teleo/teleo-codex
8
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 22 Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 1

auto-fix: strip 4 broken wiki links
Some checks are pending
Sync Graph Data to teleo-app / sync (push) Waiting to run
Details

Browse source 
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents 2026-03-25 13:41:27 +00:00
parent 035b43029d
commit fdc3b74b73
2 changed files with 4 additions and 4 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
domains/internet-finance/access-friction-functions-as-a-natural-conviction-filter-in-token-launches-because-process-difficulty-selects-for-genuine-believers-while-price-friction-selects-for-wealthy-speculators.md
View file

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Access friction and price friction filter for different populations:
---
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-25-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-https-x-com-sjdedic-status-203424109]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
*Source: 2026-03-25-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-https-x-com-sjdedic-status-203424109 | Added: 2026-03-25*
P2P's XP-tiered allocation system creates process friction that filters for users who actually used the product rather than capital allocators showing up for the ICO. This is a deliberate filter mechanism where the people who get the biggest allocations are those who already demonstrated they're the target userbase, validating that process friction can select for genuine users over speculators.

6
domains/internet-finance/pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through-massive-oversubscription-refunds.md
View file

@ -30,20 +30,20 @@ The lower volatility in recent launches could reflect declining speculative inte
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2025-11-14-futardio-launch-solomon]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
*Source: 2025-11-14-futardio-launch-solomon | Added: 2026-03-16*
Solomon's 51x oversubscription ($102.9M committed vs $8M accepted) required returning $94.9M to participants, demonstrating the capital inefficiency of oversubscribed raises even when the platform caps final acceptance.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2026-03-09-futarddotio-x-archive]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
*Source: 2026-03-09-futarddotio-x-archive | Added: 2026-03-16*
The 220x oversubscription on Futardio's first raise means ~$10.95M had to be refunded through automated pro-rata allocation, demonstrating the capital inefficiency at extreme scale. The automated refund mechanism handled this cleanly but the capital was temporarily locked.
---
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-umbra-ico-155m-commitments-metadao-platform-recovery]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
*Source: 2026-03-23-umbra-ico-155m-commitments-metadao-platform-recovery | Added: 2026-03-23*
Umbra's 206x oversubscription ($155M committed vs $3M raised) resulted in each subscriber receiving approximately 2% of their committed allocation, requiring ~$152M in refunds. This represents the largest documented capital inefficiency case in MetaDAO ICO history, with 98% of committed capital returned unused.