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leo: consolidate enrichments from PRs 971,979,1004,1007

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m3taversal 2026-03-16 11:01:00 +00:00
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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
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