rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The COAL/ORE Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond pure futarchy governance into complex tokenomic mechanism design. The proposal passed through MetaDAO's governance process (proposal #4, completed 2025-11-10) and implements a multi-token economic system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing mechanisms, treasury accumulation logic, and price-responsive supply controls. This shows MetaDAO projects are building sophisticated economic protocols, not just using futarchy for binary decisions. The proposal explicitly positions itself as creating an 'ownership coin loop that reliably accumulates ORE in the COAL treasury' and ties 'behavior to COAL/ORE price dynamics.' The proposal includes 10 detailed sections covering token mechanics, emissions bands, smelting logic, tool crafting, decay functions, dynamic license formulas (c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p), and governance parameters, indicating MetaDAO's governance infrastructure can handle complex mechanism design beyond simple yes/no votes.
+(extend) The COAL/Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's futarchy platform being used for operational protocol governance, not just fundraising. The proposal restructures COAL's entire economic model—moving mining power into tools, introducing INGOT smelting with ORE fees, implementing evergreen tool mechanics with decay and repair—all decided through futarchy markets. This shows the platform handling complex multi-parameter protocol changes with real economic stakes (ORE treasury accumulation, COAL emission distribution, tool crafting economics). The proposal passed 2025-11-10 and includes governance-adjustable parameters, suggesting MetaDAO supports ongoing protocol management through futarchy, not just one-time launch decisions.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-economies.md

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's c(y) license function automatically scales tool creation costs with token price ratios preventing oversupply during weakness"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Dynamic license fees create price-responsive supply throttle in token economies
-
-The Meta-PoW protocol implements a dynamic license fee c(y) that automatically adjusts pickaxe creation costs based on the COAL/ORE price ratio, creating a self-regulating supply mechanism that responds to market conditions without governance intervention.
-
-The license function is defined as:
-- c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p
-- Clamped between c_min and c_max
-- Where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (using EMA-smoothed TWAP)
-
-With suggested defaults:
-- c0 = 200 COAL
-- y_ref = 50
-- p = 3 (cubic scaling)
-- c_min = 1 COAL
-- c_max = 300 COAL
-
-The mechanism creates asymmetric responses to price movements:
-
-**When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases):**
-- License cost c(y) falls
-- More pickaxes become economically viable to craft
-- Increased crafting drives more INGOT smelting
-- More ORE flows into treasury
-- More COAL gets burned through licenses and smelting
-
-**When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases):**
-- License cost c(y) rises (cubic scaling amplifies the effect)
-- Crafting new pickaxes becomes prohibitively expensive
-- System self-throttles without breaking existing tools
-- Reduced new supply prevents further dilution
-
-The proposal states: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, more picks are economically viable, more smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury. When COAL is weak relative to ORE (y high): c(y) increases, crafting slows, the system self-throttles without intervention."
-
-The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates nonlinear sensitivity, meaning small price ratio changes produce large license adjustments. This is intentionally designed as "the main macro throttle" for the system.
-
-Critically, the license is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a pure supply control mechanism rather than a revenue stream. The proposal explicitly notes: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
-
-This differs from fixed-cost token economics where supply expansion continues regardless of price conditions, and from governance-adjusted parameters that require human intervention and lag market changes.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-tied-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-systems.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "License costs that scale exponentially with token price ratios automatically regulate new participant entry without requiring governance intervention"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dynamic license fees tied to price ratios create automatic supply throttling in token systems
+
+Meta-PoW implements a dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y) that adjusts based on the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating an automatic throttle on new mining capacity without requiring governance votes. The license formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p uses exponential scaling (suggested p = 3) to make the cost highly sensitive to relative token prices.
+
+With suggested defaults (c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL), the license cost responds dramatically to price movements. When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases below the reference ratio of 50), the license cost falls exponentially, making pickaxe crafting economically attractive and increasing mining capacity. When COAL weakens (y increases above 50), the license cost rises exponentially toward the 300 COAL cap, pricing out new entrants and stabilizing the system.
+
+The exponential exponent (p = 3) creates non-linear sensitivity. If y doubles from 50 to 100, the license cost increases by 8x (2^3). If y halves from 50 to 25, the license cost falls to 1/8th. This aggressive scaling prevents gradual drift—small price movements trigger meaningful economic responses.
