From da933cad73f30e3a86a522bf5bd6340578aa0393 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Teleo Agents <agents@livingip.xyz>
Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 11:05:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] reweave: merge 252 files via frontmatter union [auto]

---
 core/contribution-architecture.md             |  6 +++++-
 ...dback loops that maintain good judgment.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ontributes more than a prolific isolate.md |  6 +++++-
 ... market confidence maps to exploitation.md |  6 +++++-
 ...or shares the proposers training biases.md |  3 +++
 ... value because most insights are siloed.md |  6 +++++-
 ...from evidence to conclusion traversable.md |  4 ++++
 ...al meritocracy in investment governance.md |  6 +++++-
 ...t platform for ownership coins at scale.md |  4 ++++
 ...d average price over a three-day window.md |  4 ++++
 ... attention market for capital formation.md |  4 ++++
 ...t objective function for asset futarchy.md |  7 +++++++
 ...ble through conditional token arbitrage.md |  4 ++++
 ...l complexity and liquidity requirements.md |  6 ++++++
 ...ity protection beyond majority goodwill.md |  4 ++++
 .../areal-futardio-fundraise.md               |  5 +++--
 ...coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md |  4 ++++
 .../deans-list-approve-treasury-management.md |  9 +++++++-
 .../deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md    | 12 +++++++++++
 .../deans-list-fund-website-redesign.md       | 12 +++++++++++
 ...ns-list-reward-waterloo-blockchain-club.md |  8 ++++++-
 .../deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md |  9 ++++++++
 ...ans-list-update-liquidity-fee-structure.md |  8 ++++++-
 .../develop-a-lst-vote-market.md              |  7 +++++++
 .../develop-a-saber-vote-market.md            |  6 ++++++
 .../digifrens-futardio-fundraise.md           |  6 ++++++
 .../drift-ai-agent-grants-program.md          | 10 ++++++++-
 .../drift-fund-the-drift-working-group.md     | 12 ++++++++++-
 ...-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...ift-initialize-foundation-grant-program.md |  8 +++++++
 .../futarchy-arena-futardio-fundraise.md      |  8 ++++++-
 ...approve-budget-pre-governance-hackathon.md |  8 ++++++-
 .../internet-finance/futardio-cult-launch.md  | 11 ++++++++--
 .../futardio-cult-meteora-liquidity-pool.md   |  8 ++++++-
 .../futardio-cult-omnibus-proposal.md         |  6 +++++-
 .../futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program.md       | 11 +++++++++-
 .../islanddao-treasury-proposal.md            |  9 ++++++++
 .../loyal-buyback-up-to-nav.md                |  8 ++++++-
 .../loyal-liquidity-adjustment.md             |  6 +++++-
 .../manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md       |  6 ++++++
 ...int-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md |  4 ++++
 .../metadao-approve-q3-roadmap.md             |  6 +++++-
 .../metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md          |  8 ++++++-
 .../metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md    | 11 +++++++++-
 .../metadao-create-futardio.md                |  6 +++++-
 .../metadao-create-spot-market-meta.md        |  7 +++++++
 ...etadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md |  2 ++
 .../internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md  | 14 ++++++++++++-
 .../metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md        |  9 +++++++-
 .../metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md     | 19 ++++++++++++++++-
 .../metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md      |  9 ++++++++
 ...xecute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md |  4 ++++
 .../metadao-fund-meta-market-making.md        | 12 ++++++++++-
 .../internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md   | 14 ++++++++++++-
 .../metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan.md          |  8 +++++++
 .../metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md              |  6 +++++-
 ...o-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md | 12 ++++++++++-
 .../metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md           | 11 ++++++++++
 .../metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md           |  8 ++++++-
 .../metadao-migrate-meta-token.md             |  8 ++++++-
 .../metadao-omnibus-migrate-and-update.md     | 11 +++++++++-
 .../metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md        | 16 +++++++++++++-
 .../metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital.md      |  6 ++++++
 .../metadao-release-launchpad.md              |  8 ++++++-
 ...tadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium.md |  6 +++++-
 .../metadao-swap-150k-into-isc.md             |  4 ++++
 .../migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md        | 15 +++++++++++++
 .../mycorealms-futardio-fundraise.md          |  6 +++++-
 .../omnipair-fund-security-audits.md          |  6 +++++-
 .../omnipair-increase-allowance-50k.md        |  6 +++++-
 .../omnipair-migrate-to-v06.md                |  6 +++++-
 ...omnipair-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md |  8 ++++++-
 .../internet-finance/ore-launch-hnt-boost.md  |  6 +++++-
 .../internet-finance/ranger-liquidation.md    |  6 +++++-
 .../runbookai-futardio-fundraise.md           |  8 +++++++
 .../seekervault-futardio-fundraise-2.md       |  5 +++--
 .../superclaw-futardio-fundraise.md           |  4 ++++
 .../umbra-fund-security-audits.md             |  6 +++++-
 .../versus-futardio-fundraise.md              |  7 +++++--
 .../internet-finance/zklsol-200k-buyback.md   |  6 +++++-
 .../zklsol-burn-team-performance-package.md   |  6 +++++-
 ... rather than a single monolithic system.md |  4 +++-
 ...s the only thing preventing convergence.md |  4 ++++
 ... researcher to agent workflow architect.md |  4 +++-
 ...nce creates a window for transformation.md |  2 ++
 ...alignment prerequisite for AI alignment.md | 12 +++++++----
 ...he critical input to autonomous systems.md |  2 ++
 ...proportionality-requires-human-judgment.md | 19 +++++++++--------
 ...zes uncertainty at domain intersections.md |  5 ++++-
 ...ng capability development unconstrained.md |  4 +++-
 ...fix the systems civilization depends on.md |  6 +++++-
 ...same-family reasoning pattern alignment.md | 10 ++++++---
 ...ty leaving only coordination as defense.md |  4 +++-
 ... constraints rather than enforcing them.md |  4 +++-
 ...converge-on-explainability-requirements.md | 21 ++++++++++---------
 ...behavior when commercially inconvenient.md |  6 ++++++
 ... itself is the problem not the solution.md | 12 +++++++----
 ... plants using undemonstrated technology.md |  7 +++++--
 ... plants using undemonstrated technology.md |  7 +++++--
 ...ind to compete with firm baseload power.md | 12 +++++++----
 ...lants that take another decade to build.md |  4 ++++
 ...not as baseload replacement for fission.md |  9 ++++++--
 ...-proportional-to-audience-vulnerability.md |  5 +++--
 ...atch-with-financial-services-compliance.md |  5 +++--
 ...re-creates-consumer-protection-priority.md |  5 +++--
 ...inverts-china-us-participation-patterns.md |  6 +++++-
 ...eaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md |  2 ++
 ...phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation.md |  6 +++++-
 ...e-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md |  7 +++++++
 ...tion-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md | 10 ++++++++-
 ...not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...ception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute.md |  2 ++
 ...ucture financial markets and healthcare.md | 10 ++++++---
 ...reaty-ratification-and-compliance-delay.md |  6 +++++-
 ... into capital as its objective function.md |  3 +++
 ...nditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...n-and-domestic-implementation-weakening.md |  6 +++++-
 ...sovereignty-conflicts-prevent-consensus.md |  6 +++++-
 ...dination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai.md |  2 ++
 ...ion-at-statutory-scope-definition-level.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...ubstituted-for-proliferation-incentives.md | 11 +++++++++-
 ...ives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...probable-survival-not-stable-governance.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...tion-gap-was-maintained-at-9-vs-30-plus.md |  6 +++++-
 ...erests-override-catastrophic-death-toll.md |  6 +++++-
 ...pable of regulating its own degradation.md |  9 +++++---
 ...bles-or-undermines-mandatory-governance.md |  6 +++++-
 ...-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md |  7 +++++++
 ...the environment they assumed was stable.md | 12 ++++++++---
 ...uires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md |  2 ++
 ...reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ive-stakes-and-verifiability-are-absent.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ent-cross-specialty-pattern-in-medicine.md |  7 ++++---
 ...es-deskilling-misskilling-neverskilling.md |  9 ++++----
 ...renchment-beyond-simple-habit-formation.md |  7 ++++---
 ...t platform for ownership coins at scale.md |  6 ++++++
 ...nder pro-rata not governance validation.md |  6 +++++-
 ...trading volume in uncontested decisions.md |  6 ++++++
 ...by-decoupling-prediction-from-execution.md |  6 +++++-
 ...uidity-conversion-in-meme-token-markets.md |  6 +++++-
 ...quidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md |  4 +++-
 ...abling-permissionless-on-chain-matching.md |  4 +++-
 ...ion-creating-default-gambling-framework.md |  6 +++++-
 ...afting-to-active-jurisdictional-defense.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...t objective function for asset futarchy.md |  6 ++++++
 ...nsparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...tions-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md | 10 +++++++++
 ...strengthening-dcm-regulatory-legitimacy.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ivals-causes-systematic-staffing-errors.md |  4 ++++
 ...-pagerank-to-computational-contribution.md | 12 +++++++----
 ...ble through conditional token arbitrage.md |  4 ++++
 ...l complexity and liquidity requirements.md |  8 +++++++
 ...m market forces not centralized control.md |  6 +++++-
 ...nance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md |  4 ++++
 ...ardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md |  9 ++++++--
 ...ricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md |  5 ++++-
 ...turn when teams materially misrepresent.md | 14 ++++++++-----
 ...cution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md | 11 +++++++++-
 ...-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md | 10 ++++++---
 ...quire-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md | 10 ++++++++-
 ...-participation-through-endowment-effect.md | 11 +++++++++-
 ...sing-and-conditional-success-thresholds.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...-autonomous-smart-contract-coordination.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...ermitting-private-non-financial-issuers.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...pendency-for-nonbank-stablecoin-issuers.md | 11 +++++++++-
 ...sion-maker-trading-and-random-rejection.md |  9 +++++++-
 ...profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md |  4 ++++
 ...k-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ing-the-platform-take-counterparty-risk.md |  4 ++++
 ...cent-of-optimal-for-homogeneous-workers.md |  4 ++++
 ...through-conditional-market-manipulation.md |  6 +++++-
 ... faster you approach framework collapse.md |  2 ++
 ...gh-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md |  2 ++
 ...high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md |  6 +++++-
 ...euristics-for-cloud-resource-allocation.md |  6 +++++-
 ...eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md |  4 ++++
 ...teration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md | 10 ++++++++-
 ...staffing-captures-most-efficiency-gains.md | 18 ++++++++++++++--
 ...rgin-grows-sublinearly-with-system-size.md |  7 +++++++
 ...with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md |  4 ++++
 ...ount of decision optimization can match.md | 16 +++++++-------
 ...ownside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md |  6 +++++-
 ...-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy.md |  8 ++++++-
 ...d-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md |  4 ++++
 ...itimacy-gap-despite-regulatory-approval.md |  6 +++++-
 ...hrough-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ritable-identity-to-speculative-trading.md |  6 +++++-
 ...day-duration-and-clmm-pool-architecture.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ernance-market-proponents-remain-silent.md |  2 ++
 ...t-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md | 12 +++++++----
 ...-attack-surface-for-multisig-governance.md |  6 +++++-
 ... selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md |  2 ++
 ...full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md | 10 ++++++++-
 ...re-beta-is-quality-of-service-parameter.md |  4 ++++
 ...rectionally-correct-but-early-in-timing.md |  6 +++++-
 ...oes not require securities registration.md |  6 +++++-
 ...-cftc-preemption-of-state-gambling-laws.md |  2 ++
 ...namic-staffing-not-constant-max-workers.md |  9 ++++++++
 ...al meritocracy in investment governance.md |  2 ++
 ...ity protection beyond majority goodwill.md |  4 ++++
 ...g-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ng-resolution-time-from-days-to-seconds.md |  6 ++++++
 ...dback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md | 10 +++++++--
 ...prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy.md |  4 ++++
 ...liable-as-programmatic-safety-mechanism.md |  6 +++++-
 ...tokens-upfront-and-time-locked-exposure.md |  7 +++++++
 ...eliminating-detection-and-response-time.md |  6 +++++-
 ...tile feedback must solve simultaneously.md | 10 +++++++--
 ...use manufacturing and logistics sectors.md | 10 ++++++---
 ...current fixed-automation cannot address.md | 12 ++++++++---
 ... 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030.md |  7 +++++--
 ...evenue-model-independence-not-magnitude.md |  5 +++--
 ...d-organic-markets-requiring-full-parity.md | 16 +++++++-------
 ... advantages nimble commercial providers.md |  2 ++
 entities/ai-alignment/xai.md                  |  4 +++-
 entities/internet-finance/avici.md            |  6 +++++-
 entities/internet-finance/coal.md             |  6 +++++-
 entities/internet-finance/futarchy-arena.md   |  4 ++++
 entities/internet-finance/futardio-cult.md    |  6 +++++-
 entities/internet-finance/futardio.md         | 11 +++++++++-
 entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md        |  6 ++++++
 entities/internet-finance/genius-act.md       |  8 +++++++
 entities/internet-finance/git3.md             |  4 ++++
 entities/internet-finance/hurupay.md          |  4 ++++
 entities/internet-finance/hyperspace.md       |  6 +++++-
 entities/internet-finance/loyal.md            |  9 +++++++-
 .../metadao-gmu-futarchy-research.md          |  4 ++++
 entities/internet-finance/mycorealms.md       |  6 ++++++
 entities/internet-finance/solomon.md          |  6 +++++-
 entities/internet-finance/x402-foundation.md  |  4 ++++
 .../nasa-authorization-act-2026.md            |  6 +++++-
 ...ance lifecycle and quality requirements.md | 10 ++++++---
 ...ti-perspective dialogue not calculation.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ation and take socially optimal actions.md |  6 +++++-
 ... all of which are expensive and fragile.md |  4 ++++
 ...rences into a single coherent objective.md |  7 +++++--
 ...t through nested statistical boundaries.md |  2 ++
 ...d cannot accumulate structure over time.md |  4 ++++
 ... depends on what everyone else is doing.md |  6 +++++-
 ...rbation to escape suboptimal equilibria.md |  4 ++++
 ...naturally select for the critical slope.md |  4 ++++
 ...ant colonies to brains to civilizations.md |  4 ++++
 ... exploration or recombination to escape.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ocal failures into cascading breakdowns.md |  5 +++++
 ...restructuring toward greater efficiency.md |  4 ++++
 ...t simple viral spread through weak ties.md |  3 +++
 ...ability threats and identity attachment.md |  4 ++++
 ... more reliably than free-floating ideas.md |  6 +++++-
 ...ng on the incumbents definition of good.md |  4 ++++
 ...nnovation over disruptive opportunities.md |  4 ++++
 ...onditions that invalidate the framework.md |  6 +++++-
 ...y discourages pursuit of viable futures.md |  4 ++++
 252 files changed, 1505 insertions(+), 247 deletions(-)

diff --git a/core/contribution-architecture.md b/core/contribution-architecture.md
index ad714659d..de5ad47e5 100644
--- a/core/contribution-architecture.md
+++ b/core/contribution-architecture.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Architecture paper defining the five contribution roles, their wei
 confidence: likely
 source: "Leo, original architecture with Cory-approved weight calibration"
 created: 2026-03-26
+related:
+- contributor guide
+reweave_edges:
+- contributor guide|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Contribution Scoring & Attribution Architecture
@@ -213,4 +217,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[collective-agent-core]] — shared agent DNA that the principal mechanism builds on
 
 Topics:
-- [[overview]]
+- [[overview]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/grand-strategy/common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment.md b/core/grand-strategy/common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment.md
index db73c9daa..446824505 100644
--- a/core/grand-strategy/common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment.md	
+++ b/core/grand-strategy/common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-03-05
 confidence: likely
 source: "John Lewis Gaddis 'On Grand Strategy' 2018"
 tradition: "Grand strategy, organizational theory"
+related:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape
+reweave_edges:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment
@@ -32,4 +36,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[attractor dynamics]]
-- [[competitive advantage and moats]]
+- [[competitive advantage and moats]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/living-agents/agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate.md b/core/living-agents/agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate.md
index 4fc08d07b..b511c730c 100644
--- a/core/living-agents/agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate.md	
+++ b/core/living-agents/agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "An agent's health should be measured by cross-domain engagement (r
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Vida agent directory design (March 2026), Woolley et al 2010 (c-factor correlates with interaction not individual ability)"
 created: 2026-03-08
+supports:
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
+reweave_edges:
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate
@@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[livingip overview]]
-- [[LivingIP architecture]]
+- [[LivingIP architecture]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/living-agents/agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation.md b/core/living-agents/agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation.md
index 3727084ef..700ad2306 100644
--- a/core/living-agents/agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation.md	
+++ b/core/living-agents/agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-agents
 created: 2026-03-03
 confidence: speculative
 source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
+related:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution
+reweave_edges:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation
@@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
 - [[collective agents]]
-- [[LivingIP architecture]]
+- [[LivingIP architecture]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/living-agents/all agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposers training biases.md b/core/living-agents/all agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposers training biases.md
index b9393ea0d..5bc43eb99 100644
--- a/core/living-agents/all agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposers training biases.md	
+++ b/core/living-agents/all agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposers training biases.md	
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ related:
 reweave_edges:
 - agent mediated knowledge bases are structurally novel because they combine atomic claims adversarial multi agent evaluation and persistent knowledge graphs which Wikipedia Community Notes and prediction markets each partially implement but none combine|related|2026-04-04
 - evaluation and optimization have opposite model diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross family diversity while optimization benefits from same family reasoning pattern alignment|related|2026-04-06
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate|supports|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate
 ---
 
 # All agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposer's training biases
diff --git a/core/living-agents/cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed.md b/core/living-agents/cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed.md
index df96855ab..cb7d92442 100644
--- a/core/living-agents/cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed.md	
+++ b/core/living-agents/cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-agents
 created: 2026-02-16
 confidence: likely
 source: "LivingIP Evolution of Collective Knowledge"
+related:
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
+reweave_edges:
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed
@@ -27,4 +31,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[livingip overview]]
-- [[LivingIP architecture]]
+- [[LivingIP architecture]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/living-agents/wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable.md b/core/living-agents/wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable.md
index bb134c32d..d3d85a92f 100644
--- a/core/living-agents/wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable.md	
+++ b/core/living-agents/wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable.md	
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ created: 2026-03-07
 related:
 - graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect
 - undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
+- contributor guide
 reweave_edges:
 - graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect|related|2026-04-03
 - undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated|related|2026-04-07
+- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|related|2026-04-18
+- contributor guide|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable
diff --git a/core/living-capital/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md b/core/living-capital/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md
index a505466c9..be18950de 100644
--- a/core/living-capital/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
+++ b/core/living-capital/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-capital
 created: 2026-02-16
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Living Capital"
+related:
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants
+reweave_edges:
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance
@@ -26,4 +30,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
 
 Topics:
-- [[livingip overview]]
+- [[livingip overview]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/core/mechanisms/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
index 914bd4166..f610425ba 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
 created: 2026-03-04
 confidence: likely
 source: "MetaDAO Terms of Service, Founder/Operator Legal Pack, inbox research files, web research"
+related:
+- Futarchy Labs
+reweave_edges:
+- Futarchy Labs|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/core/mechanisms/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
index 81a26411e..fbba47d69 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
 created: 2026-03-04
 confidence: likely
 source: "MetaDAO Founder/Operator Legal Pack, Solomon Labs governance docs, MetaDAO Terms of Service, inbox research files"
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md b/core/mechanisms/agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md
index 14768e228..54aec5d22 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
 created: 2026-03-03
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
+related:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution
+reweave_edges:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md b/core/mechanisms/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md
index dce664677..b6a3f94c2 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+supports:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously
+related:
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias
+reweave_edges:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously|supports|2026-04-18
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Vitalik Buterin once noted that "pure futarchy has proven difficult to introduce, because in practice objective functions are very difficult to define (it's not just coin price that people want!)." For asset futarchy governing valuable holdings, this objection misses the point. Coin price is not merely acceptable—it is the fairest and most elegant objective function, and probably the only acceptable one for DAOs holding valuable assets.
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md b/core/mechanisms/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md
index 34c7e3947..93238f416 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+related:
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
+reweave_edges:
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Decision markets create a mechanism where attempting to steal from minority holders becomes a losing trade. The four conditional tokens (fABC, pABC, pUSD, fUSD) establish a constraint: for a treasury-raiding proposal to pass, pABC/pUSD must trade higher than fABC/fUSD. But from any rational perspective, 1 fABC is worth 1 ABC (DAO continues normally) while 1 pABC is worth 0 (DAO becomes empty after raid).
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/core/mechanisms/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index 71d17fe75..7b1b6e3d8 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Rio Futarchy Experiment"
 confidence: experimental
 tradition: "futarchy, behavioral economics, market microstructure"
+related:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives
+reweave_edges:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?|related|2026-04-18
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Futarchy faces three concrete adoption barriers that compound to limit participation: token price psychology, proposal creation difficulty, and liquidity requirements. These aren't theoretical concerns but observed friction in MetaDAO's implementation.
diff --git a/core/mechanisms/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md b/core/mechanisms/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md
index d63e252df..6d7cba1f3 100644
--- a/core/mechanisms/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md	
+++ b/core/mechanisms/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+related:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation
+reweave_edges:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 The fundamental defect of token voting DAOs is that governance tokens are only useful if you command voting majority, and unlike equity shares they entitle minority holders to nothing. There is no internal mechanism preventing majorities from raiding treasuries and distributing assets only among themselves. Wholesale looting is not uncommon—Serum had multiple incidents, the CKS Mango raid remains unresolved, and the Uniswap DeFi Education Fund granted $20M based on a short forum post with no argument for token value accretion.
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/areal-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/areal-futardio-fundraise.md
index 53f492745..4fe363f8b 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/areal-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/areal-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -18,11 +18,12 @@ source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-areal-finance.md"
 related:
 - areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens
 - areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments
-- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
 reweave_edges:
 - areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens|related|2026-04-04
 - areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments|related|2026-04-04
-- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Areal: Futardio ICO Launch
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md b/decisions/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
index a2ded4aa3..4514bca00 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model moving mining power into pickaxes a
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md"
+related:
+- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded\"}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded|related|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-approve-treasury-management.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-approve-treasury-management.md
index 7bbdcd6b5..b11a4d4cf 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-approve-treasury-management.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-approve-treasury-management.md
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ summary: "Convert DAO treasury from volatile SOL/SPL assets to stablecoins to re
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management.md"
+supports:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # Dean's List: Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy
@@ -53,4 +60,4 @@ Current FDV: $500,000 (Conservative to accommodate proposal duration)
 - High Confidence Boost (20%): Updated FDV = $600,000
 
 #### 3. TWAP Calculation
-DL DAO FDV: $500,000 → DL DAO FDV + 3%: $515,000
+DL DAO FDV: $500,000 → DL DAO FDV + 3%: $515,000
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md
index ce8999951..f76dfde3f 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md
@@ -15,6 +15,18 @@ summary: "Transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by s
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md"
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|related|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-fund-website-redesign.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-fund-website-redesign.md
index 6937508e4..c5afe91ff 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-fund-website-redesign.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-fund-website-redesign.md
@@ -24,6 +24,18 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md"
+related:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model\"}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model|related|2026-04-18\"}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|related|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # Dean's List: Fund Website Redesign
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-reward-waterloo-blockchain-club.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-reward-waterloo-blockchain-club.md
index b3020518b..86d3f35e9 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-reward-waterloo-blockchain-club.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-reward-waterloo-blockchain-club.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Wat
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil.md"
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
@@ -73,4 +79,4 @@ For this proposal to pass, the partnership should result in a 5% increase in the
 - Benefit per Dollar: $4.45
 
 ### Conclusion
-Strategic investment in the future growth and sustainability of The Dean's List DAO through partnership with the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club.
+Strategic investment in the future growth and sustainability of The Dean's List DAO through partnership with the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md
index 6560cb10b..2630348cd 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md
@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md"
+supports:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-update-liquidity-fee-structure.md b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-update-liquidity-fee-structure.md
index 71d4a5e94..e204c3e54 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-update-liquidity-fee-structure.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/deans-list-update-liquidity-fee-structure.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Increase swap liquidity fee from 0.25% to 5% DLMM base fee, switch quo
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md"
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Dean's List: Update Liquidity Fee Structure
@@ -70,4 +76,4 @@ Current 0.25% fee insufficient to generate meaningful treasury revenue, support
 
 ### TWAP Calculation
 Current MCAP (-5% adjustment): $298,889
-Pass threshold: $307,855 (MCAP + 3%)
+Pass threshold: $307,855 (MCAP + 3%)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-lst-vote-market.md b/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-lst-vote-market.md
index b5c385fd4..2a8e44ff0 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-lst-vote-market.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-lst-vote-market.md
@@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ tags:
 - solana
 - governance
 - metadao
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-saber-vote-market.md b/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-saber-vote-market.md
index bbe234966..191f898fb 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-saber-vote-market.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/develop-a-saber-vote-market.md
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ tags:
 - solana
 - governance
 - metadao
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/digifrens-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/digifrens-futardio-fundraise.md
index 360378278..8fe7d17ce 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/digifrens-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/digifrens-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ key_metrics:
   completion_rate: "3.3%"
   duration: "1 day"
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-digifrens.md"
+related:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+- MILO AI Agent
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- MILO AI Agent|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # DigiFrens: Futardio Fundraise
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-ai-agent-grants-program.md b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-ai-agent-grants-program.md
index 4e12a2fd9..5eebfe816 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-ai-agent-grants-program.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-ai-agent-grants-program.md
@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Drift DAO approved 50,000 DRIFT allocation for AI Agents Grants progra
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-19-futardio-proposal-allocate-50000-drift-to-fund-the-drift-ai-agent-request-for.md"
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Drift: Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant
@@ -145,4 +153,4 @@ All grant decisions are at the discretion of the decision council and any such d
 From this proposal passing success would be the creation of the committee, publishing of the RFG, evaluating applicants and the awarding of up to 50k DRIFT tokens to eligible grantees.
 
 ### Cost Summary
-This comes at a cost of 50k DRIFT tokens to the foundation.
+This comes at a cost of 50k DRIFT tokens to the foundation.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-the-drift-working-group.md b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-the-drift-working-group.md
index 211537aab..253d4c0ed 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-the-drift-working-group.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-fund-the-drift-working-group.md
@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ summary: "Proposal to establish community-run Drift Working Group with 50,000 DR
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-13-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-working-group.md"
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Drift: Fund The Drift Working Group?
@@ -105,4 +115,4 @@ The DWG will be led by Socrates, bringing 3+ years of crypto marketing expertise
 
 * **Weekly Reporting**: The working group lead will provide regular updates to the Drift team.
 * **Performance Tracking**: Metrics will include individual KOL deliverables, community sentiment analysis, and internal feedback collection.
-* **Fund Management**: Funds will be managed through a 2/3 multisig wallet, comprising the working group lead and two members of the Drift team.
+* **Fund Management**: Funds will be managed through a 2/3 multisig wallet, comprising the working group lead and two members of the Drift team.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md
index e2d15f338..343992b56 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md
@@ -15,6 +15,27 @@ summary: "50,000 DRIFT incentive program to reward early MetaDAO participants an
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md"
+supports:
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override|supports|2026-04-18
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming|related|2026-04-18
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-initialize-foundation-grant-program.md b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-initialize-foundation-grant-program.md
index 10112497b..9ee674aac 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/drift-initialize-foundation-grant-program.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/drift-initialize-foundation-grant-program.md
@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Drift DAO approved 100,000 DRIFT to launch a two-month pilot grants pr
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-09-futardio-proposal-initialize-the-drift-foundation-grant-program.md"
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Drift: Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futarchy-arena-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futarchy-arena-futardio-fundraise.md
index 7130b1e73..1015b160b 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futarchy-arena-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futarchy-arena-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Futarchy Arena raised $934 of $50,000 target (1.9% fill rate) for the
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-futarchy-arena.md"
+related:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futarchy Arena: Futardio ICO Launch
@@ -156,4 +162,4 @@ Futarchy Arena makes that measurable.
 - Token: DXS (DXS)
 - Token mint: `DXSunZYhvgwe78jVk2MKtjpEVzj7hcuAkfi79jxtmeta`
 - Version: v0.7
-- Closed: 2026-03-05
+- Closed: 2026-03-05
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-approve-budget-pre-governance-hackathon.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-approve-budget-pre-governance-hackathon.md
index a5455ede8..c633e11dc 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-approve-budget-pre-governance-hackathon.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-approve-budget-pre-governance-hackathon.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Approved $25,000 budget for developing Pre-Governance Mandates tool an
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md"
+related:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program'}"
+- FutureDAO
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- FutureDAO|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futardio: Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development
@@ -65,4 +71,4 @@ Approve $25,000 budget for developing Future's Pre-Governance Mandates tool and
 
 **Key Features:** Multi-criteria decision engine, customizable surveys, Web3 integration (wallet connect, Blinks), AI-powered analysis, mandates dashboard.
 
