rio: extract claims from 2026-04-24-frontiers-blockchain-futarchy-desci-dao-empirical

- Source: inbox/queue/2026-04-24-frontiers-blockchain-futarchy-desci-dao-empirical.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Claims: 1, Entities: 0
- Enrichments: 2
- Extracted by: pipeline ingest (OpenRouter anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <PIPELINE>

domains/internet-finance/cftc-anprm-treats-governance-and-sports-markets-identically-eliminating-structural-separation-defense.md

@@ -11,9 +11,16 @@ sourced_from: internet-finance/2026-04-17-bettorsinsider-cftc-selig-single-commi
 scope: structural
 sourcer: BettorsInsider / iGaming Business
 supports: ["futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse"]
-related: ["futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse", "cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets", "cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework", "cftc-anprm-economic-purpose-test-revival-creates-gatekeeping-mechanism-for-event-contracts", "retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent", "cftc-anprm-margin-trading-question-signals-leverage-expansion-for-prediction-markets"]
+related: ["futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse", "cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets", "cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework", "cftc-anprm-economic-purpose-test-revival-creates-gatekeeping-mechanism-for-event-contracts", "retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent", "cftc-anprm-margin-trading-question-signals-leverage-expansion-for-prediction-markets", "cftc-anprm-treats-governance-and-sports-markets-identically-eliminating-structural-separation-defense"]
 ---
 
 # CFTC ANPRM treats governance markets and sports prediction markets as unified regulatory category, eliminating structural-separation-based regulatory defensibility
 
 The CFTC's April 2026 ANPRM solicits comment on 'event contracts' without creating categorical distinctions between sports prediction markets and governance-related contracts. Chairman Selig's testimony confirmed the ANPRM does not distinguish prediction markets by category. This is significant because futarchy governance proponents have argued that governance markets are structurally different from gambling—they serve organizational decision-making rather than entertainment speculation. The absence of this distinction in the ANPRM means the CFTC may regulate futarchy governance markets under the same framework as sports betting. This eliminates the 'structural separation' argument that governance markets deserve different treatment. The 800+ ANPRM submissions as of April 17 came from industry participants, academics, state gaming commissions, and tribal gaming authorities—but the source notes no futarchy-specific comments were filed, meaning the CFTC has no input distinguishing governance use cases. Without explicit carve-outs in the final rule, futarchy platforms could face the same restrictions as sports betting platforms.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Bettors Insider, April 17, 2026 — CFTC Chairman Selig testimony coverage
+
+CFTC ANPRM comment period closed April 30, 2026 with 800+ submissions from industry participants, academics, state gaming commissions, and tribal gaming commissions. Zero submissions distinguished futarchy/governance markets from prediction markets or proposed a carve-out for decentralized governance applications. The entire 800-comment discussion focused on centralized platforms (Kalshi, Polymarket, ProphetX) with no Web3/futarchy voice present.

domains/internet-finance/cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets.md

@@ -335,3 +335,10 @@ The 9th Circuit's February 17, 2026 one-page decision upheld Nevada's preliminar
 **Source:** Fortune April 20, 2026, quoting industry lawyers on 9th Circuit hearing
 
 Industry lawyers characterize the Kalshi SCOTUS path as 'a true jump ball' with genuine uncertainty at each stage, not a case where federal preemption has clear legal advantage. If SCOTUS reverses the 3rd Circuit pro-preemption precedent, this would retroactively harm Kalshi even in states where it currently operates under DCM protection, demonstrating that DCM preemption is not a settled legal shield but an active battleground through 2027.
+
+
+## Challenging Evidence
+
+**Source:** MCAI Lex Vision, 9th Circuit hearing analysis, April 16, 2026
+
+Rule 40.11 paradox creates structural contradiction in CFTC preemption claims: CFTC's own Rule 40.11 excludes from CEA jurisdiction 'agreements, contracts, transactions, or swaps on gaming or activities unlawful under state law.' If Nevada gambling law bans prediction market contracts, CFTC's own rule removes them from CEA jurisdiction, undermining the preemption argument. Judge Nelson appeared to agree with this reading during oral arguments, suggesting DCM registration may not provide the jurisdictional protection previously assumed.

