Merge pull request 'extract: 2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01' (#947) from extract/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01 into main

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ Sanctum's Wonder proposal (2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota, created
 
 Dean's List DAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period and 3% TWAP threshold. Proposal completed 2024-06-25 with failed status. This provides concrete implementation data: small DAOs (FDV $123K) can deploy Autocrat with custom TWAP thresholds (3% vs. typical higher thresholds), but low absolute dollar amounts may be insufficient to attract trader participation even when percentage returns are favorable.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+Autocrat v0.1 made the three-day window configurable rather than hardcoded, with the proposer stating it was 'most importantly' designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' The proposal passed with 990K META migrated, demonstrating community acceptance of parameterized proposal duration.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri
 - MetaDAO's current scale ($219M total futarchy marketcap) may be too small to attract sophisticated attacks that the removed mechanisms were designed to prevent
 - Hanson might argue that MetaDAO's version isn't really futarchy at all — just conditional prediction markets used for governance, which is a narrower claim
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+
+MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.1 simplified by making proposal slots configurable and reducing default duration to 3 days. The proposer explicitly framed this as enabling 'quicker feedback loops,' suggesting the original implementation's fixed duration was a practical barrier to adoption.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Community approved treasury migration despite inability to verify program builds, revealing governance tradeoffs
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal risk disclosure, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
+
+The proposal explicitly disclosed that the new Autocrat program "was unable to build with solana-verifiable-build" and required "placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor." Despite this counterparty risk affecting 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL, the proposal passed. The proposer acknowledged this as a temporary compromise, stating "for future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds." This reveals a critical governance tradeoff: the MetaDAO community valued faster iteration and improved functionality (configurable proposal slots, 3-day default) over the security guarantee of verifiable builds. The decision suggests early-stage futarchy DAOs prioritize mechanism refinement over security hardening, accepting elevated trust assumptions to compress development cycles. This pattern may not generalize to mature DAOs or larger treasuries, but demonstrates that governance communities will accept temporary centralization when the alternative is slower evolution of the governance mechanism itself.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Configurable proposal slots with three-day default compress feedback loops in futarchy governance
+confidence: experimental
+source: MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal, December 2023
+created: 2026-03-15
+---
+
+# MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
+
+The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
+- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
+
+Topics:
+- [[_map]]

inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md

@@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
 date: 2023-12-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-15
+claims_extracted: ["metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md", "metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -63,3 +68,12 @@ For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
 - Autocrat version: 0
 - Completed: 2023-12-13
 - Ended: 2023-12-13
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 proposal created 2023-12-03, completed 2023-12-13
+- Proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from first to second Autocrat program
+- Autocrat v0.1 default proposal duration is 3 days
+- Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
+- DAO account: 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
+- Autocrat v0.1 could not use solana-verifiable-build for undisclosed reasons