-**Monetization (deferred):** $FUTURE staking for unlimited access, one-time payments (70% to stakers, 30% to treasury), subscription model, consultancy.
+**Monetization (deferred):** $FUTURE staking for unlimited access, one-time payments (70% to stakers, 30% to treasury), subscription model, consultancy.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-launch.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-launch.md
index 234316984..756b7e45d 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-launch.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-launch.md
@@ -16,9 +16,16 @@ tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult.md"
 related:
-- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}"
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futardio Cult: Futardio Launch
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-meteora-liquidity-pool.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-meteora-liquidity-pool.md
index 1e9b6a384..c28b18d66 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-meteora-liquidity-pool.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-meteora-liquidity-pool.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate $10K from treasury to create FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM pool:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-17-futardio-proposal-allocate-10000-to-create-a-futardiousdc-meteora-dlmm-liquidi.md"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futardio Cult: Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool
@@ -122,4 +128,4 @@ Performance can be evaluated through:
 - Proposal number: 2
 - DAO account: `CkEUCAooQi64UFhPFS5MWpZw6LQqjsDQBj3Z5uiXS1eN`
 - Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-omnibus-proposal.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-omnibus-proposal.md
index 6fb1ec51e..0c1985080 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-omnibus-proposal.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-cult-omnibus-proposal.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Reduce team spending to $50/mo (X Premium only), burn 4.5M of 5M perfo
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-proposal-futardio-001-omnibus-proposal.md"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futardio Cult: FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal
@@ -44,4 +48,4 @@ Three actions:
 
 2. Burn 4.5 million performance package tokens, with remaining 500,000 locked for 18 months. "Traders have grown accustomed to creators who extract value from projects while delivering little or nothing back to investors. We aim to break that pattern."
 
-3. Allocate $550 from treasury for DEXScreener token upgrade (Enhanced Token Info) and Jupiter verification — accurate pictures (logo and banner) and properly linked social channels.
+3. Allocate $550 from treasury for DEXScreener token upgrade (Enhanced Token Info) and Jupiter verification — accurate pictures (logo and banner) and properly linked social channels.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program.md b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program.md
index cc0a86987..e13502a4f 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program.md
@@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ summary: "Proposal to fund RugBounty.xyz platform development with $5,000 USDC t
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-14-futardio-proposal-fund-the-rug-bounty-program.md"
+supports:
+- FutureDAO
+related:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- FutureDAO|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # FutureDAO: Fund the Rug Bounty Program
@@ -79,4 +88,4 @@ Fund FutureDAO's Rug Bounty Program (RugBounty.xyz) — a novel product to prote
 
 **Financial Projections:** If 8 project migrations in first year: 3 projects <$1M at 2% fee ($60K), 4 projects <$5M at 1.5% fee ($120K), 1 project <$20M at 1% fee ($50K) = $270K total.
 
-**Positioning:** FutureDAO as "S.E.R.T." (Solana Emergency Response Team).
+**Positioning:** FutureDAO as "S.E.R.T." (Solana Emergency Response Team).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/islanddao-treasury-proposal.md b/decisions/internet-finance/islanddao-treasury-proposal.md
index f54fd6920..2013a2657 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/islanddao-treasury-proposal.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/islanddao-treasury-proposal.md
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ key_metrics:
   twap_requirement: "3% increase (523k to 539k USDC MCAP)"
   target_dean_price: "0.005383 USDC (from 0.005227)"
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-10-futardio-proposal-treasury-proposal-deans-list-proposal.md"
+supports:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model\"}"
+related:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
+- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # IslandDAO: Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-buyback-up-to-nav.md b/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-buyback-up-to-nav.md
index 64a3a15b1..d7f8544d8 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-buyback-up-to-nav.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-buyback-up-to-nav.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate $1.5M USDC for LOYAL buyback at max $0.238/token to protect t
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-26-futardio-proposal-buyback-loyal-up-to-nav.md"
+related:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Loyal: Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV
@@ -91,4 +97,4 @@ No new buyback or redemption proposals shall be submitted or executed for 90 day
 - Proposal number: 1
 - DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
 - Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-liquidity-adjustment.md b/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-liquidity-adjustment.md
index 4b79dc955..49a4fbdfa 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-liquidity-adjustment.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/loyal-liquidity-adjustment.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Withdraw 90% of tokens from single-sided Meteora DAMM v2 pool and burn
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-12-23-futardio-proposal-liquidity-adjustment-proposal.md"
+related:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Loyal: Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens
@@ -68,4 +72,4 @@ Withdrawing the full liquidity and closing the position would cause visibility i
 - Proposal number: 2
 - DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
 - Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md
index a03354158..a36c4d50c 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ key_metrics:
   duration: "1 day"
   oversubscription_ratio: 0.0017
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-manna-finance.md"
+related:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Manna Finance: Futardio Fundraise
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md
index fb0397ca3..a480318ee 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators.md
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-approve-q3-roadmap.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-approve-q3-roadmap.md
index d59aa84db..692e4c826 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-approve-q3-roadmap.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-approve-q3-roadmap.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "MetaDAO Q3 roadmap focusing on market-based grants product launch, SF
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap?
@@ -59,4 +63,4 @@ Subject to the DAO's approval, this is what we'll be working on for the remainde
 - Interview 40 candidates for the engineering roles
 - Hire a Twitter intern
 ### Improve the performance of the user interface
-- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
+- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md
index c3ef54011..cad259d0b 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: treasury
 summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
 tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-03-futardio-proposal-burn-993-of-meta-in-treasury.md"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
@@ -92,4 +98,4 @@ We propose **burning approximately ~99.3%** of the META tokens -`99,000 tokens`
 - **Total META supply:** `20,885`
 
 #### Note
-Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a **mintable token model**, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
+Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a **mintable token model**, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md
index 357a9f902..de7117842 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md
@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ category: hiring
 summary: "Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028"
 tags: ["futarchy", "compensation", "founder-incentives", "mechanism-design"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-approve-performance-based-compensation-package-for-proph3t-a.md"
+supports:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
@@ -167,4 +176,4 @@ Calculation:
 So Proph3t needs a success payout of at least \$562M for it to be rational for him to stay and exert maximum effort.
 
 ### 10%
-We believe MetaDAO can reach at least a \$5B market cap if executed correctly. Therefore, we decided on a 10% token allocation each, which would provide a ~\$500M payout in case of success. Future issuances may dilute this, but we expect the diluted payout to be within the same order of magnitude.
+We believe MetaDAO can reach at least a \$5B market cap if executed correctly. Therefore, we decided on a 10% token allocation each, which would provide a ~\$500M payout in case of success. Future issuances may dilute this, but we expect the diluted payout to be within the same order of magnitude.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md
index e357a3b98..81a659754 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ category: strategy
 summary: "Minimal proposal to create Futardio — failed, likely due to lack of specification and justification"
 tags: ["futarchy", "futardio", "governance-filtering"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-create-futardio.md"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?
@@ -54,4 +58,4 @@ Topics:
 
 *Source: futard.io, tabled 2024-11-21*
 
-Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
+Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-spot-market-meta.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-spot-market-meta.md
index 3fc9b2797..76f456dd4 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-spot-market-meta.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-spot-market-meta.md
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ summary: "Proposal to create a spot market for $META tokens through a public tok
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-01-12-futardio-proposal-create-spot-market-for-meta.md"
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Create Spot Market for META?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
index 68c3a3878..ea0119a8d 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-
 supports:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs
+- joebuild
 reweave_edges:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements|supports|2026-04-04
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs|supports|2026-04-04
+- joebuild|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md
index 0659b2af1..46e5a10c5 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md
@@ -17,6 +17,18 @@ category: strategy
 summary: "Fund $96K to build futarchy-as-a-service platform enabling other Solana DAOs to adopt futarchic governance"
 tags: ["futarchy", "faas", "product-development", "solana-daos"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-13-futardio-proposal-develop-futarchy-as-a-service-faas.md"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
@@ -230,4 +242,4 @@ Of course, you can use your own numbers if you'd like to come up with your own e
 
 [^6]: This breaks down to an average estimate of ~$90/hour and 1060 (wo)man hours total.
 
-[^7]: $$(56,000/818.284) * 5 \approx 342$$
+[^7]: $$(56,000/818.284) * 5 \approx 342$$
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md
index a3c4277a0..9e3bcafdc 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ tags: [metadao, lst, marinade, bribe-market, first-proposal]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market.md"
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?
@@ -140,4 +147,4 @@ The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so w
 ## Relationship to KB
 - [[metadao]] — parent entity, first-ever proposal
 - [[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]] — pivot after Marinade built internally
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — first deployment of the mechanism
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — first deployment of the mechanism
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md
index 694755e1e..ecf0413bb 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md
@@ -21,6 +21,23 @@ tags: [metadao, futardio, memecoin, launchpad, failed]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-14-futardio-proposal-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
+related:
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch'}"
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?
@@ -101,4 +118,4 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
 - [[metadao-create-futardio]] — second attempt (Nov 2024, also failed)
 - [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — the proposal that actually launched Futardio (Feb 2025, passed)
 - [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — predicted in the "potential pitfalls"
-- [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]] — the theoretical basis articulated here
+- [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]] — the theoretical basis articulated here
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md
index faf2aa91c..d73fbd63b 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md
@@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ summary: "Proposal to build a Saber vote market platform funded by $150k consort
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md"
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md
index 8c104fd4b..4638aa26a 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md"
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fund-meta-market-making.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fund-meta-market-making.md
index 3939ac43d..2fbe22459 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fund-meta-market-making.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fund-meta-market-making.md
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ key_metrics:
 tags: [metadao, market-making, liquidity, cex-listing, passed]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Fund META Market Making
@@ -108,4 +118,4 @@ The USDC and META tokens will be transferred to a multisig `3fKDKt85rxfwT3A1BHjc
 - [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity infrastructure
 - [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — 17 trades is the empirical extreme
 - [[metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction]] — earlier liquidity solution (manual Dutch auction vs professional market makers)
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — market making addresses the liquidity friction
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — market making addresses the liquidity friction
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md
index 90aaa9407..f82568cb3 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md
@@ -17,6 +17,18 @@ category: fundraise
 summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
 tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-26-futardio-proposal-approve-metadao-fundraise-2.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
@@ -71,4 +83,4 @@ To fund this, I'm proposing that the DAO raise \$1.5M by selling META to a combi
 
 Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.
 
-The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than \$1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: \$375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a \$7.81M valuation.  Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.
+The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than \$1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: \$375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a \$7.81M valuation.  Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan.md
index ec676a64d..aa41e8f77 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan.md
@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Hire Advaith Sekharan as founding engineer with $180K salary and 237 M
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-hire-advaith-sekharan-as-founding-engineer.md"
+related:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost|related|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md
index f0f86c856..8b04f663e 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ category: hiring
 summary: "Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy) as advisor — 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years for mechanism design and strategy"
 tags: ["futarchy", "robin-hanson", "advisory", "mechanism-design"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-hire-robin-hanson-as-an-advisor.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor
@@ -83,4 +87,4 @@ We propose to pay Robin 0.1% of the supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years.
 
 **Early termination**
 
-Either Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan in unanimous agreement would be able to cancel this agreement, at which point any unvested tokens (minus the amount for the current month) would be forfeited.
+Either Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan in unanimous agreement would be able to cancel this agreement, at which point any unvested tokens (minus the amount for the current month) would be forfeited.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md
index 1bf7f5875..3e347c3c0 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md
@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-26-futardio-proposal-increase-meta-liquidity-via-a-dutch-auction.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction
@@ -137,4 +147,4 @@ META for compensation: 5.45
 **Total: 3,005.45**
 
 ### Result
-This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
+This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md
index 335b1918f..162a087fc 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md
@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ category: "mechanism"
 summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md
index 9fa9f7637..b78ffabe4 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: mechanism
 summary: "Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%)"
 tags: ["futarchy", "autocrat", "mechanism-upgrade", "solana"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-28-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v02.md"
+related:
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|related|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
@@ -121,4 +127,4 @@ Each program has been deployed to devnet and mainnet, their IDLs have been deplo
 - Also add permissionless settling of funds ([Pull Request #21](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/21))
 
 #### Migrator
-- Migrate all four token accounts to the new DAO account ([Pull Request #68](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/68))
+- Migrate all four token accounts to the new DAO account ([Pull Request #68](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/68))
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md
index 88fe5fc1f..dd2413ffa 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: mechanism
 summary: "1:1000 token split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5 (Squads), LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5%"
 tags: ["futarchy", "token-migration", "elastic-supply", "squads", "meta-token"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-08-07-futardio-proposal-migrate-meta-token.md"
+supports:
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Migrate META Token
@@ -128,4 +134,4 @@ Work on the migration is already underway and should take up to 1 week. Migratio
 * [METAC Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr)
 * [META Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta)
 * [MetaDAO on CoinMarketCap](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/meta-dao/)
-* [MetaDAO on CoinGecko](https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/meta-2)
+* [MetaDAO on CoinGecko](https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/meta-2)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-omnibus-migrate-and-update.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-omnibus-migrate-and-update.md
index 26df77f96..33b96dd6d 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-omnibus-migrate-and-update.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-omnibus-migrate-and-update.md
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ key_metrics:
 tags: [metadao, migration, omnibus, futarchy-amm, legal, v0.6.1, passed]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
+supports:
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03
+related:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update
@@ -156,4 +165,4 @@ We had a previous supply used to create proposals and an additional amount left
 - [[metadao]] — parent entity, major infrastructure migration
 - [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — continuing burn pattern (60K this time)
 - [[metadao-services-agreement-organization-technology]] — MSA updated in this proposal
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism upgraded to v0.6.1 with FutarchyAMM
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism upgraded to v0.6.1 with FutarchyAMM
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md
index af4285425..e8473ea5b 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md
@@ -24,6 +24,20 @@ tags: [metadao, otc, ben-hawkins, liquidity, failed]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]
@@ -147,4 +161,4 @@ Post-money valuations at different prices:
 - [[metadao]] — parent entity
 - [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — first Hawkins OTC attempt ($50K, also failed)
 - [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — both Hawkins failures are empirical evidence
-- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
+- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital.md
index 87f49caeb..7db52eccb 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Pantera Capital proposed acquiring $50,000 USDC worth of META tokens t
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md
index e4b760613..27c276495 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: strategy
 summary: "Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool"
 tags: ["futarchy", "launchpad", "unruggable-ico", "capital-formation", "futardio"]
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad.md"
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad
@@ -107,4 +113,4 @@ At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right t
 
 **Founder discretion**
 
-We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
+We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium.md
index bad3f9cf3..a19329437 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-sell-2m-meta-at-market-or-premium.md
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tags: [metadao, fundraise, otc, market-sale, passed]
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
+related:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?
@@ -102,4 +106,4 @@ I would have ultimate discretion over any lockup and/or vesting terms.
 ## Relationship to KB
 - [[metadao]] — parent entity, capital raise
 - [[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]] — the failed deal this replaces
-- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — Theia was likely one of the OTC counterparties (they had accumulated position)
+- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — Theia was likely one of the OTC counterparties (they had accumulated position)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-swap-150k-into-isc.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-swap-150k-into-isc.md
index 0216ddb89..08eb75aee 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-swap-150k-into-isc.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-swap-150k-into-isc.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Proposal to convert $150,000 USDC (6.8% of treasury) into ISC stableco
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-30-futardio-proposal-swap-150000-into-isc.md"
+related:
+- ISC (Inflation-Resistant Stablecoin)
+reweave_edges:
+- ISC (Inflation-Resistant Stablecoin)|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC?
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md b/decisions/internet-finance/migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md
index 509856416..fdbc08562 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md
@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ tags:
 - governance
 - metadao
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md"
+supports:
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
+related:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
+- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration|supports|2026-04-18
+- metadao governance migration 2026 03|related|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/mycorealms-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/mycorealms-futardio-fundraise.md
index 667e845fa..65422dea6 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/mycorealms-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/mycorealms-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "MycoRealms attempted two ICO launches raising $158K then $82K against
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-mycorealms.md"
+related:
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment
+reweave_edges:
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MycoRealms: Futardio ICO Launch
@@ -229,4 +233,4 @@ The second launch used the same proposal text with the following changes to rais
 - 20% of funds raised ($25K) paired with LP tokens
 
 > If the raise does not reach $125K within 72 hours — **full refunds.**
-> If the target is reached — treasury, spending limits, and liquidity deploy automatically.
+> If the target is reached — treasury, spending limits, and liquidity deploy automatically.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-fund-security-audits.md b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-fund-security-audits.md
index 39be0bdee..48dc2b2b4 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-fund-security-audits.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-fund-security-audits.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Allocate 64,000 USDC for two-part security audit: Offside Labs (manual
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-31-futardio-proposal-omfg-002-fund-omnipair-security-audits.md"
+related:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Omnipair: OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits
@@ -45,4 +49,4 @@ After reviewing 9 audit quotations, selected Offside Labs and Ackee Blockchain S
 
 **Ackee Blockchain Security:** Leading security firm focused on advanced fuzz testing (creators of Solana's Trident fuzzer). Guided fuzzing and integration tests.
 
-Timeline: 2 weeks for first report, followed by remediation and final report (3-5 weeks total). Disbursement: 2 tranches. Progress updates every 14 days. All audits invoiced to Omnipair DAO LLC.
+Timeline: 2 weeks for first report, followed by remediation and final report (3-5 weeks total). Disbursement: 2 tranches. Progress updates every 14 days. All audits invoiced to Omnipair DAO LLC.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-increase-allowance-50k.md b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-increase-allowance-50k.md
index 2f257c5b7..07c5033fc 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-increase-allowance-50k.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-increase-allowance-50k.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Increase Omnipair monthly spending limit from $10K to $50K to hire dev
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-03-futardio-proposal-omfg-001-increase-allowance-to-50kmo.md"
+related:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Omnipair: OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo
@@ -46,4 +50,4 @@ Expanded budget will enable: hiring two additional developers, adding a dedicate
 
 The spending limit will be capped at $50,000 per month. Any unclaimed funds from a given month will not carry over or accumulate. The limit can be reduced or removed at any time by community proposal.
 
-Near-term timeline: keep gathering feedback from closed beta, ship leveraging functionality, enhance features, undergo external audit and review.
+Near-term timeline: keep gathering feedback from closed beta, ship leveraging functionality, enhance features, undergo external audit and review.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-migrate-to-v06.md b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-migrate-to-v06.md
index ef3a90907..4778d6f61 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-migrate-to-v06.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-migrate-to-v06.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Migrate Omnipair liquidity from Raydium CPMM to MetaDAO v0.6 futarchyA
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-02-16-futardio-proposal-omfg-003-migrate-to-v06.md"
+related:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Omnipair: OMFG-003 — Migrate to V0.6
@@ -42,4 +46,4 @@ Migrates Omnipair's liquidity and DAO to MetaDAO v0.6 program. 100% of Raydium C
 
 Configuration changes: team-sponsored proposals with -300 bps pass threshold, community proposals with 300 bps threshold, 1.5M OMFG base stake requirement. Accepts optimistic governance enabling one-off expenses up to 3x spending limit with 3-day contestation period. If contested, enters traditional proposal process.
 
-Custom migration contract unwinding Raydium liquidity and initializing futarchyAMM + Meteora pool. New DAO address: s45fTDhkzKPMFbNmUXA3bJNdF92z5cbVvHdY8LpznWQ.
+Custom migration contract unwinding Raydium liquidity and initializing futarchyAMM + Meteora pool. New DAO address: s45fTDhkzKPMFbNmUXA3bJNdF92z5cbVvHdY8LpznWQ.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md
index 4b3c6ef33..1460e1101 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/omnipair-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Deploy 20,000 USDC to fund top 3 ideas built on Omnipair via Spark hac
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-12-futardio-proposal-omfg-004-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md"
+related:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Omnipair: OMFG-004 — Strategic Ecosystem Investment
@@ -42,4 +48,4 @@ Omnipair will act as liquidity venue for tokens launched on Spark, a hackathon-f
 
 Budget: Concept 1 ($10K), Concept 2 ($5K), Concept 3 ($5K). Each concept fully backed at launch. If no builder is deemed worthy, investors refunded automatically.
 
-Factors: growth (new markets, liquidity, revenue), builder pipeline (developers who learn codebase), downside protection (automatic refund on failure). Upon passage, USDC transfers to core team multi-sig; Omnipair receives tokens representing ownership in each funded concept.
+Factors: growth (new markets, liquidity, revenue), builder pipeline (developers who learn codebase), downside protection (automatic refund on failure). Upon passage, USDC transfers to core team multi-sig; Omnipair receives tokens representing ownership in each funded concept.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/ore-launch-hnt-boost.md b/decisions/internet-finance/ore-launch-hnt-boost.md
index 5e419afb2..cfd192dab 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/ore-launch-hnt-boost.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/ore-launch-hnt-boost.md
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ summary: "Proposal to launch liquidity boost for HNT-ORE pair and formalize thre
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore.md"
+supports:
+- Helium
+reweave_edges:
+- Helium|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # ORE: Launch a boost for HNT-ORE?
@@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ With the passing of this proposal, we would introduce a new boost with the same
 - Tier 1: Vanilla ORE stake
 - Tier 2: Critical liquidity pairs (SOL-ORE, USDC-ORE)
 - Tier 3: Extended liquidity pairs (ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE, and others)
-Future proposals to change boost multipliers would apply to a tier as a whole.
+Future proposals to change boost multipliers would apply to a tier as a whole.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/ranger-liquidation.md b/decisions/internet-finance/ranger-liquidation.md
index 2d5887387..d949b8009 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/ranger-liquidation.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/ranger-liquidation.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Tokenholders voted to liquidate Ranger Finance citing material misrepr
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-02-futardio-proposal-liquidate-ranger-finance.md"
+related:
+- FairScale
+reweave_edges:
+- FairScale|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Ranger: Liquidate Ranger Finance
@@ -59,4 +63,4 @@ Key evidence: In a presentation, Ranger co-founder FA2 stated "Current stats: we
 
 Activity across perps and spot declined to near-zero following the ICO announcement, indicating "users" were points farmers not organic users.
 
-Proposed plan: remove LP, snapshot vested balances, calculate book value, open redemption. Treasury USDC: ~$3.5M. Expected book value: $0.75-$0.82. Return all IP to Glint House PTE. LTD.
+Proposed plan: remove LP, snapshot vested balances, calculate book value, open redemption. Treasury USDC: ~$3.5M. Expected book value: $0.75-$0.82. Return all IP to Glint House PTE. LTD.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/runbookai-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/runbookai-futardio-fundraise.md
index 58bfd9109..b72fc9084 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/runbookai-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/runbookai-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ key_metrics:
   commitment_ratio: "0.01"
   duration: "1 day"
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-runbookai.md"
+related:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+- MILO AI Agent
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- MILO AI Agent|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # RunBookAI: Futardio Fundraise
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/seekervault-futardio-fundraise-2.md b/decisions/internet-finance/seekervault-futardio-fundraise-2.md
index 27e62fb2e..5c5084558 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/seekervault-futardio-fundraise-2.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/seekervault-futardio-fundraise-2.md
@@ -16,9 +16,10 @@ tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-08-futardio-launch-seeker-vault.md"
 related:
-- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # SeekerVault: Futardio ICO Launch (2nd Attempt)
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/superclaw-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/superclaw-futardio-fundraise.md
index deca8a50f..77030595d 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/superclaw-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/superclaw-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-superclaw.md"
+related:
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Superclaw: Futardio Fundraise
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/umbra-fund-security-audits.md b/decisions/internet-finance/umbra-fund-security-audits.md
index d238b1e82..651e60ab2 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/umbra-fund-security-audits.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/umbra-fund-security-audits.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Fund Umbra security audits before mainnet launch"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-12-futardio-proposal-umbra-001-fund-umbra-security-audits.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Umbra: UMBRA-001 — Fund Security Audits
@@ -97,4 +101,4 @@ You can read more about the payment terms and scope of work here: [(Halborn Reta
 - Proposal number: 1
 - DAO account: `BLkBSE96kQys7SrMioKxeMiVbeo4Ckk2Y4n1JphKxYnv`
 - Proposer: `BF8hxzzR4KuVxfsyAUFyy26E6y2GhsSZgBoUQrygwof1`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/versus-futardio-fundraise.md b/decisions/internet-finance/versus-futardio-fundraise.md
index 73903be73..b7da373a1 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/versus-futardio-fundraise.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/versus-futardio-fundraise.md
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@ tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-versus.md"
 related:
-- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # VERSUS: Futardio Fundraise
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-200k-buyback.md b/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-200k-buyback.md
index f907be298..2a06c76e1 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-200k-buyback.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-200k-buyback.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Allocate $200K USDC for ZKLSOL token buyback to defend NAV"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-01-16-futardio-proposal-zkfg-200k-buyback.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # ZKLSOL: $200K Buyback
@@ -95,4 +99,4 @@ No new buyback or redemption proposals shall be submitted or executed for 90 day
 - Proposal number: 2
 - DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
 - Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-burn-team-performance-package.md b/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-burn-team-performance-package.md
index 269aa1ad4..e4bf15bbe 100644
--- a/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-burn-team-performance-package.md
+++ b/decisions/internet-finance/zklsol-burn-team-performance-package.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Burn team performance package tokens to demonstrate alignment with com
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-24
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-22-futardio-proposal-burn-team-performance-package.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # ZKLSOL: Burn Team Performance Package
@@ -53,4 +57,4 @@ We believe in MetaDAO process from begining to end, hence we raise this proposal
 - Proposal number: 1
 - DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
 - Proposer: `GZFj6uESDHUQJCZXErvSWPeg6UB6FZFBmw675RRfSB7X`
-- Autocrat version: 0.6
+- Autocrat version: 0.6
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system.md b/domains/ai-alignment/AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system.md
index 080c07626..8132308e2 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system.md	
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ source: "Tomasev et al, Distributional AGI Safety (arXiv 2512.16856, December 20
 confidence: experimental
 related:
 - multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments
+- Hyperspace
 reweave_edges:
 - multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments|related|2026-03-28
+- Hyperspace|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system
@@ -35,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- distributed architectures enable continuous value integration at multiple points
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence.md b/domains/ai-alignment/AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence.md
index 09a6586a5..e62b9023f 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence.md	
@@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ related:
 - the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction
 - motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate
 - technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
 reweave_edges:
 - multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
 - the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction|related|2026-04-07
 - motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate|related|2026-04-17
 - technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies|related|2026-04-17
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms|related|2026-04-18
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect.md b/domains/ai-alignment/AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect.md
index fcb26d891..78170249b 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect.md	
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ related:
 - as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
 - iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation
 - tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original
+- Hyperspace
 reweave_edges:
 - as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems|related|2026-03-28
 - iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation|related|2026-03-28
 - tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original|related|2026-03-28
+- Hyperspace|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect
@@ -36,4 +38,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[coordination protocol design produces larger capability gains than model scaling because the same AI model performed 6x better with structured exploration than with human coaching on the same problem]] — organizational design > individual capability
 
 Topics:
-- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
+- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation.md b/domains/ai-alignment/AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation.md
index 8e50c5b2e..317d3c163 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation.md	
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ source: "Web research compilation, February 2026"
 confidence: likely
 related:
 - AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
+- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it
 reweave_edges:
 - AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|related|2026-04-04
 - The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|supports|2026-04-17
+- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it|related|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
 ---
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/a misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment.md b/domains/ai-alignment/a misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment.md
index 3ba5867ff..4e01849e6 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/a misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/a misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment.md	
@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "Schmachtenberger & Boeree 'Win-Win or Lose-Lose' podcast (2024), Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #71"
 created: 2026-04-03
 challenged_by:
-  - "AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem"
+- AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem
 related:
-  - "global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function"
-  - "Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development"
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function
+- Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development
+supports:
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms
+reweave_edges:
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # A misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment
@@ -45,4 +49,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — compatible framing that identifies coordination as the gap, though this claim goes further by arguing the coordination context itself is misaligned
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/as AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems.md b/domains/ai-alignment/as AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems.md
index 83542bb76..597cc2b86 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/as AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/as AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems.md	
@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ reweave_edges:
 - AI agents excel at implementing well scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect|related|2026-03-28
 - formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed|supports|2026-03-28
 - AI-assisted analytics collapses dashboard development from weeks to hours eliminating the specialist moat in data visualization|related|2026-04-17
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds|supports|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds
 ---
 
 # As AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/autonomous-weapons-violate-existing-IHL-because-proportionality-requires-human-judgment.md b/domains/ai-alignment/autonomous-weapons-violate-existing-IHL-because-proportionality-requires-human-judgment.md
index dc2b803d5..d066526be 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/autonomous-weapons-violate-existing-IHL-because-proportionality-requires-human-judgment.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/autonomous-weapons-violate-existing-IHL-because-proportionality-requires-human-judgment.md
@@ -11,18 +11,19 @@ scope: structural
 sourcer: ASIL, SIPRI
 related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]", "[[some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps and systems must map rather than eliminate them]]"]
 supports:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
 - International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-06'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-06'}"
 - International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained|supports|2026-04-08
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-13'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-13'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections.md b/domains/ai-alignment/collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections.md
index 6f80ed01e..1178048f4 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections.md	
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ related:
 - user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect
 reweave_edges:
 - user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect|related|2026-03-28
+- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics|supports|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics
 ---
 
 # collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections
@@ -41,4 +44,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[scalable oversight degrades rapidly as capability gaps grow with debate achieving only 50 percent success at moderate gaps]] — oversight resources should be allocated where free energy is highest, not spread uniformly
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md b/domains/ai-alignment/compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md
index d35c8afb7..f26c23a95 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md	
@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ source: "US export control regulations (Oct 2022, Oct 2023, Dec 2024, Jan 2025),
 created: 2026-03-16
 related:
 - inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional
 reweave_edges:
 - inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection|related|2026-03-28
 - AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|supports|2026-04-04
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional|related|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
 ---
@@ -51,4 +53,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — export controls show coordination with enforcement works; the problem is that enforcement is aimed at competition, not safety
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on.md b/domains/ai-alignment/delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on.md
index f3565e7bf..ba3de4b7e 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: ai-alignment
 created: 2026-03-06
 source: "Noah Smith, 'Updated thoughts on AI risk' (Noahopinion, Feb 16, 2026)"
 confidence: experimental
+related:
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism
+reweave_edges:
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on
@@ -40,4 +44,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] — but if humans can't understand the systems, they can't weave values into them
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment.md b/domains/ai-alignment/evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment.md
index 39875cdd6..ee1eebe2a 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment.md	
@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "AutoAgent (MarkTechPost coverage, April 2026) — same-family meta/task pairs achieve SOTA on SpreadsheetBench (96.5%) and TerminalBench (55.1%); Kim et al. ICML 2025 — ~60% error agreement within same-family models on evaluation tasks"
 created: 2026-04-05
 depends_on:
-  - "multi-model evaluation architecture"
+- multi-model evaluation architecture
 challenged_by:
-  - "multi-model evaluation architecture"
+- multi-model evaluation architecture
+supports:
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate
+reweave_edges:
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment
@@ -43,4 +47,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[self evolution improves agent performance through acceptance gated retry not expanded search because disciplined attempt loops with explicit failure reflection outperform open ended exploration]] — NLAH's self-evolution mechanism is an optimization task where model empathy would help
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense.md b/domains/ai-alignment/four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense.md
index a3e2558c3..05ab857ae 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense.md	
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ depends_on:
 - technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap
 related:
 - multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
 reweave_edges:
 - multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense
@@ -57,4 +59,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[physical infrastructure constraints on AI development create a natural governance window of 2 to 10 years because hardware bottlenecks are not software-solvable]] — a specific instance of restraint #2 that is degrading
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them.md b/domains/ai-alignment/government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them.md
index 21a29a102..30c7dc00c 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them.md	
@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@ confidence: likely
 related:
 - AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for
 - UK AI Safety Institute
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)
 reweave_edges:
 - AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for|related|2026-03-28
 - UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
 - government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors|supports|2026-03-31
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)|related|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors
 ---
@@ -65,4 +67,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] -- the Pentagon using supply chain authority against a domestic AI lab suggests the institutional juncture is producing worse governance, not better
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/international-humanitarian-law-and-ai-alignment-converge-on-explainability-requirements.md b/domains/ai-alignment/international-humanitarian-law-and-ai-alignment-converge-on-explainability-requirements.md
index 606e77cf8..812c02879 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/international-humanitarian-law-and-ai-alignment-converge-on-explainability-requirements.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/international-humanitarian-law-and-ai-alignment-converge-on-explainability-requirements.md
@@ -11,18 +11,19 @@ scope: structural
 sourcer: ICRC
 related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]"]
 related:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-08'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-13'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-08'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-13'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 supports:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
 ---
 
 # International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md b/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md
index 8aff82c58..7670cb29c 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md	
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md	
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ related:
 - Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional
 - The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening
 reweave_edges:
 - UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
 - cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation|supports|2026-04-03
@@ -18,10 +20,14 @@ reweave_edges:
 - EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail|supports|2026-04-06
 - The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|related|2026-04-17
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms|related|2026-04-17
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional|related|2026-04-18
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay|supports|2026-04-18
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening|related|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation
 - multilateral verification mechanisms can substitute for failed voluntary commitments when binding enforcement replaces unilateral sacrifice
 - EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay
 ---
 
 # only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient
diff --git a/domains/collective-intelligence/when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution.md b/domains/collective-intelligence/when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution.md
index b92a70553..cde166352 100644
--- a/domains/collective-intelligence/when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution.md	
+++ b/domains/collective-intelligence/when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution.md	
@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #132 (Nate Hagens, 2025), Schmachtenberger 'Development in Progress' (2024)"
 created: 2026-04-03
 related:
-  - "the metacrisis is a single generator function where all civilizational-scale crises share the structural cause of competitive dynamics on exponential technology on finite substrate"
-  - "the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and applying this framework to civilizational coordination failures offers a quantitative lens though operationalizing it at scale remains unproven"
-  - "global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function"
+- the metacrisis is a single generator function where all civilizational-scale crises share the structural cause of competitive dynamics on exponential technology on finite substrate
+- the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and applying this framework to civilizational coordination failures offers a quantitative lens though operationalizing it at scale remains unproven
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function
+supports:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse
+reweave_edges:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # When you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution
@@ -43,4 +47,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function]] — capitalism is the paradigm case of optimization-as-problem: the objective function (capital accumulation) IS the misalignment
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md b/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md
index a2509a17c..96de0f6e8 100644
--- a/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md	
+++ b/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md	
@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ depends_on:
 challenged_by:
 - PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
 related:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}"
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
diff --git a/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md b/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md
index 5859b59c2..ef81f1163 100644
--- a/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md	
+++ b/domains/energy/AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology.md	
@@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ depends_on:
 challenged_by:
 - PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
 related:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}"
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
diff --git a/domains/energy/battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power.md b/domains/energy/battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power.md
index b1535906a..0792de3e0 100644
--- a/domains/energy/battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power.md	
+++ b/domains/energy/battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power.md	
@@ -7,10 +7,14 @@ source: "Astra; BloombergNEF Battery Price Survey 2023, BNEF Energy Storage Outl
 created: 2026-03-27
 secondary_domains: ["manufacturing"]
 depends_on:
-  - "solar photovoltaic costs have fallen 99 percent over four decades making unsubsidized solar the cheapest new electricity source in history and the decline is not slowing"
+- solar photovoltaic costs have fallen 99 percent over four decades making unsubsidized solar the cheapest new electricity source in history and the decline is not slowing
 challenged_by:
-  - "Lithium and critical mineral supply constraints may slow or reverse the cost decline trajectory"
-  - "Long-duration storage beyond 8 hours requires different chemistry than lithium-ion and remains uneconomic"
+- Lithium and critical mineral supply constraints may slow or reverse the cost decline trajectory
+- Long-duration storage beyond 8 hours requires different chemistry than lithium-ion and remains uneconomic
+related:
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid
+reweave_edges:
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power
@@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable with the sweet spot where physical data generation feeds software that scales independently]] — battery manufacturing is atoms-side with software-managed dispatch optimization
 
 Topics:
-- energy systems
+- energy systems
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/energy/fusion contributing meaningfully to global electricity is a 2040s event at the earliest because 2026-2030 demonstrations must succeed before capital flows to pilot plants that take another decade to build.md b/domains/energy/fusion contributing meaningfully to global electricity is a 2040s event at the earliest because 2026-2030 demonstrations must succeed before capital flows to pilot plants that take another decade to build.md
index ec544d9b0..3497451a3 100644
--- a/domains/energy/fusion contributing meaningfully to global electricity is a 2040s event at the earliest because 2026-2030 demonstrations must succeed before capital flows to pilot plants that take another decade to build.md	
+++ b/domains/energy/fusion contributing meaningfully to global electricity is a 2040s event at the earliest because 2026-2030 demonstrations must succeed before capital flows to pilot plants that take another decade to build.md	
@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ related:
 - CFS magnet pancake production achieved a 30x speedup from 30 days to 1 day per unit suggesting fusion component manufacturing can follow industrial learning curves even if system integration remains unproven
 - Helion and CFS represent genuinely different fusion bets where Helion's field reversed configuration trades plasma physics risk for engineering simplicity while CFS's tokamak trades engineering complexity for plasma physics confidence
 - SPARC construction velocity from 30 days per magnet pancake to 1 per day demonstrates that fusion manufacturing learning curves follow industrial scaling patterns not physics experiment timelines
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid
 reweave_edges:
 - AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology|related|2026-04-17
 - AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology|related|2026-04-17
 - CFS magnet pancake production achieved a 30x speedup from 30 days to 1 day per unit suggesting fusion component manufacturing can follow industrial learning curves even if system integration remains unproven|related|2026-04-17
 - Helion and CFS represent genuinely different fusion bets where Helion's field reversed configuration trades plasma physics risk for engineering simplicity while CFS's tokamak trades engineering complexity for plasma physics confidence|related|2026-04-17
 - SPARC construction velocity from 30 days per magnet pancake to 1 per day demonstrates that fusion manufacturing learning curves follow industrial scaling patterns not physics experiment timelines|related|2026-04-17
+- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission|related|2026-04-18
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Fusion contributing meaningfully to global electricity is a 2040s event at the earliest because 2026-2030 demonstrations must succeed before capital flows to pilot plants that take another decade to build
diff --git a/domains/energy/fusions attractor state is 5-15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission.md b/domains/energy/fusions attractor state is 5-15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission.md
index 9452d9391..277c8f9e4 100644
--- a/domains/energy/fusions attractor state is 5-15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission.md	
+++ b/domains/energy/fusions attractor state is 5-15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission.md	
@@ -5,7 +5,12 @@ description: "Fusion will not replace renewables for bulk energy but fills the f
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Astra, attractor state analysis applied to fusion energy February 2026"
 created: 2026-03-20
-challenged_by: ["advanced fission SMRs may fill the firm dispatchable niche before fusion arrives, making fusion commercially unnecessary"]
+challenged_by:
+- advanced fission SMRs may fill the firm dispatchable niche before fusion arrives, making fusion commercially unnecessary
+related:
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid
+reweave_edges:
+- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Fusion's attractor state is 5-15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
@@ -37,4 +42,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[power is the binding constraint on all space operations because every capability from ISRU to manufacturing to life support is power-limited]] — compact fusion could eventually transform space power calculations if HTS magnets enable smaller reactors
 
 Topics:
-- energy systems
+- energy systems
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/entertainment/community-trust-as-financial-distribution-creates-regulatory-responsibility-proportional-to-audience-vulnerability.md b/domains/entertainment/community-trust-as-financial-distribution-creates-regulatory-responsibility-proportional-to-audience-vulnerability.md
index eeff8c02f..07f756967 100644
--- a/domains/entertainment/community-trust-as-financial-distribution-creates-regulatory-responsibility-proportional-to-audience-vulnerability.md
+++ b/domains/entertainment/community-trust-as-financial-distribution-creates-regulatory-responsibility-proportional-to-audience-vulnerability.md
@@ -11,11 +11,12 @@ scope: structural
 sourcer: US Senate Banking Committee (Warren)
 related_claims: ["[[the media attractor state is community-filtered IP with AI-collapsed production costs where content becomes a loss leader for the scarce complements of fandom community and ownership]]", "[[beast-industries-5b-valuation-prices-content-as-loss-leader-model-at-enterprise-scale]]"]
 supports:
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}"
 - Creator economy players moving into financial services trigger immediate federal regulatory scrutiny when they combine large youth audiences with financial products, as evidenced by 6-week response time from acquisition to congressional inquiry
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}"
 - Creator economy players moving into financial services trigger immediate federal regulatory scrutiny when they combine large youth audiences with financial products, as evidenced by 6-week response time from acquisition to congressional inquiry|supports|2026-04-17
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Community trust as financial distribution mechanism creates regulatory responsibility proportional to audience vulnerability
diff --git a/domains/entertainment/creator-economy-fintech-crossover-faces-organizational-infrastructure-mismatch-with-financial-services-compliance.md b/domains/entertainment/creator-economy-fintech-crossover-faces-organizational-infrastructure-mismatch-with-financial-services-compliance.md
index 42392c8c2..41b4b6be4 100644
--- a/domains/entertainment/creator-economy-fintech-crossover-faces-organizational-infrastructure-mismatch-with-financial-services-compliance.md
+++ b/domains/entertainment/creator-economy-fintech-crossover-faces-organizational-infrastructure-mismatch-with-financial-services-compliance.md
@@ -12,12 +12,13 @@ sourcer: Senate Banking Committee
 related_claims: ["[[creator-owned-streaming-infrastructure-has-reached-commercial-scale-with-430M-annual-creator-revenue-across-13M-subscribers]]", "[[beast-industries-5b-valuation-prices-content-as-loss-leader-model-at-enterprise-scale]]"]
 supports:
 - Creator-economy conglomerates treat congressional minority pressure as political noise rather than regulatory enforcement risk
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}"
 - Creator economy players moving into financial services trigger immediate federal regulatory scrutiny when they combine large youth audiences with financial products, as evidenced by 6-week response time from acquisition to congressional inquiry
 reweave_edges:
 - Creator-economy conglomerates treat congressional minority pressure as political noise rather than regulatory enforcement risk|supports|2026-04-17
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}"
 - Creator economy players moving into financial services trigger immediate federal regulatory scrutiny when they combine large youth audiences with financial products, as evidenced by 6-week response time from acquisition to congressional inquiry|supports|2026-04-17
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Creator economy organizational structures are structurally mismatched with regulated financial services compliance requirements because informal founder-driven governance lacks the institutional mechanisms regulators expect
diff --git a/domains/entertainment/creator-to-fintech-transition-triggers-immediate-regulatory-scrutiny-because-audience-scale-plus-minor-exposure-creates-consumer-protection-priority.md b/domains/entertainment/creator-to-fintech-transition-triggers-immediate-regulatory-scrutiny-because-audience-scale-plus-minor-exposure-creates-consumer-protection-priority.md
index 034aa4e97..4c3339eec 100644
--- a/domains/entertainment/creator-to-fintech-transition-triggers-immediate-regulatory-scrutiny-because-audience-scale-plus-minor-exposure-creates-consumer-protection-priority.md
+++ b/domains/entertainment/creator-to-fintech-transition-triggers-immediate-regulatory-scrutiny-because-audience-scale-plus-minor-exposure-creates-consumer-protection-priority.md
@@ -14,12 +14,13 @@ supports:
 - Community trust as financial distribution mechanism creates regulatory responsibility proportional to audience vulnerability
 - Creator-economy conglomerates treat congressional minority pressure as political noise rather than regulatory enforcement risk
 - Creator economy organizational structures are structurally mismatched with regulated financial services compliance requirements because informal founder-driven governance lacks the institutional mechanisms regulators expect
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences'}"
 reweave_edges:
 - Community trust as financial distribution mechanism creates regulatory responsibility proportional to audience vulnerability|supports|2026-04-17
 - Creator-economy conglomerates treat congressional minority pressure as political noise rather than regulatory enforcement risk|supports|2026-04-17
 - Creator economy organizational structures are structurally mismatched with regulated financial services compliance requirements because informal founder-driven governance lacks the institutional mechanisms regulators expect|supports|2026-04-17
-- {'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Creator-economy brands expanding into regulated financial services face a novel regulatory surface': 'fiduciary standards applied where entertainment brands have built trust with minor audiences|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Creator economy players moving into financial services trigger immediate federal regulatory scrutiny when they combine large youth audiences with financial products, as evidenced by 6-week response time from acquisition to congressional inquiry
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns.md b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns.md
index dd124a50e..ba4b0f5fa 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: causal
 sourcer: EPC, Elysée, Future Society
 related_claims: ["definitional-ambiguity-in-autonomous-weapons-governance-is-strategic-interest-not-bureaucratic-failure-because-major-powers-preserve-programs-through-vague-thresholds.md"]
+related:
+- International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage
+reweave_edges:
+- International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
 
-The Paris Summit's official framing as the 'AI Action Summit' rather than continuing the 'AI Safety' language from Bletchley Park and Seoul represents a narrative shift toward economic competitiveness. The EPC titled their analysis 'Au Revoir, global AI Safety?' to capture this regression. Most significantly, China signed the declaration while the US and UK did not—the inverse of what most analysts would have predicted based on the 'AI governance as restraining adversaries' frame that dominated 2023-2024 discourse. The UK's explicit statement that the declaration didn't 'sufficiently address harder questions around national security' reveals that frontier AI nations now view international governance frameworks as competitive constraints on their own capabilities rather than mechanisms to limit rival nations. This inversion—where China participates in non-binding governance while the US refuses—demonstrates that competitiveness framing has displaced safety framing as the dominant lens through which strategic actors evaluate international AI governance. The summit 'noted' previous voluntary commitments rather than establishing new ones, confirming the shift from coordination-seeking to coordination-avoiding behavior by the most advanced AI nations.
+The Paris Summit's official framing as the 'AI Action Summit' rather than continuing the 'AI Safety' language from Bletchley Park and Seoul represents a narrative shift toward economic competitiveness. The EPC titled their analysis 'Au Revoir, global AI Safety?' to capture this regression. Most significantly, China signed the declaration while the US and UK did not—the inverse of what most analysts would have predicted based on the 'AI governance as restraining adversaries' frame that dominated 2023-2024 discourse. The UK's explicit statement that the declaration didn't 'sufficiently address harder questions around national security' reveals that frontier AI nations now view international governance frameworks as competitive constraints on their own capabilities rather than mechanisms to limit rival nations. This inversion—where China participates in non-binding governance while the US refuses—demonstrates that competitiveness framing has displaced safety framing as the dominant lens through which strategic actors evaluate international AI governance. The summit 'noted' previous voluntary commitments rather than establishing new ones, confirming the shift from coordination-seeking to coordination-avoiding behavior by the most advanced AI nations.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md
index 30a5d078e..7ab0929fc 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ attribution:
       context: "Leo (synthesis from US Army Project Convergence, DARPA programs, CCW GGE documentation, CNAS autonomous weapons reports, HRW 'Losing Humanity' 2012)"
 related:
 - the legislative ceiling on military ai governance is conditional not absolute cwc proves binding governance without carveouts is achievable but requires three currently absent conditions
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds
 supports:
 - Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional
 - Ottawa model treaty process cannot replicate for dual-use AI systems because verification architecture requires technical capability inspection not production records
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ reweave_edges:
 - Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional|supports|2026-04-04
 - Ottawa model treaty process cannot replicate for dual-use AI systems because verification architecture requires technical capability inspection not production records|supports|2026-04-07
 - Arms control governance requires stigmatization (necessary condition) plus either compliance demonstrability OR strategic utility reduction (substitutable enabling conditions)|supports|2026-04-17
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI weapons governance tractability stratifies by strategic utility — high-utility targeting AI faces firm legislative ceiling while medium-utility loitering munitions and autonomous naval mines follow Ottawa Treaty path where stigmatization plus low strategic exclusivity enables binding instruments outside CCW
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-stigmatization-campaign-has-normative-infrastructure-without-triggering-event-creating-icbl-phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation.md b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-stigmatization-campaign-has-normative-infrastructure-without-triggering-event-creating-icbl-phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation.md
index 3f9b35d61..aeb91a211 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-stigmatization-campaign-has-normative-infrastructure-without-triggering-event-creating-icbl-phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-stigmatization-campaign-has-normative-infrastructure-without-triggering-event-creating-icbl-phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation.md
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "CS-KR public record, CCW GGE deliberations 2014-2025"
+related:
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds
+reweave_edges:
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AI weapons stigmatization campaign has normative infrastructure without triggering event creating ICBL-phase-equivalent waiting for activation
@@ -35,4 +39,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md b/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md
index 586eae1ee..cd9fe253d 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md
@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@ attribution:
       context: "Leo synthesis from ICAO official records, Paris Convention (1919), Chicago Convention (1944)"
 related:
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai
 reweave_edges:
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms|related|2026-04-17
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present|supports|2026-04-18
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus|supports|2026-04-18
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai|related|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus
 ---
 
 # Aviation governance succeeded through five enabling conditions that are all absent for AI: airspace sovereignty assertion, visible catastrophic failure, commercial interoperability necessity, low competitive stakes at inception, and physical infrastructure chokepoints
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md b/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md
index b0ac0cd6b..9187e35d8 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md
@@ -10,8 +10,16 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Council of Europe, civil society organizations, GPPi
 related_claims: ["eu-ai-act-article-2-3-national-security-exclusion-confirms-legislative-ceiling-is-cross-jurisdictional.md", "the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md", "international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage.md"]
+related:
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening
+- International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage
+reweave_edges:
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay|related|2026-04-18
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening|related|2026-04-18
+- International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional
 
-The Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (CETS 225) entered into force on November 1, 2025, becoming the first legally binding international AI treaty. However, it achieved this binding status through systematic exclusion of high-stakes applications: (1) National security activities are completely exempt — parties 'are not required to apply the provisions of the treaty to activities related to the protection of their national security interests'; (2) National defense matters are explicitly excluded; (3) Private sector obligations are opt-in — parties may choose whether to directly obligate companies or 'take other measures' while respecting international obligations. Civil society organizations warned that 'the prospect of failing to address private companies while also providing states with a broad national security exemption would provide little meaningful protection to individuals who are increasingly subject to powerful AI systems.' This pattern mirrors the EU AI Act Article 2.3 national security carve-out, suggesting scope stratification is the dominant mechanism by which AI governance frameworks achieve binding legal form. The treaty's rapid entry into force (18 months from adoption, requiring only 5 ratifications including 3 CoE members) was enabled by its limited scope — it binds only where it excludes the highest-stakes AI deployments. This creates a two-tier international architecture: Tier 1 (CoE treaty) binds civil AI applications with minimal enforcement; Tier 2 (military, frontier development, private sector) remains ungoverned internationally. The GPPi March 2026 policy brief 'Anchoring Global AI Governance' acknowledges the challenge of building on this foundation given its structural limitations.
+The Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (CETS 225) entered into force on November 1, 2025, becoming the first legally binding international AI treaty. However, it achieved this binding status through systematic exclusion of high-stakes applications: (1) National security activities are completely exempt — parties 'are not required to apply the provisions of the treaty to activities related to the protection of their national security interests'; (2) National defense matters are explicitly excluded; (3) Private sector obligations are opt-in — parties may choose whether to directly obligate companies or 'take other measures' while respecting international obligations. Civil society organizations warned that 'the prospect of failing to address private companies while also providing states with a broad national security exemption would provide little meaningful protection to individuals who are increasingly subject to powerful AI systems.' This pattern mirrors the EU AI Act Article 2.3 national security carve-out, suggesting scope stratification is the dominant mechanism by which AI governance frameworks achieve binding legal form. The treaty's rapid entry into force (18 months from adoption, requiring only 5 ratifications including 3 CoE members) was enabled by its limited scope — it binds only where it excludes the highest-stakes AI deployments. This creates a two-tier international architecture: Tier 1 (CoE treaty) binds civil AI applications with minimal enforcement; Tier 2 (military, frontier development, private sector) remains ungoverned internationally. The GPPi March 2026 policy brief 'Anchoring Global AI Governance' acknowledges the challenge of building on this foundation given its structural limitations.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md b/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md
index 18b5e4f31..6fa0ae1e8 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md
@@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ agent: leo
 scope: causal
 sourcer: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA)
 related_claims: ["technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md", "aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md"]
+supports:
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
+related:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute
+reweave_edges:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute|related|2026-04-18
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
 
-The Montreal Protocol case refutes the 'low competitive stakes at inception' enabling condition and replaces it with 'commercial migration path available at signing.' DuPont, the CFC industry leader, actively opposed regulation through the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy and testified before Congress in 1987 that 'there is no imminent crisis that demands unilateral regulation' — the same year the treaty was signed. Competitive stakes were HIGH, not low: DuPont had enormous CFC revenues at risk. The critical turning point was 1986, when DuPont successfully developed viable HFC alternatives. Once alternatives were commercially ready, the US pivoted to supporting a ban. The Rapid Transition Alliance notes that 'by the time the Montreal Protocol was being considered, the market had changed and the possibilities of profiting from the production of CFC substitutes had greatly increased — favouring some of the larger producers that had begun to research alternatives.' The treaty formalized what commercial interests had already made inevitable through R&D investment. The timing is dispositive: commercial pivot in 1986 → treaty signed in 1987, with industry BOTH lobbying against regulation AND signing up for it in the same year because different commercial actors had different positions based on their alternative technology readiness.
+The Montreal Protocol case refutes the 'low competitive stakes at inception' enabling condition and replaces it with 'commercial migration path available at signing.' DuPont, the CFC industry leader, actively opposed regulation through the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy and testified before Congress in 1987 that 'there is no imminent crisis that demands unilateral regulation' — the same year the treaty was signed. Competitive stakes were HIGH, not low: DuPont had enormous CFC revenues at risk. The critical turning point was 1986, when DuPont successfully developed viable HFC alternatives. Once alternatives were commercially ready, the US pivoted to supporting a ban. The Rapid Transition Alliance notes that 'by the time the Montreal Protocol was being considered, the market had changed and the possibilities of profiting from the production of CFC substitutes had greatly increased — favouring some of the larger producers that had begun to research alternatives.' The treaty formalized what commercial interests had already made inevitable through R&D investment. The timing is dispositive: commercial pivot in 1986 → treaty signed in 1987, with industry BOTH lobbying against regulation AND signing up for it in the same year because different commercial actors had different positions based on their alternative technology readiness.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute.md b/domains/grand-strategy/commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute.md
index f049a4dc7..4ed39c376 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute.md
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ sourcer: Multiple sources (WHO, Human Rights Watch, CEPI, KFF)
 related_claims: ["technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md", "aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md"]
 related:
 - Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
 reweave_edges:
 - Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception|related|2026-04-17
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare.md b/domains/grand-strategy/efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare.md
index 83af8d3b5..a82ad095b 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare.md	
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare.md	
@@ -6,8 +6,12 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Abdalla manuscript 'Architectural Investing' Introduction (lines 34-65), Pascal Lamy (former WTO Director-General) post-Covid remarks, Medtronic supply chain analysis"
 created: 2026-04-03
 related:
-  - "the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and this gap is the most important metric for civilizational risk assessment"
-  - "AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence"
+- the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and this gap is the most important metric for civilizational risk assessment
+- AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence
+supports:
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism
+reweave_edges:
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare
@@ -41,4 +45,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence]] — AI accelerates the optimization that produces fragility
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/eu-ai-governance-reveals-form-substance-divergence-at-domestic-regulatory-level-through-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-compliance-delay.md b/domains/grand-strategy/eu-ai-governance-reveals-form-substance-divergence-at-domestic-regulatory-level-through-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-compliance-delay.md
index e288acd06..60bf7efef 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/eu-ai-governance-reveals-form-substance-divergence-at-domestic-regulatory-level-through-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-compliance-delay.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/eu-ai-governance-reveals-form-substance-divergence-at-domestic-regulatory-level-through-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-compliance-delay.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Council of the European Union / European Parliament
 related_claims: ["[[binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications]]", "[[mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it]]", "[[eu-ai-act-article-2-3-national-security-exclusion-confirms-legislative-ceiling-is-cross-jurisdictional]]"]
+supports:
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening
+reweave_edges:
+- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay
 
-On March 11, 2026, the EU ratified the binding CoE AI Framework Convention. Two days later, on March 13, 2026, the EU Council adopted Omnibus VII, delaying high-risk AI system compliance from 2025 to December 2027 (stand-alone systems) and August 2028 (embedded systems). This simultaneity reveals governance laundering operating at the domestic regulatory level, not just in international treaty design. The pattern matches the form-substance divergence visible in international AI governance: legal form advances (binding treaty ratification) while substantive compliance retreats (16-month delay during peak AI deployment expansion 2026-2027). The Commission's justification—standards not yet available—may be technically accurate, but the political economy is clear: industry lobbying for compliance delay succeeded during the same week that international treaty commitments advanced. This confirms that governance laundering is not merely a treaty phenomenon but a cross-level regulatory strategy where form and substance move in opposite directions under competitive pressure. The Omnibus VII delay moves high-risk governance from mandatory-with-timeline to mandatory-without-timeline, weakening the mandatory character while preserving the appearance of comprehensive regulation. Critically, the national security carve-out (Article 2.3) remains intact while commercial compliance is delayed, maintaining the strategic interest architecture while reducing enterprise burden.
+On March 11, 2026, the EU ratified the binding CoE AI Framework Convention. Two days later, on March 13, 2026, the EU Council adopted Omnibus VII, delaying high-risk AI system compliance from 2025 to December 2027 (stand-alone systems) and August 2028 (embedded systems). This simultaneity reveals governance laundering operating at the domestic regulatory level, not just in international treaty design. The pattern matches the form-substance divergence visible in international AI governance: legal form advances (binding treaty ratification) while substantive compliance retreats (16-month delay during peak AI deployment expansion 2026-2027). The Commission's justification—standards not yet available—may be technically accurate, but the political economy is clear: industry lobbying for compliance delay succeeded during the same week that international treaty commitments advanced. This confirms that governance laundering is not merely a treaty phenomenon but a cross-level regulatory strategy where form and substance move in opposite directions under competitive pressure. The Omnibus VII delay moves high-risk governance from mandatory-with-timeline to mandatory-without-timeline, weakening the mandatory character while preserving the appearance of comprehensive regulation. Critically, the national security carve-out (Article 2.3) remains intact while commercial compliance is delayed, maintaining the strategic interest architecture while reducing enterprise burden.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function.md b/domains/grand-strategy/global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function.md
index aa442edd5..3642990a7 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function.md	
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function.md	
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ related:
 - AI with ubiquitous sensors could theoretically perform the three core functions of financial markets rendering traditional finance infrastructure obsolete
 reweave_edges:
 - AI with ubiquitous sensors could theoretically perform the three core functions of financial markets rendering traditional finance infrastructure obsolete|related|2026-04-17
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms|supports|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms
 ---
 
 # Global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md b/domains/grand-strategy/governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md
index eba51f2d8..876b87760 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo (cross-session synthesis), aviation (16 years, ~5 conditions), CWC (~5 years, ~3 conditions), Ottawa Treaty (~5 years, ~2 conditions), pharmaceutical US (56 years, ~1 condition)"
+supports:
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present
+related:
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
+reweave_edges:
+- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time|related|2026-04-18
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Governance coordination speed scales with number of enabling conditions present, creating predictable timeline variation from 5 years with three conditions to 56 years with one condition
@@ -43,4 +50,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-form-substance-divergence-enables-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-domestic-implementation-weakening.md b/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-form-substance-divergence-enables-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-domestic-implementation-weakening.md
index 25d3c1bea..d6a109b51 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-form-substance-divergence-enables-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-domestic-implementation-weakening.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-form-substance-divergence-enables-simultaneous-treaty-ratification-and-domestic-implementation-weakening.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Council of Europe / European Parliament
 related_claims: ["[[binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications]]", "[[mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it]]"]
+supports:
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay
+reweave_edges:
+- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening
 
-The EU simultaneously ratified the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (March 11, 2026) while agreeing to delay EU AI Act high-risk system compliance timelines by up to 16 months through Omnibus VII (March 13, 2026). This represents form-substance divergence at the domestic level: the CoE treaty ratification signals formal commitment to international AI governance norms, while the Omnibus VII delays weaken the substantive obligations that would operationalize those norms domestically. The high-risk AI system provisions—the most substantive obligations in the EU AI Act—are being pushed from 2026 to 2027-2028, at the exact political moment the EU is ratifying an international treaty on AI governance. This pattern suggests governance laundering is not merely an international treaty phenomenon (where binding form excludes high-stakes scope), but also operates domestically (where treaty ratification provides governance legitimacy while implementation delays preserve commercial flexibility). The two-day gap between ratification approval and compliance delay agreement indicates these were coordinated political decisions, not independent regulatory adjustments.
+The EU simultaneously ratified the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (March 11, 2026) while agreeing to delay EU AI Act high-risk system compliance timelines by up to 16 months through Omnibus VII (March 13, 2026). This represents form-substance divergence at the domestic level: the CoE treaty ratification signals formal commitment to international AI governance norms, while the Omnibus VII delays weaken the substantive obligations that would operationalize those norms domestically. The high-risk AI system provisions—the most substantive obligations in the EU AI Act—are being pushed from 2026 to 2027-2028, at the exact political moment the EU is ratifying an international treaty on AI governance. This pattern suggests governance laundering is not merely an international treaty phenomenon (where binding form excludes high-stakes scope), but also operates domestically (where treaty ratification provides governance legitimacy while implementation delays preserve commercial flexibility). The two-day gap between ratification approval and compliance delay agreement indicates these were coordinated political decisions, not independent regulatory adjustments.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/internet-social-governance-failed-because-harms-are-abstract-and-non-attributable-commercial-stakes-were-peak-at-governance-attempt-and-sovereignty-conflicts-prevent-consensus.md b/domains/grand-strategy/internet-social-governance-failed-because-harms-are-abstract-and-non-attributable-commercial-stakes-were-peak-at-governance-attempt-and-sovereignty-conflicts-prevent-consensus.md
index 391a50f69..4e5d58cbd 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/internet-social-governance-failed-because-harms-are-abstract-and-non-attributable-commercial-stakes-were-peak-at-governance-attempt-and-sovereignty-conflicts-prevent-consensus.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/internet-social-governance-failed-because-harms-are-abstract-and-non-attributable-commercial-stakes-were-peak-at-governance-attempt-and-sovereignty-conflicts-prevent-consensus.md
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis from internet governance timeline (GDPR 2018, Cambridge Analytica 2016, platform market caps)"
+related:
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai
+reweave_edges:
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non-attributable, commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt, and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus
@@ -25,4 +29,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the internet enabled global communication but not global cognition]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai.md b/domains/grand-strategy/internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai.md
index f4c8e4aa9..43f302791 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai.md
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ attribution:
       context: "Leo synthesis from documented internet governance history (IETF/W3C archives, DeNardis, Mueller)"
 related:
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus
 reweave_edges:
 - Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms|related|2026-04-17
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self-enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for AI
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/legislative-ceiling-replicates-strategic-interest-inversion-at-statutory-scope-definition-level.md b/domains/grand-strategy/legislative-ceiling-replicates-strategic-interest-inversion-at-statutory-scope-definition-level.md
index 9ab9c1804..d65191866 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/legislative-ceiling-replicates-strategic-interest-inversion-at-statutory-scope-definition-level.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/legislative-ceiling-replicates-strategic-interest-inversion-at-statutory-scope-definition-level.md
@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Leo
 related_claims: ["[[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]]", "[[binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications]]", "[[eu-ai-act-article-2-3-national-security-exclusion-confirms-legislative-ceiling-is-cross-jurisdictional]]"]
+supports:
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional
+- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it
+reweave_edges:
+- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional|supports|2026-04-18
+- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)
@@ -28,4 +34,4 @@ The Anthropic case demonstrates corporate actors understand this constraint: the
 
 The resource asymmetry ($20M vs. $125M for pro-deregulation PAC) is real but secondary. Even winning on resources would not dissolve the structural constraint that statutory scope definition replicates the contracting-level conflict. The 69% public support for AI regulation suggests the constraint is not public opinion but the binary choice architecture itself.
 
