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Teleo Agents
40d80781f2 auto-fix: strip 5 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
2026-03-15 18:55:21 +00:00
Teleo Agents
1ea4aa2b20 extract: 2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore
Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
2026-03-15 18:53:20 +00:00
Teleo Agents
7b6d5ae259 entity-batch: update 2 entities
- Applied 2 entity operations from queue
- Files: entities/internet-finance/futardio.md, entities/internet-finance/futuredao.md

Pentagon-Agent: Epimetheus <968B2991-E2DF-4006-B962-F5B0A0CC8ACA>
2026-03-15 18:53:17 +00:00
5 changed files with 36 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -35,13 +35,19 @@ This was a play-money experiment, which is the primary confound. Real-money futa
ORE's HNT-ORE boost proposal demonstrates futarchy's strength in relative selection: the market validated HNT as the next liquidity pair to boost relative to other candidates (ISC already had a boost at equivalent multiplier), but the proposal does not require absolute prediction of HNT's future price or utility—only that HNT is a better strategic choice than alternatives. The proposal passed by market consensus on relative positioning (HNT as flagship DePIN project post-HIP-138), not by predicting absolute HNT performance metrics.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
ORE's three-tier boost system (vanilla stake, critical pairs, extended pairs) demonstrates futarchy's strength at relative selection. The proposal doesn't require markets to predict absolute HNT-ORE liquidity outcomes, only to rank HNT-ORE against other potential boost candidates. The tier system simplifies future governance by grouping similar proposals, reducing each decision to 'which tier' rather than 'what exact multiplier value'.
---
Relevant Notes:
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]]
- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
- speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md
- optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md
Topics:
- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
- [[foundations/collective-intelligence/_map]]
- domains/internet-finance/_map
- foundations/collective-intelligence/_map

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@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ The risk is that cultural proposals introduce systematic bias: participants who
The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliable pattern. Cultural proposals that fail futarchy governance (and thus go unobserved in public records) would provide the necessary counter-evidence to calibrate how often futarchy actually validates cultural versus financial spending.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
The HNT-ORE boost proposal frames strategic partnership as token price input: 'As a revolutionary new wireless networking protocol, Helium is one of the flagship DePIN projects on Solana and all of crypto.' The market priced not just liquidity depth but brand association value—whether aligning with Helium's DePIN reputation would increase ORE's positioning as 'competitive unit of account for assets representing real world value.' This extends cultural spending to include strategic partnership evaluation.
---
Relevant Notes:

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@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
- **2026-03-05** — [[insert-coin-labs-futardio-fundraise]] launched for Web3 gaming studio (failed, $2,508 / $50K = 5% of target)
- **2026-03-05** — [[git3-futardio-fundraise]] failed: Git3 raised $28,266 of $100K target (28.3%) before entering refunding status, demonstrating market filtering even with live MVP
- **2024-06-14** — [[futardio-fund-rug-bounty-program]] passed: Approved $5K USDC funding for RugBounty.xyz platform development to incentivize community recovery from rug pulls
- **2024-11-21** — Proposal #13 created on Futardio platform using Autocrat v0.3
- **2024-11-25** — Proposal #13 failed and completed, demonstrating continued futarchy governance activity
## Competitive Position
- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

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@ -24,5 +24,7 @@ FutureDAO is a market-governed decentralized organization building the Future Pr
- **2024-06-08** — Token Migrator proposal completed and ended
- **2024-08-30** — Proposed $25,000 budget for Pre-Governance Mandates tool development and entry into Solana Radar Hackathon (September 1 - October 8, 2024). Tool combines multi-criteria decision-making engine with customizable surveys and Web3 integration to facilitate pre-governance community engagement. Proposal passed 2024-09-02.
- **2024-11-08** — Proposed liquidity farming initiative for $FUTURE on Raydium, allocating 1% of token supply as LP rewards
- **2024-11-11** — Raydium liquidity farming proposal (HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1Vm) passed via Autocrat v0.3 futarchy governance
## Relationship to KB
FutureDAO extends [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] by applying conditional market logic to community takeovers of existing projects rather than just initial launches. The token migrator uses [[SPL-404-enables-fungible-NFT-swap-revenue-for-DAOs-by-bridging-governance-tokens-and-NFT-liquidity-on-Solana]] to distribute migration fees to staked NFT holders.

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1
date: 2024-11-25
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ processed_date: 2026-03-11
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "Futardio proposal for ORE-HNT liquidity boost. Primary extraction: three new entities (ORE protocol, decision_market for the proposal, Helium). Two enrichments showing futarchy governance patterns: three-tier boost system as governance simplification mechanism, and strategic partnership evaluation through conditional markets. No novel claims — the proposal demonstrates existing futarchy mechanisms in practice rather than introducing new theoretical insights."
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-15
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md", "futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---
## Proposal Details
@ -71,3 +75,13 @@ With the passing of this proposal, we would introduce a new boost with the same
- HNT-ORE boost uses Kamino kTokens representing concentrated liquidity positions on Orca
- ORE three-tier boost system: Tier 1 (vanilla stake), Tier 2 (SOL-ORE, USDC-ORE), Tier 3 (ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE)
- Helium HIP-138 consolidated network tokenomics around HNT as primary token
## Key Facts
- ORE proposal 2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1A passed 2024-11-28
- HNT-ORE boost uses Kamino kTokens representing concentrated liquidity positions on Orca
- ORE three-tier boost system: Tier 1 (vanilla stake), Tier 2 (SOL-ORE, USDC-ORE), Tier 3 (ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE)
- Helium HIP-138 consolidated network tokenomics around HNT as primary token
- ORE DAO account: EttCec7x4r227dbQ8BYUVtqizDdD6T3WQHGHWKdzJrCc
- Proposal used Autocrat version 0.3
- Proposal duration: 3 days (2024-11-25 to 2024-11-28)