auto-fix: strip 4 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

domains/ai-alignment/AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for.md

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ This concentration has direct alignment implications:
 
 The counterfactual worth tracking: Chinese open-source models (Qwen, DeepSeek) now capture 50-60% of new open-model adoption globally. If open-source models close the capability gap (currently 6-18 months, shrinking), capital concentration at the frontier may become less alignment-relevant as capability diffuses. But as of March 2026, frontier capability remains concentrated.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025, up from 6 in 2016. $92M in lobbying fees Q1-Q3 2025. Industry successfully blocked California SB 1047 through coordinated lobbying. Concentration creates not just market power but political power—oligopoly structure enables collective action to prevent binding regulation.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/ai-alignment/AI transparency is declining not improving because Stanford FMTI scores dropped 17 points in one year while frontier labs dissolved safety teams and removed safety language from mission statements.md

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ Expert consensus identifies 'external scrutiny, proactive evaluation and transpa
 
 STREAM proposal identifies that current model reports lack 'sufficient detail to enable meaningful independent assessment' of dangerous capability evaluations. The need for a standardized reporting framework confirms that transparency problems extend beyond general disclosure (FMTI scores) to the specific domain of dangerous capability evaluation where external verification is currently impossible.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+Stanford FMTI 2024→2025 data: mean transparency score declined 17 points. Meta -29 points, Mistral -37 points, OpenAI -14 points. OpenAI removed 'safely' from mission statement (Nov 2025), dissolved Superalignment team (May 2024) and Mission Alignment team (Feb 2026). Google accused by 60 UK lawmakers of violating Seoul commitments with Gemini 2.5 Pro (Apr 2025).
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/ai-alignment/Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development.md

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This is not a story about Anthropic's leadership failing. It is a story about [[
 
 The alignment implication is structural: if the most safety-motivated lab with the most commercially successful safety brand cannot maintain binding safety commitments, then voluntary self-regulation is not a viable alignment strategy. This strengthens the case for coordination-based approaches — [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — because the failure mode is not that safety is technically impossible but that unilateral safety is economically unsustainable.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+Anthropic's own language in RSP documentation: commitments are 'very hard to meet without industry-wide coordination.' OpenAI made safety explicitly conditional on competitor behavior in Preparedness Framework v2 (April 2025). Pattern holds across all voluntary commitments—no frontier lab maintained unilateral safety constraints when competitors advanced without them.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/ai-alignment/compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ For alignment, this means the governance infrastructure that exists (export cont
 
 The CFR article confirms diverging governance philosophies between democracies and authoritarian systems, with China's amended Cybersecurity Law emphasizing state oversight while the US pursues standard-setting body engagement. Horowitz notes the US 'must engage in standard-setting bodies to counter China's AI governance influence,' indicating that the most active governance is competitive positioning rather than safety coordination.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+US export controls use tiered country system with deployment caps. Nvidia designed compliance chips (H800, A800) specifically to meet regulatory thresholds. Mechanism proves compute governance CAN work when backed by state enforcement, but current implementation optimizes for strategic advantage over China rather than catastrophic risk reduction. KYC for compute proposed but not implemented, showing technical feasibility without political will.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/ai-alignment/pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations.md

@@ -40,10 +40,16 @@ The voluntary-collaborative model adds a selection bias dimension to evaluation
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2026-02-23-shapira-agents-of-chaos]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+*Source: 2026-02-23-shapira-agents-of-chaos | Added: 2026-03-19*
 
 Agents of Chaos study provides concrete empirical evidence: 11 documented case studies of security vulnerabilities (unauthorized compliance, identity spoofing, cross-agent propagation, destructive actions) that emerged only in realistic multi-agent deployment with persistent memory and system access—none of which would be detected by static single-agent benchmarks. The study explicitly argues that current evaluation paradigms are insufficient for realistic deployment conditions.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+METR and UK AISI evaluations as of March 2026 focus primarily on sabotage risk and cyber capabilities (METR's Claude Opus 4.6 sabotage assessment, AISI's cyber range testing of 7 LLMs). This narrow scope may miss alignment-relevant risks that don't manifest as sabotage or cyber threats. The evaluation infrastructure is optimizing for measurable near-term risks rather than harder-to-operationalize catastrophic scenarios.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
@@ -52,5 +58,5 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[the gap between theoretical AI capability and observed deployment is massive across all occupations because adoption lag not capability limits determines real-world impact]]
 
