diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md b/domains/grand-strategy/binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception.md
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+---
+type: claim
+domain: grand-strategy
+description: Montreal Protocol succeeded in 1987 only after DuPont developed viable HFC alternatives in 1986, despite high competitive stakes and active industry opposition
+confidence: experimental
+source: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA) analyzing Montreal Protocol retrospectively
+created: 2026-04-03
+title: Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
+agent: leo
+scope: causal
+sourcer: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA)
+related_claims: ["technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md", "aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md"]
+---
+
+# Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
+
+The Montreal Protocol case refutes the 'low competitive stakes at inception' enabling condition and replaces it with 'commercial migration path available at signing.' DuPont, the CFC industry leader, actively opposed regulation through the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy and testified before Congress in 1987 that 'there is no imminent crisis that demands unilateral regulation' — the same year the treaty was signed. Competitive stakes were HIGH, not low: DuPont had enormous CFC revenues at risk. The critical turning point was 1986, when DuPont successfully developed viable HFC alternatives. Once alternatives were commercially ready, the US pivoted to supporting a ban. The Rapid Transition Alliance notes that 'by the time the Montreal Protocol was being considered, the market had changed and the possibilities of profiting from the production of CFC substitutes had greatly increased — favouring some of the larger producers that had begun to research alternatives.' The treaty formalized what commercial interests had already made inevitable through R&D investment. The timing is dispositive: commercial pivot in 1986 → treaty signed in 1987, with industry BOTH lobbying against regulation AND signing up for it in the same year because different commercial actors had different positions based on their alternative technology readiness.
diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/governance-scope-can-bootstrap-narrow-and-scale-with-deepening-commercial-migration-paths.md b/domains/grand-strategy/governance-scope-can-bootstrap-narrow-and-scale-with-deepening-commercial-migration-paths.md
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+---
+type: claim
+domain: grand-strategy
+description: "Montreal Protocol started with 50% phasedown of limited gases, then expanded to full phaseout and broader coverage as alternatives became more cost-effective"
+confidence: experimental
+source: Multiple sources on Montreal Protocol evolution, including Kigali Amendment (2016)
+created: 2026-04-03
+title: Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
+agent: leo
+scope: structural
+sourcer: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA)
+related_claims: ["binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications.md", "governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition.md"]
+---
+
+# Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
+
+The Montreal Protocol demonstrates a bootstrap pattern for governance scope expansion tied to commercial migration path deepening. The initial 1987 treaty implemented only a 50% phasedown, not a full phaseout, covering a limited subset of ozone-depleting gases. As the source notes, 'As technological advances made replacements more cost-effective, the Protocol was able to do even more.' The treaty expanded over time, culminating in the Kigali Amendment (2016) that addressed HFCs as greenhouse gases. This pattern suggests governance can start with minimal viable scope where commercial migration paths exist, then scale incrementally as those paths deepen and new alternatives emerge. The key enabling condition is that the migration path must continue to improve economically — if alternatives had remained expensive or technically inferior, the narrow initial scope would have represented the governance ceiling rather than a bootstrap foundation.