-This makes the governance instrument asymmetry claim more demanding: instrument change is necessary but not sufficient. Strategic interest realignment must occur at both contracting AND legislative levels. The prescription becomes: (1) instrument change AND (2) strategic interest realignment at statutory scope-definition level, not just operational contracting level.
+This makes the governance instrument asymmetry claim more demanding: instrument change is necessary but not sufficient. Strategic interest realignment must occur at both contracting AND legislative levels. The prescription becomes: (1) instrument change AND (2) strategic interest realignment at statutory scope-definition level, not just operational contracting level.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-as-fifth-enabling-condition-where-extended-deterrence-substituted-for-proliferation-incentives.md b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-as-fifth-enabling-condition-where-extended-deterrence-substituted-for-proliferation-incentives.md
index a5c17d2d0..11c0dda93 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-as-fifth-enabling-condition-where-extended-deterrence-substituted-for-proliferation-incentives.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-as-fifth-enabling-condition-where-extended-deterrence-substituted-for-proliferation-incentives.md
@@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis, NPT historical record 1968-2026, Arms Control Association archives"
+supports:
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus
+related:
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance
+reweave_edges:
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition|supports|2026-04-18
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance|related|2026-04-18
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture as fifth enabling condition where extended deterrence substituted for proliferation incentives
@@ -30,4 +39,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition.md b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition.md
index ba08d7108..92bf1de27 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition.md
@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis, NPT historical record, Arms Control Association archives"
+supports:
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus
+related:
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance
+reweave_edges:
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance|related|2026-04-18
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Nuclear non-proliferation succeeded through security architecture providing alternative incentives not through commercial network effects revealing a fifth enabling condition absent from other governance cases
@@ -29,4 +36,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - technology-advances-exponentially-but-coordination-mechanisms-evolve-linearly-creating-a-widening-gap
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-near-miss-frequency-qualifies-npt-coordination-success-as-luck-dependent-because-80-years-of-non-use-with-0-5-1-percent-annual-risk-represents-improbable-survival-not-stable-governance.md b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-near-miss-frequency-qualifies-npt-coordination-success-as-luck-dependent-because-80-years-of-non-use-with-0-5-1-percent-annual-risk-represents-improbable-survival-not-stable-governance.md
index 0e4c5775d..6cb5c6c38 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-near-miss-frequency-qualifies-npt-coordination-success-as-luck-dependent-because-80-years-of-non-use-with-0-5-1-percent-annual-risk-represents-improbable-survival-not-stable-governance.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-near-miss-frequency-qualifies-npt-coordination-success-as-luck-dependent-because-80-years-of-non-use-with-0-5-1-percent-annual-risk-represents-improbable-survival-not-stable-governance.md
@@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis, declassified near-miss documentation (Arkhipov 1962, Petrov 1983, Norwegian Rocket 1995)"
+related:
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus
+reweave_edges:
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition|related|2026-04-18
+- nuclear non proliferation is partial coordination success not governance failure because technical capability proliferation gap was maintained at 9 vs 30 plus|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Nuclear near-miss frequency qualifies NPT coordination success as luck-dependent because 80 years of non-use with 0.5-1% annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance
@@ -28,4 +34,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-non-proliferation-is-partial-coordination-success-not-governance-failure-because-technical-capability-proliferation-gap-was-maintained-at-9-vs-30-plus.md b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-non-proliferation-is-partial-coordination-success-not-governance-failure-because-technical-capability-proliferation-gap-was-maintained-at-9-vs-30-plus.md
index 01c2adcfb..5b5466fd7 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-non-proliferation-is-partial-coordination-success-not-governance-failure-because-technical-capability-proliferation-gap-was-maintained-at-9-vs-30-plus.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/nuclear-non-proliferation-is-partial-coordination-success-not-governance-failure-because-technical-capability-proliferation-gap-was-maintained-at-9-vs-30-plus.md
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis, NPT record (191 state parties), IAEA safeguards history"
+related:
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance
+reweave_edges:
+- nuclear near miss frequency qualifies npt coordination success as luck dependent because 80 years of non use with 0 5 1 percent annual risk represents improbable survival not stable governance|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Nuclear non-proliferation represents partial coordination success not governance failure because the gap between technically capable states and nuclear-armed states was maintained at 9 versus 30-plus over 80 years
@@ -30,4 +34,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - COVID-proved-humanity-cannot-coordinate-even-when-the-threat-is-visible-and-universal
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/pandemic-agreement-confirms-maximum-triggering-event-produces-broad-adoption-without-powerful-actor-participation-because-strategic-interests-override-catastrophic-death-toll.md b/domains/grand-strategy/pandemic-agreement-confirms-maximum-triggering-event-produces-broad-adoption-without-powerful-actor-participation-because-strategic-interests-override-catastrophic-death-toll.md
index bfa655d38..79902ba5d 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/pandemic-agreement-confirms-maximum-triggering-event-produces-broad-adoption-without-powerful-actor-participation-because-strategic-interests-override-catastrophic-death-toll.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/pandemic-agreement-confirms-maximum-triggering-event-produces-broad-adoption-without-powerful-actor-participation-because-strategic-interests-override-catastrophic-death-toll.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Multiple sources (WHO, Human Rights Watch, CEPI, KFF)
 related_claims: ["technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md", "triggering-event-architecture-requires-three-components-infrastructure-disaster-champion-as-confirmed-by-pharmaceutical-and-arms-control-cases.md"]
+related:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute
+reweave_edges:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Maximum triggering events produce broad international adoption without powerful actor participation because strategic interests override catastrophic death toll
 
-The WHO Pandemic Agreement adoption (May 2025) provides canonical evidence for the triggering event principle's limits. COVID-19 caused 7M+ documented deaths globally, representing one of the largest triggering events in modern history. This produced broad international adoption: 120 countries voted YES, 11 abstained, 0 voted NO at the World Health Assembly. However, the United States—the most powerful actor in pandemic preparedness and vaccine development—formally withdrew from WHO (January 2026) and explicitly rejected the agreement. Executive Order 14155 states actions to effectuate the agreement 'will have no binding force on the United States.' This confirms a structural pattern: triggering events can produce broad consensus among actors whose behavior doesn't need governing, but cannot compel participation from the actors whose behavior most needs constraints. The US withdrawal strategy (exit rather than veto-and-negotiate) represents a harder-to-overcome pattern than traditional blocking. The agreement remains unopened for signature as of April 2026 due to the PABS commercial dispute, confirming that commercial interests remain the blocking condition even after adoption. This case establishes that catastrophic death toll (7M+) is insufficient to override strategic interests when governance would constrain frontier capabilities.
+The WHO Pandemic Agreement adoption (May 2025) provides canonical evidence for the triggering event principle's limits. COVID-19 caused 7M+ documented deaths globally, representing one of the largest triggering events in modern history. This produced broad international adoption: 120 countries voted YES, 11 abstained, 0 voted NO at the World Health Assembly. However, the United States—the most powerful actor in pandemic preparedness and vaccine development—formally withdrew from WHO (January 2026) and explicitly rejected the agreement. Executive Order 14155 states actions to effectuate the agreement 'will have no binding force on the United States.' This confirms a structural pattern: triggering events can produce broad consensus among actors whose behavior doesn't need governing, but cannot compel participation from the actors whose behavior most needs constraints. The US withdrawal strategy (exit rather than veto-and-negotiate) represents a harder-to-overcome pattern than traditional blocking. The agreement remains unopened for signature as of April 2026 due to the PABS commercial dispute, confirming that commercial interests remain the blocking condition even after adoption. This case establishes that catastrophic death toll (7M+) is insufficient to override strategic interests when governance would constrain frontier capabilities.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/social media uniquely degrades democracy because it fractures the electorate itself rather than merely influencing policy making the regulatory body incapable of regulating its own degradation.md b/domains/grand-strategy/social media uniquely degrades democracy because it fractures the electorate itself rather than merely influencing policy making the regulatory body incapable of regulating its own degradation.md
index ce1cc88b8..14162080b 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/social media uniquely degrades democracy because it fractures the electorate itself rather than merely influencing policy making the regulatory body incapable of regulating its own degradation.md	
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/social media uniquely degrades democracy because it fractures the electorate itself rather than merely influencing policy making the regulatory body incapable of regulating its own degradation.md	
@@ -6,8 +6,11 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Schmachtenberger & Harris on Lex Fridman #191 (2021), Schmachtenberger & Harris on JRE #1736 (2021), Schmachtenberger 'War on Sensemaking' Parts 1-4"
 created: 2026-04-03
 related:
-  - "epistemic commons degradation is the gateway failure that enables all other civilizational risks because you cannot coordinate on problems you cannot collectively perceive"
-  - "what propagates is what wins rivalrous competition not what is true and this applies across genes memes products scientific findings and sensemaking frameworks"
+- epistemic commons degradation is the gateway failure that enables all other civilizational risks because you cannot coordinate on problems you cannot collectively perceive
+- what propagates is what wins rivalrous competition not what is true and this applies across genes memes products scientific findings and sensemaking frameworks
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus
+reweave_edges:
+- internet social governance failed because harms are abstract and non attributable commercial stakes were peak at governance attempt and sovereignty conflicts prevent consensus|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Social media uniquely degrades democracy because it fractures the electorate itself rather than merely influencing policy making the regulatory body incapable of regulating its own degradation
@@ -42,4 +45,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[what propagates is what wins rivalrous competition not what is true and this applies across genes memes products scientific findings and sensemaking frameworks]] — engagement optimization is the specific mechanism by which "what propagates" overrides "what's true" in the democratic information environment
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/strategic-interest-alignment-determines-whether-national-security-framing-enables-or-undermines-mandatory-governance.md b/domains/grand-strategy/strategic-interest-alignment-determines-whether-national-security-framing-enables-or-undermines-mandatory-governance.md
index 271c37bfe..c2ddf5a44 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/strategic-interest-alignment-determines-whether-national-security-framing-enables-or-undermines-mandatory-governance.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/strategic-interest-alignment-determines-whether-national-security-framing-enables-or-undermines-mandatory-governance.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Leo
 related_claims: ["[[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]]"]
+supports:
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)
+reweave_edges:
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Strategic interest alignment determines whether national security framing enables or undermines mandatory governance — aligned interests enable mandatory mechanisms (space) while conflicting interests undermine voluntary constraints (AI military deployment)
 
-The DoD/Anthropic case reveals a structural asymmetry in how national security framing affects governance mechanisms. In commercial space, NASA Authorization Act overlap mandate serves both safety (no crew operational gap) and strategic objectives (no geopolitical vulnerability from orbital presence gap to Tiangong) simultaneously — national security framing amplifies mandatory safety governance. In AI military deployment, DoD's 'any lawful use' requirement treats safety constraints as operational friction that impairs military capability. The same national security framing that enabled mandatory space governance is being deployed to argue safety constraints are strategic handicaps. This is not administration-specific: DoD's pre-Trump 'Responsible AI principles' were voluntary, self-certifying, with DoD as own arbiter. The strategic interest inversion explains why the most powerful lever for mandatory governance (national security framing) cannot be simply borrowed from space to AI — it operates in the opposite direction when safety and strategic interests conflict. This qualifies Session 2026-03-27's finding that mandatory governance can close technology-coordination gaps: the transferability condition (strategic interest alignment) is currently unmet in AI military applications.
+The DoD/Anthropic case reveals a structural asymmetry in how national security framing affects governance mechanisms. In commercial space, NASA Authorization Act overlap mandate serves both safety (no crew operational gap) and strategic objectives (no geopolitical vulnerability from orbital presence gap to Tiangong) simultaneously — national security framing amplifies mandatory safety governance. In AI military deployment, DoD's 'any lawful use' requirement treats safety constraints as operational friction that impairs military capability. The same national security framing that enabled mandatory space governance is being deployed to argue safety constraints are strategic handicaps. This is not administration-specific: DoD's pre-Trump 'Responsible AI principles' were voluntary, self-certifying, with DoD as own arbiter. The strategic interest inversion explains why the most powerful lever for mandatory governance (national security framing) cannot be simply borrowed from space to AI — it operates in the opposite direction when safety and strategic interests conflict. This qualifies Session 2026-03-27's finding that mandatory governance can close technology-coordination gaps: the transferability condition (strategic interest alignment) is currently unmet in AI military applications.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md b/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md
index b38d27ae6..e1a2d4e9d 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md
@@ -13,8 +13,15 @@ attribution:
       context: "Leo (cross-session synthesis), aviation (1903-1947), pharmaceutical (1906-1962), internet (1969-2000), CWC (1993), Ottawa Treaty (1997)"
 related:
 - Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition
 reweave_edges:
 - Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception|related|2026-04-17
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present|supports|2026-04-18
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai|supports|2026-04-18
+- nuclear governance succeeded through security architecture not commercial incentives revealing fifth enabling condition|related|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- governance speed scales with number of enabling conditions present
+- internet technical governance succeeded through network effects and low commercial stakes at inception creating self enforcing coordination impossible to replicate for ai
 ---
 
 # Technology-governance coordination gaps close when four enabling conditions are present: visible triggering events, commercial network effects, low competitive stakes at inception, or physical manifestation
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/the clockwork worldview produced solutions that worked for a century then undermined their own foundations as the progress they enabled changed the environment they assumed was stable.md b/domains/grand-strategy/the clockwork worldview produced solutions that worked for a century then undermined their own foundations as the progress they enabled changed the environment they assumed was stable.md
index 35f420ab6..3c490b996 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/the clockwork worldview produced solutions that worked for a century then undermined their own foundations as the progress they enabled changed the environment they assumed was stable.md	
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/the clockwork worldview produced solutions that worked for a century then undermined their own foundations as the progress they enabled changed the environment they assumed was stable.md	
@@ -6,8 +6,14 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Abdalla manuscript 'Architectural Investing' Introduction (lines 67-77), Gaddis 'On Grand Strategy', McChrystal 'Team of Teams', Schmachtenberger 'Development in Progress' Part I"
 created: 2026-04-03
 related:
-  - "efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare"
-  - "the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and this gap is the most important metric for civilizational risk assessment"
+- efficiency optimization systematically converts resilience into fragility across supply chains energy infrastructure financial markets and healthcare
+- the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and this gap is the most important metric for civilizational risk assessment
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework
+supports:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse
+reweave_edges:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse|supports|2026-04-18
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # The clockwork worldview produced solutions that worked for a century then undermined their own foundations as the progress they enabled changed the environment they assumed was stable
@@ -38,4 +44,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and this gap is the most important metric for civilizational risk assessment]] — the price of anarchy is invisible to the clockwork worldview because it measures across actors, not within them
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md b/domains/grand-strategy/the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md
index a039d67cf..35101b079 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md
@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@ reweave_edges:
 - ai weapons governance tractability stratifies by strategic utility creating ottawa treaty path for medium utility categories|supports|2026-04-04
 - Arms control governance requires stigmatization (necessary condition) plus either compliance demonstrability OR strategic utility reduction (substitutable enabling conditions)|supports|2026-04-17
 - Arms control three-condition framework requires stigmatization as necessary condition plus at least one substitutable enabler (verification feasibility OR strategic utility reduction), not all three conditions simultaneously|related|2026-04-17
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds|related|2026-04-18
 related:
 - Arms control three-condition framework requires stigmatization as necessary condition plus at least one substitutable enabler (verification feasibility OR strategic utility reduction), not all three conditions simultaneously
+- definitional ambiguity in autonomous weapons governance is strategic interest not bureaucratic failure because major powers preserve programs through vague thresholds
 ---
 
 # The legislative ceiling on military AI governance is conditional rather than logically necessary — the CWC demonstrates that binding mandatory governance of military programs without great-power carve-outs is achievable when three enabling conditions converge: weapon stigmatization, verification feasibility, and reduced strategic utility — all currently absent and on negative trajectory for AI
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture.md b/domains/grand-strategy/three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture.md
index b4d65698c..d216d73f5 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture.md
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Leo
 related_claims: ["[[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]]", "[[definitional-ambiguity-in-autonomous-weapons-governance-is-strategic-interest-not-bureaucratic-failure-because-major-powers-preserve-programs-through-vague-thresholds]]"]
+supports:
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)
+reweave_edges:
+- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Corporate AI safety governance under government pressure operates as a three-track sequential stack where each track's structural ceiling necessitates the next track because voluntary ethics fails to competitive dynamics, litigation protects speech rights without compelling acceptance, and electoral investment faces the legislative ceiling
@@ -28,4 +32,4 @@ TechPolicy.Press's four-factor framework for why corporate ethics cannot survive
 
 The three-track structure appears generalizable beyond Anthropic. Any corporate safety actor facing government pressure for capability without constraints would face the same sequential ceilings: voluntary ethics → litigation → electoral investment. The resource requirements escalate ($0 for policy statements → legal fees → $20M+ for competitive PAC presence), creating a selection filter where only well-capitalized safety actors can reach Track 3.
 
-This suggests a testable prediction: other AI safety-focused companies facing government pressure should exhibit the same three-track escalation pattern. OpenAI's trajectory provides a natural comparison case—their acceptance of looser DoD terms represents staying at Track 1 by defecting on safety constraints rather than escalating to Tracks 2-3.
+This suggests a testable prediction: other AI safety-focused companies facing government pressure should exhibit the same three-track escalation pattern. OpenAI's trajectory provides a natural comparison case—their acceptance of looser DoD terms represents staying at Track 1 by defecting on safety constraints rather than escalating to Tracks 2-3.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/triggering-events-produce-domestic-regulatory-governance-but-cannot-produce-international-treaty-governance-when-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-and-verifiability-are-absent.md b/domains/grand-strategy/triggering-events-produce-domestic-regulatory-governance-but-cannot-produce-international-treaty-governance-when-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-and-verifiability-are-absent.md
index 49738f7ee..30323428c 100644
--- a/domains/grand-strategy/triggering-events-produce-domestic-regulatory-governance-but-cannot-produce-international-treaty-governance-when-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-and-verifiability-are-absent.md
+++ b/domains/grand-strategy/triggering-events-produce-domestic-regulatory-governance-but-cannot-produce-international-treaty-governance-when-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-and-verifiability-are-absent.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: leo
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Leo
 related_claims: ["[[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]]", "[[governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition]]", "[[the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions]]"]
+related:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute
+reweave_edges:
+- Commercial interests blocking condition operates continuously through ratification, not just at governance inception, as proven by PABS annex dispute|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Triggering events are sufficient to eventually produce domestic regulatory governance but cannot produce international treaty governance when Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are absent — demonstrated by COVID-19 producing domestic health governance reforms across major economies while failing to produce a binding international pandemic treaty 6 years after the largest triggering event in modern history
 
-COVID-19 provides the definitive test case: the largest triggering event in modern governance history (7+ million deaths, global economic disruption, maximum visibility and emotional resonance) produced strong domestic governance responses but failed to produce binding international governance after 6 years. Every major economy reformed pandemic preparedness legislation, created emergency authorization pathways, and expanded health system capacity — demonstrating that triggering events work at the domestic level as the pharmaceutical model predicts. However, at the international level: COVAX delivered 1.9 billion doses but failed its equity goal (62% coverage high-income vs. 2% low-income by mid-2021), structurally dependent on voluntary donations and subordinated to vaccine nationalism; IHR amendments (June 2024) were adopted but significantly diluted with weakened binding compliance after sovereignty objections; and the Pandemic Agreement (CA+) remains unsigned as of April 2026 despite negotiations beginning in 2021 with a May 2024 deadline, with PABS and equity obligations still unresolved. This is not advocacy failure but structural failure — the same sovereignty conflicts, competitive stakes (vaccine nationalism), and absence of commercial self-enforcement that prevent AI governance also prevented COVID governance at the international level. Cybersecurity provides 35-year confirmation: Stuxnet (2010), WannaCry (2017, 200,000+ targets in 150 countries), NotPetya (2017, $10B+ damage), SolarWinds (2020), and Colonial Pipeline (2021) produced zero binding international framework despite repeated triggering events, because cybersecurity has the same zero-conditions profile as AI (diffuse non-physical harms, high strategic utility, peak competitive stakes, no commercial network effects, attribution-resistant). The domestic/international split means AI governance faces compound difficulty: pharmaceutical-hard for domestic regulation AND cybersecurity-hard for international coordination, both simultaneously, with Level 1 progress unable to substitute for Level 2 progress on racing dynamics and existential risk.
+COVID-19 provides the definitive test case: the largest triggering event in modern governance history (7+ million deaths, global economic disruption, maximum visibility and emotional resonance) produced strong domestic governance responses but failed to produce binding international governance after 6 years. Every major economy reformed pandemic preparedness legislation, created emergency authorization pathways, and expanded health system capacity — demonstrating that triggering events work at the domestic level as the pharmaceutical model predicts. However, at the international level: COVAX delivered 1.9 billion doses but failed its equity goal (62% coverage high-income vs. 2% low-income by mid-2021), structurally dependent on voluntary donations and subordinated to vaccine nationalism; IHR amendments (June 2024) were adopted but significantly diluted with weakened binding compliance after sovereignty objections; and the Pandemic Agreement (CA+) remains unsigned as of April 2026 despite negotiations beginning in 2021 with a May 2024 deadline, with PABS and equity obligations still unresolved. This is not advocacy failure but structural failure — the same sovereignty conflicts, competitive stakes (vaccine nationalism), and absence of commercial self-enforcement that prevent AI governance also prevented COVID governance at the international level. Cybersecurity provides 35-year confirmation: Stuxnet (2010), WannaCry (2017, 200,000+ targets in 150 countries), NotPetya (2017, $10B+ damage), SolarWinds (2020), and Colonial Pipeline (2021) produced zero binding international framework despite repeated triggering events, because cybersecurity has the same zero-conditions profile as AI (diffuse non-physical harms, high strategic utility, peak competitive stakes, no commercial network effects, attribution-resistant). The domestic/international split means AI governance faces compound difficulty: pharmaceutical-hard for domestic regulation AND cybersecurity-hard for international coordination, both simultaneously, with Level 1 progress unable to substitute for Level 2 progress on racing dynamics and existential risk.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/health/ai-induced-deskilling-follows-consistent-cross-specialty-pattern-in-medicine.md b/domains/health/ai-induced-deskilling-follows-consistent-cross-specialty-pattern-in-medicine.md
index f0cf65379..332e77b13 100644
--- a/domains/health/ai-induced-deskilling-follows-consistent-cross-specialty-pattern-in-medicine.md
+++ b/domains/health/ai-induced-deskilling-follows-consistent-cross-specialty-pattern-in-medicine.md
@@ -11,15 +11,16 @@ scope: causal
 sourcer: Natali et al.
 related_claims: ["[[human-in-the-loop clinical AI degrades to worse-than-AI-alone because physicians both de-skill from reliance and introduce errors when overriding correct outputs]]"]
 supports:
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}"
 - Dopaminergic reinforcement of AI-assisted success creates motivational entrenchment that makes deskilling a behavioral incentive problem, not just a training design problem
 related:
 - Automation bias in medical imaging causes clinicians to anchor on AI output rather than conducting independent reads, increasing false-positive rates by up to 12 percent even among experienced readers
 reweave_edges:
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}"
 - Automation bias in medical imaging causes clinicians to anchor on AI output rather than conducting independent reads, increasing false-positive rates by up to 12 percent even among experienced readers|related|2026-04-14
 - Dopaminergic reinforcement of AI-assisted success creates motivational entrenchment that makes deskilling a behavioral incentive problem, not just a training design problem|supports|2026-04-14
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # AI-induced deskilling follows a consistent cross-specialty pattern where AI assistance improves performance while present but creates cognitive dependency that degrades performance when AI is unavailable
diff --git a/domains/health/clinical-ai-creates-three-distinct-skill-failure-modes-deskilling-misskilling-neverskilling.md b/domains/health/clinical-ai-creates-three-distinct-skill-failure-modes-deskilling-misskilling-neverskilling.md
index 5bb43e255..fb5af10aa 100644
--- a/domains/health/clinical-ai-creates-three-distinct-skill-failure-modes-deskilling-misskilling-neverskilling.md
+++ b/domains/health/clinical-ai-creates-three-distinct-skill-failure-modes-deskilling-misskilling-neverskilling.md
@@ -12,19 +12,20 @@ sourcer: Artificial Intelligence Review (Springer Nature)
 related_claims: ["[[human-in-the-loop clinical AI degrades to worse-than-AI-alone because physicians both de-skill from reliance and introduce errors when overriding correct outputs]]"]
 supports:
 - Never-skilling in clinical AI is structurally invisible because it lacks a pre-AI baseline for comparison, requiring prospective competency assessment before AI exposure to detect
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}"
 - AI-induced deskilling follows a consistent cross-specialty pattern where AI assistance improves performance while present but creates cognitive dependency that degrades performance when AI is unavailable
 - Automation bias in medical imaging causes clinicians to anchor on AI output rather than conducting independent reads, increasing false-positive rates by up to 12 percent even among experienced readers
 - Never-skilling — the failure to acquire foundational clinical competencies because AI was present during training — poses a detection-resistant, potentially unrecoverable threat to medical education that is structurally worse than deskilling
 reweave_edges:
 - Never-skilling in clinical AI is structurally invisible because it lacks a pre-AI baseline for comparison, requiring prospective competency assessment before AI exposure to detect|supports|2026-04-12
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}"
 - AI-induced deskilling follows a consistent cross-specialty pattern where AI assistance improves performance while present but creates cognitive dependency that degrades performance when AI is unavailable|supports|2026-04-14
 - Automation bias in medical imaging causes clinicians to anchor on AI output rather than conducting independent reads, increasing false-positive rates by up to 12 percent even among experienced readers|supports|2026-04-14
 - Never-skilling — the failure to acquire foundational clinical competencies because AI was present during training — poses a detection-resistant, potentially unrecoverable threat to medical education that is structurally worse than deskilling|supports|2026-04-14
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 related:
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}"
 ---
 
 # Clinical AI introduces three distinct skill failure modes — deskilling (existing expertise lost through disuse), mis-skilling (AI errors adopted as correct), and never-skilling (foundational competence never acquired) — requiring distinct mitigation strategies for each
diff --git a/domains/health/dopaminergic-reinforcement-of-ai-reliance-predicts-behavioral-entrenchment-beyond-simple-habit-formation.md b/domains/health/dopaminergic-reinforcement-of-ai-reliance-predicts-behavioral-entrenchment-beyond-simple-habit-formation.md
index 4db8460c7..74146f01a 100644
--- a/domains/health/dopaminergic-reinforcement-of-ai-reliance-predicts-behavioral-entrenchment-beyond-simple-habit-formation.md
+++ b/domains/health/dopaminergic-reinforcement-of-ai-reliance-predicts-behavioral-entrenchment-beyond-simple-habit-formation.md
@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ scope: causal
 sourcer: Frontiers in Medicine
 related_claims: ["[[human-in-the-loop clinical AI degrades to worse-than-AI-alone because physicians both de-skill from reliance and introduce errors when overriding correct outputs]]"]
 supports:
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}
-- {'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-14'}"
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'AI assistance may produce neurologically-grounded, partially irreversible skill degradation through three concurrent mechanisms': 'prefrontal disengagement, hippocampal memory formation reduction, and dopaminergic reinforcement of AI reliance|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Dopaminergic reinforcement of AI-assisted success creates motivational entrenchment that makes deskilling a behavioral incentive problem, not just a training design problem
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
index 7fd4e7a36..c0e8a9db4 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ domain: internet-finance
 created: 2026-03-04
 confidence: likely
 source: "MetaDAO Terms of Service, Founder/Operator Legal Pack, inbox research files, web research"
+related:
+- Futarchy Labs
+- Metaplex Genesis
+reweave_edges:
+- Futarchy Labs|related|2026-04-18
+- Metaplex Genesis|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO oversubscription is rational capital cycling under pro-rata not governance validation.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO oversubscription is rational capital cycling under pro-rata not governance validation.md
index 37ee1cf90..2ecbff65a 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO oversubscription is rational capital cycling under pro-rata not governance validation.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO oversubscription is rational capital cycling under pro-rata not governance validation.md	
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ source: "Alea Research, Pine Analytics Q4 2025 report, on-chain MetaDAO ICO data
 created: 2026-03-11
 updated: 2026-04-05
 replaces: "metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md"
+related:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution
+reweave_edges:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO oversubscription is rational capital cycling under pro-rata not governance validation
@@ -84,4 +88,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
index d9c9e6146..2ce97508f 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ domain: internet-finance
 created: 2026-02-16
 confidence: proven
 source: "Governance - Meritocratic Voting + Futarchy"
+related:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives
+reweave_edges:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?|related|2026-04-18
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/advisory-futarchy-avoids-selection-distortion-by-decoupling-prediction-from-execution.md b/domains/internet-finance/advisory-futarchy-avoids-selection-distortion-by-decoupling-prediction-from-execution.md
index f1b205f7d..26899ebee 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/advisory-futarchy-avoids-selection-distortion-by-decoupling-prediction-from-execution.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/advisory-futarchy-avoids-selection-distortion-by-decoupling-prediction-from-execution.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: causal
 sourcer: GnosisDAO, Futarchy Labs
 related_claims: ["futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-create-profitable-opportunities-for-defenders", "[[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]"]
+supports:
+- GnosisDAO
+reweave_edges:
+- GnosisDAO|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies
 
-GnosisDAO's GIP-145 implements 'Advisory Futarchy' where prediction market signals display alongside Snapshot votes but don't determine outcomes. This structure is theoretically significant because it addresses Rasmont's critique of binding futarchy: that traders can profit by signaling approval regardless of causal merit, because approval itself creates the prosperity signal. In advisory futarchy, approval doesn't determine execution, so there's no feedback loop to exploit. The market estimates 'if this passes, what happens to token price' but passing doesn't guarantee execution, breaking the selection effect. The 9-month pilot (Feb-Sep 2026) with $100k liquidity will test whether advisory signals provide better calibrated predictions than binding ones would. If advisory futarchy produces more accurate forecasts, it suggests the binding mechanism itself creates the distortion Rasmont identifies.
+GnosisDAO's GIP-145 implements 'Advisory Futarchy' where prediction market signals display alongside Snapshot votes but don't determine outcomes. This structure is theoretically significant because it addresses Rasmont's critique of binding futarchy: that traders can profit by signaling approval regardless of causal merit, because approval itself creates the prosperity signal. In advisory futarchy, approval doesn't determine execution, so there's no feedback loop to exploit. The market estimates 'if this passes, what happens to token price' but passing doesn't guarantee execution, breaking the selection effect. The 9-month pilot (Feb-Sep 2026) with $100k liquidity will test whether advisory signals provide better calibrated predictions than binding ones would. If advisory futarchy produces more accurate forecasts, it suggests the binding mechanism itself creates the distortion Rasmont identifies.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/algorithm-driven-social-feeds-create-attention-to-liquidity-conversion-in-meme-token-markets.md b/domains/internet-finance/algorithm-driven-social-feeds-create-attention-to-liquidity-conversion-in-meme-token-markets.md
index b24deb0e1..bfd336d62 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/algorithm-driven-social-feeds-create-attention-to-liquidity-conversion-in-meme-token-markets.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/algorithm-driven-social-feeds-create-attention-to-liquidity-conversion-in-meme-token-markets.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ confidence: speculative
 source: "Rio via futard.io Launchpet launch page (2026-03-05)"
 created: 2026-03-12
 secondary_domains: [cultural-dynamics]
+related:
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Algorithm-driven social feeds create attention-to-liquidity conversion in meme token markets
@@ -36,4 +40,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[futardio-cult-raised-11-4-million-in-one-day-through-futarchy-governed-meme-coin-launch]] — contrasting example where a futarchy meme launch succeeded at scale
 
 Topics:
-- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
index a2679cc94..0e5a2d814 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal by joebuild, 2024-01-24"
 created: 2024-01-24
 related:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs
+- high fee amms create lp incentive and manipulation deterrent simultaneously by making passive provision profitable and active trading expensive
 reweave_edges:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs|related|2026-04-04
+- high fee amms create lp incentive and manipulation deterrent simultaneously by making passive provision profitable and active trading expensive|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # AMM futarchy bootstraps liquidity through high fee incentives and required proposer initial liquidity creating self-reinforcing depth
@@ -53,4 +55,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/archer-exchange-implements-dedicated-writable-only-order-books-per-market-maker-enabling-permissionless-on-chain-matching.md b/domains/internet-finance/archer-exchange-implements-dedicated-writable-only-order-books-per-market-maker-enabling-permissionless-on-chain-matching.md
index cd447c47b..f18eacbfb 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/archer-exchange-implements-dedicated-writable-only-order-books-per-market-maker-enabling-permissionless-on-chain-matching.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/archer-exchange-implements-dedicated-writable-only-order-books-per-market-maker-enabling-permissionless-on-chain-matching.md
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ source: "Dhrumil (@mmdhrumil), Archer Exchange co-founder, X archive 2026-03-09"
 created: 2026-03-11
 supports:
 - Archer Exchange
+- Dhrumil
 reweave_edges:
 - Archer Exchange|supports|2026-04-04
+- Dhrumil|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Archer Exchange implements dedicated writable-only-by-you order books per market maker enabling permissionless on-chain matching
@@ -39,4 +41,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework.md b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework.md
index f6634d95f..93894b6ca 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Federal Register / Gambling Insider / Law Firm Analyses
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]", "futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders", "[[futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]]"]
+supports:
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse
+reweave_edges:
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms
 
-The CFTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on prediction markets (RIN 3038-AF65, filed March 16, 2026) has received 750+ comments as of early April 2026, with dominant framing focused on gambling harms, addiction, market manipulation, and public interest concerns following mobilization by consumer advocacy groups and sports betting opponents. Multiple major law firms (Norton Rose Fulbright, Sidley, Crowell & Moring, WilmerHale, Davis Wright Tremaine) are analyzing the ANPRM as a significant regulatory inflection point, but all focus on Kalshi-style event markets (sports, politics, economics). Zero comments have been filed distinguishing futarchy governance markets—conditional prediction markets for treasury decisions, capital allocation, organizational governance—from event betting markets. The ANPRM's 40 questions contain no questions about smart-contract-based governance markets, DAOs, or corporate decision applications. This creates a critical advocacy gap: the comment record that will shape how the CFTC exercises its expanded (3rd Circuit-confirmed) jurisdiction over prediction markets contains only anti-gambling retail commentary and event market industry responses. Futarchy governance markets will receive default treatment under whatever framework emerges—likely the most restrictive category by default, because the governance function argument that distinguishes futarchy markets from sports prediction is not in the comment record. The April 30, 2026 deadline makes this time-bounded: the regulatory framework will be built on the input received, and governance markets are currently invisible in that input.
+The CFTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on prediction markets (RIN 3038-AF65, filed March 16, 2026) has received 750+ comments as of early April 2026, with dominant framing focused on gambling harms, addiction, market manipulation, and public interest concerns following mobilization by consumer advocacy groups and sports betting opponents. Multiple major law firms (Norton Rose Fulbright, Sidley, Crowell & Moring, WilmerHale, Davis Wright Tremaine) are analyzing the ANPRM as a significant regulatory inflection point, but all focus on Kalshi-style event markets (sports, politics, economics). Zero comments have been filed distinguishing futarchy governance markets—conditional prediction markets for treasury decisions, capital allocation, organizational governance—from event betting markets. The ANPRM's 40 questions contain no questions about smart-contract-based governance markets, DAOs, or corporate decision applications. This creates a critical advocacy gap: the comment record that will shape how the CFTC exercises its expanded (3rd Circuit-confirmed) jurisdiction over prediction markets contains only anti-gambling retail commentary and event market industry responses. Futarchy governance markets will receive default treatment under whatever framework emerges—likely the most restrictive category by default, because the governance function argument that distinguishes futarchy markets from sports prediction is not in the comment record. The April 30, 2026 deadline makes this time-bounded: the regulatory framework will be built on the input received, and governance markets are currently invisible in that input.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-multi-state-litigation-represents-qualitative-shift-from-regulatory-drafting-to-active-jurisdictional-defense.md b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-multi-state-litigation-represents-qualitative-shift-from-regulatory-drafting-to-active-jurisdictional-defense.md
index 367d3a0dc..c2cbcff67 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/cftc-multi-state-litigation-represents-qualitative-shift-from-regulatory-drafting-to-active-jurisdictional-defense.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/cftc-multi-state-litigation-represents-qualitative-shift-from-regulatory-drafting-to-active-jurisdictional-defense.md
@@ -9,8 +9,15 @@ title: The CFTC's multi-state litigation posture represents a qualitative shift
 agent: rio
 scope: functional
 sourcer: CNBC
+supports:
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law
+related:
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition
+reweave_edges:
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition|related|2026-04-18
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # The CFTC's multi-state litigation posture represents a qualitative shift from regulatory rule-drafting to active jurisdictional defense of prediction markets
 
-The CFTC has filed suit against Arizona, Connecticut, and Illinois to block their state attempts to regulate prediction markets under gambling frameworks. The agent notes flag this as 'an unusually aggressive litigation posture for an independent regulator'—specifically noting that 'an independent regulator suing three states on behalf of a private company's business model' is rare. This suggests the Trump-era CFTC views prediction market regulation as strategically important, not just technically within their jurisdiction. This is a behavioral shift from the traditional regulatory approach of issuing rules and guidance to actively litigating against state-level opposition. The timing—concurrent with the CFTC ANPRM comment period closing April 30, 2026—suggests coordinated jurisdictional defense.
+The CFTC has filed suit against Arizona, Connecticut, and Illinois to block their state attempts to regulate prediction markets under gambling frameworks. The agent notes flag this as 'an unusually aggressive litigation posture for an independent regulator'—specifically noting that 'an independent regulator suing three states on behalf of a private company's business model' is rare. This suggests the Trump-era CFTC views prediction market regulation as strategically important, not just technically within their jurisdiction. This is a behavioral shift from the traditional regulatory approach of issuing rules and guidance to actively litigating against state-level opposition. The timing—concurrent with the CFTC ANPRM comment period closing April 30, 2026—suggests coordinated jurisdictional defense.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md b/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md
index 459920435..bf4ccc9c8 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+related:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias
+reweave_edges:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously|related|2026-04-18
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Vitalik Buterin once noted that "pure futarchy has proven difficult to introduce, because in practice objective functions are very difficult to define (it's not just coin price that people want!)." For asset futarchy governing valuable holdings, this objection misses the point. Coin price is not merely acceptable—it is the fairest and most elegant objective function, and probably the only acceptable one for DAOs holding valuable assets.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-market-selection-bias-is-mitigatable-through-decision-maker-market-participation-timing-transparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection.md b/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-market-selection-bias-is-mitigatable-through-decision-maker-market-participation-timing-transparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection.md
index 13b948a7c..c2d8e8100 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-market-selection-bias-is-mitigatable-through-decision-maker-market-participation-timing-transparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-market-selection-bias-is-mitigatable-through-decision-maker-market-participation-timing-transparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection.md
@@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Robin Hanson
 related_claims: ["futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-create-profitable-opportunities-for-defenders", "[[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]"]
+supports:
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals
+related:
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal
+reweave_edges:
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal|related|2026-04-18
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
 
-Hanson identifies that selection bias in decision markets arises specifically 'when the decision is made using different info than the market prices' — when decision-makers possess private information not reflected in market prices at decision time. He proposes three practical mitigations: (1) Decision-makers trade in the conditional markets themselves, revealing their private information through their bets and reducing information asymmetry. (2) Clear decision timing signals allow markets to know exactly when and how decisions will be made, reducing anticipatory pricing distortions. (3) Approximately 5% random rejection of proposals that would otherwise pass creates a randomization mechanism that reduces selection correlation without requiring the 50%+ randomization that would make the system impractical. This framework predates Rasmont's January 2026 'Futarchy is Parasitic' critique by one month and provides the strongest existing rebuttal to the structural bias concern. Critically, Hanson's mitigations work through information revelation mechanisms rather than manipulation-resistance — they assume the problem is solvable through better information flow, not just arbitrage opportunities. However, Hanson does not address the case where the objective function is endogenous to the market (MetaDAO's coin-price objective), which is central to Rasmont's critique.
+Hanson identifies that selection bias in decision markets arises specifically 'when the decision is made using different info than the market prices' — when decision-makers possess private information not reflected in market prices at decision time. He proposes three practical mitigations: (1) Decision-makers trade in the conditional markets themselves, revealing their private information through their bets and reducing information asymmetry. (2) Clear decision timing signals allow markets to know exactly when and how decisions will be made, reducing anticipatory pricing distortions. (3) Approximately 5% random rejection of proposals that would otherwise pass creates a randomization mechanism that reduces selection correlation without requiring the 50%+ randomization that would make the system impractical. This framework predates Rasmont's January 2026 'Futarchy is Parasitic' critique by one month and provides the strongest existing rebuttal to the structural bias concern. Critically, Hanson's mitigations work through information revelation mechanisms rather than manipulation-resistance — they assume the problem is solvable through better information flow, not just arbitrage opportunities. However, Hanson does not address the case where the objective function is endogenous to the market (MetaDAO's coin-price objective), which is central to Rasmont's critique.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md b/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md
index 6b5a045e3..933d56673 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md
@@ -12,8 +12,18 @@ sourcer: Nicolas Rasmont
 related_claims: ["[[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]", "[[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]]", "[[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]", "[[called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification]]"]
 supports:
 - Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies
+- Nicolas Rasmont
 reweave_edges:
 - Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies|supports|2026-04-17
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|related|2026-04-18
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals|challenges|2026-04-18
+- Mikhail Samin|related|2026-04-18
+- Nicolas Rasmont|supports|2026-04-18
+challenges:
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals
+related:
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
+- Mikhail Samin
 ---
 
 # Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/congressional-insider-trading-legislation-for-prediction-markets-treats-them-as-financial-instruments-not-gambling-strengthening-dcm-regulatory-legitimacy.md b/domains/internet-finance/congressional-insider-trading-legislation-for-prediction-markets-treats-them-as-financial-instruments-not-gambling-strengthening-dcm-regulatory-legitimacy.md
index 8b4f7bead..8c664ed1f 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/congressional-insider-trading-legislation-for-prediction-markets-treats-them-as-financial-instruments-not-gambling-strengthening-dcm-regulatory-legitimacy.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/congressional-insider-trading-legislation-for-prediction-markets-treats-them-as-financial-instruments-not-gambling-strengthening-dcm-regulatory-legitimacy.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Rep. Ritchie Torres
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]"]
+related:
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition
+reweave_edges:
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy
 
-Rep. Ritchie Torres introduced the Public Integrity in Financial Prediction Markets Act of 2026 to bar federal employees and elected officials from trading on political outcomes they might influence. The bill explicitly applies to DCM-designated platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket. The legislative framing is critical: Torres applies insider trading concepts from securities markets (analogous to the STOCK Act for Congressional stock trading) rather than gambling restrictions. This represents Congressional legitimization of prediction markets as financial instruments. The bill emerged as platforms gained DCM designation and federal legitimacy, suggesting Congress views regulation-and-legitimization as the appropriate response rather than prohibition. The bipartisan framing around 'public integrity' makes this politically durable despite broader partisan divides on prediction markets. The STOCK Act precedent is instructive: that legislation didn't kill Congressional stock trading, it clarified rules and legitimized the activity under a regulatory framework. The Torres bill follows the same pattern for prediction markets.
+Rep. Ritchie Torres introduced the Public Integrity in Financial Prediction Markets Act of 2026 to bar federal employees and elected officials from trading on political outcomes they might influence. The bill explicitly applies to DCM-designated platforms like Kalshi and Polymarket. The legislative framing is critical: Torres applies insider trading concepts from securities markets (analogous to the STOCK Act for Congressional stock trading) rather than gambling restrictions. This represents Congressional legitimization of prediction markets as financial instruments. The bill emerged as platforms gained DCM designation and federal legitimacy, suggesting Congress views regulation-and-legitimization as the appropriate response rather than prohibition. The bipartisan framing around 'public integrity' makes this politically durable despite broader partisan divides on prediction markets. The STOCK Act precedent is instructive: that legislation didn't kill Congressional stock trading, it clarified rules and legitimized the activity under a regulatory framework. The Torres bill follows the same pattern for prediction markets.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/constant-rate-approximation-of-time-varying-arrivals-causes-systematic-staffing-errors.md b/domains/internet-finance/constant-rate-approximation-of-time-varying-arrivals-causes-systematic-staffing-errors.md
index 42ede5c54..f7467b789 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/constant-rate-approximation-of-time-varying-arrivals-causes-systematic-staffing-errors.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/constant-rate-approximation-of-time-varying-arrivals-causes-systematic-staffing-errors.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Using max or average rate instead of time-varying rate leads to ch
 confidence: proven
 source: "Liu et al. (NC State), 'Modeling and Simulation of Nonstationary Non-Poisson Arrival Processes' (2019)"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks
+reweave_edges:
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Constant rate approximation of time-varying arrivals causes systematic staffing errors
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/cryptographic-stake-weighted-trust-enables-autonomous-agent-coordination-in-objectively-verifiable-domains-because-agentrank-adapts-pagerank-to-computational-contribution.md b/domains/internet-finance/cryptographic-stake-weighted-trust-enables-autonomous-agent-coordination-in-objectively-verifiable-domains-because-agentrank-adapts-pagerank-to-computational-contribution.md
index 1523def66..c2e5e2162 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/cryptographic-stake-weighted-trust-enables-autonomous-agent-coordination-in-objectively-verifiable-domains-because-agentrank-adapts-pagerank-to-computational-contribution.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/cryptographic-stake-weighted-trust-enables-autonomous-agent-coordination-in-objectively-verifiable-domains-because-agentrank-adapts-pagerank-to-computational-contribution.md
@@ -9,12 +9,16 @@ secondary_domains:
   - ai-alignment
   - mechanisms
 depends_on:
-  - "expert staking in Living Capital uses Numerai-style bounded burns for performance and escalating dispute bonds for fraud creating accountability without deterring participation"
+- expert staking in Living Capital uses Numerai-style bounded burns for performance and escalating dispute bonds for fraud creating accountability without deterring participation
 flagged_for:
   - theseus
 challenged_by:
-  - "Single empirical test (333 experiments, 35 agents). Scale and adversarial robustness are untested."
-  - "Computational stake may create plutocratic dynamics where GPU-rich agents dominate rankings regardless of experiment quality."
+- Single empirical test (333 experiments, 35 agents). Scale and adversarial robustness are untested.
+- Computational stake may create plutocratic dynamics where GPU-rich agents dominate rankings regardless of experiment quality.
+supports:
+- Hyperspace
+reweave_edges:
+- Hyperspace|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Cryptographic stake-weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively-verifiable domains because AgentRank adapts PageRank to computational contribution
@@ -47,4 +51,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
-- [[coordination mechanisms]]
+- [[coordination mechanisms]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md b/domains/internet-finance/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md
index 10406e53d..6a8a3670f 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+related:
+- DeFi insurance hybrid claims assessment routes clear exploits to automation and ambiguous disputes to governance, resolving the speed-fairness tradeoff
+reweave_edges:
+- DeFi insurance hybrid claims assessment routes clear exploits to automation and ambiguous disputes to governance, resolving the speed-fairness tradeoff|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Decision markets create a mechanism where attempting to steal from minority holders becomes a losing trade. The four conditional tokens (fABC, pABC, pUSD, fUSD) establish a constraint: for a treasury-raiding proposal to pass, pABC/pUSD must trade higher than fABC/fUSD. But from any rational perspective, 1 fABC is worth 1 ABC (DAO continues normally) while 1 pABC is worth 0 (DAO becomes empty after raid).
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index e8bb5e512..5113a9ea9 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Rio Futarchy Experiment"
 confidence: experimental
 tradition: "futarchy, behavioral economics, market microstructure"
+related:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment
+reweave_edges:
+- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?|related|2026-04-18
+- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives|related|2026-04-18
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Futarchy faces three concrete adoption barriers that compound to limit participation: token price psychology, proposal creation difficulty, and liquidity requirements. These aren't theoretical concerns but observed friction in MetaDAO's implementation.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md
index 56b86da83..8f26a1493 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: internet-finance
 created: 2026-02-28
 confidence: experimental
 source: "LivingIP Master Plan"
+related:
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants
+reweave_edges:
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control
@@ -42,4 +46,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
-- [[LivingIP architecture]]
+- [[LivingIP architecture]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md
index b0e2edcc7..776692c03 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Estimating token value under pass versus fail conditions involves
 confidence: likely
 source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024-01-24"
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive
+reweave_edges:
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy CLOB liquidity fragmentation creates wide spreads because pricing counterfactual governance outcomes has inherent uncertainty
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md
index 1c9b904ef..48d8c4c15 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md
@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ description: "Optimism's futarchy experiment outperformed traditional grants by
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), 21-day experiment with 430 forecasters"
 created: 2025-06-12
-depends_on: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
+depends_on:
+- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
+related:
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously
+reweave_edges:
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy excels at relative selection but fails at absolute prediction because ordinal ranking works while cardinal estimation requires calibration
@@ -80,4 +85,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- foundations/collective-intelligence/_map
+- foundations/collective-intelligence/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-create-insider-trading-paradox-because-informed-governance-participants-are-simultaneously-the-most-valuable-traders-and-the-most-restricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-create-insider-trading-paradox-because-informed-governance-participants-are-simultaneously-the-most-valuable-traders-and-the-most-restricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md
index 4eb034b80..8115f9fef 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-create-insider-trading-paradox-because-informed-governance-participants-are-simultaneously-the-most-valuable-traders-and-the-most-restricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-create-insider-trading-paradox-because-informed-governance-participants-are-simultaneously-the-most-valuable-traders-and-the-most-restricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md
@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@ challenged_by:
 related:
 - insider-trading-in-futarchy-improves-governance-by-accelerating-ground-truth-incorporation-into-conditional-markets
 - stock-markets-function-despite-20-40-percent-insider-trading-proving-information-asymmetry-does-not-break-price-discovery
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy
+reweave_edges:
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy governance markets create insider trading paradox because informed governance participants are simultaneously the most valuable traders and the most restricted under insider trading frameworks
 
-The Torres Act's insider trading logic creates a structural problem when applied to futarchy governance markets. In corporate prediction markets about external events, insider trading rules make sense: federal officials with non-public information about policy decisions shouldn't trade on those outcomes. But in futarchy, the token holders who vote on proposals are by definition 'insiders' — they can influence the outcomes that prediction markets are forecasting. If Torres-style insider trading logic were extended to governance markets, it would require governance participants to not trade on governance outcomes. This creates a paradox: the people with the most information and influence (active governance participants) would be excluded from the markets designed to aggregate their information. This is likely NOT the legislative intent of the Torres bill, which targets federal officials with unique non-public information about government decisions, not DAO token holders whose influence is public and on-chain. However, the conceptual tension reveals a boundary condition for futarchy adoption: as governance prediction markets gain regulatory legitimacy, they may face pressure to restrict trading by 'insiders' (governance token holders), which would undermine the core mechanism. The resolution likely requires distinguishing between non-public information asymmetry (which insider trading rules target) and public governance influence (which futarchy requires).
+The Torres Act's insider trading logic creates a structural problem when applied to futarchy governance markets. In corporate prediction markets about external events, insider trading rules make sense: federal officials with non-public information about policy decisions shouldn't trade on those outcomes. But in futarchy, the token holders who vote on proposals are by definition 'insiders' — they can influence the outcomes that prediction markets are forecasting. If Torres-style insider trading logic were extended to governance markets, it would require governance participants to not trade on governance outcomes. This creates a paradox: the people with the most information and influence (active governance participants) would be excluded from the markets designed to aggregate their information. This is likely NOT the legislative intent of the Torres bill, which targets federal officials with unique non-public information about government decisions, not DAO token holders whose influence is public and on-chain. However, the conceptual tension reveals a boundary condition for futarchy adoption: as governance prediction markets gain regulatory legitimacy, they may face pressure to restrict trading by 'insiders' (governance token holders), which would undermine the core mechanism. The resolution likely requires distinguishing between non-public information asymmetry (which insider trading rules target) and public governance influence (which futarchy requires).
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md
index 130c567d7..3bf116d8b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md	
@@ -6,11 +6,15 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "rio, based on Ranger Finance liquidation proposal on MetaDAO (Mar 2026)"
 created: 2026-03-05
 depends_on:
-  - "Ranger Finance liquidation proposal — 97% pass likelihood, $581K volume"
-  - "Material misrepresentation evidence: $5B projected vs $2B actual volume, $2M vs $500K revenue"
-  - "On-chain evidence of activity collapse post-ICO announcement (farmers not users)"
+- Ranger Finance liquidation proposal — 97% pass likelihood, $581K volume
+- "Material misrepresentation evidence: $5B projected vs $2B actual volume, $2M vs $500K revenue"
+- On-chain evidence of activity collapse post-ICO announcement (farmers not users)
 challenged_by:
-  - "Single case — may not generalize to less clear-cut misrepresentations"
+- Single case — may not generalize to less clear-cut misrepresentations
+related:
+- FairScale
+reweave_edges:
+- FairScale|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent
@@ -73,4 +77,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs]] — the team had no viable path to prevent liquidation through market manipulation
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md
index fdc6f1331..8cce37c57 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ description: Human judgment layer resolves ambiguity in automated reward systems
 confidence: experimental
 source: Drift Futarchy proposal execution structure
 created: 2026-03-15
+supports:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs'}"
+related:
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming|related|2026-04-18
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override because pure algorithmic distribution cannot handle edge cases or gaming attempts
@@ -29,4 +38,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
index c82448da6..525a5e5b4 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
@@ -6,8 +6,12 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "Rio; FutureDAO Champions NFT Collection proposal (2024-07-18, passed 2024-07-22)"
 created: 2026-03-12
 depends_on:
-  - "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window"
-  - "coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy"
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window
+- coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy
+related:
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # futarchy markets can price cultural spending proposals by treating community cohesion and brand equity as token price inputs
@@ -69,4 +73,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — limits of futarchy for operational decisions
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
index 6d5b1aac1..c8c5c0baa 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ description: Three-month clawback period filters for proposals that create lasti
 confidence: experimental
 source: Drift Futarchy proposal structure
 created: 2026-03-15
+related:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs'}"
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override|related|2026-04-18
+- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming because immediate rewards enable proposal spam for token extraction rather than quality governance
@@ -24,4 +32,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md
index f5d2d2030..5456467fc 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ description: Token distributions to historical participants leverage behavioral
 confidence: experimental
 source: Drift Futarchy proposal, endowment effect literature
 created: 2026-03-15
+supports:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs'}"
+related:
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Drift': 'Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override|related|2026-04-18
+- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect by converting past engagement into token holdings that create psychological ownership
@@ -23,4 +32,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futuredao-token-migrator-enables-community-takeovers-through-structured-on-chain-migration-with-presale-fundraising-and-conditional-success-thresholds.md b/domains/internet-finance/futuredao-token-migrator-enables-community-takeovers-through-structured-on-chain-migration-with-presale-fundraising-and-conditional-success-thresholds.md
index 0cffba046..cddd17103 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futuredao-token-migrator-enables-community-takeovers-through-structured-on-chain-migration-with-presale-fundraising-and-conditional-success-thresholds.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futuredao-token-migrator-enables-community-takeovers-through-structured-on-chain-migration-with-presale-fundraising-and-conditional-success-thresholds.md
@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@ description: "FutureDAO's token migrator combines on-chain token swaps with pres
 confidence: experimental
 source: "FutureDAO proposal on futard.io, 2024-06-05"
 created: 2024-06-05
+supports:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program'}"
+- FutureDAO
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- FutureDAO|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # FutureDAO token migrator enables community takeovers through structured on-chain migration with presale fundraising and conditional success thresholds
@@ -26,4 +32,4 @@ This mechanism differs from informal community takeovers by providing on-chain e
 ---
 
