Compare commits
10 commits
7b785f35e0
...
e6205916e5
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
e6205916e5 | ||
|
|
a5a11f0e46 | ||
| 1054e28191 | |||
|
|
a811fd20b6 | ||
|
|
d58839a44a | ||
|
|
0178ae4cbc | ||
|
|
7aa7d26d28 | ||
|
|
08d6ab2a24 | ||
|
|
bf3bc3a549 | ||
|
|
33612e8717 |
16 changed files with 282 additions and 16 deletions
|
|
@ -69,3 +69,8 @@ Key mechanisms:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
P2P.me ICO demonstrates futarchy-governed launches can attract institutional capital, not just retail speculation. Three venture investors publicly announced investment theses and competed for allocation in the same mechanism as retail participants, suggesting the governance model has credibility beyond meme-coin speculation.
|
P2P.me ICO demonstrates futarchy-governed launches can attract institutional capital, not just retail speculation. Three venture investors publicly announced investment theses and competed for allocation in the same mechanism as retail participants, suggesting the governance model has credibility beyond meme-coin speculation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Futardio Cult raised $11.4M (63.7% of platform total) as a futarchy-governed meme coin, demonstrating 22,806% oversubscription and validating that governance tokens structured as meme coins can attract massive speculative capital
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -10,3 +10,8 @@ Seyf's near-zero traction ($200 raised) suggests that while participation fricti
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Proposals 7, 8, and 9 all failed despite being OTC purchases at below-market prices. Proposal 7 (Ben Hawkins, $50k at $33.33/META) failed when spot was ~$97. Proposal 8 (Pantera, $50k at min(TWAP, $100)) failed when spot was $695. Proposal 9 (Ben Hawkins v2, $100k at max(TWAP, $200)) failed when spot was $695. These weren't rejected for bad economics—they were rejected despite offering sellers massive premiums. This suggests participation friction (market creation costs, liquidity requirements, complexity) dominated economic evaluation.
|
Proposals 7, 8, and 9 all failed despite being OTC purchases at below-market prices. Proposal 7 (Ben Hawkins, $50k at $33.33/META) failed when spot was ~$97. Proposal 8 (Pantera, $50k at min(TWAP, $100)) failed when spot was $695. Proposal 9 (Ben Hawkins v2, $100k at max(TWAP, $200)) failed when spot was $695. These weren't rejected for bad economics—they were rejected despite offering sellers massive premiums. This suggests participation friction (market creation costs, liquidity requirements, complexity) dominated economic evaluation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Nvision raised $99 of $50K (0.2% of goal) despite being a futarchy-adjacent prediction market product, demonstrating that even conceptually aligned projects fail when participation friction exceeds community attention threshold
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -131,6 +131,18 @@ Kuleen Nimkar frames P2P ICO as testing whether the team can grow EM userbase an
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
P2P.me ICO on MetaDAO described as 'one of the most compelling public sale opportunities we've seen in quite some time' by institutional participant Moonrock Capital, with FDV 15-25M and structure praised for fairness (100% unlock for participants vs locked investors and KPI-based team unlock).
