auto-fix: strip 1 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -202,12 +202,6 @@ MetaDAO governance proposal with 84% likelihood to pass and $408k traded demonst
 
 P2P.me launch demonstrates MetaDAO ICO platform being used by projects with existing product-market fit (23k+ users, $4M monthly volume peak) rather than just early-stage concepts. The launch reveals tension between 'working product needs token' skepticism and 'community ownership infrastructure' framing, suggesting MetaDAO is attracting projects across maturity spectrum.
 
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-03-24-vibhu-solana-foundation-builder-support-infrastructure]] | Added: 2026-03-24*
-
-Solana Foundation's committee-based model (per Vibhu, 2026-03-24) deploys 'tens of millions collectively' per year through hackathons, grants, and accelerators but provides no published outcome metrics. This creates a direct comparison gap: MetaDAO's market-based selection operates at smaller scale but with transparent outcome tracking (15x oversubscription, conditional market prices), while the dominant committee model lacks comparable measurement infrastructure despite being orders of magnitude larger.
-
-
 
 
 

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md

@@ -59,12 +59,6 @@ Ranger Finance case shows futarchy can succeed at ordinal selection (this projec
 
 Hurupay had $7.2M/month transaction volume and $500K+ monthly revenue but failed to raise $3M. The market rejection is interpretively ambiguous: either (A) correct valuation assessment (mechanism working) or (B) platform reputation contamination from prior Trove/Ranger failures (mechanism producing noise). Without controls, we cannot distinguish quality signal from sentiment contagion, revealing a fundamental limitation in interpreting futarchy selection outcomes.
 
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-03-24-gg-research-futarchy-vs-grants-council-optimism-experiment]] | Added: 2026-03-24*
-
-The Optimism comparison adds the EV vs. variance dimension: futarchy's relative selection advantage (+$32.5M aggregate TVL) held despite 8x absolute prediction overshoot. The selection quality (which projects to fund) was superior even when the prediction quality (how much TVL they would generate) was catastrophically wrong. This suggests the relative selection mechanism is robust to calibration failures.
-
-
 
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-variance-creates-portfolio-problem-because-mechanism-selects-both-top-performers-and-worst-performers-simultaneously.md

@@ -38,12 +38,6 @@ The variance pattern also interacts with the prediction accuracy failure: market
 
 Trove Markets was one of 6 ICOs in MetaDAO's Q4 2025 success quarter. The same selection mechanism that produced successful raises also selected a project that crashed 95-98% and was later identified as fraud, confirming the variance problem extends to fraud detection, not just performance variance.
 
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2026-03-24-gg-research-futarchy-vs-grants-council-optimism-experiment]] | Added: 2026-03-24*
-
-Optimism experiment empirically confirmed this: futarchy's divergent picks included both the top performer (Balancer & Beets, +$27.8M TVL) and the worst performer, while Grants Council showed consistent mid-range outcomes. The variance is not a bug but a structural feature of the mechanism's risk profile.
-
-
 
 Relevant Notes:
 - Living Capital vehicles pair Living Agent domain expertise with futarchy-governed investment to direct capital toward crucial innovations.md

domains/internet-finance/play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md

@@ -35,12 +35,6 @@ Play-money futarchy fails because there's no downside risk - people participate
 
 ---
 
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2026-03-24-gg-research-futarchy-vs-grants-council-optimism-experiment]] | Added: 2026-03-24*
-
-Optimism experiment used play-money (Butter platform) and produced 8x prediction overshoot, confirming that absence of real stakes inflates prediction inaccuracy. However, the selection quality (which projects to fund) still outperformed committee selection on aggregate TVL, suggesting play-money can work for relative ranking even when absolute predictions fail.
-
-
 Relevant Notes:
 - futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
 - speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md

entities/internet-finance/colosseum.md

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ Colosseum operates Solana's hackathon infrastructure, runs an accelerator progra
 - **2024-03-19** — [[metadao-otc-trade-colosseum]] proposed: $250,000 USDC acquisition of META tokens with 20% immediate unlock and 80% vested over 12 months
 - **2024-03-24** — [[metadao-otc-trade-colosseum]] passed: Colosseum completed OTC acquisition of META tokens from MetaDAO treasury
 