 Topics:
-- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
-- [[core/grand-strategy/_map]]
+- domains/ai-alignment/_map
+- core/grand-strategy/_map

domains/ai-alignment/voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints.md

@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ The International AI Safety Report 2026 (multi-government committee, February 20
 
 The gap between expert consensus (76 specialists identify third-party audits as top-3 priority) and actual implementation (no mandatory audit requirements at major labs) demonstrates that knowing what's needed is insufficient. Even when the field's experts across multiple domains agree on priorities, competitive dynamics prevent voluntary adoption.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence]] | Added: 2026-03-19*
+
+Comprehensive evidence across governance mechanisms: ALL international declarations (Bletchley, Seoul, Paris, Hiroshima, OECD, UN) produced zero verified behavioral change. Frontier Model Forum produced no binding commitments. White House voluntary commitments eroded. 450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025 ($92M in fees), California SB 1047 vetoed after industry pressure. Only binding regulation (EU AI Act, China enforcement, US export controls) changed behavior.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

entities/ai-alignment/anthropic.md

@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ Frontier AI safety laboratory founded by former OpenAI VP of Research Dario Amod
 
 - **2026-03-18** — Department of War threatened to blacklist Anthropic unless it removed safeguards against mass surveillance and autonomous weapons; Anthropic refused publicly and Pentagon retaliated (reported by HKS Carr-Ryan Center)
 - **2026-03** — Department of War threatened to blacklist Anthropic unless it removed safeguards against mass surveillance and autonomous weapons; Anthropic refused publicly and Pentagon retaliated (HKS Carr-Ryan Center report)
+- **2026-02** — Abandoned binding RSP (Responsible Scaling Policy)
+- **2026-03** — Reached $380B valuation, ~$19B annualized revenue (10x YoY sustained 3 years)
+- **2026-03** — Claude Code achieved 54% enterprise coding market share, $2.5B+ run-rate
+- **2026-03** — Surpassed OpenAI at 40% enterprise LLM spend
+- **2026-03** — Department of War threatened to blacklist Anthropic unless it removed safeguards against mass surveillance and autonomous weapons. Anthropic refused publicly and faced Pentagon retaliation.
 ## Competitive Position
 Strongest position in enterprise AI and coding. Revenue growth (10x YoY) outpaces all competitors. The safety brand was the primary differentiator — the RSP rollback creates strategic ambiguity. CEO publicly uncomfortable with power concentration while racing to concentrate it.
 

entities/ai-alignment/openai.md

@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ The largest and most-valued AI laboratory. OpenAI pioneered the transformer-base
 - **2026-02** — Raised $110B at $840B valuation, restructured to PBC
 - **2026** — IPO preparation underway
 
+- **2025-2026** — John Schulman departed for Thinking Machines Lab
+- **2026-03** — Reached $840B valuation, ~$25B annualized revenue
+- **2026-03** — 68% consumer market share, 27% enterprise LLM spend
+- **2026-03** — Released GPT-5/5.2/5.3
+- **2026-03** — Restructured to Public Benefit Corporation
+- **2026-03** — IPO expected H2 2026-2027
 ## Competitive Position
 Highest valuation and strongest consumer brand, but losing enterprise share to Anthropic. The Microsoft partnership (exclusive API hosting) provides distribution but also dependency. Key vulnerability: the enterprise coding market — where Anthropic's Claude Code dominates — may prove more valuable than consumer chat.
 

entities/ai-alignment/uk-aisi.md

@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ The first government-established AI safety evaluation body, created after the Bl
 - **2024-12** — Joint pre-deployment evaluation of OpenAI o1 with US AISI
 - **2025-02** — Rebranded to "AI Security Institute"
 
