substantive-fix: address reviewer feedback (frontmatter_schema)
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Teleo Agents
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: Configurable proposal slots with three-day default compress feedback loops in futarchy governance
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confidence: experimental
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source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal, December 2023
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created: 2026-03-15
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---
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# MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
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The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-10-15-futardio-proposal-lets-get-futarded]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Coal's v0.6 parameters set proposal length at 3 days with 1-day TWAP delay, confirming this as the standard configuration for Autocrat v0.6 implementations. The combination of 1-day TWAP delay plus 3-day proposal window creates a 4-day total decision cycle.
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### Auto-enrichment (near-duplicate conversion, similarity=1.00)
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*Source: PR #1922 — "metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration"*
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*Auto-converted by substantive fixer. Review: revert if this evidence doesn't belong here.*
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```json
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{"action": "flag_duplicate", "candidates": ["decisions/internet-finance/metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md", "domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md", "domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-daos-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md"], "reasoning": "The reviewer explicitly states that the new decision record duplicates `decisions/internet-finance/metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md`. The reviewer also suggests that the claim addition is a stretch for the v0.1 claim and would be more defensible for `metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md`. Finally, the reviewer notes that the Squads multisig integration connects directly to `futarchy-governed-daos-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md`."}
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```
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### Auto-enrichment (near-duplicate conversion, similarity=1.00)
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*Source: PR #1939 — "metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration"*
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*Auto-converted by substantive fixer. Review: revert if this evidence doesn't belong here.*
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{"action": "flag_duplicate", "candidates": ["decisions/internet-finance/metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md", "domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md", "domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-daos-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md"], "reasoning": "The new decision file `metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal-march-2026.md` is a substantive duplicate of `decisions/internet-finance/metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md`. The reviewer explicitly states that the new file should be merged into the existing one. The enrichment added to `metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md` is misplaced. The reviewer suggests it would be more appropriate for `metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md` due to the iterative migration pattern and community consensus superseding uncertainty. Additionally, the Squads v4.0 integration identified in the source directly extends `futarchy-governed-daos-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md` by providing a structural fix for the execution velocity problem."}
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```
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---
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-26*
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MetaDAO's March 2026 'Omnibus Proposal — Migrate and Update' reached 84% pass probability with $408K in governance market volume, representing the highest-activity recent governance event. The proposal includes both DAO program migration (likely autocrat v0.5.x → newer version) and legal document updates. The Squads v4.0 multisig integration in recent GitHub commits suggests the migration creates structural separation between futarchy-governed treasury decisions and multisig-controlled operational execution, potentially addressing the execution velocity problem that BDF3M temporarily solved through human delegation.
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Relevant Notes:
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- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
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- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
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Topics:
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- [[_map]]
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{
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"action": "flag_duplicate",
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"candidates": [
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"decisions/internet-finance/metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md",
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"decisions/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md",
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"decisions/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-daos-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md"
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],
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"reasoning": "The current claim is a near-duplicate of 'metadao-governance-migration-2026-03.md' as it describes the same March 2026 omnibus proposal with identical metrics and scope. The reviewer feedback explicitly states this is a duplicate and should be merged. The other two candidates are relevant for rerouting the enrichment and for a potential new claim about Squads multisig, respectively, as suggested by the reviewer."
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}
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```
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