extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model
This commit is contained in:
parent
8139841a10
commit
d31d52ab8d
3 changed files with 25 additions and 1 deletions
|
|
@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
|
Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed economic modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting favorable economics drove approval. The proposal included worked examples with specific price impact calculations (24% upward pressure, 15% downward from sells) demonstrating clear positive expected value.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Relevant Notes:
|
Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
|
The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (extend)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback model with specific mechanics: 80% of USDC revenue used to purchase $DEAN tokens, distributed to DAO citizens as payment, while 20% DAO tax remains in USDC as hedge. Example shows 2500 USDC dApp review generates 2000 USDC in $DEAN purchases (560k tokens), with 80% citizen sell pressure (448k tokens) still resulting in net positive price action. Model projects 5.33% FDV increase from 6 monthly reviews, exceeding 3% TWAP requirement.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Relevant Notes:
|
Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
|
||||||
date: 2024-07-18
|
date: 2024-07-18
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
format: data
|
format: data
|
||||||
status: unprocessed
|
status: enrichment
|
||||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||||
event_type: proposal
|
event_type: proposal
|
||||||
|
processed_by: rio
|
||||||
|
processed_date: 2026-03-16
|
||||||
|
enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
|
||||||
|
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Proposal Details
|
## Proposal Details
|
||||||
|
|
@ -146,3 +150,11 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||||
- Completed: 2024-07-22
|
- Completed: 2024-07-22
|
||||||
- Ended: 2024-07-22
|
- Ended: 2024-07-22
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Key Facts
|
||||||
|
- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time with 100M circulating $DEAN supply at $0.00337 price
|
||||||
|
- The Dean's List DAO daily trading volume was $500 at proposal time
|
||||||
|
- Proposal modeled 6 dApp reviews per month at 2500 USDC each generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number 3 for DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue