extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed economic modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting favorable economics drove approval. The proposal included worked examples with specific price impact calculations (24% upward pressure, 15% downward from sells) demonstrating clear positive expected value.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
 
 The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback model with specific mechanics: 80% of USDC revenue used to purchase $DEAN tokens, distributed to DAO citizens as payment, while 20% DAO tax remains in USDC as hedge. Example shows 2500 USDC dApp review generates 2000 USDC in $DEAN purchases (560k tokens), with 80% citizen sell pressure (448k tokens) still resulting in net positive price action. Model projects 5.33% FDV increase from 6 monthly reviews, exceeding 3% TWAP requirement.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
 date: 2024-07-18
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -146,3 +150,11 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-07-22
 - Ended: 2024-07-22
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time with 100M circulating $DEAN supply at $0.00337 price
+- The Dean's List DAO daily trading volume was $500 at proposal time
+- Proposal modeled 6 dApp reviews per month at 2500 USDC each generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
+- Proposal account: 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
+- Proposal number 3 for DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