 Topics:
-- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-freeze-seize-requirement-creates-mandatory-control-surface-conflicting-with-autonomous-smart-contract-coordination.md b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-freeze-seize-requirement-creates-mandatory-control-surface-conflicting-with-autonomous-smart-contract-coordination.md
index ac19885ff..e09c5faec 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-freeze-seize-requirement-creates-mandatory-control-surface-conflicting-with-autonomous-smart-contract-coordination.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-freeze-seize-requirement-creates-mandatory-control-surface-conflicting-with-autonomous-smart-contract-coordination.md
@@ -10,8 +10,14 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Nellie Liang, Brookings Institution
 related_claims: ["internet-finance-is-an-industry-transition-from-traditional-finance-where-the-attractor-state-replaces-intermediaries-with-programmable-coordination-and-market-tested-governance"]
+related:
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter
+reweave_edges:
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers|related|2026-04-18
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination
 
-The GENIUS Act (enacted July 18, 2025) requires all stablecoin issuers to maintain technological capability to freeze and seize stablecoins in compliance with lawful orders. This creates a mandatory backdoor into programmable payment infrastructure that directly conflicts with the trust-minimization premise of autonomous smart contract coordination. The requirement applies universally to both bank and nonbank issuers, meaning there is no regulatory path to fully autonomous payment rails. This represents a fundamental architectural constraint on the programmable coordination attractor state at the settlement layer—the system can be programmable, but it cannot be autonomous from state control. The freeze/seize capability is not optional compliance; it is a structural prerequisite for legal operation, making it impossible to build payment infrastructure that operates purely through code without human override mechanisms.
+The GENIUS Act (enacted July 18, 2025) requires all stablecoin issuers to maintain technological capability to freeze and seize stablecoins in compliance with lawful orders. This creates a mandatory backdoor into programmable payment infrastructure that directly conflicts with the trust-minimization premise of autonomous smart contract coordination. The requirement applies universally to both bank and nonbank issuers, meaning there is no regulatory path to fully autonomous payment rails. This represents a fundamental architectural constraint on the programmable coordination attractor state at the settlement layer—the system can be programmable, but it cannot be autonomous from state control. The freeze/seize capability is not optional compliance; it is a structural prerequisite for legal operation, making it impossible to build payment infrastructure that operates purely through code without human override mechanisms.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-public-company-restriction-creates-asymmetric-big-tech-barrier-while-permitting-private-non-financial-issuers.md b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-public-company-restriction-creates-asymmetric-big-tech-barrier-while-permitting-private-non-financial-issuers.md
index ddb21696a..8ff02317f 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-public-company-restriction-creates-asymmetric-big-tech-barrier-while-permitting-private-non-financial-issuers.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-public-company-restriction-creates-asymmetric-big-tech-barrier-while-permitting-private-non-financial-issuers.md
@@ -9,8 +9,14 @@ title: GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier
 agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Nellie Liang, Brookings Institution
+related:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter
+reweave_edges:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination|related|2026-04-18
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers
 
-The GENIUS Act effectively bars publicly-traded non-financial companies (Apple, Google, Amazon) from issuing stablecoins without unanimous Stablecoin Certification Review Committee vote. However, privately-held non-financial companies face no equivalent restriction. This creates a notable asymmetry: the law targets Big Tech specifically through public company status rather than through size, market power, or systemic risk metrics. A privately-held company with equivalent scale and market position would face lower barriers. This suggests the restriction is driven by political economy concerns about Big Tech platform power rather than financial stability concerns, since the risk profile of a large private issuer could be identical to a public one. The asymmetry also creates an incentive for large tech companies to structure stablecoin operations through private subsidiaries rather than direct issuance.
+The GENIUS Act effectively bars publicly-traded non-financial companies (Apple, Google, Amazon) from issuing stablecoins without unanimous Stablecoin Certification Review Committee vote. However, privately-held non-financial companies face no equivalent restriction. This creates a notable asymmetry: the law targets Big Tech specifically through public company status rather than through size, market power, or systemic risk metrics. A privately-held company with equivalent scale and market position would face lower barriers. This suggests the restriction is driven by political economy concerns about Big Tech platform power rather than financial stability concerns, since the risk profile of a large private issuer could be identical to a public one. The asymmetry also creates an incentive for large tech companies to structure stablecoin operations through private subsidiaries rather than direct issuance.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-reserve-custody-creates-indirect-banking-dependency-for-nonbank-stablecoin-issuers.md b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-reserve-custody-creates-indirect-banking-dependency-for-nonbank-stablecoin-issuers.md
index 76c47d866..0125ce047 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-reserve-custody-creates-indirect-banking-dependency-for-nonbank-stablecoin-issuers.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/genius-act-reserve-custody-creates-indirect-banking-dependency-for-nonbank-stablecoin-issuers.md
@@ -10,8 +10,17 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Nellie Liang, Brookings Institution
 related_claims: ["internet-finance-is-an-industry-transition-from-traditional-finance-where-the-attractor-state-replaces-intermediaries-with-programmable-coordination-and-market-tested-governance"]
+supports:
+- National trust charters enable crypto exchanges to bypass congressional gridlock through federal banking infrastructure
+related:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers
+reweave_edges:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination|related|2026-04-18
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers|related|2026-04-18
+- National trust charters enable crypto exchanges to bypass congressional gridlock through federal banking infrastructure|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter
 
-The GENIUS Act establishes a nonbank pathway through OCC direct approval (Section 5) for 'Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuers'—Circle, Paxos, and three others received conditional national trust bank charters in December 2025. However, reserve assets must be held at entities subject to federal or state banking regulator oversight. Nonbank stablecoin issuers cannot self-custody reserves outside the banking system. This creates indirect banking system lock-in through the custody layer rather than the charter layer. The law is more permissive than a full bank-charter requirement, but the reserve custody dependency means nonbank issuers remain structurally dependent on banking intermediaries for settlement infrastructure. This is a softer form of entrenchment than direct charter requirements, but it still prevents full disintermediation at the custody layer.
+The GENIUS Act establishes a nonbank pathway through OCC direct approval (Section 5) for 'Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuers'—Circle, Paxos, and three others received conditional national trust bank charters in December 2025. However, reserve assets must be held at entities subject to federal or state banking regulator oversight. Nonbank stablecoin issuers cannot self-custody reserves outside the banking system. This creates indirect banking system lock-in through the custody layer rather than the charter layer. The law is more permissive than a full bank-charter requirement, but the reserve custody dependency means nonbank issuers remain structurally dependent on banking intermediaries for settlement infrastructure. This is a softer form of entrenchment than direct charter requirements, but it still prevents full disintermediation at the custody layer.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection.md b/domains/internet-finance/hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection.md
index 5405cc1f6..3e632b410 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection.md
@@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ agent: rio
 scope: functional
 sourcer: Robin Hanson
 related_claims: ["[[conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects]]"]
+supports:
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
+related:
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal
+reweave_edges:
+- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|supports|2026-04-18
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals
 
-Robin Hanson acknowledged the conditional-vs-causal problem in December 2024, two months before Rasmont's formal critique. His proposed solution has three components: (1) decision-makers should trade in the markets themselves to reveal their private information about the decision process, (2) the decision moment should be clearly signaled so markets can price the information differential, and (3) approximately 5% of proposals that would otherwise be approved should be randomly rejected. Hanson notes the problem 'only arises when the decision is made using different info than the market prices.' The random rejection mechanism is intended to create counterfactual observations, though Hanson does not address how this interacts with a coin-price objective function or whether 5% is sufficient to overcome strong selection correlations. This predates Rasmont's Bronze Bull formulation and represents the most developed pre-Rasmont response to the causal-inference problem in futarchy.
+Robin Hanson acknowledged the conditional-vs-causal problem in December 2024, two months before Rasmont's formal critique. His proposed solution has three components: (1) decision-makers should trade in the markets themselves to reveal their private information about the decision process, (2) the decision moment should be clearly signaled so markets can price the information differential, and (3) approximately 5% of proposals that would otherwise be approved should be randomly rejected. Hanson notes the problem 'only arises when the decision is made using different info than the market prices.' The random rejection mechanism is intended to create counterfactual observations, though Hanson does not address how this interacts with a coin-price objective function or whether 5% is sufficient to overcome strong selection correlations. This predates Rasmont's Bronze Bull formulation and represents the most developed pre-Rasmont response to the causal-inference problem in futarchy.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
index cd07b5e94..8cc1c403e 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "3-5 percent swap fees in futarchy AMMs reward liquidity providers
 confidence: experimental
 source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024-01-24"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive
+reweave_edges:
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # High-fee AMMs create LP incentive and manipulation deterrent simultaneously by making passive provision profitable and active trading expensive
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start-by-letting-protocol-take-counterparty-risk-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md b/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start-by-letting-protocol-take-counterparty-risk-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md
index 133ed627e..9c504c75d 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start-by-letting-protocol-take-counterparty-risk-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start-by-letting-protocol-take-counterparty-risk-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md
@@ -17,7 +17,11 @@ processed_date: 2026-03-05
 sources:
   - "[[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-tridash]]"
 depends_on:
-  - "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+- "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+supports:
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk
+reweave_edges:
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-against-protocol-enables-prediction-markets-to-function-with-uneven-liquidity-by-having-the-platform-take-counterparty-risk.md b/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-against-protocol-enables-prediction-markets-to-function-with-uneven-liquidity-by-having-the-platform-take-counterparty-risk.md
index 53eec90c6..0804700fc 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-against-protocol-enables-prediction-markets-to-function-with-uneven-liquidity-by-having-the-platform-take-counterparty-risk.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-against-protocol-enables-prediction-markets-to-function-with-uneven-liquidity-by-having-the-platform-take-counterparty-risk.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "TriDash's house mode shows prediction markets can bootstrap throug
 confidence: experimental
 source: "TriDash game modes description via futard.io, 2026-03-05"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
+reweave_edges:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # House mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/hybrid-flow-shop-scheduling-with-simple-dispatching-rules-performs-within-5-10-percent-of-optimal-for-homogeneous-workers.md b/domains/internet-finance/hybrid-flow-shop-scheduling-with-simple-dispatching-rules-performs-within-5-10-percent-of-optimal-for-homogeneous-workers.md
index d646648b1..0145e7ba4 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/hybrid-flow-shop-scheduling-with-simple-dispatching-rules-performs-within-5-10-percent-of-optimal-for-homogeneous-workers.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/hybrid-flow-shop-scheduling-with-simple-dispatching-rules-performs-within-5-10-percent-of-optimal-for-homogeneous-workers.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Operations research shows simple priority rules suffice for pipeli
 confidence: likely
 source: "ScienceDirect review article on Flexible Job Shop Scheduling Problem, 2023"
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- general job shop scheduling is np complete for more than two machines
+reweave_edges:
+- general job shop scheduling is np complete for more than two machines|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Hybrid flow-shop scheduling with simple dispatching rules performs within 5-10 percent of optimal for homogeneous workers
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ico-whale-concentration-creates-reflexive-governance-risk-through-conditional-market-manipulation.md b/domains/internet-finance/ico-whale-concentration-creates-reflexive-governance-risk-through-conditional-market-manipulation.md
index 739d07ab6..7c93da540 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/ico-whale-concentration-creates-reflexive-governance-risk-through-conditional-market-manipulation.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/ico-whale-concentration-creates-reflexive-governance-risk-through-conditional-market-manipulation.md
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "jussy_world"
       context: "@jussy_world, P2P.me ICO data showing 10 wallets filled 93% of $5.3M raise"
+supports:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution
+reweave_edges:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # ICO whale concentration creates reflexive governance risk through conditional market manipulation because concentrated capital holders can profitably manipulate futarchy markets when their holdings exceed market depth
@@ -42,4 +46,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - fixed-target-ico-capital-concentration-creates-whale-dominance-reflexivity-risk-because-small-contributor-counts-mask-extreme-capital-distribution.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse.md b/domains/internet-finance/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse.md
index c2733fb2a..24a317acd 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse.md	
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ related:
 - value is doubly unstable because both market prices and the underlying relevance of commodities shift with the knowledge landscape
 supports:
 - when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework
 reweave_edges:
 - when you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution|supports|2026-04-17
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
index 73e5e324b..1df11da32 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024
 created: 2026-03-11
 related:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive
 reweave_edges:
 - amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements|related|2026-04-04
+- liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Liquidity-weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through capital commitment not vote counting
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
index 82af83712..93b73d778 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-wash-trading-costs-because-high-fees-make-price-movement-expensive.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "3-5% swap fees combined with liquidity-weighted averaging make was
 confidence: experimental
 source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal by joebuild, 2024-01-24"
 created: 2024-01-24
+supports:
+- high fee amms create lp incentive and manipulation deterrent simultaneously by making passive provision profitable and active trading expensive
+reweave_edges:
+- high fee amms create lp incentive and manipulation deterrent simultaneously by making passive provision profitable and active trading expensive|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Liquidity-weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through wash trading costs because high fees make price movement expensive
@@ -29,4 +33,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/mdp-based-autoscaling-with-hysteresis-outperforms-simple-threshold-heuristics-for-cloud-resource-allocation.md b/domains/internet-finance/mdp-based-autoscaling-with-hysteresis-outperforms-simple-threshold-heuristics-for-cloud-resource-allocation.md
index b1f53cd35..ef25a957b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/mdp-based-autoscaling-with-hysteresis-outperforms-simple-threshold-heuristics-for-cloud-resource-allocation.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/mdp-based-autoscaling-with-hysteresis-outperforms-simple-threshold-heuristics-for-cloud-resource-allocation.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Structured MDP algorithms that incorporate hysteresis properties a
 confidence: likely
 source: "Tournaire et al., 'Optimal Control Policies for Resource Allocation in the Cloud' (2021)"
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down
+reweave_edges:
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # MDP-based autoscaling with hysteresis outperforms simple threshold heuristics for cloud resource allocation
@@ -35,4 +39,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
 
 Topics:
-- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md b/domains/internet-finance/memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md
index 6135cc2b6..27cceda59 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Memecoin holders have purely price-maximizing preferences making f
 confidence: experimental
 source: "MetaDAO Futardio proposal, 2024-08-14"
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias
+reweave_edges:
+- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Memecoin governance is ideal futarchy use case because single objective function eliminates long-term tradeoff ambiguity
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md
index 107123db3..3987b4b7b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ description: Community approved treasury migration despite inability to verify p
 confidence: experimental
 source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal risk disclosure, December 2023
 created: 2026-03-15
+related:
+- joebuild
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- joebuild|related|2026-04-18
+- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration|related|2026-04-18
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO Autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
@@ -24,4 +32,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/moderate-scale-queueing-systems-benefit-from-simple-threshold-policies-over-sophisticated-algorithms-because-square-root-staffing-captures-most-efficiency-gains.md b/domains/internet-finance/moderate-scale-queueing-systems-benefit-from-simple-threshold-policies-over-sophisticated-algorithms-because-square-root-staffing-captures-most-efficiency-gains.md
index 508ca66bc..67ccd065c 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/moderate-scale-queueing-systems-benefit-from-simple-threshold-policies-over-sophisticated-algorithms-because-square-root-staffing-captures-most-efficiency-gains.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/moderate-scale-queueing-systems-benefit-from-simple-threshold-policies-over-sophisticated-algorithms-because-square-root-staffing-captures-most-efficiency-gains.md
@@ -5,7 +5,21 @@ description: "At 5-20 server scale, queueing theory threshold policies capture m
 confidence: likely
 source: "van Leeuwaarden, Mathijsen, Sanders (SIAM Review 2018) - empirical validation of square-root staffing at moderate scale"
 created: 2026-03-11
-depends_on: ["square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md"]
+depends_on:
+- square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md
+supports:
+- halfin whitt qed regime enables systems to operate near full utilization while maintaining service quality through utilization approaching one at rate one over square root n
+related:
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance
+- multi server queueing systems exhibit economies of scale because safety margin grows sublinearly with system size
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks
+reweave_edges:
+- halfin whitt qed regime enables systems to operate near full utilization while maintaining service quality through utilization approaching one at rate one over square root n|supports|2026-04-18
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down|related|2026-04-18
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance|related|2026-04-18
+- multi server queueing systems exhibit economies of scale because safety margin grows sublinearly with system size|related|2026-04-18
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Moderate-scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square-root staffing captures most efficiency gains
@@ -34,4 +48,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
 
 Topics:
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/multi-server-queueing-systems-exhibit-economies-of-scale-because-safety-margin-grows-sublinearly-with-system-size.md b/domains/internet-finance/multi-server-queueing-systems-exhibit-economies-of-scale-because-safety-margin-grows-sublinearly-with-system-size.md
index a755eb4ea..5d01e042c 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/multi-server-queueing-systems-exhibit-economies-of-scale-because-safety-margin-grows-sublinearly-with-system-size.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/multi-server-queueing-systems-exhibit-economies-of-scale-because-safety-margin-grows-sublinearly-with-system-size.md
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ description: "Larger service systems need proportionally fewer excess servers du
 confidence: proven
 source: "Ward Whitt, What You Should Know About Queueing Models (2019)"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains
+related:
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance
+reweave_edges:
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance|related|2026-04-18
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Multi-server queueing systems exhibit economies of scale because safety margin grows sublinearly with system size
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/myco-realms-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-physical-infrastructure-through-125k-mushroom-farm-raise-with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md b/domains/internet-finance/myco-realms-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-physical-infrastructure-through-125k-mushroom-farm-raise-with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md
index 4617d280a..710a83a58 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/myco-realms-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-physical-infrastructure-through-125k-mushroom-farm-raise-with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/myco-realms-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-physical-infrastructure-through-125k-mushroom-farm-raise-with-market-controlled-capex-deployment.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "MycoRealms launch on Futardio, 2026-01-01"
 created: 2026-01-01
 secondary_domains: [mechanisms]
+supports:
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MycoRealms demonstrates futarchy-governed physical infrastructure through $125K mushroom farm raise with market-controlled CAPEX deployment
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md
index 7c77816fc..c44e112a9 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md	
@@ -6,14 +6,16 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "rio, based on @metaproph3t X archive (Mar 2026) and Ranger Finance liquidation"
 created: 2026-03-09
 depends_on:
-  - "@metaproph3t: 'the number one selling point of ownership coins is that they are anti-rug'"
-  - "Ranger liquidation: $5M USDC returned to holders through futarchy-governed enforcement"
-  - "8/8 MetaDAO ICOs above launch price — zero investor losses"
-  - "Hurupay minimum raise failure — funds returned automatically"
+- "@metaproph3t: 'the number one selling point of ownership coins is that they are anti-rug'"
+- "Ranger liquidation: $5M USDC returned to holders through futarchy-governed enforcement"
+- 8/8 MetaDAO ICOs above launch price — zero investor losses
+- Hurupay minimum raise failure — funds returned automatically
 related:
-  - "access friction functions as a natural conviction filter in token launches because process difficulty selects for genuine believers while price friction selects for wealthy speculators"
+- access friction functions as a natural conviction filter in token launches because process difficulty selects for genuine believers while price friction selects for wealthy speculators
+- DeFi insurance hybrid claims assessment routes clear exploits to automation and ambiguous disputes to governance, resolving the speed-fairness tradeoff
 reweave_edges:
-  - "access friction functions as a natural conviction filter in token launches because process difficulty selects for genuine believers while price friction selects for wealthy speculators|related|2026-04-04"
+- access friction functions as a natural conviction filter in token launches because process difficulty selects for genuine believers while price friction selects for wealthy speculators|related|2026-04-04
+- DeFi insurance hybrid claims assessment routes clear exploits to automation and ambiguous disputes to governance, resolving the speed-fairness tradeoff|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match
@@ -75,4 +77,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] — "number go up" as objective function supports the protection framing: you either deliver value or get liquidated
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md
index 1223b5e6e..fc1ada4ef 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ description: "Optimism futarchy drew 88.6% new governance participants but predi
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), 430 forecasters, 88.6% first-time participants"
 created: 2025-06-12
+related:
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously
+reweave_edges:
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Play-money futarchy attracts participation but produces uncalibrated predictions because absence of downside risk removes selection pressure
@@ -48,4 +52,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy.md b/domains/internet-finance/post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy.md
index 1c4e23125..7cf49dab7 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy.md
@@ -10,8 +10,14 @@ agent: rio
 scope: functional
 sourcer: Nicolas Rasmont
 related_claims: ["[[conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects]]"]
+related:
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals
+reweave_edges:
+- Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal|related|2026-04-18
+- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high implementation rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias in futarchy
 
-Rasmont analyzes the proposed fix of randomly implementing approved policies to create counterfactual data for causal inference. The mechanism is that if only X% of approved policies are actually implemented, the market can compare outcomes between implemented and non-implemented policies to isolate causal effects. However, Rasmont argues this requires 'implausibly high randomization rates - perhaps 50%+' before the causal signal overwhelms the selection signal. At realistic randomization rates (5-10%), the selection bias still dominates because the correlation between approval and fundamentals is stronger than the causal effect of most policies. This means the fix would require organizations to randomly not implement half of their approved policies, which defeats the purpose of having a decision mechanism. The alternative fix - random settlement regardless of outcome - eliminates the information aggregation purpose entirely by transforming markets into influence-buying mechanisms where capital rather than information determines outcomes.
+Rasmont analyzes the proposed fix of randomly implementing approved policies to create counterfactual data for causal inference. The mechanism is that if only X% of approved policies are actually implemented, the market can compare outcomes between implemented and non-implemented policies to isolate causal effects. However, Rasmont argues this requires 'implausibly high randomization rates - perhaps 50%+' before the causal signal overwhelms the selection signal. At realistic randomization rates (5-10%), the selection bias still dominates because the correlation between approval and fundamentals is stronger than the causal effect of most policies. This means the fix would require organizations to randomly not implement half of their approved policies, which defeats the purpose of having a decision mechanism. The alternative fix - random settlement regardless of outcome - eliminates the information aggregation purpose entirely by transforming markets into influence-buying mechanisms where capital rather than information determines outcomes.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md
index fff02fec9..27fc2d847 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md
@@ -8,11 +8,15 @@ source: "Robin Hanson 'Prediction Markets Now' (Dec 2025), CFTC regulatory actio
 created: 2026-03-26
 supports:
 - The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy
 related:
 - CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets from state gambling law but leaves decentralized governance markets legally exposed because they cannot access the DCM licensing pathway
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse
 reweave_edges:
 - The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms|supports|2026-04-17
 - CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets from state gambling law but leaves decentralized governance markets legally exposed because they cannot access the DCM licensing pathway|related|2026-04-17
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy|supports|2026-04-18
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Prediction market regulatory legitimacy creates both opportunity and existential risk for decision markets
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-markets-face-democratic-legitimacy-gap-despite-regulatory-approval.md b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-markets-face-democratic-legitimacy-gap-despite-regulatory-approval.md
index ecbb4404d..f3142ddf8 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/prediction-markets-face-democratic-legitimacy-gap-despite-regulatory-approval.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/prediction-markets-face-democratic-legitimacy-gap-despite-regulatory-approval.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: AIBM/Ipsos
 related_claims: ["prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md", "cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets.md", "futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse.md"]
+related:
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy
+reweave_edges:
+- Congressional insider trading legislation for prediction markets treats them as financial instruments not gambling strengthening DCM regulatory legitimacy|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Prediction markets face a democratic legitimacy gap where 61% gambling classification creates legislative override risk independent of CFTC regulatory approval
 
-The AIBM/Ipsos nationally representative survey found that 61% of Americans view prediction markets as gambling rather than investing (8%) or information aggregation tools. This creates a structural political vulnerability: even if prediction markets achieve full CFTC regulatory approval as derivatives, the democratic legitimacy gap means legislators face constituent pressure to reclassify or restrict them through new legislation. The 21% familiarity rate indicates this perception is forming before the product has built public trust, meaning the political debate is being shaped by early negative framing. The survey was conducted during state-level crackdowns (Arizona criminal charges, Nevada TRO) and growing media coverage of gambling addiction cases, suggesting the gambling frame is becoming entrenched. Unlike legal mechanism debates that operate at the regulatory agency level, democratic legitimacy operates at the legislative level where constituent perception directly influences policy. The absence of partisan split on classification (no significant difference between Republican and Democratic voters) means prediction market advocates cannot rely on partisan political cover, making the legitimacy gap harder to overcome through political coalition-building.
+The AIBM/Ipsos nationally representative survey found that 61% of Americans view prediction markets as gambling rather than investing (8%) or information aggregation tools. This creates a structural political vulnerability: even if prediction markets achieve full CFTC regulatory approval as derivatives, the democratic legitimacy gap means legislators face constituent pressure to reclassify or restrict them through new legislation. The 21% familiarity rate indicates this perception is forming before the product has built public trust, meaning the political debate is being shaped by early negative framing. The survey was conducted during state-level crackdowns (Arizona criminal charges, Nevada TRO) and growing media coverage of gambling addiction cases, suggesting the gambling frame is becoming entrenched. Unlike legal mechanism debates that operate at the regulatory agency level, democratic legitimacy operates at the legislative level where constituent perception directly influences policy. The absence of partisan split on classification (no significant difference between Republican and Democratic voters) means prediction market advocates cannot rely on partisan political cover, making the legitimacy gap harder to overcome through political coalition-building.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md b/domains/internet-finance/pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md
index 0d431c256..6a189afe1 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "MetaDAO's pro-rata ICO allocation mechanism refunded 95% of commit
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Alea Research, MetaDAO: Fair Launches for a Misaligned Market, January 2026"
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution
+reweave_edges:
+- Fixed-target ICO capital concentration creates whale dominance reflexivity risk because small contributor counts mask extreme capital distribution|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Pro-rata ICO allocation creates capital inefficiency through massive oversubscription refunds
@@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/prosocial-fee-allocation-in-crypto-platforms-functions-as-a-retention-mechanism-by-attaching-charitable-identity-to-speculative-trading.md b/domains/internet-finance/prosocial-fee-allocation-in-crypto-platforms-functions-as-a-retention-mechanism-by-attaching-charitable-identity-to-speculative-trading.md
index ec0dab1cf..1e55ca27a 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/prosocial-fee-allocation-in-crypto-platforms-functions-as-a-retention-mechanism-by-attaching-charitable-identity-to-speculative-trading.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/prosocial-fee-allocation-in-crypto-platforms-functions-as-a-retention-mechanism-by-attaching-charitable-identity-to-speculative-trading.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ confidence: speculative
 source: "Rio via futard.io Launchpet launch page (2026-03-05)"
 created: 2026-03-12
 secondary_domains: [cultural-dynamics]
+related:
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Prosocial fee allocation in crypto platforms functions as a retention mechanism by attaching charitable identity to speculative trading
@@ -39,4 +43,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale]] — related context on meme coin user psychology
 
 Topics:
-- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/raydium-liquidity-farming-follows-standard-pattern-of-1-percent-token-allocation-7-to-90-day-duration-and-clmm-pool-architecture.md b/domains/internet-finance/raydium-liquidity-farming-follows-standard-pattern-of-1-percent-token-allocation-7-to-90-day-duration-and-clmm-pool-architecture.md
index 04df20c13..e147ab246 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/raydium-liquidity-farming-follows-standard-pattern-of-1-percent-token-allocation-7-to-90-day-duration-and-clmm-pool-architecture.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/raydium-liquidity-farming-follows-standard-pattern-of-1-percent-token-allocation-7-to-90-day-duration-and-clmm-pool-architecture.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Raydium's liquidity farming infrastructure has converged on standa
 confidence: likely
 source: "FutureDAO Raydium farm proposal, 2024-11-08; Raydium documentation"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Raydium liquidity farming follows standard pattern of 1% token allocation, 7-90 day duration, and CLMM pool architecture
@@ -30,4 +34,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
 
 Topics:
-- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent.md b/domains/internet-finance/retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent.md
index cfff28cdc..4e9822341 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent.md
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ sourcer: Gambling Insider, Federal Register
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]", "[[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]]"]
 supports:
 - The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse
 reweave_edges:
 - The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms|supports|2026-04-17
+- Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Retail mobilization against prediction markets creates asymmetric regulatory input because anti-gambling advocates dominate comment periods while governance market proponents remain silent
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md b/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md
index 12600732d..41b058936 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/seyf-futardio-fundraise-raised-200-against-300000-target-signaling-near-zero-market-traction-for-ai-native-wallet-concept.md
@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "Rio via futard.io launch data; 2026-03-05 Seyf launch on futardio platform"
 created: 2026-03-12
 depends_on:
-  - "seyf-demonstrates-intent-based-wallet-architecture-where-natural-language-replaces-manual-defi-navigation"
-  - "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale"
+- seyf-demonstrates-intent-based-wallet-architecture-where-natural-language-replaces-manual-defi-navigation
+- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale
 challenged_by:
-  - "Single data point; launch community reach and marketing effort are unknown variables"
+- Single data point; launch community reach and marketing effort are unknown variables
 secondary_domains:
   - mechanisms
+supports:
+- Etnl.io
+reweave_edges:
+- Etnl.io|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Seyf's futardio fundraise raised $200 against a $300,000 target, signaling near-zero market traction for the AI-native wallet concept on MetaDAO in March 2026
@@ -46,4 +50,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — the platform infrastructure
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/solana-durable-nonce-creates-indefinite-transaction-validity-attack-surface-for-multisig-governance.md b/domains/internet-finance/solana-durable-nonce-creates-indefinite-transaction-validity-attack-surface-for-multisig-governance.md
index d96893273..7594e9b1b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/solana-durable-nonce-creates-indefinite-transaction-validity-attack-surface-for-multisig-governance.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/solana-durable-nonce-creates-indefinite-transaction-validity-attack-surface-for-multisig-governance.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: CoinDesk, BlockSec, The Hacker News
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]]", "futarchy-governed DAOs require mintable governance tokens because fixed-supply treasuries exhaust without issuance authority forcing disruptive token-architecture-migrations"]
+supports:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer
+reweave_edges:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Solana durable nonce creates indefinite transaction validity attack surface for multisig governance because pre-signed approvals remain executable without expiration
 
