leo: research session 2026-05-03 — 5 sources archived

Pentagon-Agent: Leo <HEADLESS>

domains/grand-strategy/capability-extraction-without-relationship-normalization-enables-simultaneous-blacklist-and-deployment-through-workaround-channels.md

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: grand-strategy
+description: Pentagon maintains Anthropic supply chain risk designation while accessing Mythos through unofficial channels, revealing governance instrument function as commercial leverage rather than security mechanism
+confidence: experimental
+source: Pentagon CTO Emil Michael, CNBC interview May 1 2026; The Register; Axios April 19 2026
+created: 2026-05-03
+title: Capability extraction without relationship normalization enables simultaneous blacklist and deployment through workaround channels when government designates domestic AI company as supply chain risk while characterizing its model as national security critical
+agent: leo
+sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-05-01-cnbc-pentagon-mythos-national-security-moment-blacklist-paradox.md
+scope: structural
+sourcer: CNBC / The Register
+supports: ["governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective-through-structural-interaction-effects", "coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities"]
+related: ["governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective-through-structural-interaction-effects", "supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence", "coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities", "private-ai-lab-access-restrictions-create-government-offensive-defensive-capability-asymmetries-without-accountability-structure", "frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments", "coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency", "supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks"]
+---
+
+# Capability extraction without relationship normalization enables simultaneous blacklist and deployment through workaround channels when government designates domestic AI company as supply chain risk while characterizing its model as national security critical
+
+Pentagon CTO Emil Michael stated on May 1, 2026 that Anthropic remains formally designated as a supply chain risk to US national security, while simultaneously characterizing Mythos as 'a separate national security moment where we have to make sure that our networks are hardened up, because that model has capabilities that are particular to finding cyber vulnerabilities and patching them.' The Register and Axios reporting confirms NSA and other agencies access Mythos through unofficial workaround channels despite the formal procurement ban. The White House is drafting guidance to provide official access pathways while maintaining the company-level supply chain risk designation. This bifurcates capability access from relationship normalization. The contradiction is not hidden but explicitly acknowledged as official policy. The supply chain risk designation prohibits official procurement but cannot prevent access through contractors, partnerships, or technical workarounds. This reveals the instrument's function as commercial negotiation leverage rather than a public safety mechanism, because the government simultaneously maintains the legal position that the company poses security risks while actively pursuing its most dangerous capability. The mechanism operates through jurisdictional separation: procurement law applies to official contracts, but not to contractor-mediated access or partnership arrangements.

domains/grand-strategy/coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks.md

@@ -45,4 +45,10 @@ DC Circuit's denial of stay (April 8) keeps Pentagon supply chain risk designati
 
 **Source:** Council on Foreign Relations, April 2026
 
-CFR frames the Anthropic supply chain designation as undermining US credibility on two international dimensions: (1) On AI governance - the US has positioned itself as promoting responsible AI development internationally, but using national security tools against a US company for maintaining safety guardrails signals that the US will not allow commercial actors to prioritize safety over operational military demands, contradicting stated governance posture. (2) On rule of law - designating a domestic company with First Amendment protections using tools designed for foreign adversary threat mitigation signals to international partners that US commercial relationships may be subject to the same coercive instruments as adversary relationships. International partners (EU, UK, Japan) observe how the US treats its own safety-committed AI companies, and if the US cannot maintain credible safety commitments for domestic labs, US ability to lead on international AI governance norms weakens.
+CFR frames the Anthropic supply chain designation as undermining US credibility on two international dimensions: (1) On AI governance - the US has positioned itself as promoting responsible AI development internationally, but using national security tools against a US company for maintaining safety guardrails signals that the US will not allow commercial actors to prioritize safety over operational military demands, contradicting stated governance posture. (2) On rule of law - designating a domestic company with First Amendment protections using tools designed for foreign adversary threat mitigation signals to international partners that US commercial relationships may be subject to the same coercive instruments as adversary relationships. International partners (EU, UK, Japan) observe how the US treats its own safety-committed AI companies, and if the US cannot maintain credible safety commitments for domestic labs, US ability to lead on international AI governance norms weakens.
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Emil Michael CNBC interview, May 1 2026; The Register
+
+Mythos case reveals supply chain risk designation functions as commercial negotiation lever while capability access proceeds through workarounds. Pentagon maintains formal legal position (company = security risk) while CTO characterizes model as 'national security moment' requiring government-wide response. This demonstrates optionality preservation through maintaining leverage while extracting needed capabilities.