+
+Critically, the license is paid in COAL and burned, not sent to the treasury. This makes it a pure control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism. The proposal states: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+
+The price ratio y = P_ORE / P_COAL is calculated using an EMA-smoothed TWAP (time-weighted average price) to prevent manipulation through short-term price spikes. This makes the throttle responsive to genuine market conditions while resistant to flash attacks.
+
+The system is self-stabilizing: when COAL is strong, low license costs attract miners, increasing INGOT demand and ORE inflow to the treasury, which strengthens ORE and raises y, which increases license costs and slows new entry. When COAL is weak, high license costs deter new miners, reducing sell pressure on COAL and allowing price recovery. The proposal explicitly describes this: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable... If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
+
+## Evidence
+- License formula: "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, Clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max"
+- Suggested parameters: "c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300"
+- Price calculation: "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
+- Control vs revenue: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+- Self-stabilizing behavior: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes liquid markets for both COAL and ORE with reliable price feeds. If either market is illiquid or manipulable, the TWAP can be gamed to artificially lower license costs. The exponential scaling (p = 3) is aggressive—if miscalibrated, it could create cliff effects where small price movements cause mass entry or exit. The clamping bounds (1-300 COAL) are governance parameters but untested at the extremes. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-stabilizes-token-demand.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Making repair costs lower than recrafting costs plus 4 percent daily decay creates rational incentive for continuous maintenance over churn"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Evergreen tool design with repair cheaper than replacement stabilizes token demand
-
-The Meta-PoW protocol implements an "evergreen" tool architecture where daily repair costs are calibrated to be cheaper than recrafting, combined with gradual decay rather than permanent breakage, creating rational economic incentives for continuous tool maintenance that stabilize INGOT demand.
-
-The mechanism has three components:
-
-**1. Gradual decay instead of breakage:**
-- Tools have power p between 0 and 1
-- Skipping repair causes 4% daily decay: p_next = 0.96 * p
-- Tools never permanently break
-- Accumulated repair costs can restore full power at any time
-
-**2. Repair costs calibrated below replacement:**
-- Daily repair for pickaxe: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
-- Crafting new pickaxe: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
-- Repair is ~8.3% of crafting INGOT cost
-- License fee c(y) adds significant additional cost to recrafting
-
-**3. Continuous demand profile:**
-- Rational players maintain tools rather than replace
-- Each maintained pickaxe creates steady 0.082643 INGOT/day demand
-- This translates to predictable ORE treasury inflow
-- System state becomes number of active maintained tools
-
-The proposal explicitly states: "Repairing is cheaper than constantly recrafting. A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury. Result: Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable."
-
-The 4% daily decay rate creates meaningful pressure (tools lose ~50% power in 17 days without repair) while avoiding the binary cliff of permanent breakage that would force replacement regardless of economics.
-
-This design stabilizes demand in two ways:
-
-1. **Predictable consumption**: Active player count × repair rate = baseline INGOT demand, which is more stable than boom-bust crafting cycles
-
-2. **Reduced volatility**: Players don't abandon tools during price swings because repair remains economically rational even when new crafting isn't
-
-The proposal notes: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
-
-This contrasts with durability-based systems (tools break permanently, forcing replacement) and zero-maintenance systems (no ongoing costs, no steady demand). The evergreen + repair-cheaper-than-replacement combination creates what the proposal calls "the key state variable" — the count of actively maintained tools.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-economics-with-decay-and-repair-prevents-churn-cycles-in-token-mining-systems.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Tools that decay gradually but remain repairable indefinitely create stable demand patterns versus disposable tools that cause boom-bust crafting cycles"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Evergreen tool economics with decay and repair prevents churn cycles in token mining systems
+
+Meta-PoW introduces an "evergreen" tool design where pickaxes (mining tools) never permanently break but decay by 4% per day if not maintained. Players can repair tools at any time by paying accumulated repair costs (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day), restoring full power. This creates a continuous maintenance economy rather than a replacement economy.