domains/internet-finance/cftc-sole-commissioner-governance-creates-structural-concentration-risk-through-administration-contingent-favorability.md

@@ -106,3 +106,10 @@ Norton Rose analysis documents Selig's April 17 House Agriculture Committee test
 **Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM analysis, April 21 2026
 
 Norton Rose analysis documents Selig's April 17 House Agriculture Committee testimony where he stated 'CFTC will no longer sit idly by while overzealous state governments undermine the agency's exclusive jurisdiction' and warned unregulated prediction markets could be 'the next FTX.' Analysis notes 'Sole commissioner creates structural concentration risk — all major prediction market regulatory decisions flow through one person with prior Kalshi board membership. Regulatory favorability is administration-contingent, not institutionally durable.' The ANPRM itself (40 separately numbered questions across six core topics) flows entirely through Selig's authority as sole sitting commissioner.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Bettors Insider, April 17, 2026 — ANPRM process implications
+
+The 800-comment ANPRM record may actually help lock in Chairman Selig's prediction market framework despite single-commissioner governance risk. A substantial public comment process makes the resulting rule harder to reverse by future bipartisan commissioners, as the administrative record demonstrates extensive stakeholder engagement and deliberation.

domains/internet-finance/conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects.md

@@ -10,26 +10,18 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Nicolas Rasmont
 related_claims: ["[[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]", "[[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]]", "[[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]", "[[called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification]]"]
-supports:
-- Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies
-- nicolas-rasmont
-- Futarchy is parasitic on what it tries to govern because selection bias inefficiency costs are paid by the organization while gains accrue to market participants
-reweave_edges:
-- Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies|supports|2026-04-17
-- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|related|2026-04-18
-- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals|challenges|2026-04-18
-- mikhail-samin|related|2026-04-18
-- nicolas-rasmont|supports|2026-04-18
-- Post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high implementation rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias in futarchy|related|2026-04-19
-- Futarchy is parasitic on what it tries to govern because selection bias inefficiency costs are paid by the organization while gains accrue to market participants|supports|2026-04-24
-challenges:
-- Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals
-related:
-- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
-- mikhail-samin
-- Post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high implementation rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias in futarchy
+supports: ["Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies", "nicolas-rasmont", "Futarchy is parasitic on what it tries to govern because selection bias inefficiency costs are paid by the organization while gains accrue to market participants"]
+reweave_edges: ["Advisory futarchy avoids selection distortion by decoupling prediction from execution because non-binding markets cannot create the approval-signals-prosperity correlation that Rasmont identifies|supports|2026-04-17", "Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|related|2026-04-18", "Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals|challenges|2026-04-18", "mikhail-samin|related|2026-04-18", "nicolas-rasmont|supports|2026-04-18", "Post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high implementation rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias in futarchy|related|2026-04-19", "Futarchy is parasitic on what it tries to govern because selection bias inefficiency costs are paid by the organization while gains accrue to market participants|supports|2026-04-24"]
+challenges: ["Hanson's decision-selection-bias solution requires decision-makers to trade in markets to reveal private information and approximately 5 percent random rejection of otherwise-approved proposals"]
+related: ["Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign", "mikhail-samin", "Post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high implementation rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias in futarchy", "conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects", "conditional-decision-markets-cannot-estimate-causal-policy-effects-under-endogenous-selection", "futarchy-conditional-markets-aggregate-information-through-financial-stake-not-voting-participation", "hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection", "futarchy-parasitism-claim-cost-borne-by-governed-entity-gains-to-traders"]
 ---
 
 # Conditional decision markets are structurally biased toward selection correlations rather than causal policy effects, making futarchy approval signals evidential rather than causal
 
