rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with standard 3-day trading period and TWAP settlement. Proposal required 3% TWAP increase on Dean's List DAO FDV to pass. Failed 2024-06-25. Concrete implementation data: proposal account DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ, completed 2024-06-25, Autocrat version 0.3.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) against projected 1,523% FDV growth. The proposal used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period but failed to generate sufficient market participation to resolve even this modest threshold. This confirms the limited trading volume pattern in decisions where the economic case appears uncontested — if the 15x token appreciation projection were credible, the 3% hurdle should have been trivial to clear. Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO proposal failure reveals a potential fourth friction source beyond psychology, complexity, and liquidity: credibility of financial projections. The proposal claimed $15K campaign would drive FDV from $123,263 to $2,000,000+ (1,523% increase) through supply reduction as members locked tokens for governance leaderboards. Despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase to pass, the proposal failed, suggesting markets rejected the projection methodology itself. When pass conditions are trivial relative to claimed impact yet still fail to attract trading volume, the bottleneck may be trust in the proposer's financial modeling rather than mechanism design friction. This suggests futarchy adoption friction may operate at the credibility/trust layer rather than purely at the mechanism or psychology layers.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO proposal failed despite 3% TWAP threshold being trivial relative to projected 1500% FDV increase, suggesting psychological or credibility barriers to futarchy adoption beyond mechanism design"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Futardio proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO Event Promotion, failed 2024-06-25"
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created: 2024-06-25
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depends_on: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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---
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# Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption friction beyond mechanism design
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion proposal failed despite requiring only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) against a projected FDV growth from $123,263 to over $2,000,000 (1,523% increase). The proposal's own financial projections claimed the $15K campaign cost would be covered by token appreciation as members locked tokens to climb governance leaderboards, creating supply reduction and demand increase.
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This failure pattern suggests futarchy adoption faces barriers beyond mechanism complexity or liquidity requirements. When a proposal's pass condition is trivial relative to its claimed economic impact, yet still fails to attract sufficient trading volume to resolve, the bottleneck is not rational market pricing but either:
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1. **Credibility discount on financial projections** — Markets rejected the 15x token appreciation methodology itself, not the futarchy mechanism
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2. **Participant skepticism about execution** — Insufficient trust in the team's ability to deliver the claimed outcomes
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3. **Psychological friction** — Participants avoid trading even when odds appear favorable, consistent with [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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The proposal used standard futarchy architecture (3-day trading period, TWAP settlement via Autocrat v0.3) but failed to generate the market participation needed to validate even a modest 3% threshold. This indicates that adoption friction operates even when the economic case appears overwhelming on paper.
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## Evidence
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- Dean's List DAO current FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Projected FDV: $2,000,000+ (1,523% increase from current)
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- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5 governance holders, $5K events for top 50)
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- Outcome: Failed (2024-06-25)
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- Platform: Futardio/MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3
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- Trading period: 3 days
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- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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The proposal's financial model assumed token price appreciation from 15x ($0.01 to $0.15) driven by supply reduction as members locked tokens for governance power multipliers. The campaign cost would be funded by liquidating appreciated tokens, creating a self-funding mechanism if the projections held.
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## Limitations
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This is a single-case observation from a small DAO ($123K FDV). The failure could reflect:
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- Lack of trust in the specific team's execution capability rather than futarchy friction
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- Skepticism about the 15x price appreciation projection methodology being unrealistic marketing
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- Insufficient liquidity to make trading worthwhile even with favorable odds
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- Participant unfamiliarity with futarchy mechanics in this specific DAO
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The proposal's own projections may have been unrealistic rather than credible financial modeling, which would make market skepticism rational rather than evidence of psychological friction.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO proposal explicitly allocated $10K travel rewards to top 5 governance power holders, creating plutocratic incentive structures where physical experiences are distributed by token holdings"
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confidence: speculative
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source: "Futardio proposal DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO Event Promotion, 2024-06-22"
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created: 2024-06-25
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---
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# Governance power leaderboards with IRL rewards create plutocratic incentive structures in DAOs
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal explicitly structured governance participation as a wealth competition where the top 5 governance power holders would receive $10K in travel and accommodation, and the top 50 would receive event invitations and airdrops. Governance power in this system is determined by token holdings with lockup multipliers, making it directly proportional to capital deployed.
