diff --git a/core/living-capital/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md b/core/living-capital/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md
index a33910018..7ee9ca43d 100644
--- a/core/living-capital/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md	
+++ b/core/living-capital/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md	
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@ reweave_edges:
 - SpaceX dual-class IPO structure makes Musk structurally irremovable as CEO/CTO/Chairman, concentrating single-player space economy risk at both organizational and governance levels simultaneously|related|2026-05-06
 - investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails|related|2026-05-08
 - open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes|related|2026-05-08
+- The SEC-CFTC 2026 transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring essential managerial efforts to drive profits structurally supports futarchy's securities defense because market mechanisms replace concentrated promoter control|related|2026-05-10
 related:
 - confidential computing reshapes defi mechanism design
 - SpaceX dual-class IPO structure makes Musk structurally irremovable as CEO/CTO/Chairman, concentrating single-player space economy risk at both organizational and governance levels simultaneously
 - investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails
 - open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes
+- The SEC-CFTC 2026 transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring essential managerial efforts to drive profits structurally supports futarchy's securities defense because market mechanisms replace concentrated promoter control
 ---
 
 # futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-august-2026-enforcement-deadline-legally-active-first-mandatory-ai-governance.md b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-august-2026-enforcement-deadline-legally-active-first-mandatory-ai-governance.md
index 573545275..9482fd82d 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-august-2026-enforcement-deadline-legally-active-first-mandatory-ai-governance.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-august-2026-enforcement-deadline-legally-active-first-mandatory-ai-governance.md
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ related:
 - august-2026-dual-enforcement-geometry-creates-bifurcated-ai-compliance-environment-through-opposite-military-civilian-requirements
 - eu-ai-act-military-exclusion-gap-limits-governance-scope-to-civilian-systems
 - pre-enforcement-retreat-is-fifth-governance-failure-mode
+- EU AI Act GPAI evaluation requirements represent the only surviving mandatory governance mechanism targeting frontier AI after the omnibus deferral because systemic-risk model providers face mandatory evaluation risk assessment and AI Office notification from August 2026 while high-risk deployment requirements were deferred 16-24 months
+reweave_edges:
+- EU AI Act GPAI evaluation requirements represent the only surviving mandatory governance mechanism targeting frontier AI after the omnibus deferral because systemic-risk model providers face mandatory evaluation risk assessment and AI Office notification from August 2026 while high-risk deployment requirements were deferred 16-24 months|related|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # EU AI Act high-risk enforcement deadline became legally active April 28, 2026 when the Omnibus trilogue failed, creating the first mandatory AI governance enforcement date in history without a legislative escape clause
@@ -58,4 +61,4 @@ May 13, 2026 trilogue has ~25% probability of closing (deferring August 2 deadli
 
 **Source:** EU AI Act omnibus provisional agreement, May 7, 2026
 
-The May 2026 omnibus deal confirmed that GPAI obligations under Articles 50-55 were NOT deferred and remain active from August 2026. Multiple law firm analyses (Orrick, IAPP, Bird & Bird, Hogan Lovells) independently confirmed that GPAI requirements 'were not in substantive dispute and continue on their current schedule.' The omnibus strengthened (not weakened) AI Office supervisory competence over GPAI models. This creates a two-track structure where frontier AI labs face full requirements from August 2026 while high-risk deployers have requirements deferred to December 2027/August 2028.