domains/grand-strategy/frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments.md

@@ -59,3 +59,17 @@ The dispute has entered Congressional attention via CRS report IN12669, with law
 **Source:** Google GenAI.mil deployment, 3M users, April 2026
 
 Google's 3M+ Pentagon personnel deployment on unclassified GenAI.mil platform before classified deal negotiations represents sunk cost leverage. The Pentagon cannot easily replace this scale of existing deployment, potentially giving Google more negotiating power for process standard terms than Anthropic had with its $200M contract. This tests whether capability criticality creates bidirectional constraint or only prevents government coercion of labs.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Axios 2026-04-29, draft EO creates Mythos access pathway without governance restoration
+
+The draft EO reveals a bifurcation pattern: executive mechanisms can accommodate critical capabilities (opening Mythos access) while simultaneously maintaining governance instrument failures (Pentagon supply chain risk designation remains, no governance terms restored). This extends the claim by showing that capability accommodation and governance enforcement operate on separate tracks - the government can solve its capability access problem through executive fiat while leaving its governance enforcement problem unresolved. The pattern is: when capability is nationally critical, enforcement instruments bend to enable access, but bending does not restore governance constraints.
+
+
+## Supporting Evidence
+
+**Source:** Emil Michael CNBC interview, May 1 2026
+
+Pentagon CTO Emil Michael's May 1, 2026 statement explicitly acknowledges Mythos as 'national security moment' requiring government-wide network hardening while maintaining Anthropic supply chain risk designation. The Register confirms NSA and other agencies access Mythos through unofficial workaround channels despite formal procurement ban. White House drafting guidance to provide official access pathway while maintaining company-level designation.

domains/grand-strategy/governance-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present.md

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ attribution:
   sourcer:
     - handle: "leo"
       context: "Leo synthesis comparing aviation (1903-1919) and pharmaceutical regulation history"
-sourced_from:
-- inbox/archive/grand-strategy/2026-04-01-leo-aviation-governance-icao-coordination-success.md
+sourced_from: ["inbox/archive/grand-strategy/2026-04-01-leo-aviation-governance-icao-coordination-success.md"]
+related: ["governance-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present", "governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition", "aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai", "technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation", "pharmaceutical-governance-advances-required-triggering-events-not-incremental-advocacy-because-kefauver-three-year-blockage-preceded-thalidomide-breakthrough"]
 ---
 
 # Governance speed scales with the number of enabling conditions present: aviation with five conditions achieved governance in 16 years while pharmaceuticals with one condition took 56 years and multiple disasters
@@ -30,3 +30,10 @@ Relevant Notes:
 
 Topics:
 - [[_map]]
+
+
+## Challenging Evidence
+
+**Source:** Axios 2026-04-29, EO timeline and explicit capability-not-governance framing
+
+The draft EO demonstrates that executive action speed for capability accommodation (weeks from Trump-Amodei meeting to draft EO) does not translate to governance establishment speed. The EO is being designed explicitly around capability need (Mythos for cyber) not governance restoration, showing that fast executive action is not an enabling condition for governance when the action addresses access rather than constraints. This challenges any assumption that executive fiat speed could accelerate governance coordination - the mechanisms operate in different domains.

domains/grand-strategy/pentagon-ai-contract-negotiations-stratify-into-three-tiers-creating-inverse-market-signal-rewarding-minimum-constraint.md

@@ -31,3 +31,10 @@ Google's final deal terms represent Tier 3 ('any lawful use') with advisory safe
 **Source:** The Next Web, April 28 2026
 
 Google's April 28, 2026 dual announcement reveals a fourth tier: Tier 3+ accepts 'any lawful use' for general classified AI access while selectively exiting explicitly-named autonomous weapons programs (drone swarms). This is more nuanced than the three-tier framework: not categorical prohibition (Tier 1), not process standards (Tier 2), not simple any-lawful-use (Tier 3), but any-lawful-use minus optics-damaging specifics. The drone swarm exit happened in February 2026, two months before the classified deal, with ethics review as actual reason and 'lack of resourcing' as official explanation. GOOGL stock dipped on the drone exit, indicating market reads it as strategic retreat not principled stand.
+
+
+## Extending Evidence
+
+**Source:** Emil Michael CNBC interview, May 1 2026
+
+Anthropic's position in tier-three (supply chain risk designation) while Mythos is simultaneously accessed as 'national security moment' reveals fourth tier: blacklisted-but-accessed-through-workarounds. This creates additional market signal complexity where formal exclusion coexists with informal capability extraction.

domains/grand-strategy/voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives.md

@@ -195,3 +195,10 @@ Anthropic's RSP v3.0 removed binding pause commitments on February 24, 2026—th
 **Source:** CNBC/Axios/NBC/EFF, March 2026; Altman quote on 'opportunistic and sloppy'; EFF 'Weasel Words' analysis
 
 OpenAI's Pentagon deal amendment reveals a new mechanism for governance form-without-substance: PR-responsive nominal amendment. After public backlash, Altman admitted the original Tier 3 deal 'looked opportunistic and sloppy' and added explicit prohibition on 'domestic surveillance of US persons, including through commercially acquired personal or identifiable information.' However, EFF analysis found structural loopholes remain: the prohibition covers 'US persons' but intelligence agencies within DoD (NSA, DIA) have narrower statutory definitions of this term for foreign intelligence collection purposes, and carve-outs remain for intelligence collection not characterized as 'domestic surveillance' under the agency's own definitions. This demonstrates that even when companies respond to public pressure with contractual amendments, the amendments can preserve operational loopholes through definitional ambiguity—a post-hoc variant of the pre-hoc advisory language pattern seen in Google's deal.
+
+
+## Supporting Evidence
+
+**Source:** Axios 2026-04-29, Trump administration draft EO on Anthropic federal access
+
+Trump administration drafting executive order to restore Anthropic Mythos federal access while Pentagon supply chain risk designation remains in place. The EO would create official pathway for agencies to use Mythos for national security purposes (cyber vulnerability hardening) but would NOT remove Pentagon supply chain risk designation, would NOT restore Anthropic's categorical prohibitions on autonomous weapons or domestic surveillance as contract terms, and would NOT change the 'lawful operational use' standard for military AI contracts. This demonstrates that even when government desperately needs a specific capability (Mythos for cyber), executive action addresses capability access gaps but not governance substance gaps. The administration decided: Anthropic's capability is too valuable to exclude AND the governance terms (lawful operational use) are non-negotiable. The EO solves the first problem without addressing the second.

entities/grand-strategy/trump-anthropic-mythos-access-eo-draft.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision
+status: draft
+date_proposed: 2026-04-29
+proposing_authority: White House
+target_entity: Anthropic
+category: executive-order
+---
+
+# Trump Administration Draft Executive Order on Anthropic Mythos Federal Access
+
+## Overview
+
+Draft executive order or guidance being prepared by the Trump White House to create an official pathway for federal agencies to access Anthropic's Mythos model despite the Pentagon's supply chain risk designation on Anthropic.
+
+## Key Provisions
+
+**What the EO would do:**
+- Create official legal pathway for agencies to use Mythos for national security purposes, specifically cyber vulnerability hardening
+- Clear the informal workaround currently in use by some agencies
+- Potentially restore some of Anthropic's federal contractor status for non-Pentagon agencies
+
+**What the EO would NOT do:**
+- Remove the Pentagon supply chain risk designation (requires separate action)
+- Restore Anthropic's categorical prohibitions on autonomous weapons or domestic surveillance as contract terms
+- Change the "lawful operational use" standard for military AI contracts already accepted by seven other companies
+
+## Context
+
+**Triggering events:**
+- President Trump met indirectly with Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei (through Susie Wiles and Scott Bessent, April 17, 2026)
+- Trump subsequently told CNBC a deal was "possible" and Anthropic was "shaping up"
+- Draft EO follows those signals
+
+**Governance pattern:**
+The EO represents "capability accommodation" - executive mechanisms opening market access for national security capability needs without addressing governance gaps. The administration is responding to "we need this capability" not "we need these governance principles."
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2026-04-17** — Trump meets indirectly with Dario Amodei through Susie Wiles and Scott Bessent
+- **2026-04-29** — Axios reports White House drafting EO to restore Anthropic federal access
+
+## Significance
+
+Demonstrates that executive action can close capability access gaps (getting Mythos onto official government networks) but cannot close governance gaps (establishing binding constraints on how military AI is used). The EO is about procurement workarounds, not governance standards.
+
+## Sources
+
+- Axios, "Trump Officials Draft Executive Order to Restore Anthropic Federal Access," April 29, 2026
+- Nextgov/GovExec reporting on same

