auto-fix: strip 11 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
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6 changed files with 11 additions and 11 deletions
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@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] -- futarchy extends ownership alignment from value creation to decision-making
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- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- futarchy is a continuous alignment mechanism through market forces
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- [[collective superintelligence is the alternative to monolithic AI controlled by a few]] -- futarchy is a governance mechanism for the collective architecture
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- [[mechanism design changes the game itself to produce better equilibria rather than expecting players to find optimal strategies]] -- futarchy is mechanism design applied to governance: the market structure makes honest pricing the dominant strategy and manipulation self-defeating
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- [[the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own]] -- futarchy's manipulation resistance parallels the Vickrey auction's strategy-proofness: both restructure payoffs so that truthful behavior dominates without requiring external enforcement
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- mechanism design changes the game itself to produce better equilibria rather than expecting players to find optimal strategies -- futarchy is mechanism design applied to governance: the market structure makes honest pricing the dominant strategy and manipulation self-defeating
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- the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own -- futarchy's manipulation resistance parallels the Vickrey auction's strategy-proofness: both restructure payoffs so that truthful behavior dominates without requiring external enforcement
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Topics:
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- [[livingip overview]]
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@ -35,4 +35,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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@ -39,4 +39,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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@ -39,5 +39,5 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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- core/mechanisms/_map
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Kalshi is the institutional/mainstream bet on prediction markets. If prediction
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — Kalshi co-beneficiary of this vindication
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- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — same mechanism theory applies
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- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply equally
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- decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior — boundary conditions apply equally
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---
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-11
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founded: 2020-06-01
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founders: ["[[shayne-coplan]]"]
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founders: ["shayne-coplan"]
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category: "Prediction market platform (Polygon/Ethereum L2)"
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stage: growth
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funding: "ICE (Intercontinental Exchange) invested up to $2B"
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ key_metrics:
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monthly_volume_30d: "$8.7B (March 2026)"
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daily_volume_24h: "$390M (March 2026)"
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election_accuracy: "94%+ one month before resolution; 98% on winners"
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competitors: ["[[kalshi]]", "[[augur]]"]
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competitors: ["[[kalshi]]", "augur"]
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built_on: ["Polygon"]
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tags: ["prediction-markets", "decision-markets", "information-aggregation"]
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---
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@ -63,13 +63,13 @@ Polymarket proved prediction markets work at scale. The 2024 election vindicatio
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]] — core vindication claim
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- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — mechanism theory Polymarket demonstrates
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- [[decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior]] — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID)
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- decision markets fail in three systematic categories where legitimacy thin information or herding dynamics make voting or deliberation structurally superior — boundary conditions apply to Polymarket too (thin-information markets showed media-tracking behavior during early COVID)
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---
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Relevant Entities:
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- [[kalshi]] — primary competitor (regulated)
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- [[metadao]] — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction)
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- metadao — same mechanism class, different application (governance vs prediction)
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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