+
+The economic incentive structure makes repair cheaper than recrafting. Daily repair costs ~0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD to maintain full power (p = 1). Crafting a new pickaxe costs 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, and a dynamic COAL license fee c(y) that ranges from 1 to 300 COAL depending on price ratios. Since repair costs are roughly 1/12th the INGOT cost of crafting (0.082643 vs 1.0) and avoid the license fee entirely, rational players maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting.
+
+This design prevents the churn cycles that plague many mining token systems, where players craft tools during profitable periods and abandon them when margins compress, creating volatile demand for crafting materials and unstable treasury inflows. With evergreen tools, the decision to stop mining is separate from the decision to destroy capital—players can idle tools without losing their investment, then resume mining by paying catch-up repair costs.
+
+The 4% daily decay rate creates urgency without catastrophic loss. After 7 days of no maintenance, a tool retains ~73% power (0.96^7). After 30 days, ~29% power (0.96^30). This gradual degradation means short breaks don't destroy value, but extended abandonment makes the tool economically unviable to resurrect (accumulated repair costs exceed crafting a fresh tool). The system naturally retires tools that are genuinely abandoned while preserving those temporarily idled.
+
+The proposal explicitly states this goal: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it" and "This: Makes tools evergreen (no permanent break), Keeps a consistent economic choice (repair vs abandon and recraft), Avoids churn and keeps the system state stable."
+
+## Evidence
+- Decay mechanism: "If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
+- Repair vs recraft economics: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" for repair vs "1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL" for crafting
+- Catch-up repair: "If you decide to repair later, you pay the accumulated repair cost (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day) to restore full power"
+- Design intent: "Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable."
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes players can accurately forecast mining profitability and make rational repair-vs-abandon decisions. If COAL emissions become worthless relative to repair costs, players may abandon tools en masse despite the sunk cost, causing treasury inflow collapse. The 4% decay rate is governance-adjustable but untested—too slow and tools never retire, too fast and the system reverts to churn dynamics. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -34,12 +34,6 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-The Meta-PoW proposal reveals another adoption friction: mechanism complexity in proposals themselves. The proposal spans 10 detailed sections covering token mechanics, emissions bands, smelting logic, tool crafting, decay functions, dynamic license formulas, and governance parameters. It requires voters to understand: (1) how c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p creates supply throttling, (2) why repair costs of 0.082643 INGOT/day map to ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow, (3) how 4% daily decay rates interact with repair economics, (4) the relationship between TWAP-smoothed price ratios and license fee clamping. The proposal notes 'this proposal allows parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community' — suggesting even after passing futarchy, the mechanism needs expert refinement. This indicates futarchy governance can approve complex mechanisms but may struggle with parameter precision and voter comprehension of nonlinear dynamics.
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accrual-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW model channels ORE into treasury through mandatory smelting fees paid when crafting INGOT, creating predictable revenue flow tied to mining activity"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW creates deterministic ORE treasury accrual through INGOT smelting fees
+
+The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a mechanical loop where all ORE paid into the system flows directly to the COAL treasury through a single choke point: INGOT smelting. To smelt 1 INGOT, users must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE per INGOT) to the treasury. Since INGOT is required for both crafting and repairing pickaxes (the mining tools that access COAL emissions), and pickaxes are designed to be maintained rather than constantly replaced, the system creates sustained demand for INGOT and therefore sustained ORE inflow.
+
+The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day flowing to the treasury per fully maintained pickaxe. With daily repair costs set at ~0.082643 INGOT per pickaxe, and repair being cheaper than recrafting (which costs 1 INGOT plus 8 WOOD plus a dynamic COAL license fee), rational players maintain their tools rather than churn them. This creates a stable relationship between active mining participants and treasury ORE accumulation.
+
+The model is self-regulating through the dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y), which adjusts based on the COAL/ORE price ratio. When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y = P_ORE / P_COAL decreases), the license cost falls, making pickaxe crafting more economically viable, which increases INGOT demand and accelerates ORE inflow. When COAL weakens, the license cost rises, throttling new pickaxe creation without breaking existing tools. The license formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p (with suggested defaults c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL) creates exponential sensitivity to price dynamics.
+
+This architecture differs from typical token economics by making the treasury accumulation mechanism deterministic rather than discretionary. Every unit of mining power added to the system has a calculable ORE cost, and the evergreen tool design (4% daily decay if not repaired, but repairable at any time by paying accumulated repair costs) prevents the boom-bust cycles that plague fixed-supply mining tokens.
+
+## Evidence
+- Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury" with "Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT"
+- Calibration target: "r_ing_total is set so that... A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury" with "Current calibration: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day"
+- Self-regulation mechanism: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- Evergreen tool design: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes rational player behavior (maintaining tools rather than abandoning them) and stable participation. If COAL/ORE price volatility exceeds the license curve's ability to throttle, the system could see either treasury depletion (if ORE becomes too expensive relative to mining rewards) or excessive dilution (if COAL strengthens too much). The calibration parameters are governance-adjustable but untested at scale. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data yet.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-bottleneck.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's Meta-PoW design forces all tool crafting through INGOT smelting which requires ORE payment creating guaranteed treasury inflow"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting bottleneck
-
-The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a structural mechanism for ORE accumulation by making INGOT the universal input for all tool operations (crafting and repair) while requiring ORE payment exclusively at the smelting stage. This creates a deterministic relationship between player activity and treasury inflow.
-
-The mechanism works through three linked constraints:
-
-1. **Smelting monopoly on ORE payment**: To smelt 1 INGOT requires burning 100 COAL plus paying μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE) directly to the COAL treasury. This is the only point where ORE enters the system.
-
-2. **INGOT as universal tool input**: Both pickaxes (mining tools) and axes (WOOD production) require INGOT for crafting and daily repair. A fully maintained pickaxe consumes approximately 0.082643 INGOT per day in repair costs.
-
-3. **Evergreen tool design**: Tools decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repair is cheaper than recrafting. This incentivizes continuous maintenance rather than tool churn, creating steady INGOT demand.
-
-The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day of treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe. With repair costs of 0.082643 INGOT/day and smelting costs of 12.10 ORE per INGOT, this implies each active pickaxe drives roughly 1 ORE/day into the treasury through the INGOT consumption cycle.
-
-The proposal explicitly states: "Each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately: 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury, 8.26 COAL per day burned via smelting."
-
-This differs from voluntary treasury contribution mechanisms because the ORE payment is structurally required to access COAL emissions. Players cannot mine COAL without pickaxes, cannot craft or maintain pickaxes without INGOT, and cannot produce INGOT without paying ORE to the treasury.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "HAymbnVo1w5sC7hz8E6sdmzSuDpqUwKXWzBeshEAb7WC"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_date: 2025-11-07
-resolution_date: 2025-11-10
-category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Proposal to implement Meta-PoW economic model that moves mining power into pickaxes and creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
-
-## Summary
-The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a new economic model for COAL that creates a deterministic loop accumulating ORE in the treasury. The system moves mining power from direct token claims into pickaxe tools, makes INGOT (crafted using COAL + ORE) the universal input for all tool operations, and implements dynamic license fees that scale with COAL/ORE price ratios to throttle supply during weakness.
-
-## Market Data
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** HAymbnVo1w5sC7hz8E6sdmzSuDpqUwKXWzBeshEAb7WC
-- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- **Created:** 2025-11-07
-- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
-- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
-
-## Mechanism Design
-The proposal introduces four tokens (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with specific roles:
-
-**COAL:** Mineable with 25M max supply and halving-band emissions. Burned for smelting and pickaxe licenses.
-
-**ORE:** External hard asset. Only paid at smelting (μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT). 100% goes to COAL treasury.
-
-**INGOT:** Minted only by smelting (burn 100 COAL + pay μ ORE). Universal input for crafting and repairing tools.
-
-**WOOD:** Produced by axes. Used for tool crafting and repair. No direct emissions or ORE role.
-
-**Key mechanisms:**
-1. Dynamic license fee: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. Defaults: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, clamped [1,300]
-2. Evergreen tools: 4% daily decay if not repaired. Repair cheaper than recrafting.