+The May 2026 omnibus deal confirmed that GPAI obligations under Articles 50-55 were NOT deferred and remain active from August 2026. Multiple law firm analyses (Orrick, IAPP, Bird & Bird, Hogan Lovells) independently confirmed that GPAI requirements 'were not in substantive dispute and continue on their current schedule.' The omnibus strengthened (not weakened) AI Office supervisory competence over GPAI models. This creates a two-track structure where frontier AI labs face full requirements from August 2026 while high-risk deployers have requirements deferred to December 2027/August 2028.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments.md b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments.md
index 3220aec43..ba576e1d4 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments.md
@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@ sourced_from:
 - inbox/archive/ai-alignment/2026-03-29-techpolicy-press-anthropic-pentagon-timeline.md
 related:
 - cross-jurisdictional-governance-retreat-convergence-indicates-regulatory-tradition-independent-pressures
+supports:
+- EU GPAI requirements apply to US frontier AI labs without equivalent domestic US requirements creating a de facto extraterritorial governance asymmetry where AI producers face mandatory EU evaluation that US law does not impose
+reweave_edges:
+- EU GPAI requirements apply to US frontier AI labs without equivalent domestic US requirements creating a de facto extraterritorial governance asymmetry where AI producers face mandatory EU evaluation that US law does not impose|supports|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail
 
-The Anthropic-Pentagon dispute has triggered European policy discussions about whether EU AI Act provisions could be enforced extraterritorially on US-based labs operating in European markets. This follows the GDPR structural dynamic: European market access creates compliance incentives that congressional inaction cannot. The mechanism is market-based binding constraint rather than voluntary commitment. When a company can be penalized by its government for maintaining safety standards (as the Pentagon dispute demonstrated), voluntary commitments become a competitive liability. But if European market access requires AI Act compliance, US labs face a choice: comply with binding European requirements to access European markets, or forfeit that market. This creates a structural alternative to the failed US voluntary commitment framework. The key insight is that binding governance can emerge from market access requirements rather than domestic statutory authority. European policymakers are explicitly examining this mechanism as a response to the demonstrated failure of voluntary commitments under competitive pressure. The extraterritorial enforcement discussion represents a shift from incremental EU AI Act implementation to whether European regulatory architecture can provide the binding governance that US voluntary commitments structurally cannot.
+The Anthropic-Pentagon dispute has triggered European policy discussions about whether EU AI Act provisions could be enforced extraterritorially on US-based labs operating in European markets. This follows the GDPR structural dynamic: European market access creates compliance incentives that congressional inaction cannot. The mechanism is market-based binding constraint rather than voluntary commitment. When a company can be penalized by its government for maintaining safety standards (as the Pentagon dispute demonstrated), voluntary commitments become a competitive liability. But if European market access requires AI Act compliance, US labs face a choice: comply with binding European requirements to access European markets, or forfeit that market. This creates a structural alternative to the failed US voluntary commitment framework. The key insight is that binding governance can emerge from market access requirements rather than domestic statutory authority. European policymakers are explicitly examining this mechanism as a response to the demonstrated failure of voluntary commitments under competitive pressure. The extraterritorial enforcement discussion represents a shift from incremental EU AI Act implementation to whether European regulatory architecture can provide the binding governance that US voluntary commitments structurally cannot.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-gpai-requirements-create-extraterritorial-governance-asymmetry-for-us-frontier-labs.md b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-gpai-requirements-create-extraterritorial-governance-asymmetry-for-us-frontier-labs.md
index fa9636b59..2dd2781d7 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/eu-gpai-requirements-create-extraterritorial-governance-asymmetry-for-us-frontier-labs.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/eu-gpai-requirements-create-extraterritorial-governance-asymmetry-for-us-frontier-labs.md
@@ -10,9 +10,19 @@ agent: theseus
 sourced_from: ai-alignment/2026-05-07-eu-ai-act-gpai-carve-out-asymmetric-enforcement.md
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Multiple law firm analyses