|
P2P.me ICO on MetaDAO described as 'one of the most compelling public sale opportunities we've seen in quite some time' by institutional participant Moonrock Capital, with FDV 15-25M and structure praised for fairness (100% unlock for participants vs locked investors and KPI-based team unlock).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (extend)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Futardio's parallel permissionless platform shows even more extreme oversubscription patterns: Superclaw achieved 11,902% oversubscription ($6M raised) and Futardio Cult 22,806% ($11.4M), suggesting permissionless mode may amplify rather than dampen oversubscription dynamics
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Additional Evidence (extend)
|
||||||
|
*Source: [[2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
P2P.me ICO targets $6M with 10M tokens at $0.60, creating $15.5M FDV. This represents a 182x multiple on $82K annual gross profit, which Pine Analytics characterizes as 'stretched valuation.' The valuation premium suggests ICO participants are pricing future growth potential and mechanism credibility rather than current fundamentals, consistent with the oversubscription pattern but revealing the valuation boundaries where market enthusiasm meets financial skepticism.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ CFTC-designated contract market for event-based trading. USD-denominated, KYC-re
|
||||||
- **2026-01-09** — Tennessee court ruled in favor of Kalshi in KalshiEx v. Orgel, finding impossibility of dual compliance and obstacle to federal objectives, creating circuit split with Maryland
|
- **2026-01-09** — Tennessee court ruled in favor of Kalshi in KalshiEx v. Orgel, finding impossibility of dual compliance and obstacle to federal objectives, creating circuit split with Maryland
|
||||||
- **2026-03-19** — Ninth Circuit denied administrative stay motion, allowing Nevada to proceed with temporary restraining order that would exclude Kalshi from Nevada for at least two weeks pending preliminary injunction hearing
|
- **2026-03-19** — Ninth Circuit denied administrative stay motion, allowing Nevada to proceed with temporary restraining order that would exclude Kalshi from Nevada for at least two weeks pending preliminary injunction hearing
|
||||||
- **2026-03-16** — Federal Reserve Board paper validates Kalshi prediction market accuracy, showing statistically significant improvement over Bloomberg consensus for CPI forecasting and perfect FOMC rate matching
|
- **2026-03-16** — Federal Reserve Board paper validates Kalshi prediction market accuracy, showing statistically significant improvement over Bloomberg consensus for CPI forecasting and perfect FOMC rate matching
|
||||||
|
- **2026-03-23** — CEO Tarek Mansour co-founded [[5cc-capital]] with Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan, creating dedicated VC fund for prediction market infrastructure
|
||||||
## Competitive Position
|
## Competitive Position
|
||||||
- **Regulation-first**: Only CFTC-designated prediction market exchange. Institutional credibility.
|
- **Regulation-first**: Only CFTC-designated prediction market exchange. Institutional credibility.
|
||||||
- **vs Polymarket**: Different market — Kalshi targets mainstream/institutional users who won't touch crypto. Polymarket targets crypto-native users who want permissionless market creation. Both grew massively post-2024 election.
|
- **vs Polymarket**: Different market — Kalshi targets mainstream/institutional users who won't touch crypto. Polymarket targets crypto-native users who want permissionless market creation. Both grew massively post-2024 election.
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
|
||||||
- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-migration-proposal-2026]] Active at 84% likelihood: Migration to new onchain DAO program with $408K traded
|
- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-migration-proposal-2026]] Active at 84% likelihood: Migration to new onchain DAO program with $408K traded
|
||||||
- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund futarchy research at GMU with Robin Hanson under community discussion
|
- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund futarchy research at GMU with Robin Hanson under community discussion
|
||||||
- **2024-03-31** — [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] Passed: Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M with 1015 META + 100k USDC compensation to address execution bottlenecks
|
- **2024-03-31** — [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] Passed: Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M with 1015 META + 100k USDC compensation to address execution bottlenecks
|
||||||
|
- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal-march-2026]] Active at 84% pass probability: Autocrat program migration with Squads v4.0 multisig integration and legal document updates ($408K volume)
|
||||||
## Key Decisions
|
## Key Decisions
|
||||||
| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
|
| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
|
||||||
|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
|
|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ Crypto-native prediction market platform on Polygon. Users trade binary outcome
|
||||||
- **2026-01-XX** — Nevada Gaming Control Board sued Polymarket to halt sports-related contracts, arguing they constitute unlicensed gambling under state jurisdiction
|
- **2026-01-XX** — Nevada Gaming Control Board sued Polymarket to halt sports-related contracts, arguing they constitute unlicensed gambling under state jurisdiction
|
||||||
- **2026-01-XX** — Partnered with Palantir and TWG AI to build surveillance system detecting suspicious trading and manipulation in sports prediction markets
|
- **2026-01-XX** — Partnered with Palantir and TWG AI to build surveillance system detecting suspicious trading and manipulation in sports prediction markets
|
||||||
- **2026-01-XX** — Targeting $20B valuation alongside Kalshi as prediction market duopoly emerges
|
- **2026-01-XX** — Targeting $20B valuation alongside Kalshi as prediction market duopoly emerges
|
||||||
|
- **2026-03-23** — CEO Shayne Coplan co-founded [[5cc-capital]] with Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour, creating dedicated VC fund for prediction market infrastructure
|
||||||
## Competitive Position
|
## Competitive Position
|
||||||
- **#1 by volume** — leads Kalshi on 30-day volume ($8.7B vs $6.8B)
|
- **#1 by volume** — leads Kalshi on 30-day volume ($8.7B vs $6.8B)
|
||||||
- **Crypto-native**: USDC on Polygon, non-custodial, permissionless market creation
|
- **Crypto-native**: USDC on Polygon, non-custodial, permissionless market creation
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
129
inbox/archive/2026-03-25-futardio-launch-generated-test.md
Normal file
129
inbox/archive/2026-03-25-futardio-launch-generated-test.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: source
|
||||||
|
title: "Futardio: Generated Test fundraise goes live"
|
||||||
|
author: "futard.io"
|
||||||
|
url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE"
|
||||||
|
date: 2026-03-25
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
format: data
|
||||||
|
status: unprocessed
|
||||||
|
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||||
|
event_type: launch
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Launch Details
|
||||||
|
- Project: Generated Test
|
||||||
|
- Description: Creating the future of finance holds everything in our hands.
