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 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-04-01-leo-nuclear-npt-partial-coordination-success-limits]] | Added: 2026-04-01*
+*Source: 2026-04-01-leo-nuclear-npt-partial-coordination-success-limits | Added: 2026-04-01*
 
 Nuclear case reveals potential fifth enabling condition: security architecture providing non-proliferation incentives. NPT succeeded partly because US extended deterrence removed allied states' need for independent nuclear weapons (Japan, South Korea, Germany, Taiwan all technically capable but chose not to proliferate). This is distinct from commercial network effects—it's a security arrangement where dominant power substitutes for competitive advantage. Condition 3 (low competitive stakes) was ABSENT in nuclear case, yet governance partially succeeded through this novel mechanism.