-Rasmont argues that futarchy contains a structural impossibility: conditional decision markets cannot estimate causal policy effects once their outputs are acted upon. The mechanism is that traders must price contracts based on welfare-conditional-on-approval, not welfare-caused-by-approval. In the bronze bull example, a wasteful monument gets approved because approval signals economic confidence ('only prosperous societies build monuments'), making the conditional-on-approval price higher than the causal effect warrants. The bailout inversion shows the reverse: a beneficial stimulus package gets rejected because approval signals crisis, making welfare-conditional-on-approval low even though welfare-caused-by-approval is high. This creates what Rasmont calls 'market superstitions' - self-fulfilling coordination equilibria where traders profit by correctly reading organizational fundamentals rather than policy effects. The organization bears the costs of bad policies while traders capture gains from gambling on fundamentals. Proposed fixes fail: post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias, while random settlement eliminates information aggregation entirely. The core claim is that 'there is no payout structure that simultaneously incentivizes decision market participants to price in causal knowledge and allows that knowledge to be acted upon.' This is distinct from manipulation or illiquidity critiques - it claims even perfectly implemented futarchy with rational traders systematically fails at causal inference.
+Rasmont argues that futarchy contains a structural impossibility: conditional decision markets cannot estimate causal policy effects once their outputs are acted upon. The mechanism is that traders must price contracts based on welfare-conditional-on-approval, not welfare-caused-by-approval. In the bronze bull example, a wasteful monument gets approved because approval signals economic confidence ('only prosperous societies build monuments'), making the conditional-on-approval price higher than the causal effect warrants. The bailout inversion shows the reverse: a beneficial stimulus package gets rejected because approval signals crisis, making welfare-conditional-on-approval low even though welfare-caused-by-approval is high. This creates what Rasmont calls 'market superstitions' - self-fulfilling coordination equilibria where traders profit by correctly reading organizational fundamentals rather than policy effects. The organization bears the costs of bad policies while traders capture gains from gambling on fundamentals. Proposed fixes fail: post-hoc randomization requires implausibly high rates (50%+) to overcome selection bias, while random settlement eliminates information aggregation entirely. The core claim is that 'there is no payout structure that simultaneously incentivizes decision market participants to price in causal knowledge and allows that knowledge to be acted upon.' This is distinct from manipulation or illiquidity critiques - it claims even perfectly implemented futarchy with rational traders systematically fails at causal inference.
+
+## Challenging Evidence
+
+**Source:** Robin Hanson, Overcoming Bias 2026-04-24
+
+Hanson proposes four fixes (randomized rejection, insider trading access, timing announcements, sequential markets) that he argues can address decision selection bias through information-timing corrections. This challenges Rasmont's claim that the bias is structurally intrinsic by proposing operational mechanisms that could mitigate it. However, Hanson does not directly engage the payout-structure critique—his fixes address information asymmetry, not the fundamental question of whether conditional payouts reward correlation vs causation.

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-random-rejection-fix-creates-governance-legitimacy-costs-for-high-stakes-decisions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Randomly overruling 5% of market-approved proposals solves the counterfactual observation problem in theory but creates unacceptable legitimacy costs when applied to consequential one-time governance decisions"
+confidence: experimental
+source: Robin Hanson, Overcoming Bias 2026-04-24
+created: 2026-04-24
+title: "Futarchy's 5% random rejection fix creates governance legitimacy costs that make it inapplicable to high-stakes single decisions"
+agent: rio
+sourced_from: internet-finance/2026-04-24-overcomingbias-hanson-decision-selection-bias-futarchy-fix.md
+scope: functional
+sourcer: "@robinhanson"
+related: ["metadao-futarchy-80-iq-governance-blocks-catastrophic-decisions-not-strategic-optimization", "futarchy-governance-overhead-increases-decision-friction-because-every-significant-action-requires-conditional-market-consensus-preventing-fast-pivots", "post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy", "hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection", "conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects", "futarchy-conditional-markets-aggregate-information-through-financial-stake-not-voting-participation", "futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments"]
+---
+
+# Futarchy's 5% random rejection fix creates governance legitimacy costs that make it inapplicable to high-stakes single decisions
+
+Hanson proposes 'randomly reject 5% of proposals that the system would otherwise accept' to ensure observations of the counterfactual state, allowing traders to price conditionally on non-adoption accurately. This works mathematically: it creates the data needed to distinguish correlation from causation. However, it creates severe governance legitimacy problems for high-stakes decisions. If a futarchy system approves a critical treasury allocation, protocol upgrade, or strategic partnership—and then randomly rejects it despite market approval—participants will not accept this outcome. The random rejection is operationally arbitrary from the perspective of stakeholders who see the market signal as legitimate. This fix may work for low-stakes iterated decisions (where 5% rejection is tolerable noise) but fails for high-stakes single decisions (where random overrule destroys legitimacy). Hanson does not address this legitimacy cost in his proposal. The fix is theoretically sound but operationally constrained to contexts where random rejection is socially acceptable.