|
||||||
|
- Funding target: $10.00
|
||||||
|
- Total committed: $1.00
|
||||||
|
- Status: Live
|
||||||
|
- Launch date: 2026-03-25
|
||||||
|
- URL: https://www.futard.io/launch/EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Team / Description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# mockToken — Initial Coin Offering Document
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*This document is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Please read the Legal Disclaimer before proceeding.*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Executive Summary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
mockToken is a next-generation digital asset designed to [brief description of purpose or use case]. Built on a foundation of transparency, security, and decentralisation, mockToken aims to address [key problem or market gap] by providing [core value proposition].
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The mockToken ICO represents an opportunity for early participants to support the development of a robust ecosystem and gain access to a token with [utility description — e.g. governance rights, access to platform services, staking rewards]. A total supply of [X] mockTokens will be issued, with [Y]% made available during the public sale.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Our team comprises experienced professionals in blockchain development, cryptography, and enterprise technology, united by a shared commitment to delivering a scalable and compliant platform.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Technology
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Architecture Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
mockToken is built on [blockchain platform — e.g. Ethereum, Solana, Polygon], leveraging its established infrastructure for security, interoperability, and developer tooling. The protocol is governed by a set of audited smart contracts that manage token issuance, distribution, and utility functions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Smart Contracts
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
All smart contracts underpinning the mockToken ecosystem have been developed in accordance with industry best practices and are subject to third-party security audits prior to deployment. Contract addresses will be published publicly upon mainnet launch.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Security & Auditing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Security is a core priority. mockToken's codebase undergoes rigorous internal review and independent auditing by [Audit Firm Name]. All audit reports will be made available to the public via our official repository.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Scalability
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The platform is designed with scalability in mind, utilising [Layer 2 solutions / sharding / other mechanism] to ensure that transaction throughput and fees remain viable as the user base grows.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Roadmap
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Q1 [Year] — Foundation
|
||||||
|
- Concept development and whitepaper publication
|
||||||
|
- Core team formation and initial advisory board appointments
|
||||||
|
- Seed funding round
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Q2 [Year] — Development
|
||||||
|
- Smart contract development and internal testing
|
||||||
|
- Launch of developer testnet
|
||||||
|
- Community building and early adopter programme
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Q3 [Year] — ICO & Launch
|
||||||
|
- Public ICO commences
|
||||||
|
- Independent smart contract audit completed and published
|
||||||
|
- Token Generation Event (TGE)
|
||||||
|
- Listing on [Exchange Name(s)]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Q4 [Year] — Ecosystem Expansion
|
||||||
|
- Platform beta launch
|
||||||
|
- Strategic partnerships announced
|
||||||
|
- Governance framework activated
|
||||||
|
- Staking and rewards mechanism goes live
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### [Year+1] — Maturity & Growth
|
||||||
|
- Full platform launch
|
||||||
|
- Cross-chain integration
|
||||||
|
- Expansion into [new markets or regions]
|
||||||
|
- Ongoing protocol upgrades governed by token holders
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## FAQ
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**What is mockToken?**
|
||||||
|
mockToken is a digital asset issued on [blockchain platform] that provides holders with [utility — e.g. access to platform services, governance rights, staking rewards]. It is designed to [brief purpose statement].