-related: ["compute-export-controls-are-the-most-impactful-ai-governance-mechanism-but-target-geopolitical-competition-not-safety", "eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments", "eu-us-parallel-ai-governance-retreat-cross-jurisdictional-convergence", "august-2026-dual-enforcement-geometry-creates-bifurcated-ai-compliance-environment-through-opposite-military-civilian-requirements", "pentagon-exclusion-creates-eu-civilian-compliance-advantage-through-pre-aligned-safety-practices-when-enforcement-proceeds", "eu-ai-act-military-exclusion-gap-limits-governance-scope-to-civilian-systems"]
+related:
+- compute-export-controls-are-the-most-impactful-ai-governance-mechanism-but-target-geopolitical-competition-not-safety
+- eu-ai-act-extraterritorial-enforcement-creates-binding-governance-alternative-to-us-voluntary-commitments
+- eu-us-parallel-ai-governance-retreat-cross-jurisdictional-convergence
+- august-2026-dual-enforcement-geometry-creates-bifurcated-ai-compliance-environment-through-opposite-military-civilian-requirements
+- pentagon-exclusion-creates-eu-civilian-compliance-advantage-through-pre-aligned-safety-practices-when-enforcement-proceeds
+- eu-ai-act-military-exclusion-gap-limits-governance-scope-to-civilian-systems
+supports:
+- EU AI Act GPAI evaluation requirements represent the only surviving mandatory governance mechanism targeting frontier AI after the omnibus deferral because systemic-risk model providers face mandatory evaluation risk assessment and AI Office notification from August 2026 while high-risk deployment requirements were deferred 16-24 months
+reweave_edges:
+- EU AI Act GPAI evaluation requirements represent the only surviving mandatory governance mechanism targeting frontier AI after the omnibus deferral because systemic-risk model providers face mandatory evaluation risk assessment and AI Office notification from August 2026 while high-risk deployment requirements were deferred 16-24 months|supports|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # EU GPAI requirements apply to US frontier AI labs without equivalent domestic US requirements creating a de facto extraterritorial governance asymmetry where AI producers face mandatory EU evaluation that US law does not impose
 
-The omnibus deal's selective preservation of GPAI requirements while deferring high-risk deployment obligations creates a governance asymmetry with geopolitical implications. The EU maintained mandatory evaluation, risk assessment, and AI Office notification requirements for systemic-risk GPAI models (primarily developed by US companies: Anthropic, OpenAI, Google) while deferring compliance burden for high-risk deployers (hospitals, employers, banks—predominantly EU entities). This means US frontier labs face mandatory EU evaluation requirements from August 2026 that US domestic law does not impose. The asymmetry is deliberate and politically revealing: the EU chose to protect downstream deployers from compliance burden while maintaining scrutiny of frontier AI labs. This creates a de facto situation where US frontier labs must comply with EU model-level governance requirements that have no US equivalent. The omnibus was widely framed as competitiveness-driven deregulation, yet the selective preservation of GPAI requirements suggests the EU views AI producer governance (model-level) and AI deployer compliance (deployment-level) as distinct, and finds the former politically acceptable to maintain even under competitive pressure. This represents extraterritorial governance where the EU imposes requirements on foreign AI producers that their home jurisdictions do not enforce.
+The omnibus deal's selective preservation of GPAI requirements while deferring high-risk deployment obligations creates a governance asymmetry with geopolitical implications. The EU maintained mandatory evaluation, risk assessment, and AI Office notification requirements for systemic-risk GPAI models (primarily developed by US companies: Anthropic, OpenAI, Google) while deferring compliance burden for high-risk deployers (hospitals, employers, banks—predominantly EU entities). This means US frontier labs face mandatory EU evaluation requirements from August 2026 that US domestic law does not impose. The asymmetry is deliberate and politically revealing: the EU chose to protect downstream deployers from compliance burden while maintaining scrutiny of frontier AI labs. This creates a de facto situation where US frontier labs must comply with EU model-level governance requirements that have no US equivalent. The omnibus was widely framed as competitiveness-driven deregulation, yet the selective preservation of GPAI requirements suggests the EU views AI producer governance (model-level) and AI deployer compliance (deployment-level) as distinct, and finds the former politically acceptable to maintain even under competitive pressure. This represents extraterritorial governance where the EU imposes requirements on foreign AI producers that their home jurisdictions do not enforce.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/judicial-oversight-of-ai-governance-through-constitutional-grounds-not-statutory-safety-law.md b/domains/ai-alignment/judicial-oversight-of-ai-governance-through-constitutional-grounds-not-statutory-safety-law.md
index 844becd3b..5574ecd26 100644
--- a/domains/ai-alignment/judicial-oversight-of-ai-governance-through-constitutional-grounds-not-statutory-safety-law.md
