TWAP thresholds rather than absolute price targets.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 after a 3-day trading period despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute on $123,263 FDV) to pass. The proposal projected 15x token appreciation but failed to attract sufficient trading volume to reach the minimal pass threshold. This confirms the pattern of limited trading volume in futarchy markets, even when proposals have seemingly favorable economics. The failure occurred on Autocrat v0.3, suggesting the volume problem persists across MetaDAO platform versions.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "DAOs can use real-world event perks tied to governance power rankings to incentivize token locking and reduce circulating supply"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal, Futardio 2024-06-22"
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created: 2024-06-22
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---
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# DAO event incentive proposals create token locking demand through governance power leaderboards
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DAOs can use real-world event perks tied to governance power rankings to incentivize token locking, creating a mechanism where members compete for leaderboard positions by removing tokens from circulation.
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## Mechanism Structure
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal structured incentives as:
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- **Top 5 governance power holders**: $10K in travel and accommodation (12 days at ThailandDAO event in Koh Samui, Sept 25 - Oct 25)
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- **Top 50 governance power holders**: IRL event invitations, partner airdrops, ongoing perks
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- **Governance power calculation**: Token deposits plus locking multipliers (longer locks = higher power)
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- **Real-time leaderboard**: Public rankings showing governance power positions
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- **Delegation allowed**: Members could transfer governance power to other leaderboard participants
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- **Prize transferability**: Winners could pass prizes to other leaderboard members if they chose not to claim
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## Token Locking Dynamics
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The mechanism creates competitive dynamics where members lock tokens to climb rankings, reducing circulating supply. The proposal projected this would drive 15x token appreciation (from $0.01 to $0.15) as members locked tokens to compete for the top 5 travel prizes.
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This represents a DAO-native incentive structure distinct from traditional token utility:
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- **Not staking rewards**: No yield, just ranking position
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- **Not governance rights**: Power is the prize, not the mechanism for voting
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- **Not token-gated access**: Requires competitive ranking, not just holding threshold
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## Inspiration and Context
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The approach mirrors MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's community event models but adds futarchy governance to the capital allocation decision. The proposal explicitly cited these models as inspiration for creating a "global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world."
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## Evidence
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- Top 5 prize: $10K travel + 12-day accommodation at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui)
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- Top 50 prize: IRL event access, partner airdrops, ongoing perks
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- Governance power source: Token deposits + locking multipliers
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- Leaderboard: Real-time public rankings on DL DAO platform
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- Projected impact: 15x token appreciation ($0.01 → $0.15) from locking-driven supply reduction
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- Inspiration: MonkeDAO and SuperTeam community event models
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- DAO size: $123,263 FDV (2024-06-22)
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## Outcome and Limitations
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The proposal failed on 2024-06-25, which could indicate:
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1. The incentive structure was insufficient to drive participation
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2. The futarchy market rejected the economic projections as unrealistic
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3. Participation friction prevented supporters from trading
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The 15x appreciation projection appears speculative given the $15K budget and small DAO size. The mechanism's effectiveness remains unproven without implementation data from successful proposals using similar structures.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md]]
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- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md]]
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- [[futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates concrete adoption friction: despite a 3% pass threshold and 15x projected appreciation, the proposal failed to pass. The proposal required understanding conditional token mechanics, evaluating token locking dynamics, leaderboard competition, and trading on pass/fail markets—creating multiple friction points. The failure suggests that even when economic incentives appear strongly positive, the complexity of futarchy participation deters engagement. Dean's List DAO had $123,263 FDV, indicating the liquidity requirement barrier affects even established DAOs, not just new launches. The proposal's failure despite minimal pass threshold (3% TWAP increase) suggests complexity friction exceeded market disagreement as the failure mechanism.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy proposals can fail despite favorable economics when participation friction exceeds market disagreement as the failure mechanism"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, 2024-06-22"
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created: 2024-06-22
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depends_on: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy proposals with favorable economics can fail due to participation friction not market disagreement
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event proposal demonstrates that futarchy markets can fail to pass even when the economic case appears strongly positive, suggesting participation barriers rather than negative market sentiment as the failure mechanism.
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## The Puzzle
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The proposal required only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute on $123,263 FDV) over 3 days to pass, while projecting 15x token appreciation (from $0.01 to $0.15) driven by token locking mechanics. The proposal budget was $15K for travel and events, to be funded by selling tokens after appreciation. The proposal failed on 2024-06-25 after the 3-day trading period completed.
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If markets believed even a fraction of the projected appreciation (requiring only 3% to pass vs 1,500% projected), rational traders should have easily pushed the TWAP above the pass threshold. Three explanations are possible:
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1. **Market disbelief**: Traders rejected the 15x appreciation projection as unrealistic
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2. **Liquidity failure**: Insufficient trading volume meant no price discovery occurred
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3. **Participation friction**: The complexity of conditional token trading deterred participation even from supporters
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## Evidence for Participation Friction
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The failure suggests futarchy's adoption barrier may be participation friction rather than decision quality. When proposals require active trading to pass, default outcomes favor the status quo even when change would be value-positive. The Dean's List case shows:
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- **Pass threshold**: 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) — a minimal bar
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- **Projected upside**: 15x token appreciation — far exceeding the pass requirement
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- **Mechanism complexity**: Members must understand token locking, conditional markets, TWAP settlement, and leaderboard dynamics
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- **Outcome**: Failed despite seemingly favorable risk-reward
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- **Platform**: Futardio/MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3
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## Alternative Explanations
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This is a single case study. Markets may have correctly rejected inflated projections (the 15x appreciation claim was marketing rhetoric without proven mechanism). The proposal may have been poorly designed (mixing governance incentives with event perks). Dean's List DAO may have had insufficient liquidity for any proposal to pass.
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The claim requires additional futarchy proposal data to distinguish between market skepticism and participation friction as failure modes.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[futarchy-implementations-must-simplify-theoretical-mechanisms-for-production-adoption-because-original-designs-include-impractical-elements-that-academics-tolerate-but-users-reject.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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proposal_date: 2024-06-22
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resolution_date: 2024-06-25
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event perks for top governance power holders, requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
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## Summary
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Proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui) offering travel and accommodation for top 5 governance power holders ($10K) and IRL event access for top 50 members ($5K). The proposal aimed to incentivize token locking through a governance power leaderboard, projecting 15x token appreciation. Required only 3% TWAP increase over 3 days to pass but failed despite seemingly favorable economics.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Proposal Account:** DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- **DAO Account:** 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
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- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
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- **Required TWAP:** 3% increase ($3,698 on $123,263 FDV)
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- **Budget:** $15K total ($10K travel, $5K events)
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## Significance
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This proposal is significant as a failure case study for futarchy adoption. Despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase and projecting 15x token appreciation, the market failed to pass the proposal. This suggests either:
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1. Markets rejected the economic projections as unrealistic
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2. Insufficient trading volume prevented price discovery
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3. Participation friction deterred even supporters from trading
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The failure demonstrates that futarchy markets can default to status quo even when change appears economically favorable, highlighting adoption barriers beyond decision quality.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - confirms pattern
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - demonstrates friction
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@ -47,3 +47,5 @@ Topics:
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## Timeline
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- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K event promotion requiring 3% TWAP increase, failed 2024-06-25
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md", "dao-event-incentive-proposals-create-token-locking-demand-through-governance-power-leaderboards.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental due to single-case evidence. The proposal's failure despite favorable economics is itself evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -182,3 +188,14 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024, Koh Samui Thailand
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- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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