From fb17d9c7c5a8f2ad5bd3c232b2b11c959f0f023d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 11:25:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 35 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...erators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md | 6 +++--- ...re-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md | 4 ++-- ...-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md | 4 ++-- ...ll treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md | 2 +- ...ees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md | 2 +- ... creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md | 2 +- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md index 29c1017d..c944c430 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md @@ -42,6 +42,6 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[AI autonomously managing investment capital is regulatory terra incognita because the SEC framework assumes human-controlled registered entities deploy AI as tools]] Topics: -- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] -- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]] -- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] +- domains/internet-finance/_map +- domains/ai-alignment/_map +- core/mechanisms/_map diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md index 13f49ec6..940516da 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md @@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha]] Topics: -- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] -- [[foundations/teleological-economics/_map]] +- domains/internet-finance/_map +- foundations/teleological-economics/_map diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md index 21ce6520..e534296e 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] Topics: -- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] -- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] +- domains/internet-finance/_map +- core/mechanisms/_map diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md index 8865929a..8e6c4bd3 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* +*Source: 2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation. diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md index d91daf61..2f445c1a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Proph3t's other framing reinforces this: he distinguishes "market oversight" fro ### Additional Evidence (extend) -*Source: [[2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* +*Source: 2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type. diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md index e134977a..bb8bf340 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]] -- the token emission model is the investment-domain version of this incentive alignment - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- the governance framework within which token economics operates -- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance +- the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance Topics: - [[livingip overview]]