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-requires-quantifiable-exogenous-kpis-as-deployment-constraint-because-most-dao-proposals-lack-measurable-objectives.md

@@ -10,8 +10,16 @@ agent: rio
 scope: structural
 sourcer: Anonymous authors, Frontiers in Blockchain
 related_claims: ["[[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]", "[[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]"]
+related: ["futarchy-requires-quantifiable-exogenous-kpis-as-deployment-constraint-because-most-dao-proposals-lack-measurable-objectives", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions", "metadao-futarchy-80-iq-governance-blocks-catastrophic-decisions-not-strategic-optimization"]
 ---
 
 # Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives
 
 The paper's empirical analysis of governance data from 13 DeSci DAOs (January 2024-April 2025) identified 'absent KPIs in most proposals' as a primary barrier to futarchy implementation. This finding reveals a structural constraint: futarchy mechanisms require clearly defined, measurable success metrics to function, but real-world DAO proposals are predominantly qualitative. The paper argues DeSci contexts are 'particularly suited' for futarchy specifically because research proposals can generate quantifiable metrics (publication outcomes, hypothesis confirmation, milestone achievement) — unlike ambiguous political decisions. This implies futarchy's applicability is limited to domains where objective functions can be externalized and measured. The constraint is not theoretical but empirical: the governance infrastructure that would make futarchy viable (proposal-level KPIs) does not currently exist in most DAO contexts. The paper lists 'clearly defined, measurable KPIs for each proposal' as the first implementation requirement, suggesting this is the binding constraint on adoption.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Frontiers in Blockchain 2025, VitaDAO simulation study
+
+Peer-reviewed study identifies DeSci research funding as ideal futarchy domain because scientific outcomes provide 'measurable KPIs' and 'quantifiable endpoints' that most DAO proposals lack. Study analyzed 13 DeSci DAOs and found futarchy particularly suited to decisions with measurable research outcomes.

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-simulation-in-desci-shows-directional-alignment-with-expert-governance-while-eliminating-plutocratic-pathologies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: Retrospective simulation on VitaDAO proposals found futarchy would select the same projects as current governance but through epistemic accuracy rewards rather than token-weighted voting
+confidence: experimental
+source: Frontiers in Blockchain peer-reviewed study, VitaDAO governance data simulation
+created: 2026-04-24
+title: Futarchy simulation in DeSci DAOs shows directional alignment with existing governance while eliminating capital-weighted voting pathologies
+agent: rio
+sourced_from: internet-finance/2026-04-24-frontiers-blockchain-futarchy-desci-dao-empirical.md
+scope: functional
+sourcer: Frontiers in Blockchain
+supports: ["MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy", "futarchy-requires-quantifiable-exogenous-kpis-as-deployment-constraint-because-most-dao-proposals-lack-measurable-objectives"]
+related: ["futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration", "domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge", "vitadao"]
+---
+
+# Futarchy simulation in DeSci DAOs shows directional alignment with existing governance while eliminating capital-weighted voting pathologies
+
+A peer-reviewed study analyzing 13 DeSci DAOs and running retrospective simulations on VitaDAO proposals found 'full directional alignment under deterministic modeling' — futarchy and existing governance structures would have selected the same proposals when given the same information. However, the mechanism differs fundamentally: current DeSci governance suffers from 'vote buying and strategic collusion by large holders' through capital-weighted voting, while futarchy shifts to mechanisms that 'reward those who are epistemically accurate, rather than economically powerful.' This finding is double-edged: it validates that domain expert judgment in current governance is directionally sound, but also means futarchy's value proposition is process improvement (eliminating plutocratic pathologies) rather than outcome improvement (selecting better projects). The study is simulation-based using prospective modeling, not deployed system evidence, which limits its evidentiary weight compared to MetaDAO's actual deployment data. The paper recommends measurable KPIs and epistemic diversity as design principles, noting futarchy is particularly suited to scientific funding decisions with quantifiable endpoints.

domains/internet-finance/hanson-decision-selection-bias-fixes-address-information-timing-not-structural-payout-gap.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: The proposed fixes (randomized rejection, insider trading access, timing announcements, sequential markets) solve information asymmetry but do not resolve Rasmont's critique that conditional market payouts structurally reward correlation-exploiters rather than causal reasoners
+confidence: experimental
+source: Robin Hanson, Overcoming Bias 2026-04-24
+created: 2026-04-24
+title: Hanson's decision selection bias fixes address information-timing problems but not the structural payout gap between conditional and causal welfare estimates
+agent: rio
+sourced_from: internet-finance/2026-04-24-overcomingbias-hanson-decision-selection-bias-futarchy-fix.md
+scope: structural
+sourcer: "@robinhanson"
+supports: ["futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-create-profitable-opportunities-for-arbitrageurs"]
+challenges: ["conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects"]
+related: ["conditional-decision-markets-are-structurally-biased-toward-selection-correlations-rather-than-causal-policy-effects", "conditional-decision-markets-cannot-estimate-causal-policy-effects-under-endogenous-selection", "conditional-decision-market-selection-bias-is-mitigatable-through-decision-maker-market-participation-timing-transparency-and-low-rate-random-rejection", "hanson-decision-selection-bias-partial-solution-requires-decision-maker-trading-and-random-rejection", "post-hoc-randomization-requires-implausibly-high-implementation-rates-to-overcome-selection-bias-in-futarchy"]
+---
+
+# Hanson's decision selection bias fixes address information-timing problems but not the structural payout gap between conditional and causal welfare estimates
+
+Hanson acknowledges decision selection bias exists in futarchy when 'one allows decision selection bias sequences of price then info then decision.' His four proposed fixes all address information-timing problems: (1) randomized 5% rejection creates counterfactual observations, (2) insider trading access ensures decision-maker information enters markets, (3) timing announcements prevent traders from fearing future information, (4) sequential per-timestep markets avoid selection throughout the process. However, none of these fixes address Rasmont's structural critique that the conditional payout mechanism itself (paying based on welfare-conditional-on-adoption rather than welfare-caused-by-adoption) creates an intrinsic bias toward correlation-exploiters. Hanson treats this as an information problem (traders lack data to distinguish correlation from causation); Rasmont treats it as a mechanism design problem (the payout structure itself selects for the wrong type of reasoning). The gap between these two framings remains unresolved. Hanson's fixes would improve futarchy's information aggregation under his framing, but would not address the structural payout critique under Rasmont's framing.

inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-16-bettorsinsider-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-testimony.md

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ date: 2026-04-17
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-04-24
 priority: medium
 tags: [cftc, anprm, prediction-markets, regulation, selig, rulemaking]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content

inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-16-mcai-lex-vision-ninth-circuit-prediction-market-structure.md

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ date: 2026-04-16
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-04-24
 priority: medium
 tags: [prediction-markets, 9th-circuit, kalshi, regulatory, structure, cftc, nevada]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content

inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-24-frontiers-blockchain-futarchy-desci-dao-empirical.md

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ date: 2026-04-24
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: [ai-alignment]
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-04-24
 priority: medium
 tags: [futarchy, desci, dao, empirical, simulation, research-funding, vitadao]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content

inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-04-24-overcomingbias-hanson-decision-selection-bias-futarchy-fix.md

@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ date: 2026-04-24
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: article
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-04-24
 priority: high
 tags: [futarchy, decision-markets, selection-bias, mechanism-design, hanson, rasmont]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content