+++ b/domains/ai-alignment/judicial-oversight-of-ai-governance-through-constitutional-grounds-not-statutory-safety-law.md
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@ supports:
 - judicial-oversight-checks-executive-ai-retaliation-but-cannot-create-positive-safety-obligations
 - Voluntary AI safety constraints are protected as corporate speech but unenforceable as safety requirements, creating legal mechanism gap when primary demand-side actor seeks safety-unconstrained providers
 - Supply chain risk designation weaponizes national security procurement law to punish AI safety constraints, as confirmed by federal court finding that the designation was designed to punish First Amendment-protected speech not to protect national security
+- Judicial analysis of vendor AI safety controls creates governance precedent regardless of case outcome because courts asking whether post-delivery control is technically meaningful validates or undermines vendor-based safety architecture as a governance model
 reweave_edges:
 - judicial-oversight-checks-executive-ai-retaliation-but-cannot-create-positive-safety-obligations|supports|2026-03-31
 - Voluntary AI safety constraints are protected as corporate speech but unenforceable as safety requirements, creating legal mechanism gap when primary demand-side actor seeks safety-unconstrained providers|supports|2026-04-20
 - Supply chain risk designation weaponizes national security procurement law to punish AI safety constraints, as confirmed by federal court finding that the designation was designed to punish First Amendment-protected speech not to protect national security|supports|2026-05-08
+- Judicial analysis of vendor AI safety controls creates governance precedent regardless of case outcome because courts asking whether post-delivery control is technically meaningful validates or undermines vendor-based safety architecture as a governance model|supports|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # Judicial oversight of AI governance operates through constitutional and administrative law grounds rather than statutory AI safety frameworks creating negative liberty protection without positive safety obligations
diff --git a/domains/entertainment/community-owned-ip-theory-preserves-concentrated-creative-execution-through-strategic-operational-separation.md b/domains/entertainment/community-owned-ip-theory-preserves-concentrated-creative-execution-through-strategic-operational-separation.md
index 4c6fe033d..af422ba64 100644
--- a/domains/entertainment/community-owned-ip-theory-preserves-concentrated-creative-execution-through-strategic-operational-separation.md
+++ b/domains/entertainment/community-owned-ip-theory-preserves-concentrated-creative-execution-through-strategic-operational-separation.md
@@ -15,10 +15,12 @@ related:
 - external-showrunner-partnerships-complicate-community-ip-editorial-authority-by-splitting-creative-control-between-founding-team-and-studio-professionals
 - NFT holder royalties from IP licensing create permanent financial skin-in-the-game that aligns holder interests with IP quality without requiring governance participation
 - community-owned-ip-theory-preserves-concentrated-creative-execution-through-strategic-operational-separation
+- Fantasy Hollywood model reframes community IP participation as financial alignment with outcomes rather than creative governance over decisions
 reweave_edges:
 - community-owned-ip-is-community-branded-but-not-community-governed-in-flagship-web3-projects|related|2026-04-17
 - external-showrunner-partnerships-complicate-community-ip-editorial-authority-by-splitting-creative-control-between-founding-team-and-studio-professionals|related|2026-04-17
 - NFT holder royalties from IP licensing create permanent financial skin-in-the-game that aligns holder interests with IP quality without requiring governance participation|related|2026-04-17
+- Fantasy Hollywood model reframes community IP participation as financial alignment with outcomes rather than creative governance over decisions|related|2026-05-10
 sourced_from: ["inbox/archive/entertainment/2026-04-12-a16z-community-owned-characters-framework.md"]
 supports:
 - Community IP governance fragmentation increases with liquidity as tradable ownership attracts financially-motivated holders with weaker creative alignment
diff --git a/domains/health/food-insecurity-independently-predicts-41-percent-higher-cvd-incidence-establishing-temporality-for-sdoh-cardiovascular-pathway.md b/domains/health/food-insecurity-independently-predicts-41-percent-higher-cvd-incidence-establishing-temporality-for-sdoh-cardiovascular-pathway.md
index ffc3ed6c7..117eef489 100644
--- a/domains/health/food-insecurity-independently-predicts-41-percent-higher-cvd-incidence-establishing-temporality-for-sdoh-cardiovascular-pathway.md
+++ b/domains/health/food-insecurity-independently-predicts-41-percent-higher-cvd-incidence-establishing-temporality-for-sdoh-cardiovascular-pathway.md
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ supports:
 reweave_edges:
 - food-as-medicine-interventions-produce-clinically-significant-improvements-during-active-delivery-but-benefits-fully-revert-when-structural-food-environment-support-is-removed|supports|2026-04-03