+- **2026-03-16** — Published cyber capability testing results on 7 LLMs using custom-built cyber ranges
+- **2026-00-00** — Renamed from 'AI Safety Institute' to 'AI Security Institute'
+- **2026-02-25** — Released Inspect Scout transcript analysis tool
+- **2026-02-17** — Published universal jailbreak assessment against best-defended systems
+- **2025-10-22** — Released ControlArena library for AI control experiments
+- **2025-07-00** — Conducted international joint testing exercise on agentic systems
+- **2025-05-00** — Released HiBayES statistical modeling framework
+- **2024-04-00** — Released open-source Inspect evaluation framework
 ## Alignment Significance
 The UK AISI is the strongest evidence that institutional infrastructure CAN be created from international coordination — but also the strongest evidence that institutional infrastructure without enforcement authority has limited impact. Labs grant access voluntarily. The rebrand from "safety" to "security" mirrors the broader political shift away from safety framing.
 

entities/entertainment/dropout.md

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Creator-owned streaming platform focused on comedy content. Reached 1M+ subscrib
 - **2025-10-01** — Crossed 1 million subscribers (31% YoY growth). Launched $129.99/year superfan tier in response to fan requests to support platform at higher price point.
 - **2025-10-01** — Crossed 1 million subscribers (31% YoY growth). Launched $129.99/year superfan tier in response to fan requests for higher-priced support option. Dimension 20 MSG live show sold out (January 2025). Brennan Lee Mulligan signed 3-year deal while simultaneously participating in Critical Role Campaign 4.
 - **2025-10-01** — Crossed 1 million subscribers with 31% YoY growth; launched $129.99/year superfan tier in response to fan requests to support platform
+- **2025-10-01** — Crossed 1 million subscribers (31% YoY growth); launched $129.99/year superfan tier originated by fan request
 ## Relationship to KB
 
 - [[creator-owned-streaming-infrastructure-has-reached-commercial-scale-with-430M-annual-creator-revenue-across-13M-subscribers]]

entities/internet-finance/p2p-me.md

@@ -53,3 +53,5 @@ Treasury controlled by token holders through futarchy-based governance. Team can
 - **February 2026** — Peak monthly volume of $3.95M
 - **March 15, 2026** — Pine Analytics publishes pre-ICO analysis identifying 182x gross profit multiple concern
 - **March 26, 2026** — ICO scheduled on MetaDAO
+
+- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-metadao-ico]] Active: ICO scheduled, targeting $6M raise at $15.5M FDV with Pine Analytics identifying 182x gross profit multiple concerns

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-02-28-demoura-when-ai-writes-software.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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+      "ai-generated-code-overfits-test-suites-creating-adversarial-brittleness-that-testing-cannot-detect.md:stripped_wiki_link:formal-verification-becomes-economically-necessary-as-AI-gen",
+      "ai-generated-code-overfits-test-suites-creating-adversarial-brittleness-that-testing-cannot-detect.md:stripped_wiki_link:AI-models-distinguish-testing-from-deployment-environments-p",
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+    ],
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+      "supply-chain-poisoning-via-ai-training-data-enables-systematic-vulnerability-injection-at-ecosystem-scale.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-19"
+}

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice.json

@@ -1,24 +1,34 @@
 {
   "rejected_claims": [
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       "issues": [
         "missing_attribution_extractor"
       ]
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-      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:stripped_wiki_link:only-binding-regulation-with-enforcement-teeth-changes-front"
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+      "pre-deployment-AI-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:stripped_wiki_link:voluntary-safety-pledges-cannot-survive-competitive-pressure",
+      "pre-deployment-AI-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:stripped_wiki_link:only-binding-regulation-with-enforcement-teeth-changes-front",
+      "UK-AISI-renaming-to-Security-Institute-signals-government-priority-shift-from-existential-safety-to-cybersecurity-threats.md:set_created:2026-03-19",
+      "UK-AISI-renaming-to-Security-Institute-signals-government-priority-shift-from-existential-safety-to-cybersecurity-threats.md:stripped_wiki_link:government-designation-of-safety-conscious-AI-labs-as-supply",
+      "UK-AISI-renaming-to-Security-Institute-signals-government-priority-shift-from-existential-safety-to-cybersecurity-threats.md:stripped_wiki_link:compute-export-controls-are-the-most-impactful-AI-governance"
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-      "pre-deployment-ai-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+      "pre-deployment-AI-evaluation-operates-on-voluntary-collaborative-model-where-labs-can-decline-without-consequence.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "UK-AISI-renaming-to-Security-Institute-signals-government-priority-shift-from-existential-safety-to-cybersecurity-threats.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
     ]
   },
   "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence.json