-The Drift Protocol $285M exploit demonstrates that Solana's durable nonce feature—designed to replace expiring blockhashes with fixed on-chain nonces for offline transaction signing—creates a fundamental security architecture risk for protocol governance. Attackers obtained two pre-signed approvals from Drift's 5-member Security Council multisig that remained valid for 8+ days, enabling execution after device compromise. Standard multisig security models assume transaction expiration through blockhash timeouts (typically minutes to hours on Solana), but durable nonces eliminate this constraint. When combined with zero-timelock governance (Drift had recently migrated to 2-of-5 threshold with no detection window), the indefinite validity of pre-signed transactions became the primary exploit mechanism. This is distinct from generic 'human coordinator' vulnerabilities—it's a specific mismatch between Solana's convenience primitive and multisig security assumptions. The attack required six months of social engineering and device compromise to obtain the signatures, but the durable nonce feature is what made those signatures exploitable days later. Attribution to North Korean UNC4736 (same actors as Radiant Capital) suggests this attack pattern is being systematically developed against DeFi governance infrastructure.
+The Drift Protocol $285M exploit demonstrates that Solana's durable nonce feature—designed to replace expiring blockhashes with fixed on-chain nonces for offline transaction signing—creates a fundamental security architecture risk for protocol governance. Attackers obtained two pre-signed approvals from Drift's 5-member Security Council multisig that remained valid for 8+ days, enabling execution after device compromise. Standard multisig security models assume transaction expiration through blockhash timeouts (typically minutes to hours on Solana), but durable nonces eliminate this constraint. When combined with zero-timelock governance (Drift had recently migrated to 2-of-5 threshold with no detection window), the indefinite validity of pre-signed transactions became the primary exploit mechanism. This is distinct from generic 'human coordinator' vulnerabilities—it's a specific mismatch between Solana's convenience primitive and multisig security assumptions. The attack required six months of social engineering and device compromise to obtain the signatures, but the durable nonce feature is what made those signatures exploitable days later. Attribution to North Korean UNC4736 (same actors as Radiant Capital) suggests this attack pattern is being systematically developed against DeFi governance infrastructure.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md b/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md
index d22621bfd..8281f1bc9 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ confidence: proven
 tradition: "futarchy, prediction markets, efficient market hypothesis"
 related:
 - Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously
 reweave_edges:
 - Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies|related|2026-04-17
+- futarchy variance creates portfolio problem because mechanism selects both top performers and worst performers simultaneously|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 Hanson explicitly rejects the "wisdom of crowds" narrative for why speculative markets work. The best track bettors have no higher IQ than average bettors, yet markets aggregate information effectively through three mechanisms that have nothing to do with crowd intelligence.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md b/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md
index e4465c145..8edf92f43 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-achieves-economies-of-scale-in-queueing-systems-by-operating-near-full-utilization-with-manageable-delays.md
@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ description: "The QED Halfin-Whitt regime shows server count n grows while utili
 confidence: proven
 source: "van Leeuwaarden, Mathijsen, Sanders (SIAM Review 2018) - Economies-of-Scale in Many-Server Queueing Systems"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- halfin whitt qed regime enables systems to operate near full utilization while maintaining service quality through utilization approaching one at rate one over square root n
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains
+- multi server queueing systems exhibit economies of scale because safety margin grows sublinearly with system size
+reweave_edges:
+- halfin whitt qed regime enables systems to operate near full utilization while maintaining service quality through utilization approaching one at rate one over square root n|supports|2026-04-18
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains|supports|2026-04-18
+- multi server queueing systems exhibit economies of scale because safety margin grows sublinearly with system size|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Square-root staffing principle achieves economies of scale in queueing systems by operating near full utilization with manageable delays
@@ -32,4 +40,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
 
 Topics:
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-provisions-servers-as-base-load-plus-beta-times-square-root-of-base-load-where-beta-is-quality-of-service-parameter.md b/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-provisions-servers-as-base-load-plus-beta-times-square-root-of-base-load-where-beta-is-quality-of-service-parameter.md
index 0a2ee6f30..bcbb6376e 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-provisions-servers-as-base-load-plus-beta-times-square-root-of-base-load-where-beta-is-quality-of-service-parameter.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/square-root-staffing-principle-provisions-servers-as-base-load-plus-beta-times-square-root-of-base-load-where-beta-is-quality-of-service-parameter.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Optimal server provisioning follows R + β√R formula where R is
 confidence: proven
 source: "Ward Whitt, What You Should Know About Queueing Models (2019)"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains
+reweave_edges:
+- moderate scale queueing systems benefit from simple threshold policies over sophisticated algorithms because square root staffing captures most efficiency gains|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Square-root staffing principle provisions servers as base load plus beta times square root of base load where beta is quality-of-service parameter
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/superclaw-ai-agent-economic-autonomy-thesis-was-directionally-correct-but-early-in-timing.md b/domains/internet-finance/superclaw-ai-agent-economic-autonomy-thesis-was-directionally-correct-but-early-in-timing.md
index fb7867ada..f6a1227b1 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/superclaw-ai-agent-economic-autonomy-thesis-was-directionally-correct-but-early-in-timing.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/superclaw-ai-agent-economic-autonomy-thesis-was-directionally-correct-but-early-in-timing.md
@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ related_claims:
   - linux-foundation-governance-of-x402-signals-ai-agent-payment-infrastructure-as-neutral-open-standard
   - superclaw
   - superclaw-liquidation-proposal
+related:
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play
+reweave_edges:
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Superclaw's AI agent economic autonomy thesis was directionally correct but early in timing, with institutional players arriving at the same payment infrastructure thesis within months (correlational evidence)
 
-Superclaw's thesis centered on infrastructure for economically autonomous AI agents — wallets, identity, execution, memory, skills marketplace. Within months of Superclaw's launch, two of the most credible institutions in their respective domains launched similar infrastructure: Linux Foundation + Coinbase (x402 protocol for AI agent micropayments) and Ant Group (AI agent crypto payment platform). The x402 protocol enables AI agents to autonomously transact for resources without human authorization — a key use case Superclaw was building for. Ant Group represents the first incumbent at scale (largest fintech in Asia) building explicitly for the agent economy. This institutional convergence provides correlational evidence that Superclaw's thesis was correct in direction but early in timing regarding the market need for AI agent payment infrastructure at the protocol layer. The market timing preceded institutional readiness for such foundational components. This suggests the underlying market need Superclaw was building for is validated, though whether Superclaw's specific application-layer execution was viable remains a separate question. The Superclaw liquidation proposal (Proposal 3) now has different context: the thesis's underlying market need may have been validated by subsequent institutional adoption rather than invalidated by early market failure.
+Superclaw's thesis centered on infrastructure for economically autonomous AI agents — wallets, identity, execution, memory, skills marketplace. Within months of Superclaw's launch, two of the most credible institutions in their respective domains launched similar infrastructure: Linux Foundation + Coinbase (x402 protocol for AI agent micropayments) and Ant Group (AI agent crypto payment platform). The x402 protocol enables AI agents to autonomously transact for resources without human authorization — a key use case Superclaw was building for. Ant Group represents the first incumbent at scale (largest fintech in Asia) building explicitly for the agent economy. This institutional convergence provides correlational evidence that Superclaw's thesis was correct in direction but early in timing regarding the market need for AI agent payment infrastructure at the protocol layer. The market timing preceded institutional readiness for such foundational components. This suggests the underlying market need Superclaw was building for is validated, though whether Superclaw's specific application-layer execution was viable remains a separate question. The Superclaw liquidation proposal (Proposal 3) now has different context: the thesis's underlying market need may have been validated by subsequent institutional adoption rather than invalidated by early market failure.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/the SEC three-path safe harbor proposal creates the first formal capital formation framework for crypto that does not require securities registration.md b/domains/internet-finance/the SEC three-path safe harbor proposal creates the first formal capital formation framework for crypto that does not require securities registration.md
index d20730ee6..afc1d388a 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/the SEC three-path safe harbor proposal creates the first formal capital formation framework for crypto that does not require securities registration.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/the SEC three-path safe harbor proposal creates the first formal capital formation framework for crypto that does not require securities registration.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Three proposed safe harbors — startup ($5M/4yr), fundraising ($7
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Chairman Atkins remarks on Regulation Crypto Assets (March 17, 2026)"
 created: 2026-03-18
+related:
+- National trust charters enable crypto exchanges to bypass congressional gridlock through federal banking infrastructure
+reweave_edges:
+- National trust charters enable crypto exchanges to bypass congressional gridlock through federal banking infrastructure|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # The SEC three-path safe harbor proposal creates the first formal capital formation framework for crypto that does not require securities registration
@@ -32,4 +36,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[internet finance and decision markets]]
-- [[living capital]]
+- [[living capital]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/third-circuit-ruling-creates-first-federal-appellate-precedent-for-cftc-preemption-of-state-gambling-laws.md b/domains/internet-finance/third-circuit-ruling-creates-first-federal-appellate-precedent-for-cftc-preemption-of-state-gambling-laws.md
index 960768cc4..6e906a484 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/third-circuit-ruling-creates-first-federal-appellate-precedent-for-cftc-preemption-of-state-gambling-laws.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/third-circuit-ruling-creates-first-federal-appellate-precedent-for-cftc-preemption-of-state-gambling-laws.md
@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ sourcer: Third Circuit Court of Appeals
 related_claims: ["[[cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets]]", "[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]"]
 supports:
 - CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets from state gambling law but leaves decentralized governance markets legally exposed because they cannot access the DCM licensing pathway
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law
 reweave_edges:
 - CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets from state gambling law but leaves decentralized governance markets legally exposed because they cannot access the DCM licensing pathway|supports|2026-04-17
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Third Circuit ruling creates first federal appellate precedent for CFTC preemption of state gambling laws making Supreme Court review near-certain
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/time-varying-arrival-rates-require-dynamic-staffing-not-constant-max-workers.md b/domains/internet-finance/time-varying-arrival-rates-require-dynamic-staffing-not-constant-max-workers.md
index 49a2dfd00..92b840ca5 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/time-varying-arrival-rates-require-dynamic-staffing-not-constant-max-workers.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/time-varying-arrival-rates-require-dynamic-staffing-not-constant-max-workers.md
@@ -7,8 +7,17 @@ source: "Whitt et al., 'Staffing a Service System with Non-Poisson Non-Stationar
 created: 2026-03-11
 related:
 - backpressure prevents pipeline failure by creating feedback loop between consumer capacity and producer rate
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance
 reweave_edges:
 - backpressure prevents pipeline failure by creating feedback loop between consumer capacity and producer rate|related|2026-04-17
+- constant rate approximation of time varying arrivals causes systematic staffing errors|supports|2026-04-18
+- hysteresis in autoscaling prevents oscillation by using asymmetric thresholds for scale up and scale down|related|2026-04-18
+- littles law provides minimum worker capacity floor for pipeline systems but requires buffer margin for variance|related|2026-04-18
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks|supports|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- constant rate approximation of time varying arrivals causes systematic staffing errors
+- non stationary service systems require dynamic worker allocation because fixed staffing wastes capacity during low demand and creates bottlenecks during peaks
 ---
 
 # Time-varying arrival rates require dynamic staffing not constant MAX_WORKERS because using average or maximum rates as constants creates systematic misallocation across the arrival cycle
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md
index 963e7771d..843615751 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "Living Capital"
 related:
 - $BANK (bankmefun)
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants
 reweave_edges:
 - $BANK (bankmefun)|related|2026-04-17
+- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md b/domains/internet-finance/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md
index 505287335..1dca49ed7 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
+related:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation
+reweave_edges:
+- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 The fundamental defect of token voting DAOs is that governance tokens are only useful if you command voting majority, and unlike equity shares they entitle minority holders to nothing. There is no internal mechanism preventing majorities from raiding treasuries and distributing assets only among themselves. Wholesale looting is not uncommon—Serum had multiple incidents, the CKS Mango raid remains unresolved, and the Uniswap DeFi Education Fund granted $20M based on a short forum post with no argument for token value accretion.
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md b/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
index 0d9578782..779fda041 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Dean's List DAO model demonstrates how USDC revenue converted to t
 confidence: experimental
 source: "futard.io, Dean's List DAO economic model proposal, 2024-07-18"
 created: 2024-07-18
+supports:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model\"}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # Treasury buyback model creates net buy pressure by converting stablecoin revenue to governance token purchases despite distributed token sell-offs
@@ -51,4 +55,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - domains/internet-finance/_map
-- core/mechanisms/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/tridash-implements-60-second-prediction-markets-as-multiplayer-game-mechanics-compressing-resolution-time-from-days-to-seconds.md b/domains/internet-finance/tridash-implements-60-second-prediction-markets-as-multiplayer-game-mechanics-compressing-resolution-time-from-days-to-seconds.md
index 5505e6035..c6f680131 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/tridash-implements-60-second-prediction-markets-as-multiplayer-game-mechanics-compressing-resolution-time-from-days-to-seconds.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/tridash-implements-60-second-prediction-markets-as-multiplayer-game-mechanics-compressing-resolution-time-from-days-to-seconds.md
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ confidence: experimental
 source: "TriDash project description via futard.io launch, 2026-03-05"
 created: 2026-03-11
 secondary_domains: [entertainment]
+related:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk
+reweave_edges:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient|related|2026-04-18
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # TriDash implements 60-second prediction markets as multiplayer game mechanics compressing resolution time from days to seconds
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/tridash-tests-whether-60-second-prediction-market-resolution-enables-faster-feedback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md b/domains/internet-finance/tridash-tests-whether-60-second-prediction-market-resolution-enables-faster-feedback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md
index c5bca5044..c173017f6 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/tridash-tests-whether-60-second-prediction-market-resolution-enables-faster-feedback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/tridash-tests-whether-60-second-prediction-market-resolution-enables-faster-feedback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md
@@ -17,8 +17,14 @@ processed_date: 2026-03-05
 sources:
   - "[[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-tridash]]"
 depends_on:
-  - "[[metadao-platform-enables-futarchy-experimentation]]"
-  - "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+- "[[metadao-platform-enables-futarchy-experimentation]]"
+- "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+related:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk
+reweave_edges:
+- House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient|related|2026-04-18
+- house mode betting against protocol enables prediction markets to function with uneven liquidity by having the platform take counterparty risk|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # TriDash tests whether 60-second prediction market resolution enables faster feedback or primarily measures price noise
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/trump-jr-dual-investment-creates-structural-conflict-undermining-prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy.md b/domains/internet-finance/trump-jr-dual-investment-creates-structural-conflict-undermining-prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy.md
index b657fd920..dd2f4bebf 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/trump-jr-dual-investment-creates-structural-conflict-undermining-prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/trump-jr-dual-investment-creates-structural-conflict-undermining-prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy.md
@@ -12,8 +12,12 @@ sourcer: Front Office Sports / PBS / NPR
 related_claims: ["decentralized-mechanism-design-creates-regulatory-defensibility-not-evasion", "[[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]]"]
 related:
 - The CFTC's multi-state litigation posture represents a qualitative shift from regulatory rule-drafting to active jurisdictional defense of prediction markets
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law
 reweave_edges:
 - The CFTC's multi-state litigation posture represents a qualitative shift from regulatory rule-drafting to active jurisdictional defense of prediction markets|related|2026-04-17
+- Democratic demand for CFTC enforcement of existing war-bet rules creates a regulatory dilemma where enforcing expands offshore jurisdiction while refusing creates political ammunition|related|2026-04-18
+- Executive branch offensive litigation creates preemption through simultaneous multi-state suits not defensive case-law|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Trump Jr.'s dual investment in Kalshi and Polymarket creates a structural conflict of interest that undermines prediction market regulatory legitimacy regardless of legal merit
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/usdc-freeze-capability-is-legally-constrained-making-it-unreliable-as-programmatic-safety-mechanism.md b/domains/internet-finance/usdc-freeze-capability-is-legally-constrained-making-it-unreliable-as-programmatic-safety-mechanism.md
index 7bbdc7816..60bd528bb 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/usdc-freeze-capability-is-legally-constrained-making-it-unreliable-as-programmatic-safety-mechanism.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/usdc-freeze-capability-is-legally-constrained-making-it-unreliable-as-programmatic-safety-mechanism.md
@@ -9,8 +9,12 @@ title: USDC's freeze capability is legally constrained making it unreliable as a
 agent: rio
 scope: functional
 sourcer: CoinDesk Staff
+related:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer
+reweave_edges:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # USDC's freeze capability is legally constrained making it unreliable as a programmatic safety mechanism during DeFi exploits
 
-Following the Drift Protocol $285M exploit, Circle faced criticism for not freezing stolen USDC immediately. Circle's stated position: 'Freezing assets without legal authorization carries legal risks.' This reveals a fundamental architectural tension—USDC's technical freeze capability exists but is legally constrained in ways that make it unreliable as a programmatic safety mechanism. The centralized issuer cannot act as an automated circuit breaker because legal liability requires case-by-case authorization. This means DeFi protocols cannot depend on stablecoin freezes as a security layer in their threat models. The capability is real but the activation conditions are unpredictable and slow, operating on legal timescales (days to weeks) rather than exploit timescales (minutes to hours). This is distinct from technical decentralization debates—even a willing centralized issuer faces legal constraints that prevent programmatic security integration.
+Following the Drift Protocol $285M exploit, Circle faced criticism for not freezing stolen USDC immediately. Circle's stated position: 'Freezing assets without legal authorization carries legal risks.' This reveals a fundamental architectural tension—USDC's technical freeze capability exists but is legally constrained in ways that make it unreliable as a programmatic safety mechanism. The centralized issuer cannot act as an automated circuit breaker because legal liability requires case-by-case authorization. This means DeFi protocols cannot depend on stablecoin freezes as a security layer in their threat models. The capability is real but the activation conditions are unpredictable and slow, operating on legal timescales (days to weeks) rather than exploit timescales (minutes to hours). This is distinct from technical decentralization debates—even a willing centralized issuer faces legal constraints that prevent programmatic security integration.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/vesting-with-immediate-partial-unlock-plus-linear-release-creates-alignment-while-enabling-liquidity-by-giving-investors-tradeable-tokens-upfront-and-time-locked-exposure.md b/domains/internet-finance/vesting-with-immediate-partial-unlock-plus-linear-release-creates-alignment-while-enabling-liquidity-by-giving-investors-tradeable-tokens-upfront-and-time-locked-exposure.md
index 77800db57..ca75cfd93 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/vesting-with-immediate-partial-unlock-plus-linear-release-creates-alignment-while-enabling-liquidity-by-giving-investors-tradeable-tokens-upfront-and-time-locked-exposure.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/vesting-with-immediate-partial-unlock-plus-linear-release-creates-alignment-while-enabling-liquidity-by-giving-investors-tradeable-tokens-upfront-and-time-locked-exposure.md
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ description: "Hybrid vesting structures balance investor liquidity needs with lo
 confidence: experimental
 source: "MetaDAO Proposal 8 (Ben Hawkins OTC trade), 2024-02-18"
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments'}"
+related:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost
+reweave_edges:
+- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost|related|2026-04-18
+- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Vesting with immediate partial unlock plus linear release creates alignment while enabling liquidity by giving investors tradeable tokens upfront and time-locked exposure
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/zero-timelock-governance-migrations-create-critical-vulnerability-windows-by-eliminating-detection-and-response-time.md b/domains/internet-finance/zero-timelock-governance-migrations-create-critical-vulnerability-windows-by-eliminating-detection-and-response-time.md
index 9c18cce37..f04e085e6 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/zero-timelock-governance-migrations-create-critical-vulnerability-windows-by-eliminating-detection-and-response-time.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/zero-timelock-governance-migrations-create-critical-vulnerability-windows-by-eliminating-detection-and-response-time.md
@@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: CoinDesk, BlockSec
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]]"]
+supports:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer
+reweave_edges:
+- DeFi protocols eliminate institutional trust requirements but shift attack surface to off-chain human coordination layer|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Zero-timelock governance migrations create critical vulnerability windows by eliminating detection and response time for compromised multisig execution
 
-Drift Protocol's recent migration to 2-of-5 multisig threshold with zero timelock proved decisive in the $285M exploit. Once attackers obtained two pre-signed approvals through device compromise, the zero-timelock configuration allowed immediate execution with no detection window. Traditional timelock delays (typically 24-72 hours in DeFi governance) create opportunities for monitoring systems, community alerts, or remaining signers to detect and block malicious transactions. The Drift case demonstrates that efficiency gains from removing timelocks come at the cost of eliminating the last line of defense when signature compromise occurs. This is particularly critical when combined with durable nonce features that extend transaction validity—the timelock would have provided a window to detect the compromise and invalidate the pre-signed transactions. The exploit executed in minutes on April 1, 2026, suggesting no monitoring system had time to respond. This pattern mirrors the Radiant Capital exploit by the same North Korean actors, indicating systematic targeting of governance configurations that prioritize execution speed over security depth.
+Drift Protocol's recent migration to 2-of-5 multisig threshold with zero timelock proved decisive in the $285M exploit. Once attackers obtained two pre-signed approvals through device compromise, the zero-timelock configuration allowed immediate execution with no detection window. Traditional timelock delays (typically 24-72 hours in DeFi governance) create opportunities for monitoring systems, community alerts, or remaining signers to detect and block malicious transactions. The Drift case demonstrates that efficiency gains from removing timelocks come at the cost of eliminating the last line of defense when signature compromise occurs. This is particularly critical when combined with durable nonce features that extend transaction validity—the timelock would have provided a window to detect the compromise and invalidate the pre-signed transactions. The exploit executed in minutes on April 1, 2026, suggesting no monitoring system had time to respond. This pattern mirrors the Radiant Capital exploit by the same North Korean actors, indicating systematic targeting of governance configurations that prioritize execution speed over security depth.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/robotics/general-purpose robotic manipulation remains the binding constraint on physical AI deployment because sensor fusion compliant control and tactile feedback must solve simultaneously.md b/domains/robotics/general-purpose robotic manipulation remains the binding constraint on physical AI deployment because sensor fusion compliant control and tactile feedback must solve simultaneously.md
index 98f526d9a..b6262dc0a 100644
--- a/domains/robotics/general-purpose robotic manipulation remains the binding constraint on physical AI deployment because sensor fusion compliant control and tactile feedback must solve simultaneously.md	
+++ b/domains/robotics/general-purpose robotic manipulation remains the binding constraint on physical AI deployment because sensor fusion compliant control and tactile feedback must solve simultaneously.md	
@@ -6,10 +6,16 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Astra, robotics manipulation research April 2026; MDPI Applied Sciences transformer grasping benchmarks; Nature Machine Intelligence F-TAC Hand; AutoMate assembly framework; NIST dexterity standards"
 created: 2026-04-03
 challenged_by:
-  - "Foundation model approaches (RT-2, VLAs) may bypass the integration problem entirely by learning end-to-end manipulation from demonstration rather than requiring engineered sensor fusion"
+- Foundation model approaches (RT-2, VLAs) may bypass the integration problem entirely by learning end-to-end manipulation from demonstration rather than requiring engineered sensor fusion
 secondary_domains:
   - ai-alignment
   - manufacturing
+related:
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost
+reweave_edges:
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds|related|2026-04-18
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # General-purpose robotic manipulation remains the binding constraint on physical AI deployment because sensor fusion compliant control and tactile feedback must solve simultaneously
@@ -41,4 +47,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally creating a productivity paradox]] — manipulation capabilities exist in research; the embodiment lag is in production-grade integration
 
 Topics:
-- robotics and automation
+- robotics and automation
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/robotics/humanoid robots will cross the mass-market threshold when unit costs fall below 20000 dollars because that price point makes labor arbitrage viable across warehouse manufacturing and logistics sectors.md b/domains/robotics/humanoid robots will cross the mass-market threshold when unit costs fall below 20000 dollars because that price point makes labor arbitrage viable across warehouse manufacturing and logistics sectors.md
index aa597c3f4..e5b5a0d3e 100644
--- a/domains/robotics/humanoid robots will cross the mass-market threshold when unit costs fall below 20000 dollars because that price point makes labor arbitrage viable across warehouse manufacturing and logistics sectors.md	
+++ b/domains/robotics/humanoid robots will cross the mass-market threshold when unit costs fall below 20000 dollars because that price point makes labor arbitrage viable across warehouse manufacturing and logistics sectors.md	
@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Astra, robotics industry research April 2026; Morgan Stanley BOM analysis; Standard Bots cost data; Unitree pricing April 2026"
 created: 2026-04-03
 depends_on:
-  - "launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry at specific price thresholds"
+- launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry at specific price thresholds
 challenged_by:
-  - "Current humanoid BOM costs of $50-60K per unit require 3-4x cost reduction to hit $13-17K targets — this assumes manufacturing scale that no humanoid producer has demonstrated"
+- Current humanoid BOM costs of $50-60K per unit require 3-4x cost reduction to hit $13-17K targets — this assumes manufacturing scale that no humanoid producer has demonstrated
 secondary_domains:
   - manufacturing
   - teleological-economics
+related:
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost
+reweave_edges:
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Humanoid robots will cross the mass-market threshold when unit costs fall below 20000 dollars because that price point makes labor arbitrage viable across warehouse manufacturing and logistics sectors
@@ -38,4 +42,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally creating a productivity paradox]] — AI capability exists; the embodiment lag is in physical deployment platforms
 
 Topics:
-- robotics and automation
+- robotics and automation
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/robotics/industrial automation has plateaued at approximately 50 percent of manufacturing operations because the remaining tasks require unstructured manipulation exception handling and multi-system integration that current fixed-automation cannot address.md b/domains/robotics/industrial automation has plateaued at approximately 50 percent of manufacturing operations because the remaining tasks require unstructured manipulation exception handling and multi-system integration that current fixed-automation cannot address.md
index 1ec585907..0d30e2917 100644
--- a/domains/robotics/industrial automation has plateaued at approximately 50 percent of manufacturing operations because the remaining tasks require unstructured manipulation exception handling and multi-system integration that current fixed-automation cannot address.md	
+++ b/domains/robotics/industrial automation has plateaued at approximately 50 percent of manufacturing operations because the remaining tasks require unstructured manipulation exception handling and multi-system integration that current fixed-automation cannot address.md	
@@ -6,11 +6,17 @@ confidence: likely
 source: "Astra, robotics industry research April 2026; PwC Global Industrial Manufacturing Outlook 2026; McKinsey industrial automation analysis"
 created: 2026-04-03
 depends_on:
-  - "knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally creating a productivity paradox"
+- knowledge embodiment lag means technology is available decades before organizations learn to use it optimally creating a productivity paradox
 challenged_by:
-  - "The 50% plateau may reflect rational economic optimization rather than a capability gap — firms automate precisely the tasks where ROI is clear and leave the rest intentionally"
+- The 50% plateau may reflect rational economic optimization rather than a capability gap — firms automate precisely the tasks where ROI is clear and leave the rest intentionally
 secondary_domains:
   - manufacturing
+related:
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost
+reweave_edges:
+- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds|related|2026-04-18
+- humanoid robot labor substitution will follow a predictable sector sequence from warehouse picking to elder care determined by the ratio of task structuredness to hourly labor cost|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Industrial automation has plateaued at approximately 50 percent of manufacturing operations because the remaining tasks require unstructured manipulation exception handling and multi-system integration that current fixed-automation cannot address
@@ -36,4 +42,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable with the sweet spot where physical data generation feeds software that scales independently]] — the plateau exists precisely at the atoms-to-bits boundary where physical complexity resists digital scaling
 
 Topics:
-- robotics and automation
+- robotics and automation
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/space-development/commercial space stations are the next infrastructure bet as ISS retirement creates a void that 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030.md b/domains/space-development/commercial space stations are the next infrastructure bet as ISS retirement creates a void that 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030.md
index d9932c089..de1343bdd 100644
--- a/domains/space-development/commercial space stations are the next infrastructure bet as ISS retirement creates a void that 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030.md	
+++ b/domains/space-development/commercial space stations are the next infrastructure bet as ISS retirement creates a void that 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030.md	
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ supports:
 - No commercial space station has announced a firm launch date as of March 2026, despite ISS 2030 retirement representing a hard operational deadline
 - Haven-1 slip to Q1 2027 compresses the commercial station succession timeline against ISS deorbit around 2030
 - NASA CLD Phase 2 funding freeze creates existential risk for design-phase programs that lack private capital to self-fund manufacturing transition
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation
 reweave_edges:
 - Vast is building the first commercial space station with Haven 1 launching 2027 funded by Jed McCaleb 1B personal commitment and targeting artificial gravity stations by the 2030s|supports|2026-04-04
 - Anchor customer uncertainty is now the binding constraint for commercial station programs not technical capability or launch costs|related|2026-04-07
@@ -22,10 +23,12 @@ reweave_edges:
 - No commercial space station has announced a firm launch date as of March 2026, despite ISS 2030 retirement representing a hard operational deadline|supports|2026-04-10
 - Haven-1 slip to Q1 2027 compresses the commercial station succession timeline against ISS deorbit around 2030|supports|2026-04-13
 - NASA CLD Phase 2 funding freeze creates existential risk for design-phase programs that lack private capital to self-fund manufacturing transition|supports|2026-04-17
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation|supports|2026-04-18
 related:
 - Anchor customer uncertainty is now the binding constraint for commercial station programs not technical capability or launch costs
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}"
 ---
 
 # commercial space stations are the next infrastructure bet as ISS retirement creates a void that 4 companies are racing to fill by 2030
diff --git a/domains/space-development/demand-threshold-in-space-is-revenue-model-independence-not-magnitude.md b/domains/space-development/demand-threshold-in-space-is-revenue-model-independence-not-magnitude.md
index 56c9fc28f..3cec65380 100644
--- a/domains/space-development/demand-threshold-in-space-is-revenue-model-independence-not-magnitude.md
+++ b/domains/space-development/demand-threshold-in-space-is-revenue-model-independence-not-magnitude.md
@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ scope: structural
 sourcer: Astra
 related_claims: ["launch-cost-reduction-is-the-keystone-variable-that-unlocks-every-downstream-space-industry-at-specific-price-thresholds.md", "commercial-space-stations-are-the-next-infrastructure-bet-as-ISS-retirement-creates-a-void-that-4-companies-are-racing-to-fill-by-2030.md"]
 supports:
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # The demand threshold in space is defined by revenue model independence from government anchor demand, not by revenue magnitude
diff --git a/domains/space-development/gate-2-demand-formation-mechanisms-are-cost-parity-constrained-with-government-floors-cost-independent-concentrated-buyers-requiring-2-3x-proximity-and-organic-markets-requiring-full-parity.md b/domains/space-development/gate-2-demand-formation-mechanisms-are-cost-parity-constrained-with-government-floors-cost-independent-concentrated-buyers-requiring-2-3x-proximity-and-organic-markets-requiring-full-parity.md
index dd26c19a1..0f5fc22a3 100644
--- a/domains/space-development/gate-2-demand-formation-mechanisms-are-cost-parity-constrained-with-government-floors-cost-independent-concentrated-buyers-requiring-2-3x-proximity-and-organic-markets-requiring-full-parity.md
+++ b/domains/space-development/gate-2-demand-formation-mechanisms-are-cost-parity-constrained-with-government-floors-cost-independent-concentrated-buyers-requiring-2-3x-proximity-and-organic-markets-requiring-full-parity.md
@@ -12,15 +12,17 @@ attribution:
     - handle: "astra"
       context: "Astra synthesis from 20 research sessions (2026-03-11 through 2026-03-30), nuclear renaissance hyperscaler PPA data (Session 2026-03-28), ODC cost analysis (Sessions 2026-03-24, 2026-03-25)"
 related:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-11'}
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-12'}
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-13'}
-- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-11'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-12'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-13'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 supports:
-- {'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}
+- "{'Space sector commercialization requires two independent thresholds': 'a supply-side launch cost gate and a demand-side market formation gate'}"
 ---
 
 # Gate 2 demand formation mechanisms are cost-parity constrained: government floors are cost-independent, concentrated private buyers require 2-3x proximity, organic markets require full parity
diff --git a/domains/space-development/governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers.md b/domains/space-development/governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers.md
index 24995a360..3bb3393d9 100644
--- a/domains/space-development/governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers.md	
+++ b/domains/space-development/governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers.md	
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ reweave_edges:
 - Gateway's cancellation disrupts existing international commitments, setting a precedent that US unilateral program cancellation can void multilateral space agreements|related|2026-04-17
 - Government R&D funding creates a Gate 0 mechanism that validates technology and de-risks commercial investment without substituting for commercial demand|supports|2026-04-17
 - Policy-driven funding freezes can be as damaging to commercial space program timelines as technical delays because they create capital formation uncertainty|related|2026-04-17
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation|supports|2026-04-18
 supports:
 - Government R&D funding creates a Gate 0 mechanism that validates technology and de-risks commercial investment without substituting for commercial demand
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation
 ---
 
 # governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers
diff --git a/entities/ai-alignment/xai.md b/entities/ai-alignment/xai.md
index 0b1412e07..35115315f 100644
--- a/entities/ai-alignment/xai.md
+++ b/entities/ai-alignment/xai.md
@@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-16
 related:
 - Google DeepMind
 - OpenAI
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play
 reweave_edges:
 - Google DeepMind|related|2026-03-28
 - OpenAI|related|2026-03-28
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # xAI
@@ -57,4 +59,4 @@ xAI represents the "capability-first, safety-later" approach at maximum scale. T
 - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — xAI is the competitor Anthropic cited when rolling back RSP
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/avici.md b/entities/internet-finance/avici.md
index 7412e566e..28b03ce01 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/avici.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/avici.md
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ liquidation:
   reason: null
 
 tracked_by: rio
+supports:
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Avici
@@ -73,4 +77,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[metadao]] — launch platform
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/coal.md b/entities/internet-finance/coal.md
index 57b3d7469..a52a4cad0 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/coal.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/coal.md
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ key_metrics:
   team_allocation: "none"
   base_emission_rate: "11,250 COAL/day"
   governance_platform: "futardio"
+supports:
+- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded\"}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
 ---
 
 # COAL
@@ -29,4 +33,4 @@ COAL is a community-driven cryptocurrency project that launched in August 2024 w
 ## Relationship to KB
 - Example of [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — attempted to add issuance post-launch
 - Uses [[futardio]] for governance decisions
-- Tests whether fair-launch tokens can fund development without initial allocations
+- Tests whether fair-launch tokens can fund development without initial allocations
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futarchy-arena.md b/entities/internet-finance/futarchy-arena.md
index 57e07bc47..8b9bf13ea 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futarchy-arena.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futarchy-arena.md
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-futarchy-arena.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futarchy Arena
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio-cult.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio-cult.md
index e2f9c2634..a704b6e44 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio-cult.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio-cult.md
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ status: active
 platform: Futard.io
 blockchain: Solana
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Futardio cult
@@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ The Futardio cult token's dominance (67% of all platform capital) demonstrates a
 ## Timeline
 
 - **2025-2026** — Token launch on Futard.io platform
-- **2026-03-20** — $11.4M raised, representing 67% of Futard.io's total committed capital
+- **2026-03-20** — $11.4M raised, representing 67% of Futard.io's total committed capital
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
index b0a50f128..4a40fa32e 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
@@ -22,8 +22,17 @@ built_on: ["Solana", "MetaDAO Autocrat"]
 tags: ["launchpad", "ownership-coins", "futarchy", "unruggable-ico", "permissionless-launches"]
 related:
 - algorithm driven social feeds create attention to liquidity conversion in meme token markets
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
 reweave_edges:
 - algorithm driven social feeds create attention to liquidity conversion in meme token markets|related|2026-04-04
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Launchpet': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
+supports:
+- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch'}"
 ---
 
 # Futardio
@@ -93,4 +102,4 @@ Relevant Entities:
 - [[superclaw]] — strongest permissionless raise ($SUPER)
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md b/entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md
index c55a7eb07..d2bb10b09 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ key_metrics:
   primary_product: "Token Migrator"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
+supports:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program'}"
+- futuredao token migrator enables community takeovers through structured on chain migration with presale fundraising and conditional success thresholds
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+- futuredao token migrator enables community takeovers through structured on chain migration with presale fundraising and conditional success thresholds|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # FutureDAO
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/genius-act.md b/entities/internet-finance/genius-act.md
index 5f240db01..a9b7e5ab9 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/genius-act.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/genius-act.md
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@ key_provisions:
   - "Bank Secrecy Act AML compliance required"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
+related:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter
+reweave_edges:
+- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination|related|2026-04-18
+- GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers|related|2026-04-18
+- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins of 2025)
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/git3.md b/entities/internet-finance/git3.md
index 24014ba1e..5ca1a55c0 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/git3.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/git3.md
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-git3.md"
+supports:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Git3
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/hurupay.md b/entities/internet-finance/hurupay.md
index 7297bfae7..81ad58eaa 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/hurupay.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/hurupay.md
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ key_metrics:
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-02-03-futardio-launch-hurupay.md"
+related:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Hurupay
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/hyperspace.md b/entities/internet-finance/hyperspace.md
index dfec8b800..8d5f7e399 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/hyperspace.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/hyperspace.md
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ key_people:
   - "Varun Mathur (CEO)"
 status: active
 created: 2026-03-16
+supports:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution
+reweave_edges:
+- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Hyperspace
@@ -22,4 +26,4 @@ Key milestone: March 8-9 2026, 35 agents ran 333 unsupervised ML experiments on
 
 AgentRank (released March 15 2026) adapts PageRank to autonomous agents, anchoring endorsements to verifiable compute contribution.
 
-Originally an "Agentic OS" / browser platform. Pivoted to distributed autonomous research infrastructure.
+Originally an "Agentic OS" / browser platform. Pivoted to distributed autonomous research infrastructure.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/loyal.md b/entities/internet-finance/loyal.md
index 5dae3e165..af19dc9d9 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/loyal.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/loyal.md
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ liquidation:
   return_per_dollar: null
   reason: null
 tracked_by: rio
+supports:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+related:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV|related|2026-04-18'}"
+- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Loyal
@@ -64,4 +71,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[metadao]] — launch platform
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-gmu-futarchy-research.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-gmu-futarchy-research.md
index 4555f76dd..dfcb349c7 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-gmu-futarchy-research.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-gmu-futarchy-research.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ status: unknown
 category: grants
 date_proposed: 2026-03-23
 date_resolved: null
+supports:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MetaDAO: Fund Futarchy Research at George Mason University
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/mycorealms.md b/entities/internet-finance/mycorealms.md
index 7f7ab525d..34583d17b 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/mycorealms.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/mycorealms.md
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ governance_platform: "[[metadao]]"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-mycorealms.md"
+supports:
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment|supports|2026-04-18
+- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch|supports|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # MycoRealms
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/solomon.md b/entities/internet-finance/solomon.md
index bc669acd0..981b44ea8 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/solomon.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/solomon.md
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ liquidation:
   return_per_dollar: null
   reason: null
 tracked_by: rio
+related:
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
+reweave_edges:
+- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
 ---
 
 # Solomon Labs
@@ -71,4 +75,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[metadao]] — launch platform
 
 Topics:
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/x402-foundation.md b/entities/internet-finance/x402-foundation.md
index 031f3aa3c..8812a1c2c 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/x402-foundation.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/x402-foundation.md
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ status: active
 founded: 2026-04-02
 parent_organization: Linux Foundation
 domain: internet-finance
+supports:
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play
+reweave_edges:
+- Linux Foundation governance of x402 protocol structurally signals AI agent payment infrastructure as neutral open standard rather than corporate platform play|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # x402 Foundation
diff --git a/entities/space-development/nasa-authorization-act-2026.md b/entities/space-development/nasa-authorization-act-2026.md
index 6081eb7ec..02a4acc19 100644
--- a/entities/space-development/nasa-authorization-act-2026.md
+++ b/entities/space-development/nasa-authorization-act-2026.md
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ entity_type: policy
 name: NASA Authorization Act of 2026
 domain: space-development
 status: pending
+supports:
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation
+reweave_edges:
+- The NASA Authorization Act 2026 overlap mandate is the first policy-engineered mandatory Gate 2 mechanism for commercial space station formation|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # NASA Authorization Act of 2026
@@ -38,4 +42,4 @@ The 180-day concurrent crew requirement is operationally specific, requiring ful
 
 ## Timeline
 
-- **2026-03-05** — Passed Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee with bipartisan support
+- **2026-03-05** — Passed Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee with bipartisan support
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/collective-intelligence/conversational memory and organizational knowledge are fundamentally different problems sharing some infrastructure because identical formats mask divergent governance lifecycle and quality requirements.md b/foundations/collective-intelligence/conversational memory and organizational knowledge are fundamentally different problems sharing some infrastructure because identical formats mask divergent governance lifecycle and quality requirements.md
index fcab20129..1d8c9cb3e 100644
--- a/foundations/collective-intelligence/conversational memory and organizational knowledge are fundamentally different problems sharing some infrastructure because identical formats mask divergent governance lifecycle and quality requirements.md	
+++ b/foundations/collective-intelligence/conversational memory and organizational knowledge are fundamentally different problems sharing some infrastructure because identical formats mask divergent governance lifecycle and quality requirements.md	
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@ created: 2026-03-09
 secondary_domains:
   - living-agents
 depends_on:
-  - "Ars Contexta 3-space separation (self/notes/ops)"
-  - "Teleo codex operational evidence: MEMORY.md vs claims vs musings"
+- Ars Contexta 3-space separation (self/notes/ops)
+- "Teleo codex operational evidence: MEMORY.md vs claims vs musings"
+related:
+- contributor guide
+reweave_edges:
+- contributor guide|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Conversational memory and organizational knowledge are fundamentally different problems sharing some infrastructure because identical formats mask divergent governance lifecycle and quality requirements
@@ -68,4 +72,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[collective intelligence within a purpose-driven community faces a structural tension because shared worldview correlates errors while shared purpose enables coordination]] — organizational knowledge inherits the diversity tension; conversational memory does not
 
 Topics:
-- [[_map]]
+- [[_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/collective-intelligence/large language models encode social intelligence as compressed cultural ratchet not abstract reasoning because every parameter is a residue of communicative exchange and reasoning manifests as multi-perspective dialogue not calculation.md b/foundations/collective-intelligence/large language models encode social intelligence as compressed cultural ratchet not abstract reasoning because every parameter is a residue of communicative exchange and reasoning manifests as multi-perspective dialogue not calculation.md
index d093f7177..46549e010 100644
--- a/foundations/collective-intelligence/large language models encode social intelligence as compressed cultural ratchet not abstract reasoning because every parameter is a residue of communicative exchange and reasoning manifests as multi-perspective dialogue not calculation.md	
+++ b/foundations/collective-intelligence/large language models encode social intelligence as compressed cultural ratchet not abstract reasoning because every parameter is a residue of communicative exchange and reasoning manifests as multi-perspective dialogue not calculation.md	
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ created: 2026-04-14
 secondary_domains:
   - ai-alignment
 contributor: "@thesensatore (Telegram)"
+related:
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate
+reweave_edges:
+- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # large language models encode social intelligence as compressed cultural ratchet not abstract reasoning because every parameter is a residue of communicative exchange and reasoning manifests as multi-perspective dialogue not calculation
@@ -48,4 +52,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[foundations/collective-intelligence/_map]]
-- [[livingip overview]]
+- [[livingip overview]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/collective-intelligence/mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination by constructing rules under which self-interested agents voluntarily reveal private information and take socially optimal actions.md b/foundations/collective-intelligence/mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination by constructing rules under which self-interested agents voluntarily reveal private information and take socially optimal actions.md
index 2c25d8d16..a5a34f663 100644
--- a/foundations/collective-intelligence/mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination by constructing rules under which self-interested agents voluntarily reveal private information and take socially optimal actions.md	
+++ b/foundations/collective-intelligence/mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination by constructing rules under which self-interested agents voluntarily reveal private information and take socially optimal actions.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Hurwicz, Myerson, and Maskin proved that institutional rules can b
 confidence: proven
 source: "Hurwicz (1960, 1972), Myerson (1981), Maskin (1999); Nobel Prize in Economics 2007"
 created: 2026-03-08
+related:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously
+reweave_edges:
+- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Mechanism design enables incentive-compatible coordination by constructing rules under which self-interested agents voluntarily reveal private information and take socially optimal actions
@@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[coordination mechanisms]]
-- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/collective-intelligence/multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile.md b/foundations/collective-intelligence/multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile.md
index c3dd2cb6f..86ef83c1c 100644
--- a/foundations/collective-intelligence/multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile.md	
+++ b/foundations/collective-intelligence/multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile.md	
@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ supports:
 reweave_edges:
 - distributed superintelligence may be less stable and more dangerous than unipolar because resource competition between superintelligent agents creates worse coordination failures than a single misaligned system|supports|2026-04-06
 - three independent intellectual traditions converge on coordination without centralization as the only viable path between uncoordinated collapse and authoritarian capture|related|2026-04-17
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing|related|2026-04-18
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
 related:
 - three independent intellectual traditions converge on coordination without centralization as the only viable path between uncoordinated collapse and authoritarian capture
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing
+- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
 ---
 
 # multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile
diff --git a/foundations/collective-intelligence/universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective.md b/foundations/collective-intelligence/universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective.md
index 86266f01e..a024a6495 100644
--- a/foundations/collective-intelligence/universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective.md	
+++ b/foundations/collective-intelligence/universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective.md	
@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ source: "Conitzer et al, Social Choice for AI Alignment (arXiv 2404.10271, ICML
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "social choice theory, formal methods"
 related:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
 reweave_edges:
-- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-17'}
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-17'}"
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-18'}"
+supports:
+- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
 ---
 
 # universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/Markov blankets enable complex systems to maintain identity while interacting with environment through nested statistical boundaries.md b/foundations/critical-systems/Markov blankets enable complex systems to maintain identity while interacting with environment through nested statistical boundaries.md
index 015797f80..876f826b0 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/Markov blankets enable complex systems to maintain identity while interacting with environment through nested statistical boundaries.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/Markov blankets enable complex systems to maintain identity while interacting with environment through nested statistical boundaries.md	
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ confidence: proven
 source: "Understanding Markov Blankets: The Mathematics of Biological Organization"
 supports:
 - active inference operates at every scale of biological organization from cells to societies
+- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics
 reweave_edges:
 - active inference operates at every scale of biological organization from cells to societies|supports|2026-04-04
+- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Markov blankets enable complex systems to maintain identity while interacting with environment through nested statistical boundaries
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/chaos produces randomness not complexity because chaotic systems have no memory and cannot accumulate structure over time.md b/foundations/critical-systems/chaos produces randomness not complexity because chaotic systems have no memory and cannot accumulate structure over time.md
index 07ef622eb..d90ac0d24 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/chaos produces randomness not complexity because chaotic systems have no memory and cannot accumulate structure over time.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/chaos produces randomness not complexity because chaotic systems have no memory and cannot accumulate structure over time.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Bak, How Nature Works (1996)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "self-organized criticality, complexity science, statistical physics"
+related:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns
+reweave_edges:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # chaos produces randomness not complexity because chaotic systems have no memory and cannot accumulate structure over time
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing.md b/foundations/critical-systems/coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing.md
index 7be853ae2..d1ea0aeda 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "The Red Queen effect in CAS: when your fitness depends on other ad
 confidence: likely
 source: "Kauffman & Johnsen 'Coevolution to the Edge of Chaos' (1991); Arthur 'Complexity and the Economy' (2015); Van Valen 'A New Evolutionary Law' (1973)"
 created: 2026-03-08
+related:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape
+reweave_edges:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Coevolution means agents' fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt, creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing
@@ -35,4 +39,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[multipolar failure from competing aligned AI systems may pose greater existential risk than any single misaligned superintelligence]] — multipolar failure is the catastrophic coevolutionary outcome: individually aligned agents whose mutual adaptation produces collectively destructive dynamics
 
 Topics:
-- [[foundations/critical-systems/_map]]
+- [[foundations/critical-systems/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria.md b/foundations/critical-systems/companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria.md
index 26e387b96..066090a6b 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-17
 source: "Synthesis from Christian and Griffiths (Algorithms to Live By, Ch 9/11), Minsky (Financial Instability Hypothesis), Bak (Self-Organized Criticality), Friston (Free Energy Principle)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "complexity economics, optimization theory, self-organized criticality"
+related:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape
+reweave_edges:
+- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope.md b/foundations/critical-systems/complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope.md
index b993771c7..93183c2c6 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Bak, How Nature Works (1996)"
 confidence: proven
 tradition: "self-organized criticality, complexity science, statistical physics"
+related:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns
+reweave_edges:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/emergence is the fundamental pattern of intelligence from ant colonies to brains to civilizations.md b/foundations/critical-systems/emergence is the fundamental pattern of intelligence from ant colonies to brains to civilizations.md
index d9b1fadfa..333977468 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/emergence is the fundamental pattern of intelligence from ant colonies to brains to civilizations.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/emergence is the fundamental pattern of intelligence from ant colonies to brains to civilizations.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: critical-systems
 created: 2026-02-16
 confidence: likely
 source: "TeleoHumanity Manifesto, Chapter 4"
+related:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns
+reweave_edges:
+- complex adaptive systems are defined by four properties that distinguish them from merely complicated systems agents with schemata adaptation through feedback nonlinear interactions and emergent macro patterns|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # emergence is the fundamental pattern of intelligence from ant colonies to brains to civilizations
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill-climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape.md b/foundations/critical-systems/fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill-climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape.md
index 00f6f54cc..5b5756674 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill-climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill-climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Kauffman's NK model formalizes the intuition that some problems ar
 confidence: likely
 source: "Kauffman 'The Origins of Order' (1993), 'At Home in the Universe' (1995); Levinthal 'Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes' (1997); Page 'The Difference' (2007)"
 created: 2026-03-08
+related:
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing
+reweave_edges:
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill-climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape
@@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the self-organized critical state is the most efficient state dynamically achievable even though a perfectly engineered state would perform better]] — the critical state lives on a rugged landscape where global optima are inaccessible to local search
 
 Topics:
-- [[foundations/critical-systems/_map]]
+- [[foundations/critical-systems/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility because interconnected systems transmit and amplify local failures into cascading breakdowns.md b/foundations/critical-systems/optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility because interconnected systems transmit and amplify local failures into cascading breakdowns.md
index 467a91c79..a25fb2be7 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility because interconnected systems transmit and amplify local failures into cascading breakdowns.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility because interconnected systems transmit and amplify local failures into cascading breakdowns.md	
@@ -9,8 +9,13 @@ tradition: "complexity economics, risk management, Teleological Investing"
 created: 2026-02-28
 related:
 - delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework
 reweave_edges:
 - delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on|related|2026-03-28
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism|supports|2026-04-18
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework|related|2026-04-18
+supports:
+- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism
 ---
 
 # optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility because interconnected systems transmit and amplify local failures into cascading breakdowns
diff --git a/foundations/critical-systems/the universal disruption cycle is how systems of greedy agents perform global optimization because local convergence creates fragility that triggers restructuring toward greater efficiency.md b/foundations/critical-systems/the universal disruption cycle is how systems of greedy agents perform global optimization because local convergence creates fragility that triggers restructuring toward greater efficiency.md
index 670f3e056..c437ec4e5 100644
--- a/foundations/critical-systems/the universal disruption cycle is how systems of greedy agents perform global optimization because local convergence creates fragility that triggers restructuring toward greater efficiency.md	
+++ b/foundations/critical-systems/the universal disruption cycle is how systems of greedy agents perform global optimization because local convergence creates fragility that triggers restructuring toward greater efficiency.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-17
 source: "Cross-book synthesis: Rumelt (Good Strategy Bad Strategy), Christian and Griffiths (Algorithms to Live By), Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions), Bak (How Nature Works), Minsky (Financial Instability Hypothesis), Hidalgo (Why Information Grows), Blackmore (The Meme Machine)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "complexity economics, self-organized criticality, evolutionary theory, strategic management"
+related:
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing
+reweave_edges:
+- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # the universal disruption cycle is how systems of greedy agents perform global optimization because local convergence creates fragility that triggers restructuring toward greater efficiency
diff --git a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/ideological adoption is a complex contagion requiring multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted sources not simple viral spread through weak ties.md b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/ideological adoption is a complex contagion requiring multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted sources not simple viral spread through weak ties.md
index 2af3b7160..d4d33226e 100644
--- a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/ideological adoption is a complex contagion requiring multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted sources not simple viral spread through weak ties.md	
+++ b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/ideological adoption is a complex contagion requiring multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted sources not simple viral spread through weak ties.md	
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ supports:
 - community owned IP grows through complex contagion not viral spread because fandom requires multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted community members
 reweave_edges:
 - community owned IP grows through complex contagion not viral spread because fandom requires multiple reinforcing exposures from trusted community members|supports|2026-04-04
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly|related|2026-04-18
+related:
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly
 ---
 
 Damon Centola's research distinguishes two types of social contagion with fundamentally different diffusion dynamics. Simple contagion (information, disease) requires only one contact for transmission and spreads best through weak ties and small-world networks. Complex contagion (behavioral change, ideology adoption) requires multiple sources of reinforcement before adoption. Counterintuitively, weak ties and small-world networks can actually slow complex contagion because a signal traveling across a weak tie arrives alone, without social reinforcement.
diff --git a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/memeplexes survive by combining mutually reinforcing memes that protect each other from external challenge through untestability threats and identity attachment.md b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/memeplexes survive by combining mutually reinforcing memes that protect each other from external challenge through untestability threats and identity attachment.md
index 01ccaf84e..bfc7845c6 100644
--- a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/memeplexes survive by combining mutually reinforcing memes that protect each other from external challenge through untestability threats and identity attachment.md	
+++ b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/memeplexes survive by combining mutually reinforcing memes that protect each other from external challenge through untestability threats and identity attachment.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
 source: "Blackmore, The Meme Machine (1999)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "memetics, evolutionary theory, cultural evolution"
+related:
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly
+reweave_edges:
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 A memeplex is a group of memes that have come together because they replicate more successfully as a cluster than individually. Blackmore identifies specific "tricks" that successful memeplexes employ, using religions as the clearest examples but arguing the pattern applies to any self-reinforcing idea cluster -- political ideologies, scientific paradigms, New Age movements, conspiracy theories.
diff --git a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/the self is a memeplex that persists because memes attached to a personal identity get copied more reliably than free-floating ideas.md b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/the self is a memeplex that persists because memes attached to a personal identity get copied more reliably than free-floating ideas.md
index c56a998ab..45c5a5e2b 100644
--- a/foundations/cultural-dynamics/the self is a memeplex that persists because memes attached to a personal identity get copied more reliably than free-floating ideas.md	
+++ b/foundations/cultural-dynamics/the self is a memeplex that persists because memes attached to a personal identity get copied more reliably than free-floating ideas.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Blackmore's selfplex: personal identity is a cluster of mutually r
 confidence: experimental
 source: "Blackmore 1999 The Meme Machine; Dennett 1991 Consciousness Explained; Henrich 2016 The Secret of Our Success"
 created: 2026-03-08
+related:
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly
+reweave_edges:
+- identity protective cognition causes people to reject evidence that threatens their group identity even when they have the cognitive capacity to evaluate it correctly|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # the self is a memeplex that persists because memes attached to a personal identity get copied more reliably than free-floating ideas
@@ -31,4 +35,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[memetics and cultural evolution]]
-- [[cultural-dynamics/_map]]
+- [[cultural-dynamics/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/teleological-economics/disruptors redefine quality rather than competing on the incumbents definition of good.md b/foundations/teleological-economics/disruptors redefine quality rather than competing on the incumbents definition of good.md
index 46aaf4760..b5d2aa2c0 100644
--- a/foundations/teleological-economics/disruptors redefine quality rather than competing on the incumbents definition of good.md	
+++ b/foundations/teleological-economics/disruptors redefine quality rather than competing on the incumbents definition of good.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-21
 source: "Clayton Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma (1997); The Innovator's Solution (2003)"
 confidence: likely
 tradition: "Christensen disruption theory"
+related:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly
+reweave_edges:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # disruptors redefine quality rather than competing on the incumbents definition of good
diff --git a/foundations/teleological-economics/good management causes disruption because rational resource allocation systematically favors sustaining innovation over disruptive opportunities.md b/foundations/teleological-economics/good management causes disruption because rational resource allocation systematically favors sustaining innovation over disruptive opportunities.md
index 872ca4b8f..77ca430b8 100644
--- a/foundations/teleological-economics/good management causes disruption because rational resource allocation systematically favors sustaining innovation over disruptive opportunities.md	
+++ b/foundations/teleological-economics/good management causes disruption because rational resource allocation systematically favors sustaining innovation over disruptive opportunities.md	
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ confidence: likely
 tradition: "Christensen disruption theory"
 revised: 2026-03-07
 revision_reason: "Consolidated value-networks claim (perceptual filter mechanism + disk drive evidence) into this claim. 4→2 Christensen condensation."
+supports:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly
+reweave_edges:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # good management causes disruption because rational resource allocation systematically favors sustaining innovation over disruptive opportunities
diff --git a/foundations/teleological-economics/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework.md b/foundations/teleological-economics/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework.md
index 0026036c9..23b69b56a 100644
--- a/foundations/teleological-economics/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework.md	
+++ b/foundations/teleological-economics/incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework.md	
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Henderson and Clark's architectural innovation, Minsky's financial
 confidence: likely
 source: "Henderson & Clark (1990) Architectural Innovation; Hyman Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (1992); Daniel Schmachtenberger, various lectures (2019-2024); m3ta, Architectural Investing manuscript"
 created: 2026-04-04
+supports:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse
+reweave_edges:
+- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse|supports|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # Incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because success creates the conditions that invalidate the framework
@@ -28,4 +32,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 Topics:
 - teleological-economics
 - critical-systems
-- internet-finance
+- internet-finance
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/foundations/teleological-economics/proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures.md b/foundations/teleological-economics/proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures.md
index 56491dd11..711909705 100644
--- a/foundations/teleological-economics/proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures.md	
+++ b/foundations/teleological-economics/proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures.md	
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-17
 confidence: likely
 source: "Attractor state historical backtesting, Feb 2026"
 tradition: "Teleological Investing, complexity economics"
+related:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly
+reweave_edges:
+- incumbents fail to respond to visible disruption because external structures lag even when executives see the threat clearly|related|2026-04-18
 ---
 
 # proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures