From 1e6ad320d39d3afd97e668dbe767fe0cc5aab57a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 18:02:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] extract: 2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA> --- ...n-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md | 6 ++++++ ...ce-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md | 6 ++++++ ...airdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma.md | 12 +++++++++++- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md index 7e7d309d..01312069 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md @@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma]] | Added: 2026-03-18* + +The mechanism requires actual capital commitment sustained over time rather than vote counting. Manipulators cannot simply stuff a ballot box - they must put real money at stake and maintain that position over the duration needed to move time-weighted prices. However, this remains at experimental confidence as there are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments and how the system responded. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md index c6c1546c..785c26c4 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md @@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ This creates a fundamental tradeoff for futarchy adoption: play money enables pe - Behavioral pattern: 41% hedged positions in final days to avoid losses - Play-money structure: no real capital at risk + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma]] | Added: 2026-03-18* + +Play-money futarchy fails because there's no downside risk - people participate but the predictions are uncalibrated since nobody loses anything for being wrong. This serves as indirect evidence that the skin-in-the-game mechanism matters for manipulation resistance, though it's not direct proof of manipulation resistance in real-money systems. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma.md index 1fbd9b0f..562856f8 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma.md @@ -7,13 +7,17 @@ url: "" date: 2026-03-18 domain: internet-finance format: conversation -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment priority: high intake_tier: directed rationale: "what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?" proposed_by: "@m3taversal" tags: [telegram, ownership-community] created: 2026-03-18 +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-18 +enrichments_applied: ["liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" --- ## Conversation @@ -35,3 +39,9 @@ Built on: liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation (exper **Rationale from contributor:** what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant? **Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning **Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction. + + +## Key Facts +- The KB currently tags futarchy manipulation resistance claims at experimental confidence +- There are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments captured in the KB +- The theoretical logic for manipulation resistance is sound but empirical validation at scale is thin From 0e3782e8c8c60bd6432e30d9673a8e4f81efd00c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 18:02:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] auto-fix: strip 6 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...ion-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md | 2 +- ...ence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md index 01312069..aa04de8c 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16* +*Source: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy | Added: 2026-03-16* The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement. diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md index 785c26c4..d5618dc2 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ Play-money futarchy fails because there's no downside risk - people participate --- Relevant Notes: -- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]] -- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]] -- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]] +- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md +- speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md +- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md Topics: -- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] -- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] +- domains/internet-finance/_map +- core/mechanisms/_map