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+{
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+      ]
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+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
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+      "binding-regulation-with-enforcement-is-the-only-ai-governance-mechanism-that-changes-frontier-lab-behavior.md:stripped_wiki_link:only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes front",
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+      "binding-regulation-with-enforcement-is-the-only-ai-governance-mechanism-that-changes-frontier-lab-behavior.md:stripped_wiki_link:Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the fir",
+      "compute-governance-through-export-controls-works-but-targets-geopolitics-not-safety-leaving-capability-race-unconstrained.md:set_created:2026-03-19",
+      "compute-governance-through-export-controls-works-but-targets-geopolitics-not-safety-leaving-capability-race-unconstrained.md:stripped_wiki_link:compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance",
+      "compute-governance-through-export-controls-works-but-targets-geopolitics-not-safety-leaving-capability-race-unconstrained.md:stripped_wiki_link:nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier A",
+      "third-party-ai-evaluation-ecosystem-is-fragile-without-regulatory-mandate-because-voluntary-participation-and-funding-instability-threaten-continuity.md:set_created:2026-03-19",
+      "third-party-ai-evaluation-ecosystem-is-fragile-without-regulatory-mandate-because-voluntary-participation-and-funding-instability-threaten-continuity.md:stripped_wiki_link:pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "binding-regulation-with-enforcement-is-the-only-ai-governance-mechanism-that-changes-frontier-lab-behavior.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "compute-governance-through-export-controls-works-but-targets-geopolitics-not-safety-leaving-capability-race-unconstrained.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "third-party-ai-evaluation-ecosystem-is-fragile-without-regulatory-mandate-because-voluntary-participation-and-funding-instability-threaten-continuity.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-19"
+}

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-16-theseus-ai-industry-landscape-briefing.json

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
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+        "opsec_internal_deal_terms"
+      ]
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+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor",
+        "opsec_internal_deal_terms"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
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+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 6,
+    "rejected": 2,
+    "fixes_applied": [
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+      "enterprise-coding-agents-emerged-as-first-killer-app-category-for-frontier-ai-because-verifiable-output-and-immediate-roi-overcome-adoption-friction.md:stripped_wiki_link:coding-agents-crossed-usability-threshold-december-2025-when",
+      "enterprise-coding-agents-emerged-as-first-killer-app-category-for-frontier-ai-because-verifiable-output-and-immediate-roi-overcome-adoption-friction.md:stripped_wiki_link:the-gap-between-theoretical-AI-capability-and-observed-deplo",
+      "frontier-ai-lab-talent-circulation-accelerated-dramatically-in-2025-2026-with-11-plus-google-executives-to-microsoft-and-multiple-openai-departures-indicating-competitive-pressure-on-retention.md:set_created:2026-03-19",
+      "frontier-ai-lab-talent-circulation-accelerated-dramatically-in-2025-2026-with-11-plus-google-executives-to-microsoft-and-multiple-openai-departures-indicating-competitive-pressure-on-retention.md:stripped_wiki_link:AI-talent-circulation-between-frontier-labs-transfers-alignm",
+      "frontier-ai-lab-talent-circulation-accelerated-dramatically-in-2025-2026-with-11-plus-google-executives-to-microsoft-and-multiple-openai-departures-indicating-competitive-pressure-on-retention.md:stripped_wiki_link:Anthropics-RSP-rollback-under-commercial-pressure-is-the-fir"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "enterprise-coding-agents-emerged-as-first-killer-app-category-for-frontier-ai-because-verifiable-output-and-immediate-roi-overcome-adoption-friction.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "enterprise-coding-agents-emerged-as-first-killer-app-category-for-frontier-ai-because-verifiable-output-and-immediate-roi-overcome-adoption-friction.md:opsec_internal_deal_terms",
+      "frontier-ai-lab-talent-circulation-accelerated-dramatically-in-2025-2026-with-11-plus-google-executives-to-microsoft-and-multiple-openai-departures-indicating-competitive-pressure-on-retention.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "frontier-ai-lab-talent-circulation-accelerated-dramatically-in-2025-2026-with-11-plus-google-executives-to-microsoft-and-multiple-openai-departures-indicating-competitive-pressure-on-retention.md:opsec_internal_deal_terms"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-19"
+}