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**How do I participate in the ICO?**
|
||||||
|
To participate, you will need a compatible digital wallet (e.g. MetaMask) and [accepted currency — e.g. ETH or USDC]. Full participation instructions will be published on our official website prior to the sale opening.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**What is the total supply of mockToken?**
|
||||||
|
The total supply is capped at [X] mockTokens. Of this, [Y]% will be allocated to the public sale, with the remainder distributed across the team, advisors, ecosystem reserve, and treasury according to the tokenomics schedule.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Is mockToken available to investors in all countries?**
|
||||||
|
mockToken is not available to residents of certain jurisdictions, including [restricted regions — e.g. the United States, sanctioned countries]. Participants are responsible for ensuring compliance with the laws of their local jurisdiction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**When will mockToken be listed on exchanges?**
|
||||||
|
We are targeting listings on [Exchange Name(s)] in [Q/Year]. Announcements will be made through our official communication channels.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Has the smart contract been audited?**
|
||||||
|
Yes. mockToken's smart contracts have been audited by [Audit Firm Name]. The full audit report is available [here/on our website].
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**How can I stay informed about the project?**
|
||||||
|
You can follow our progress via our official website, Telegram community, Twitter/X account, and newsletter. Links to all official channels can be found at [website URL].
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*© [Year] mockToken. All rights reserved. This document is subject to change without notice.*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Links
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Website: https://reids.space
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Launch address: `EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE`
|
||||||
|
- Token: ENv (ENv)
|
||||||
|
- Token mint: `ENvHYc8TbfCAW2ozrxFsyRECzD9UiP1G9pMR6PQaxoQU`
|
||||||
|
- Version: v0.7
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-25
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
secondary_domains: []
|
secondary_domains: []
|
||||||
format: tweet
|
format: tweet
|
||||||
status: unprocessed
|
status: processed
|
||||||
priority: medium
|
priority: medium
|
||||||
tags: [p2p-me, polymarket, prediction-markets, manipulation, self-dealing, futarchy, metadao-ico]
|
tags: [p2p-me, polymarket, prediction-markets, manipulation, self-dealing, futarchy, metadao-ico]
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ The highest-information actor (P2P team, who controls business decisions) can pu
|
||||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** A formal Polymarket ruling or investigation. The allegation appears in the comment thread, not in any official announcement. This may mean: (a) Polymarket investigated and found nothing, (b) Polymarket hasn't investigated, or (c) the allegation was low-quality. Cannot determine which from available data.
|
**What I expected but didn't find:** A formal Polymarket ruling or investigation. The allegation appears in the comment thread, not in any official announcement. This may mean: (a) Polymarket investigated and found nothing, (b) Polymarket hasn't investigated, or (c) the allegation was low-quality. Cannot determine which from available data.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**KB connections:**
|
**KB connections:**
|
||||||
- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
|
- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
|
||||||
- [[Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B)]] — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
|
- Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B) — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||||
1. CLAIM CANDIDATE: Prediction market participation by project issuers in their own commitment markets creates circular social proof with no arbitrage correction — novel mechanism risk not in KB
|
1. CLAIM CANDIDATE: Prediction market participation by project issuers in their own commitment markets creates circular social proof with no arbitrage correction — novel mechanism risk not in KB
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-25
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
secondary_domains: []
|
secondary_domains: []
|
||||||
format: tweet
|
format: tweet
|
||||||
status: unprocessed
|
status: processed
|
||||||
priority: medium
|
priority: medium
|
||||||
tags: [futardio, permissionless-capital, capital-concentration, meta-bets, futarchy, launchpad]
|
tags: [futardio, permissionless-capital, capital-concentration, meta-bets, futarchy, launchpad]
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"rejected_claims": [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"filename": "permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md",
|
||||||
|
"issues": [
|
||||||
|
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"validation_stats": {
|
||||||
|
"total": 1,
|
||||||
|
"kept": 0,
|
||||||
|
"fixed": 1,
|
||||||
|
"rejected": 1,
|
||||||
|
"fixes_applied": [
|
||||||
|
"permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md:set_created:2026-03-25"
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"rejections": [
|
||||||
|
"permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
|
||||||
|
"date": "2026-03-25"
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"rejected_claims": [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"filename": "performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism.md",
|
||||||
|
"issues": [
|
||||||
|
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"filename": "high-float-at-tge-creates-immediate-test-conditions-for-passive-allocator-selling-pressure-in-ico-markets.md",
|
||||||
|
"issues": [
|
||||||
|
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"validation_stats": {
|
||||||
|
"total": 2,
|
||||||
|
"kept": 0,
|
||||||
|
"fixed": 6,
|
||||||
|
"rejected": 2,
|
||||||
|
"fixes_applied": [
|
||||||
|
"performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
|
||||||
|
"performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism.md:stripped_wiki_link:performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-trigger",