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This mechanism design creates a plutocratic tournament where:
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1. Physical experiences (12 days at ThailandDAO villa) are allocated by token holdings
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2. Leaderboards make wealth rankings publicly visible and competitive
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3. The DAO explicitly incentivizes members to "climb the leaderboard ranks" through token accumulation
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4. Contributors can opt to receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount, creating buy pressure and compounding wealth concentration
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The proposal framed this as "MonkeDAO & SuperTeam inspired" community building, positioning plutocratic allocation as a feature rather than a bug. The vision statement described "a global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world" with membership unlocking "valuable experiences" — explicitly tying social capital and physical experiences to financial capital.
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This represents a different failure mode than [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md]]. Rather than majority rule without safeguards, this is explicit minority rule where the wealthiest governance participants receive material rewards funded by the treasury.
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## Evidence
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- Top 5 governance power holders: $10K travel and accommodation (airplane fares + 12 days at DL DAO Villa)
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- Top 50 governance power holders: IRL event invitations, airdrops from partners, continuous perks
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- Governance power calculation: token holdings with lockup multipliers
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- Payment option: DL DAO contributors can receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount
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- Total budget: $15K ($10K for top 5, $5K for top 50)
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- Leaderboard: real-time public rankings on DL DAO platform
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- Proposal explicitly stated: "Deposit your $DEAN tokens or even lock them for a multiplier to increase your governance power and receive awesome perks."
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## Limitations
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This is a single proposal from a small DAO that failed to pass, so it may not represent a broader pattern. The plutocratic structure could be:
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- An outlier design choice rather than a trend in DAO governance
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- Rational incentive alignment if governance power holders are also the most engaged contributors
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- Comparable to corporate equity compensation where ownership correlates with responsibility
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The proposal failed (via futarchy, not explicit governance rejection), which could indicate the DAO community rejected this plutocratic structure. However, the failure mechanism was insufficient TWAP increase rather than explicit community opposition to the incentive model.
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Many DAOs use token-weighted voting without explicit wealth-based rewards, suggesting this leaderboard + IRL perks model is not universal practice.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
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proposal_date: 2024-06-22
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resolution_date: 2024-06-25
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event promotion with $15K budget rewarding top governance power holders with travel and accommodation, requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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key_metrics:
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required_twap_increase: "3%"
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absolute_threshold: "$3,698"
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current_fdv: "$123,263"
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projected_fdv: "$2,000,000+"
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budget: "$15,000"
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top_5_allocation: "$10,000"
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top_50_allocation: "$5,000"
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trading_period: "3 days"
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autocrat_version: "0.3"
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---
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# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
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## Summary
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Proposal to create a promotional campaign for Dean's List DAO by offering exclusive perks at ThailandDAO event (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui). Top 5 governance power holders would receive $10K in travel and accommodation for 12 days at DL DAO Villa. Top 50 would receive IRL event invitations, airdrops, and continuous perks. Contributors could opt to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at 10% discount. Required 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) on Dean's List FDV to pass.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Proposal Account:** DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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- **DAO Account:** 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
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- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
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- **Required TWAP:** 3% increase ($3,698 absolute)
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- **Current FDV:** $123,263
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- **Projected FDV:** $2,000,000+ (1,523% increase)
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## Significance
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This proposal failed despite requiring only a 3% TWAP increase against a projected 1,523% FDV growth, revealing friction in futarchy adoption beyond mechanism design. The proposal's financial model claimed the $15K campaign cost would be self-funding through token appreciation as members locked tokens to climb governance leaderboards, creating supply reduction and demand increase.
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The failure suggests markets either:
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1. Rejected the 15x price appreciation projection as unrealistic
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2. Lacked sufficient liquidity to make trading worthwhile
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3. Distrusted the team's execution capability
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4. Found the plutocratic incentive structure (wealth-based IRL rewards) objectionable
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The proposal explicitly structured governance as a wealth competition where top token holders received material rewards (travel, accommodation, exclusive events), making it a test case for plutocratic DAO incentive design.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] — governance decision
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- [[futardio]] — platform
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism used
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — failure case evidence
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — confirms pattern
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@ -47,3 +47,6 @@ Topics:
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## Timeline
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- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
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- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K ThailandDAO event promotion with governance leaderboard rewards (top 5 get $10K travel, top 50 get IRL perks), requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass
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- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: proposal did not achieve 3% TWAP threshold despite projecting 1,523% FDV increase from $123K to $2M+
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ processed_date: 2024-06-22
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md", "governance-power-leaderboards-with-irl-rewards-create-plutocratic-incentive-structures-in-daos.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics (3% threshold vs 1,523% projected growth), which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -182,3 +188,13 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Trading period: 3 days
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
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- ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand
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- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
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- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Trading period: 3 days
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- Proposal failed: 2024-06-25
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