 - Food insecurity creates a bidirectional reinforcing loop with cardiovascular disease where disease drives dietary insufficiency through medical costs and dietary insufficiency drives disease through ultra-processed food reliance|supports|2026-04-07
+- Loneliness independently increases all-cause dementia risk by 19-31% after adjusting for depression, with vascular dementia showing stronger association than Alzheimer's disease|related|2026-05-10
+related:
+- Loneliness independently increases all-cause dementia risk by 19-31% after adjusting for depression, with vascular dementia showing stronger association than Alzheimer's disease
 ---
 
 # Food insecurity in young adulthood independently predicts 41% higher CVD incidence in midlife after adjustment for socioeconomic factors, establishing temporality for the SDOH → cardiovascular disease pathway
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md
index 6c24f2b47..f3f365d43 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires.md	
@@ -5,9 +5,24 @@ description: Three structural features of futarchy-governed entities compound to
 confidence: experimental
 source: SEC Report on The DAO (2017), Howey test framework, MetaDAO ecosystem analysis, Seedplex regulatory analysis, March 2026
 created: 2026-03-05
-challenges: ["permissioned-futarchy-icos-are-securities-at-launch-regardless-of-governance-mechanism-because-team-effort-dominates-early-value-creation"]
-related: ["the SECs treatment of staking rewards as service payments establishes that mechanical participation in network consensus is not an investment contract", "confidential computing reshapes defi mechanism design", "investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails", "open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes", "futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires", "the DAO Reports rejection of voting as active management is the central legal hurdle for futarchy because prediction market trading must prove fundamentally more meaningful than token voting", "futarchy-governed-ico-tokens-transition-from-securities-to-non-securities-through-mechanism-maturity-faster-than-token-voting-daos"]
-reweave_edges: ["permissioned-futarchy-icos-are-securities-at-launch-regardless-of-governance-mechanism-because-team-effort-dominates-early-value-creation|challenges|2026-04-19", "the SECs treatment of staking rewards as service payments establishes that mechanical participation in network consensus is not an investment contract|related|2026-04-19", "confidential computing reshapes defi mechanism design|related|2026-04-28", "investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails|related|2026-05-08", "open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes|related|2026-05-08"]
+challenges:
+- permissioned-futarchy-icos-are-securities-at-launch-regardless-of-governance-mechanism-because-team-effort-dominates-early-value-creation
+related:
+- the SECs treatment of staking rewards as service payments establishes that mechanical participation in network consensus is not an investment contract
+- confidential computing reshapes defi mechanism design
+- investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails
+- open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes
+- futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires
+- the DAO Reports rejection of voting as active management is the central legal hurdle for futarchy because prediction market trading must prove fundamentally more meaningful than token voting
+- futarchy-governed-ico-tokens-transition-from-securities-to-non-securities-through-mechanism-maturity-faster-than-token-voting-daos
+reweave_edges:
+- permissioned-futarchy-icos-are-securities-at-launch-regardless-of-governance-mechanism-because-team-effort-dominates-early-value-creation|challenges|2026-04-19
+- the SECs treatment of staking rewards as service payments establishes that mechanical participation in network consensus is not an investment contract|related|2026-04-19
+- confidential computing reshapes defi mechanism design|related|2026-04-28
+- investment company act exposure not howey is the binding regulatory constraint on futarchy governed investment vehicles because beneficial ownership tests reach token holders even when the efforts of others prong fails|related|2026-05-08
+- open sourcing channels are a structural prerequisite for futarchy governed investment vehicles to clear the howey efforts of others prong because gatekept curation makes the curators judgment essential to investment outcomes|related|2026-05-08
+supports:
+- The SEC-CFTC 2026 transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring essential managerial efforts to drive profits structurally supports futarchy's securities defense because market mechanisms replace concentrated promoter control
 ---
 
 # futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires
@@ -139,4 +154,4 @@ Topics:
 
 **Source:** Ballard Spahr LLP analysis of SEC-CFTC joint interpretation, March 17, 2026
 
-The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation adopts a transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring 'essential managerial efforts' to drive profits. This regulatory framework directly supports the futarchy defensibility thesis by making the absence of concentrated promoter control the key test for avoiding securities classification.
+The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation adopts a transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring 'essential managerial efforts' to drive profits. This regulatory framework directly supports the futarchy defensibility thesis by making the absence of concentrated promoter control the key test for avoiding securities classification.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/the SEC frameworks silence on prediction markets and conditional tokens leaves futarchy governance mechanisms in a regulatory gap neither explicitly covered nor excluded from the token taxonomy.md b/domains/internet-finance/the SEC frameworks silence on prediction markets and conditional tokens leaves futarchy governance mechanisms in a regulatory gap neither explicitly covered nor excluded from the token taxonomy.md
index 562b0e946..a6ae455f5 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/the SEC frameworks silence on prediction markets and conditional tokens leaves futarchy governance mechanisms in a regulatory gap neither explicitly covered nor excluded from the token taxonomy.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/the SEC frameworks silence on prediction markets and conditional tokens leaves futarchy governance mechanisms in a regulatory gap neither explicitly covered nor excluded from the token taxonomy.md	
@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@ related:
 - SEC Token Taxonomy Framework (2026)
 - the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional split assigns SEC primary market authority over fundraising and CFTC secondary market authority over spot trading creating a dual-registration boundary that token projects must navigate
 - the SECs Transition Point mechanism creates a competitive incentive for token projects to decentralize because decentralization is now a formal pathway to reduced regulatory burden
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories
 reweave_edges:
 - prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets|related|2026-04-19
 - SEC Token Taxonomy Framework (2026)|related|2026-04-19
 - the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional split assigns SEC primary market authority over fundraising and CFTC secondary market authority over spot trading creating a dual-registration boundary that token projects must navigate|related|2026-04-19
 - the SECs Transition Point mechanism creates a competitive incentive for token projects to decentralize because decentralization is now a formal pathway to reduced regulatory burden|related|2026-04-19
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories|related|2026-05-10
 sourced_from:
 - inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-17-sec-cftc-token-taxonomy-interpretation.md
 ---
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations.md b/domains/internet-finance/the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations.md
index da4633dd0..159df268b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations.md	
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ source: "SEC Interpretive Release S7-2026-09 (March 17, 2026); Chairman Atkins r
 created: 2026-03-18
 sourced_from:
 - inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-17-sec-cftc-token-taxonomy-interpretation.md
+related:
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories
+reweave_edges:
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories|related|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # The SEC's distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations
@@ -31,4 +35,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]] — the asset/contract distinction supports the structural argument
 
 Topics:
-- [[maps/internet finance and decision markets]]
+- [[maps/internet finance and decision markets]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/the SECs investment contract termination doctrine creates a formal regulatory off-ramp where crypto assets can transition from securities to commodities by demonstrating fulfilled promises or sufficient decentralization.md b/domains/internet-finance/the SECs investment contract termination doctrine creates a formal regulatory off-ramp where crypto assets can transition from securities to commodities by demonstrating fulfilled promises or sufficient decentralization.md
index a81e14725..aae1c70b4 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/the SECs investment contract termination doctrine creates a formal regulatory off-ramp where crypto assets can transition from securities to commodities by demonstrating fulfilled promises or sufficient decentralization.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/the SECs investment contract termination doctrine creates a formal regulatory off-ramp where crypto assets can transition from securities to commodities by demonstrating fulfilled promises or sufficient decentralization.md	
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@ supports:
 related:
 - the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional split assigns SEC primary market authority over fundraising and CFTC secondary market authority over spot trading creating a dual-registration boundary that token projects must navigate
 - the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations
+- The SEC-CFTC 2026 transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring essential managerial efforts to drive profits structurally supports futarchy's securities defense because market mechanisms replace concentrated promoter control
 reweave_edges:
 - SEC Token Taxonomy Framework (2026)|supports|2026-04-19
 - the SEC-CFTC jurisdictional split assigns SEC primary market authority over fundraising and CFTC secondary market authority over spot trading creating a dual-registration boundary that token projects must navigate|related|2026-04-19
 - the SECs Transition Point mechanism creates a competitive incentive for token projects to decentralize because decentralization is now a formal pathway to reduced regulatory burden|supports|2026-04-19
 - the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations|related|2026-04-19
+- The SEC-CFTC 2026 transaction-focused Howey analysis requiring essential managerial efforts to drive profits structurally supports futarchy's securities defense because market mechanisms replace concentrated promoter control|related|2026-05-10
 sourced_from:
 - inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-17-sec-cftc-token-taxonomy-interpretation.md
 ---
diff --git a/domains/space-development/planetary-defense-addresses-detectable-asteroid-threats-not-grbs-supervolcanism-or-anthropogenic-catastrophe.md b/domains/space-development/planetary-defense-addresses-detectable-asteroid-threats-not-grbs-supervolcanism-or-anthropogenic-catastrophe.md
index 30d24d51d..52b808539 100644
--- a/domains/space-development/planetary-defense-addresses-detectable-asteroid-threats-not-grbs-supervolcanism-or-anthropogenic-catastrophe.md
+++ b/domains/space-development/planetary-defense-addresses-detectable-asteroid-threats-not-grbs-supervolcanism-or-anthropogenic-catastrophe.md
@@ -12,10 +12,14 @@ sourcer: NASA / Agent analysis
 supports:
 - DART validated kinetic deflection at heliocentric scales with beta factor 3.61 proving ejecta momentum amplification dominates impact transfer on rubble-pile asteroids
 - Planetary defense addresses asteroid/comet impacts but not GRBs, supervolcanism, or anthropogenic catastrophe — the risks most clearly requiring multiplanetary distribution
+- DART shifted the entire Didymos binary system's solar orbit by 0.15 seconds through ejecta-amplified momentum transfer, validating kinetic deflection at heliocentric scale
+- Planetary defense advancement narrows the asteroid-impact risk gap but does not address non-asteroid location-correlated extinction risks that motivate the multiplanetary imperative
 reweave_edges:
 - DART validated kinetic deflection at heliocentric scales with beta factor 3.61 proving ejecta momentum amplification dominates impact transfer on rubble-pile asteroids|supports|2026-04-24
 - Planetary defense addresses asteroid/comet impacts but not GRBs, supervolcanism, or anthropogenic catastrophe — the risks most clearly requiring multiplanetary distribution|supports|2026-04-24
 - The multiplanetary imperative's distinct value proposition is insurance against location-correlated extinction-level events, not all existential risks, because Earth-based bunkers can provide cost-effective resilience for catastrophes where Earth's biosphere remains functional|related|2026-04-29
+- DART shifted the entire Didymos binary system's solar orbit by 0.15 seconds through ejecta-amplified momentum transfer, validating kinetic deflection at heliocentric scale|supports|2026-05-10
+- Planetary defense advancement narrows the asteroid-impact risk gap but does not address non-asteroid location-correlated extinction risks that motivate the multiplanetary imperative|supports|2026-05-10
 related:
 - The multiplanetary imperative's distinct value proposition is insurance against location-correlated extinction-level events, not all existential risks, because Earth-based bunkers can provide cost-effective resilience for catastrophes where Earth's biosphere remains functional
 ---
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/sec-token-taxonomy-2026.md b/entities/internet-finance/sec-token-taxonomy-2026.md
index 33ecc2afc..cab74bfd3 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/sec-token-taxonomy-2026.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/sec-token-taxonomy-2026.md
@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-18
 tags: [sec, cftc, regulation, howey-test, securities, commodities, token-taxonomy]
 supports:
 - the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories
 reweave_edges:
 - the SECs distinction between the crypto asset and the investment contract means tokens are not inherently securities and only the surrounding transaction structure can create securities obligations|supports|2026-04-19
+- The March 2026 SEC-CFTC joint interpretation's five-category token taxonomy omits governance tokens, leaving futarchy-governed assets without explicit classification in either securities or commodities categories|supports|2026-05-10
 ---
 
 # SEC Token Taxonomy Framework (2026)