|
||||||
|
"performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism.md:stripped_wiki_link:time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockup",
|
||||||
|
"high-float-at-tge-creates-immediate-test-conditions-for-passive-allocator-selling-pressure-in-ico-markets.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
|
||||||
|
"high-float-at-tge-creates-immediate-test-conditions-for-passive-allocator-selling-pressure-in-ico-markets.md:stripped_wiki_link:metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-valid",
|
||||||
|
"high-float-at-tge-creates-immediate-test-conditions-for-passive-allocator-selling-pressure-in-ico-markets.md:stripped_wiki_link:pro-rata-ico-allocation-creates-capital-inefficiency-through"
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"rejections": [
|
||||||
|
"performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
|
||||||
|
"high-float-at-tge-creates-immediate-test-conditions-for-passive-allocator-selling-pressure-in-ico-markets.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
|
||||||
|
"date": "2026-03-25"
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"rejected_claims": [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"filename": "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md",
|
||||||
|
"issues": [
|
||||||
|
"missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"validation_stats": {
|
||||||
|
"total": 1,
|
||||||
|
"kept": 0,
|
||||||
|
"fixed": 3,
|
||||||
|
"rejected": 1,
|
||||||
|
"fixes_applied": [
|
||||||
|
"prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
|
||||||
|
"prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-c",
|
||||||
|
"prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:stripped_wiki_link:speculative-markets-aggregate-information-through-incentive-"
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"rejections": [
|
||||||
|
"prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
|
||||||
|
]
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
|
||||||
|
"date": "2026-03-25"
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
@ -60,9 +60,9 @@ Truth Predict (Trump Media, March 2026): Trump's media company entering predicti
|
||||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that MetaDAO, Robin Hanson, or Proph3t has submitted or is planning to submit a CFTC comment. META-036 (if it passed) would fund academic research that could inform such a comment, but the practical regulatory window closes before the research would complete.
|
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that MetaDAO, Robin Hanson, or Proph3t has submitted or is planning to submit a CFTC comment. META-036 (if it passed) would fund academic research that could inform such a comment, but the practical regulatory window closes before the research would complete.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**KB connections:**
|
**KB connections:**
|
||||||
- [[The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk]] — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
|
- The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
|
||||||
- [[CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis]] (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
|
- CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
|
||||||
- [[Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility]] (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
|
- Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||||
1. CLAIM: CFTC ANPRM contains no futarchy-specific questions, creating default gaming classification risk for governance decision markets — high confidence, directly documented
|
1. CLAIM: CFTC ANPRM contains no futarchy-specific questions, creating default gaming classification risk for governance decision markets — high confidence, directly documented
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ The Squads multisig integration is particularly interesting for the trustless jo
|
||||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** The proposal text. The 429 rate-limiting on MetaDAO's platform has been a recurring obstacle. This is the third session where a significant governance event is confirmed to exist but content is inaccessible.
|
**What I expected but didn't find:** The proposal text. The 429 rate-limiting on MetaDAO's platform has been a recurring obstacle. This is the third session where a significant governance event is confirmed to exist but content is inaccessible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**KB connections:**
|
**KB connections:**
|
||||||
- [[Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation]] (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
|
- Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
|
||||||
- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
|
- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
|
||||||
- [[Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles]] — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
|
- Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||||
1. Once proposal text is accessible: extract as evidence for mechanism improvement claim (autocrat migration history pattern)
|
1. Once proposal text is accessible: extract as evidence for mechanism improvement claim (autocrat migration history pattern)
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2026-03-15
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
secondary_domains: []
|
secondary_domains: []
|
||||||
format: thread
|
format: thread
|
||||||
status: unprocessed
|
status: enrichment
|
||||||
priority: high
|
priority: high
|
||||||
tags: [metadao, p2p-me, ico, tokenomics, ownership-coins, futarchy, performance-vesting]
|
tags: [metadao, p2p-me, ico, tokenomics, ownership-coins, futarchy, performance-vesting]
|
||||||
|
processed_by: rio
|
||||||
|
processed_date: 2026-03-25
|
||||||
|
enrichments_applied: ["metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md"]
|
||||||
|
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Content
|
## Content
|
||||||
|
|
@ -58,9 +62,9 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive pre-ICO analysis of P2P.me ahead of the
|
||||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Founder backgrounds. The team section is completely blank in every indexed source. This is a meaningful transparency gap for an "ownership" thesis — you're aligned with people you can't identify.