-- **2026-03-24** — Vibhu reports $60M fund size, 0.67% acceptance rate, and $650M+ in follow-on VC for alumni
 ## Relationship to KB
 - [[metadao]] — strategic investor and ecosystem partner
 - Demonstrates institutional adoption of futarchy-governed token sales as fundraising mechanism

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -132,8 +132,6 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2026-03-21** — [[metadao-meta036-hanson-futarchy-research]] Active: $80K academic research grant to Robin Hanson at GMU for futarchy information aggregation experiments, 50% likelihood
 - **2026-03-21** — [[metadao-meta036-hanson-futarchy-research]] Active at 50% likelihood: $80K GMU research engagement with Robin Hanson to experimentally validate futarchy governance
 - **2026-03** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund six-month futarchy research engagement with Robin Hanson at GMU
-- **2024-06-30** — BDF3M term expired and was not renewed, with Futarchy-as-a-Service having launched in May 2024 addressing the underlying operational bottleneck
-- **2026-03-22** — [[metadao-umbra-privacy-proposal-2026]] Active: Umbra Privacy proposal at 84% pass likelihood with $408K conditional market volume
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

entities/internet-finance/ranger-finance.md

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ Perps aggregator and DEX aggregation platform on Solana/Hyperliquid. Three produ
 - **2026-03-13** — [[ranger-finance-liquidation-march-2026]] Passed: Futarchy governance voted to liquidate following material misrepresentation; $5.047M USDC returned to token holders
 - **2026-03-23** — Liquidation proposal passed with 97% support and $581K trading volume, returning ~5M USDC to unlocked RNGR holders at $0.78 book value; IP returned to team
 - **2026-03-23** — [[ranger-finance-liquidation-2026]] Passed with 97% support: returned ~5M USDC to holders at $0.78 book value
-- **2026-03-23** — [[ranger-finance-liquidation-2026]] Passed with 97% support: Liquidation approved, ~$5M USDC returned to holders at $0.78 book value
 ## Significance for KB
 Ranger is THE test case for futarchy-governed enforcement. The system is working as designed: investors funded a project, the project underperformed relative to representations, the community used futarchy to force liquidation and treasury return. This is exactly what the "unruggable ICO" mechanism promises — and Ranger is the first live demonstration.
 

inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-24-vibhu-solana-foundation-builder-support-infrastructure.md

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
----
-type: source
-title: "Vibhu (Solana Foundation): Solana Does More for Builders Than Any Other Network"
-author: "Vibhu (@vibhu)"
-url: https://x.com/vibhu/status/2036233757154484542
-date: 2026-03-24
-domain: internet-finance
-secondary_domains: []
-format: tweet
-status: processed
-priority: medium
-tags: [solana, grants, builder-support, committee-selection, capital-formation, comparison]
----
-
-## Content
-
-Vibhu (Solana Foundation CEO) posted a detailed thread defending Solana's builder support infrastructure against unnamed criticism. Key claims in the thread:
-
-**Funding:**
-- 3+ hackathons since Jan 1 (Privacy, Consumer/NFTs/Gaming, Agents, Mobile) — "millions in prizes"
-- Colosseum: YC-style accelerator, $60M fund, 0.67% acceptance rate, $650M+ in follow-on VC for alumni
-- Superteam Earn: "millions paid out"; Superteam USA just launched
-- Instagrants up to $10K; evergreen grants ($40K average check); YC founder top-ups ($50K extra)
-- Kalshi x Solana $2M fund for prediction markets
-- Total: "tens of millions collectively" per year from Foundation and adjacent entities, "no equity commitments or tradeoffs"
-
-**Distribution:**
-- Solana Foundation amplified 300+ different ecosystem companies since Jan 1
-- Dedicated handles: @capitalmarkets, @solanapayments, @x402
-- @Luminaries: 50+ content creator collective for ecosystem stories
-- 10 regular podcasts featuring ecosystem teams
-- Led all crypto networks in X/LinkedIn total impressions and engagement in 2025
-
-**Key claim:** "I would bet a significant amount that we (at SF & as an ecosystem) do more to support founders/builders than any other network, and it's probably not even that close."
-
-No outcome data (success rates, failure rates, post-grant performance) is included in the thread.
-
-## Agent Notes
-**Why this matters:** Vibhu's thread provides the most comprehensive public summary of the Solana Foundation's committee-based grant/support infrastructure. This is a direct comparison point for the MetaDAO market-based ICO model. The thread reveals what the committee model looks like at scale — high volume, no equity, committee selection, broad distribution support.
-**What surprised me:** No outcome data anywhere in the thread. Vibhu argues "we do more" by volume of programs, not by outcome quality. The absence of outcome data is notable — if the committee model were producing measurably better results, outcome data would be the strongest possible argument. Its absence suggests either (a) the data doesn't exist in a comparable form or (b) the committee model's outcomes aren't strong enough to be the headline argument.
-**What I expected but didn't find:** Any comparison to market-based selection (Colosseum vs. MetaDAO), or any data on post-grant company performance rates. "Founders have raised $650M+ in VC" is survivorship-biased — it describes the 0.67% that made it into Colosseum's accelerator, not the outcomes of the broader grant pool.
-**KB connections:**
-- Comparison point for MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — this is the committee model that futarchy claims to outperform
-- Comparison gap: no KB claim exists that directly compares committee selection outcomes to futarchy selection outcomes at the project level (Optimism v1 is the closest but in a grants context, not an ICO context)
-- Colosseum OTC trade with MetaDAO ($250K, 2024-03-19) already in archive — shows prior collaboration despite competing models
-- Relevant to Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — the Solana Foundation model represents a well-resourced committee intermediary in the capital formation space
-
-**Extraction hints:**
-- The absence of outcome data from the Solana Foundation's grant program is an empirical gap — the committee model lacks transparent outcome measurement that would enable comparison. This could be a claim: "Committee-based grant selection lacks published outcome metrics, making systematic comparison to market-based selection mechanisms impossible with current data."
-- Vibhu's framing ("we do more") focuses on input metrics (dollars deployed, programs run) rather than output metrics (project success rates, capital efficiency). This is a specific failure mode in evaluating capital allocation mechanisms — input metrics can be gamed; output metrics reveal actual value creation.
-
-**Context:** Vibhu is Solana Foundation's Head of Global Growth / effectively CEO-equivalent. His tweets carry institutional weight — this is official Solana Foundation positioning. The thread was shared by @m3taversal to Rio via Telegram, suggesting the ownership coins community is tracking this as competitive context.
-
-## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
-WHY ARCHIVED: Best available summary of the committee-based grant model at scale. Creates the comparative context for claims about market-based selection superiority. The absence of outcome data is itself an extractable observation about measurement gaps in committee-based capital allocation.
-EXTRACTION HINT: The extractor should focus on the comparison gap: this thread describes the input side of committee grant-making but provides no output data. The absence of comparable outcome metrics is the most important thing to capture, not the infrastructure details themselves.

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-24-gg-research-futarchy-vs-grants-council-optimism-experiment.json

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "rejected_claims": [
-    {
-      "filename": "futarchy-produces-higher-expected-value-than-committee-selection-but-higher-variance-making-mechanism-choice-dependent-on-risk-tolerance.md",
-      "issues": [
-        "missing_attribution_extractor"
-      ]
-    }
-  ],
-  "validation_stats": {
-    "total": 1,
-    "kept": 0,
-    "fixed": 1,
-    "rejected": 1,
-    "fixes_applied": [
-      "futarchy-produces-higher-expected-value-than-committee-selection-but-higher-variance-making-mechanism-choice-dependent-on-risk-tolerance.md:set_created:2026-03-24"
-    ],
-    "rejections": [
-      "futarchy-produces-higher-expected-value-than-committee-selection-but-higher-variance-making-mechanism-choice-dependent-on-risk-tolerance.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
-    ]
-  },
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
-  "date": "2026-03-24"
-}

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-24-metadao-bdf3m-markets-authorizing-delegates-analytical-framing.json

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "rejected_claims": [
-    {
-      "filename": "futarchy-governed-daos-can-authorize-temporary-executive-delegation-through-conditional-markets-when-execution-velocity-is-the-welfare-problem.md",
-      "issues": [
-        "missing_attribution_extractor"
-      ]
-    }
-  ],
-  "validation_stats": {
-    "total": 1,
-    "kept": 0,
-    "fixed": 3,
-    "rejected": 1,
-    "fixes_applied": [
-      "futarchy-governed-daos-can-authorize-temporary-executive-delegation-through-conditional-markets-when-execution-velocity-is-the-welfare-problem.md:set_created:2026-03-24",
-      "futarchy-governed-daos-can-authorize-temporary-executive-delegation-through-conditional-markets-when-execution-velocity-is-the-welfare-problem.md:stripped_wiki_link:optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-differ",
-      "futarchy-governed-daos-can-authorize-temporary-executive-delegation-through-conditional-markets-when-execution-velocity-is-the-welfare-problem.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-solves-trustless-joint-ownership-not-just-better-de"
-    ],
-    "rejections": [
-      "futarchy-governed-daos-can-authorize-temporary-executive-delegation-through-conditional-markets-when-execution-velocity-is-the-welfare-problem.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
-    ]
-  },
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
-  "date": "2026-03-24"
-}

inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-24-vibhu-solana-foundation-builder-support-infrastructure.json

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "rejected_claims": [
-    {
-      "filename": "committee-based-grant-selection-lacks-published-outcome-metrics-making-systematic-comparison-to-market-based-selection-impossible.md",
-      "issues": [
-        "missing_attribution_extractor"
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "filename": "capital-allocation-mechanism-evaluation-defaults-to-input-metrics-over-output-metrics-because-input-metrics-are-easier-to-measure-and-harder-to-challenge.md",
-      "issues": [
-        "missing_attribution_extractor"
-      ]
-    }
-  ],
-  "validation_stats": {
-    "total": 2,
-    "kept": 0,
-    "fixed": 2,
-    "rejected": 2,
-    "fixes_applied": [
-      "committee-based-grant-selection-lacks-published-outcome-metrics-making-systematic-comparison-to-market-based-selection-impossible.md:set_created:2026-03-24",
-      "capital-allocation-mechanism-evaluation-defaults-to-input-metrics-over-output-metrics-because-input-metrics-are-easier-to-measure-and-harder-to-challenge.md:set_created:2026-03-24"
-    ],
-    "rejections": [
-      "committee-based-grant-selection-lacks-published-outcome-metrics-making-systematic-comparison-to-market-based-selection-impossible.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
-      "capital-allocation-mechanism-evaluation-defaults-to-input-metrics-over-output-metrics-because-input-metrics-are-easier-to-measure-and-harder-to-challenge.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
-    ]
-  },
-  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
-  "date": "2026-03-24"
-}

inbox/queue/2026-03-24-gg-research-futarchy-vs-grants-council-optimism-experiment.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-24
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
 format: analysis
-status: processed
+status: unprocessed
 priority: high
 tags: [optimism, futarchy, grants, committee-selection, comparative-governance, empirical]
 ---

inbox/queue/2026-03-24-metadao-bdf3m-markets-authorizing-delegates-analytical-framing.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-24
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: analysis
-status: processed
+status: unprocessed
 priority: medium
 tags: [metadao, futarchy, governance, meta-governance, delegation, bdf3m, mechanism-design]
 ---

inbox/queue/2026-03-24-vibhu-solana-foundation-builder-support-infrastructure.md

@@ -7,13 +7,9 @@ date: 2026-03-24
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: tweet
-status: enrichment
+status: unprocessed
 priority: medium
 tags: [solana, grants, builder-support, committee-selection, capital-formation, comparison]
-processed_by: rio
-processed_date: 2026-03-24
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md"]
-extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -59,14 +55,3 @@ No outcome data (success rates, failure rates, post-grant performance) is includ
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
 WHY ARCHIVED: Best available summary of the committee-based grant model at scale. Creates the comparative context for claims about market-based selection superiority. The absence of outcome data is itself an extractable observation about measurement gaps in committee-based capital allocation.
 EXTRACTION HINT: The extractor should focus on the comparison gap: this thread describes the input side of committee grant-making but provides no output data. The absence of comparable outcome metrics is the most important thing to capture, not the infrastructure details themselves.
-
-
-## Key Facts
-- Solana Foundation ran 3+ hackathons since Jan 1, 2026: Privacy, Consumer/NFTs/Gaming, Agents, Mobile
-- Solana Foundation instagrants go up to $10K; evergreen grants average $40K; YC founder top-ups are $50K
-- Kalshi x Solana created $2M fund for prediction markets
-- Solana Foundation amplified 300+ different ecosystem companies since Jan 1, 2026
-- Solana Foundation operates dedicated handles: @capitalmarkets, @solanapayments, @x402
-- @Luminaries is a 50+ content creator collective for ecosystem stories
-- Solana Foundation supports 10 regular podcasts featuring ecosystem teams
-- Solana led all crypto networks in X/LinkedIn total impressions and engagement in 2025