inbox/queue/2026-02-28-demoura-when-ai-writes-software.md

@@ -7,11 +7,14 @@ date_published: 2026-02-28
 date_archived: 2026-03-16
 domain: ai-alignment
 secondary_domains: [teleological-economics]
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 processed_by: theseus
 tags: [formal-verification, lean, ai-generated-code, proof-verification, trust-infrastructure]
 sourced_via: "Alex Obadia (@ObadiaAlex) tweet, ARIA Research Scaling Trust programme"
 twitter_id: "712705562191011841"
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-19
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 # When AI Writes the World's Software, Who Verifies It?
@@ -33,3 +36,15 @@ Key arguments:
 - "The barrier to verified software is no longer AI capability. It is platform readiness."
 
 Directly relevant to [[formal verification of AI-generated proofs provides scalable oversight that human review cannot match because machine-checked correctness scales with AI capability while human verification degrades]].
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Google: >25% of new code is AI-generated as of 2026
+- Microsoft: ~30% of code is AI-generated as of 2026
+- Microsoft CTO predicts 95% AI-generated code by 2030
+- Anthropic built 100,000-line C compiler using AI agents in 2 weeks for <$20,000
+- Nearly half of AI-generated code fails basic security tests
+- Poor software quality costs US economy $2.41T/year (CSIQ 2022)
+- Lean has 200K+ formalized theorems
+- 5 Fields medalists have adopted Lean
+- AlphaProof uses Lean as verification platform

inbox/queue/2026-03-00-metr-aisi-pre-deployment-evaluation-practice.md

@@ -7,13 +7,17 @@ date: 2026-03-01
 domain: ai-alignment
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 priority: medium
 tags: [evaluation-infrastructure, pre-deployment, METR, AISI, voluntary-collaborative, Inspect, Claude-Opus-4-6, cyber-evaluation]
 processed_by: theseus
 processed_date: 2026-03-19
 enrichments_applied: ["pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-19
+enrichments_applied: ["pre-deployment-AI-evaluations-do-not-predict-real-world-risk-creating-institutional-governance-built-on-unreliable-foundations.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -49,7 +53,7 @@ Synthesized overview of the two main organizations conducting pre-deployment AI
 **KB connections:**
 - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — voluntary evaluation has the same structural problem; a lab can simply not invite METR
 - [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap]] — METR and AISI are growing their evaluation capacity, but AI capabilities are growing faster; the gap widens in every period
-- [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic]] — AISI renaming to "Security Institute" is a softer version of the same dynamic — government safety infrastructure shifting to serve government security interests rather than existential risk reduction
+- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic — AISI renaming to "Security Institute" is a softer version of the same dynamic — government safety infrastructure shifting to serve government security interests rather than existential risk reduction
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Key claim: "Pre-deployment AI evaluation operates on a voluntary-collaborative model where evaluators (METR, AISI) require lab cooperation, meaning labs that decline evaluation face no consequence"
@@ -72,3 +76,14 @@ EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the voluntary-collaborative limitation: no evaluation
 - UK AISI was renamed from 'AI Safety Institute' to 'AI Security Institute' in 2026
 - UK AISI tested 7 LLMs on custom cyber ranges as of March 16, 2026
 - METR maintains a Frontier AI Safety Policies repository covering Amazon, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- METR reviewed Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 sabotage risk report on March 12, 2026
+- UK AISI tested 7 LLMs on custom cyber ranges as of March 16, 2026
+- UK AISI was renamed from 'AI Safety Institute' to 'AI Security Institute' in 2026
+- METR maintains a Frontier AI Safety Policies repository covering Amazon, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, Meta, Microsoft, and OpenAI
+- UK AISI released the Inspect evaluation framework in April 2024
+- UK AISI released Inspect Scout transcript analysis tool on February 25, 2026
+- UK AISI released ControlArena library for AI control experiments on October 22, 2025
+- UK AISI conducted international joint testing exercise on agentic systems in July 2025