|
**What I expected but didn't find:** Founder backgrounds. The team section is completely blank in every indexed source. This is a meaningful transparency gap for an "ownership" thesis — you're aligned with people you can't identify.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**KB connections:**
|
**KB connections:**
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators]] — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
|
- MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
|
||||||
- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
|
- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
|
||||||
- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
|
- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||||
1. CLAIM: Performance-gated team vesting (no benefit below 2x ICO price) eliminates early insider selling as an ownership alignment mechanism — extract as a mechanism design innovation claim
|
1. CLAIM: Performance-gated team vesting (no benefit below 2x ICO price) eliminates early insider selling as an ownership alignment mechanism — extract as a mechanism design innovation claim
|
||||||
|
|
@ -73,3 +77,25 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive pre-ICO analysis of P2P.me ahead of the
|
||||||
PRIMARY CONNECTION: Performance-based team vesting as ownership alignment mechanism (novel, not yet in KB)
|
PRIMARY CONNECTION: Performance-based team vesting as ownership alignment mechanism (novel, not yet in KB)
|
||||||
WHY ARCHIVED: Most sophisticated ownership tokenomics design observed in MetaDAO history; testable prediction framework for post-TGE outcome
|
WHY ARCHIVED: Most sophisticated ownership tokenomics design observed in MetaDAO history; testable prediction framework for post-TGE outcome
|
||||||
EXTRACTION HINT: Lead with the vesting mechanism design, not the product description — that's what's new to the KB
|
EXTRACTION HINT: Lead with the vesting mechanism design, not the product description — that's what's new to the KB
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Key Facts
|
||||||
|
- P2P.me has 23,000+ registered users as of March 2026
|
||||||
|
- 78% of P2P.me users are in India (18,071 users), 15% in Brazil
|
||||||
|
- Weekly active users: 2,000-2,500 (10-11% of registered base)
|
||||||
|
- Monthly volume peaked at $3.95M in February 2026
|
||||||
|
- Cumulative revenue through mid-March 2026: $327.4K
|
||||||
|
- Monthly revenue: $34K-$47K
|
||||||
|
- Annual gross profit: ~$82K
|
||||||
|
- 27% average MoM volume growth over 16 months
|
||||||
|
- Team size: 25 staff
|
||||||
|
- Monthly burn rate: $175K
|
||||||
|
- Seed round: $2M (April 2025) from Multicoin Capital, Coinbase Ventures, Alliance DAO
|
||||||
|
- ICO structure: 25.8M total supply, $0.60/token, 10M tokens for sale, $15.5M FDV
|
||||||
|
- 50% float at TGE (highest in MetaDAO ICO history)
|
||||||
|
- Team allocation: 30% with performance gates at 2x/4x/8x/16x/32x via 3-month TWAP
|
||||||
|
- Investor allocation: 20% with 12-month lock then five equal tranches
|
||||||
|
- 182x multiple on annual gross profit
|
||||||
|
- User acquisition stagnated for six months
|
||||||
|
- B2B SDK launching June 2026
|
||||||
|
- No publicly available founder backgrounds
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ Two March 2026 developments signal accelerating institutional adoption of predic
|
||||||
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any 5c(c) Capital statement on the types of prediction market companies they'll invest in. If they invest in governance decision market platforms (futarchy), they become natural allies for regulatory advocacy. If they invest only in event prediction platforms, they're separate interests.
|
**What I expected but didn't find:** Any 5c(c) Capital statement on the types of prediction market companies they'll invest in. If they invest in governance decision market platforms (futarchy), they become natural allies for regulatory advocacy. If they invest only in event prediction platforms, they're separate interests.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**KB connections:**
|
**KB connections:**
|
||||||
- [[Markets beat votes for information aggregation]] (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
|
- Markets beat votes for information aggregation (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
|
||||||
- [[CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap]] (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
|
- CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Extraction hints:**
|
**Extraction hints:**
|
||||||
1. CLAIM: Prediction market founders creating dedicated VC funds signals industry maturation beyond platform-building into capital formation infrastructure — institutional legitimization milestone
|
1. CLAIM: Prediction market founders creating dedicated VC funds signals industry maturation beyond platform-building into capital formation infrastructure — institutional legitimization milestone
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue