diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md
index 710eed7..fcbc6a5 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md	
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ depends_on:
 
 # Optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective
 
-The [[token launch mechanisms face an impossible trilemma between shill-proofness community alignment and price discovery because optimizing for any two structurally undermines the third|launch mechanism trilemma]] implies that no single mechanism can simultaneously be shill-proof, community-aligned, and price-discovering. The [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other|hybrid-value auction theory]] explains why: common-value and private-value optimization require fundamentally different mechanism properties.
+The [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma]] implies that no single mechanism can simultaneously be shill-proof, community-aligned, and price-discovering. The [[token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other|hybrid-value auction theory]] explains why: common-value and private-value optimization require fundamentally different mechanism properties.
 
 The resolution is not finding a better single mechanism. It is separating the launch process into layers, each handling one objective with the mechanism best suited to it.
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md
index 079d9bc..1bec47e 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md	
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Token launches are neither. They are **hybrid-value auctions** with two interact
 
 **The interaction creates a specific failure mode.** When you optimize for common-value price discovery (dutch auction, batch auction), you correctly find the clearing price but allocate tokens indiscriminately — a bot and a future core contributor pay the same price, or the bot gets a better deal through sophisticated bidding. When you optimize for private-value community alignment (reputation gates, tiered access, vesting discounts), you reward the right participants but sacrifice price accuracy because the mechanism no longer aggregates common-value information efficiently.
 
-**This is why the trilemma exists.** The [[token launch mechanisms face an impossible trilemma between shill-proofness community alignment and price discovery because optimizing for any two structurally undermines the third|launch mechanism trilemma]] is a consequence of the hybrid-value structure. Shill-proofness + price discovery = common-value optimization (ignoring private values). Community alignment = private-value optimization (potentially sacrificing common-value accuracy). No single mechanism handles both simultaneously because the auction theory results that govern each case conflict.
+**This is why the trilemma exists.** The [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters|early-conviction pricing trilemma]] is a consequence of the hybrid-value structure. Shill-proofness + price discovery = common-value optimization (ignoring private values). Community alignment = private-value optimization (potentially sacrificing common-value accuracy). No single mechanism handles both simultaneously because the auction theory results that govern each case conflict.
 
 **The implication: separate the value components across mechanism layers.** If common-value and private-value optimization require different mechanisms, the solution is not a hybrid mechanism but a layered architecture — one layer for common-value price discovery (batch auction or dutch auction) and a separate layer for private-value community alignment (retroactive rewards, conviction bonuses, governance participation incentives). This separation is the theoretical basis for the layered launch architecture thesis.