diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
index 42b258d6..2a50ec92 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
@@ -60,13 +60,13 @@ The Kalshi litigation reveals that CFTC regulation alone does not resolve state
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (challenge)
-*Source: [[2026-02-00-better-markets-prediction-markets-gambling]] | Added: 2026-03-18*
+*Source: 2026-02-00-better-markets-prediction-markets-gambling | Added: 2026-03-18*
 
 Better Markets presents the strongest counter-argument to CFTC exclusive jurisdiction: the CEA already prohibits gaming contracts under Section 5c(c)(5)(C), and sports prediction markets ARE gaming by any reasonable definition. Kalshi's own prior admission that 'Congress did not want sports betting conducted on derivatives markets' undermines the current industry position. This suggests Polymarket's regulatory legitimacy may be more fragile than assumed—state AGs have a statutory basis to challenge CFTC jurisdiction, not just a turf war.
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (challenge)
-*Source: [[2026-02-00-better-markets-prediction-markets-gambling]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+*Source: 2026-02-00-better-markets-prediction-markets-gambling | Added: 2026-03-19*
 
 Better Markets argues that CFTC jurisdiction over prediction markets is legally unsound because the CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C) already prohibits gaming contracts, and sports/entertainment prediction markets are gaming by definition. They cite Senator Blanche Lincoln's legislative intent that the CEA was NOT meant to 'enable gambling through supposed event contracts' and specifically named sports events. Most damaging: Kalshi's own prior admission that 'Congress did not want sports betting conducted on derivatives markets' when defending election contracts, which undermines the current CFTC jurisdiction claim.
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-kalshi-duopoly-emerging-as-dominant-us-prediction-market-structure-with-complementary-regulatory-models.md b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-kalshi-duopoly-emerging-as-dominant-us-prediction-market-structure-with-complementary-regulatory-models.md
index 7f7ae7b7..a242a6ea 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-kalshi-duopoly-emerging-as-dominant-us-prediction-market-structure-with-complementary-regulatory-models.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-kalshi-duopoly-emerging-as-dominant-us-prediction-market-structure-with-complementary-regulatory-models.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The duopoly thesis assumes regulatory barriers remain high. If CFTC streamlines
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-01-30-npr-kalshi-19-federal-lawsuits]] | Added: 2026-03-18*
+*Source: 2026-01-30-npr-kalshi-19-federal-lawsuits | Added: 2026-03-18*
 
 Kalshi litigation outcome affects competitors Robinhood, Coinbase, FanDuel, and DraftKings, all of which recently announced rival prediction market services. A Kalshi loss could shut down the entire US prediction market industry beyond Polymarket's offshore model, while a Kalshi victory establishes federal preemption precedent reshaping sports betting regulation nationally.