From e81870bfc26075734c1c6f52a5498d259f0009ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 11:22:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 5 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...ng-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md | 8 ++++---- ...026-03-00-ebg-kalshi-litigation-preemption-analysis.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md index 65bd04d2..e7992546 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md @@ -30,25 +30,25 @@ The federal-state jurisdictional conflict is unresolved. If states successfully ### Additional Evidence (challenge) -*Source: [[2026-01-00-nevada-polymarket-lawsuit-prediction-markets]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2026-01-00-nevada-polymarket-lawsuit-prediction-markets | Added: 2026-03-16* Nevada Gaming Control Board's January 2026 lawsuit against Polymarket directly challenges the CFTC regulatory legitimacy established through QCX acquisition. Nevada court found NGCB 'reasonably likely to prevail on the merits' and rejected Polymarket's exclusive federal jurisdiction argument, indicating state courts do not accept CFTC authority as dispositive. Massachusetts issued similar preliminary injunction against Kalshi. This represents coordinated state pushback against federal preemption. ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2026-02-00-cftc-prediction-market-rulemaking | Added: 2026-03-16* CFTC's imminent rulemaking signal in February 2026 represents the agency moving from case-by-case enforcement to comprehensive regulatory framework, attempting to establish federal primacy before courts resolve jurisdiction questions ### Additional Evidence (challenge) -*Source: [[2026-01-30-npr-kalshi-19-federal-lawsuits]] | Added: 2026-03-18* +*Source: 2026-01-30-npr-kalshi-19-federal-lawsuits | Added: 2026-03-18* Consumer class action lawsuits alleging prediction markets worsen gambling addiction create political risk independent of legal outcomes. Four class-action suits seeking certification demonstrate that even if prediction markets win federal preemption arguments, the gambling addiction narrative generates political pressure that could constrain operations or invite Congressional intervention. Daniel Wallach (gaming attorney): 'They're engaging in gambling, no matter what they're trying to call it.' ### Additional Evidence (challenge) -*Source: [[2026-02-26-hklaw-prediction-market-jurisdictional-battle]] | Added: 2026-03-18* +*Source: 2026-02-26-hklaw-prediction-market-jurisdictional-battle | Added: 2026-03-18* Polymarket's CFTC regulatory status is now under direct challenge in 50+ state enforcement actions. Nevada, Massachusetts, Maryland, Ohio, Connecticut, and New York have all brought enforcement actions arguing that sports prediction markets are state-regulated gaming, not CFTC-regulated derivatives. The Ninth Circuit denied Kalshi's stay in February 2026, and 36+ states filed amicus briefs in the Fourth Circuit opposing federal preemption. This suggests Polymarket's regulatory legitimacy through CFTC compliance may not protect it from state-level gaming enforcement. diff --git a/inbox/archive/2026-03-00-ebg-kalshi-litigation-preemption-analysis.md b/inbox/archive/2026-03-00-ebg-kalshi-litigation-preemption-analysis.md index f2d99e1f..3ec4e4f4 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2026-03-00-ebg-kalshi-litigation-preemption-analysis.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2026-03-00-ebg-kalshi-litigation-preemption-analysis.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ For futarchy: this matters because a futarchy governance market operating on Sol **KB connections:** - The express preemption gap is the root cause of all the litigation — claim candidate - The "dual compliance" problem for decentralized protocols is novel and not in the KB -- Connects to [[Ooki DAO proved that DAOs without legal wrappers face general partnership liability]] — same pattern of decentralized protocols facing worse legal treatment than centralized ones +- Connects to Ooki DAO proved that DAOs without legal wrappers face general partnership liability — same pattern of decentralized protocols facing worse legal treatment than centralized ones **Extraction hints:** Focus on the express preemption gap and the centralized vs decentralized asymmetry in preemption analysis.