extract: 2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content

Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
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Teleo Agents 2026-03-15 18:49:26 +00:00
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@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ From the MetaDAO proposal:
This claim extends futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility by showing the reputational concern operates at the mechanism level, not just the platform level. The market's rejection of Futardio suggests futarchy stakeholders prioritize mechanism credibility over short-term adoption metrics.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
The futardio proposal explicitly lists 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' as potential pitfalls, directly confirming the reputational risk tradeoff. The proposal was put to a futarchy vote specifically because MetaDAO was uncertain whether memecoin association would damage credibility.
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Relevant Notes:

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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ From the proposal:
This claim complements [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] by identifying the specific context where coin price is unambiguously correct: assets with no purpose beyond speculation. It also relates to [[redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation]]—memecoins avoid this problem by having no productive value to begin with.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
MetaDAO's futardio proposal explicitly identifies memecoin governance as ideal for futarchy because 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.' This confirms the single-objective-function thesis with a real implementation attempt.
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Relevant Notes:

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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJ
date: 2024-08-28
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-15
enrichments_applied: ["memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md", "futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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## Proposal Details
@ -352,3 +356,13 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-09-01
- Ended: 2024-09-01
## Key Facts
- Futardio proposal was submitted to MetaDAO on 2024-08-28
- Futardio proposal failed on 2024-09-01
- Proposed funding was $100k over 6 months
- Target launch was Q3 (timing relative to proposal date)
- Proposal account: EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJo
- Proposal number: 8 in MetaDAO
- Proposer account: HwBL75xHHKcXSMNcctq3UqWaEJPDWVQz6NazZJNjWaQc