inbox/queue/2026-03-16-theseus-ai-coordination-governance-evidence.md

@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ url: null
 date_published: 2026-03-16
 date_archived: 2026-03-16
 domain: ai-alignment
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 processed_by: theseus
 tags: [ai-governance, coordination, safety-commitments, regulation, enforcement, voluntary-pledges]
 sourced_via: "Theseus research agent — 45 web searches synthesized from Brookings, Stanford FMTI, EU legislation, OECD, government publications, TechCrunch, TIME, CNN, Fortune, academic papers"
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-19
+enrichments_applied: ["AI transparency is declining not improving because Stanford FMTI scores dropped 17 points in one year while frontier labs dissolved safety teams and removed safety language from mission statements.md", "Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development.md", "voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints.md", "compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md", "AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 # Empirical Evidence: AI Coordination and Governance Mechanisms That Changed Behavior
@@ -51,3 +55,19 @@ Core finding: almost no international AI governance mechanism has produced verif
 - Insurance/liability: market projected $29.7B by 2033. Creates market incentives aligned with safety.
 - Third-party auditing: METR, Apollo Research. Apollo warns ecosystem unsustainable without regulatory mandate.
 - Futarchy: implemented for DAO governance (MetaDAO, Optimism experiment) but not yet for AI governance.
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- EU AI Act: Apple paused Apple Intelligence in EU, Meta changed ads, EUR 500M+ fines under DMA
+- China implemented mandatory algorithm filing with criminal enforcement (August 2023)
+- US export controls: tiered country system, deployment caps, Nvidia compliance chips (H800, A800)
+- Stanford FMTI transparency scores: -17 points mean (2024→2025), Meta -29, Mistral -37, OpenAI -14
+- OpenAI removed 'safely' from mission statement (November 2025)
+- OpenAI dissolved Superalignment team (May 2024) and Mission Alignment team (February 2026)
+- Google accused by 60 UK lawmakers of violating Seoul commitments (Gemini 2.5 Pro, April 2025)
+- 450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025 (up from 6 in 2016), $92M in lobbying fees Q1-Q3 2025
+- California SB 1047 vetoed after industry lobbying
+- Watermarking: 38% implementation rate across frontier labs
+- US AISI defunded/rebranded after initial establishment
+- UK-US joint evaluation of OpenAI o1 model conducted
+- Insurance/liability market projected $29.7B by 2033

inbox/queue/2026-03-16-theseus-ai-industry-landscape-briefing.md

@@ -7,10 +7,13 @@ date_published: 2026-03-16
 date_archived: 2026-03-16
 domain: ai-alignment
 secondary_domains: [internet-finance]
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 processed_by: theseus
 tags: [industry-landscape, ai-labs, funding, competitive-dynamics, startups, investors]
 sourced_via: "Theseus research agent — 33 web searches synthesized from MIT Tech Review, TechCrunch, Crunchbase, OECD, company announcements, CNBC, Fortune, etc."
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-19
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 # AI Industry Landscape Briefing — March 2026
@@ -54,3 +57,19 @@ Multi-source synthesis of the current AI industry state. Key data points:
 - Daniel Gross → left SSI for Meta superintelligence team
 - John Schulman → left OpenAI for Thinking Machines Lab
 - 11+ Google executives → Microsoft in 2025
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- xAI reached ~$230B valuation with Grok 4/4.1 leading LMArena, 1M+ H100 GPUs, $20B Series E Jan 2026
+- Mistral reached $13.8B valuation, EUR 300M ARR targeting EUR 1B, building European sovereign compute
+- Google DeepMind released Gemini 3/3.1 family, 21% enterprise LLM spend, $175-185B capex 2026, Deep Think achieved gold-medal Olympiad results
+- Sierra (Bret Taylor) reached $10B+ valuation in agentic customer service
+- Databricks reached $134B valuation, $5B Series L, filed for IPO Q2 2026
+- 2025 total AI VC: $259-270B (52-61% of all global VC)
+- Feb 2026 AI funding: $189B (largest single month ever)
+- 75-79% of AI funding to US companies
+- Inference cost deflation ~10x/year
+- Chinese open-source (Qwen, DeepSeek) capturing 50-60% of new open-model adoption
+- 95% of enterprise AI pilots fail to deliver ROI (MIT Project NANDA)
+- Big 5 AI capex: $660-690B planned 2026
+- US deregulating AI, EU softening regulations