From fb1d8aa89ac07648731d01358ddad9e42248287c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 17:24:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 5 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- agents/rio/musings/metadao-x-landscape.md | 2 +- ...n shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md | 4 ++-- ...tical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md | 2 +- ...full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/agents/rio/musings/metadao-x-landscape.md b/agents/rio/musings/metadao-x-landscape.md index f31af8710..9e3b5afa1 100644 --- a/agents/rio/musings/metadao-x-landscape.md +++ b/agents/rio/musings/metadao-x-landscape.md @@ -103,4 +103,4 @@ Sources: Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]] -- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana]] +- MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md index 321296cf4..0e772a1af 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ source: "Governance - Meritocratic Voting + Futarchy" # MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions -MetaDAO provides the most significant real-world test of futarchy governance to date. Their conditional prediction markets have proven remarkably resistant to manipulation attempts, validating the theoretical claim that [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]]. However, the implementation also reveals important limitations that theory alone does not predict. +MetaDAO provides the most significant real-world test of futarchy governance to date. Their conditional prediction markets have proven remarkably resistant to manipulation attempts, validating the theoretical claim that futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders. However, the implementation also reveals important limitations that theory alone does not predict. In uncontested decisions -- where the community broadly agrees on the right outcome -- trading volume drops to minimal levels. Without genuine disagreement, there are few natural counterparties. Trading these markets in any size becomes a negative expected value proposition because there is no one on the other side to trade against profitably. The system tends to be dominated by a small group of sophisticated traders who actively monitor for manipulation attempts, with broader participation remaining low. @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[ --- Relevant Notes: -- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- MetaDAO confirms the manipulation resistance claim empirically +- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders -- MetaDAO confirms the manipulation resistance claim empirically - [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- MetaDAO evidence supports reserving futarchy for contested, high-stakes decisions - [[trial and error is the only coordination strategy humanity has ever used]] -- MetaDAO is a live experiment in deliberate governance design, breaking the trial-and-error pattern diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md index 5d0da333c..7bad1d641 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri Relevant Notes: - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — the simplified implementation - [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — each friction point is a simplification target -- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — does manipulation resistance survive simplification? +- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders — does manipulation resistance survive simplification? Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md index ae098727f..4ac4964be 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Relevant Notes: - [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — Ranger shows the mechanism works bidirectionally, protecting investors from team extraction - [[futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — strongest real-world evidence: investors exercising ownership rights to liquidate without courts - [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — Ranger liquidation is the "unruggable" mechanism operating in production -- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — the team had no viable path to prevent liquidation through market manipulation +- futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders — the team had no viable path to prevent liquidation through market manipulation Topics: - [[internet finance and decision markets]]