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@ -34,12 +34,6 @@ Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liqui
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Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000 coal for proposals, with OTC buyer lined up to purchase dev fund tokens and seed the futarchy AMM. This shows the liquidity bootstrapping pattern extends beyond initial launch to governance upgrades, where projects must arrange capital to meet minimum depth requirements before migration.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The proposal describes the bootstrapping mechanism: 'These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets. With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -21,12 +21,6 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
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- AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
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- State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal (135-225 SOL annually at 3-5 proposals/month), while AMMs cost 'almost nothing' in state rent. At January 2024 SOL prices ($85), this represents $11,475-$19,125 annual savings.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
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- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
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- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The proposal identifies that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' This is cited as 'the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ This claim extends futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separ
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Futardio proposal explicitly lists reputational risk as a potential pitfall: 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' and 'May make it harder to recruit contributors.' MetaDAO recognized this tradeoff and put the decision itself to futarchy markets, demonstrating awareness that memecoin association could damage credibility with serious adopters.
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Futardio proposal explicitly lists reputational risk as a potential pitfall: 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' and 'May make it harder to recruit contributors.' MetaDAO used futarchy to decide whether to launch the memecoin platform precisely because they recognized the credibility tradeoff.
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@ -36,12 +36,6 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
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- May reduce legitimate trading volume
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- LP attraction depends on base trading activity
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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MetaDAO's AMM proposal sets fees at 3-5% explicitly to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The mechanism works because high fees make price manipulation through wash trading expensive while creating strong incentives for liquidity provision.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -30,12 +30,6 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
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- No empirical data on manipulation resistance
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- High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement.
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ MetaDAO's Futardio proposal explicitly states: 'One of the ideal use-cases for f
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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MetaDAO proposal explicitly identifies memecoin governance as ideal futarchy use case, stating 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.' This confirms the single-objective-function thesis with direct practitioner reasoning.
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MetaDAO proposal explicitly identifies memecoins as ideal futarchy use case: 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action.' This confirms the single-objective-function thesis with direct practitioner reasoning.
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@ -6,13 +6,9 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
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date: 2024-01-24
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: enrichment
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status: unprocessed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-16
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enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -132,14 +128,3 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-01-29
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- Ended: 2024-01-29
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed on 2024-01-24
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- Proposal completed on 2024-01-29
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- Budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
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- CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
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- AMM implementation timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
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- Proposer: XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ
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- DAO account: 7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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@ -359,10 +359,10 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
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## Key Facts
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- Futardio proposal on MetaDAO failed on 2024-09-01
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- Proposed $100k grant over 6 months for futardio development team
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- Planned Q3 launch timeline for futardio platform
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- Futardio would have allocated percentage of new token supply to futarchy DAOs
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- Points system would convert to $FUTA token within 180 days
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- Revenue would flow to vault claimable by FUTA holders
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- Platform would be immutable and decentralized at token launch
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- Futardio proposal created 2024-08-28, failed 2024-09-01
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- Proposal offered $100k grant paid over 6 months
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- Target launch was Q3 2024
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- Points would convert to $FUTA token within 180 days
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- FUTA distribution only to points owners and MetaDAO
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- Revenue would go to vault claimable by FUTA holders
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- Nallok and Proph3t would support team but not be core team
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