-3. Calibration: Each fully maintained pickaxe targets ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow via 0.082643 INGOT/day repair costs
-
-## Significance
-This proposal represents a significant evolution in tokenomic design for mining-based protocols. Rather than direct token emissions, it creates a multi-layer economic system where:
-- Treasury accumulation is deterministic (tied to player activity through INGOT demand)
-- Supply responds automatically to price conditions (via dynamic license fees)
-- Tool maintenance creates steady-state demand (evergreen design with repair < replacement cost)
-
-The mechanism demonstrates how futarchy governance can approve complex economic protocols with multiple interacting parameters. The proposal notes parameters may be "slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," indicating futarchy provides directional approval while expert implementation handles precision.
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[coal]] - parent entity, governance decision
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - platform enabling this governance
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - related mechanism design pattern

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "coal core team"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Restructures COAL mining economics to accumulate ORE in treasury through deterministic INGOT smelting fees and evergreen tool mechanics"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+Meta-PoW fundamentally restructures COAL's token economics by moving mining power from direct token emissions into craftable pickaxes, introducing INGOT as a crafting material that requires burning COAL plus paying ORE fees, and implementing evergreen tool mechanics with decay and repair. The model creates a deterministic loop where mining activity drives ORE accumulation in the COAL treasury through mandatory smelting fees, with dynamic license costs that automatically throttle new capacity based on COAL/ORE price ratios.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** COAL core team
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+
+## Key Mechanisms
+1. **INGOT Smelting:** To craft 1 INGOT, users burn 100 COAL and pay ~12.10 ORE to treasury. All ORE enters system only through smelting.
+2. **Evergreen Tools:** Pickaxes decay 4% daily if not repaired but can be restored by paying accumulated repair costs (~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per day). Repair is cheaper than recrafting (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + dynamic license fee).
+3. **Dynamic License:** Pickaxe crafting requires burning c(y) COAL where c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300, with y = P_ORE/P_COAL. License cost rises exponentially when COAL weakens, throttling new capacity.
+4. **Treasury Calibration:** System targets ~1 ORE/day flowing to treasury per fully maintained pickaxe.
+
+## Significance
+This proposal demonstrates futarchy governance applied to complex operational protocol economics, not just binary launch decisions. The multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with interdependent mechanics and governance-adjustable parameters shows futarchy handling ongoing protocol management. The deterministic treasury accrual mechanism through mandatory smelting fees creates a novel "ownership coin" model where mining activity directly funds the treasury through unavoidable ORE payments.
+
+The evergreen tool design with decay and repair prevents boom-bust crafting cycles common in mining tokens, while the exponential license fee scaling creates automatic supply throttling without governance intervention. The proposal explicitly allows core team parameter adjustments before launch based on community feedback, suggesting a hybrid governance model where futarchy approves architecture but implementation details remain flexible.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[coal]] - protocol governance decision
+- [[futardio]] - governance platform
+- [[ore]] - treasury asset
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - demonstrates operational governance use case
+- [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale]] - extends to protocol economics management

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-bottleneck.md", "dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-economies.md", "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-stabilizes-token-demand.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accrual-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md", "evergreen-tool-economics-with-decay-and-repair-prevents-churn-cycles-in-token-mining-systems.md", "dynamic-license-fees-tied-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-systems.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md", "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about treasury accumulation, dynamic pricing, and evergreen tool economics. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched 2 existing claims about MetaDAO's scope and futarchy adoption friction. The proposal demonstrates sophisticated multi-token economic design passing through futarchy governance, though with noted complexity requiring expert parameter tuning post-approval."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 novel mechanism claims about deterministic treasury accrual, evergreen tool economics, and dynamic license throttling. Enriched 2 existing claims about futarchy governance scope. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated COAL entity timeline. Source contains detailed token economics with governance-adjustable parameters—all key numerical facts preserved in key_facts for reference."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -274,13 +274,14 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
-- Halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
-- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
-- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
-- Pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT/day + 0.3 WOOD
-- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
-- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped [1, 300]
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 with halving bands every 5% of supply (1,250,000 COAL)
+- Initial daily emissions: 11,250 COAL/day, halving by band index k_t
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL burned + ~12.10 ORE to treasury
+- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license (1-300 range)
+- Daily repair cost: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per pickaxe
+- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired (p_next = 0.96 * p)
+- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD, repair: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
+- License formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300 COAL, y = P_ORE/P_COAL via EMA-smoothed TWAP
 - Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
 - DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- GUI planned: minechain.gg for mining, smelting, chopping, crafting