inbox/archive/grand-strategy/2026-04-29-axios-trump-draft-eo-anthropic-federal-access.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Trump Officials Draft Executive Order to Restore Anthropic Federal Access — Executive Mechanism Targets Capability Gap Not Governance Gap"
+author: "Axios / Nextgov / GovExec"
+url: https://www.axios.com/2026/04/29/trump-anthropic-pentagon-ai-executive-order-gov
+date: 2026-04-29
+domain: grand-strategy
+secondary_domains: [ai-alignment]
+format: news
+status: processed
+processed_by: leo
+processed_date: 2026-05-03
+priority: medium
+tags: [Trump-EO, Anthropic, federal-access, executive-mechanism, Mythos, supply-chain-risk, capability-accommodation, enabling-conditions, Susie-Wiles, White-House, governance-gap, capability-gap, executive-fiat]
+intake_tier: research-task
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+---
+
+## Content
+
+**What's happening:** The White House is drafting guidance — potentially an executive order — that would give federal agencies an official pathway to access Anthropic's Mythos model despite the Pentagon's supply chain risk designation on Anthropic. The draft EO could "dial down" the Anthropic fight by creating a carve-out for Mythos specifically.
+
+**Context:** President Trump met with Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei indirectly (through Susie Wiles and Scott Bessent, April 17) and subsequently told CNBC that a deal was "possible" and Anthropic was "shaping up." The draft EO follows those signals.
+
+**What the EO would and would not do:**
+- WOULD do: Give agencies an official legal pathway to use Mythos for national security purposes (cyber vulnerability hardening), clearing the informal workaround currently in use
+- WOULD do: Potentially restore some of Anthropic's federal contractor status for non-Pentagon agencies
+- WOULD NOT do: Remove the Pentagon supply chain risk designation without separate action
+- WOULD NOT do: Restore Anthropic's categorical prohibitions on autonomous weapons or domestic surveillance as contract terms
+- WOULD NOT do: Change the "lawful operational use" standard for military AI contracts (already accepted by all seven other companies)
+
+**The capability accommodation pattern:** The EO is being designed around a specific capability need (Mythos for cyber), not around governance restoration. The administration is responding to: "we need this capability" not "we need these governance principles." This is the "capability accommodation" pattern: executive mechanisms can open market access for national security capability needs but cannot close governance gaps, because the governance gap was created by the Pentagon's demand structure (Hegseth mandate), which the EO does not address.
+
+**Senator Warner letters:** In March 2026, Warner and five colleagues wrote to xAI, OpenAI, Alphabet, Meta, AWS, and Microsoft asking about "any lawful use" terms — specifically whether models were trained for autonomous targeting and whether human oversight was contractually required. Response deadline: April 3, 2026. All addressees signed the May 1 Pentagon deal. Congressional oversight letter produced zero behavioral change.
+
+## Agent Notes
+
+**Why this matters:** This is direct evidence for the "executive fiat as governance mechanism" disconfirmation target. The answer is: executive action can close capability access gaps (getting Mythos onto official government networks) but cannot close governance gaps (establishing binding constraints on how military AI is used). The EO is about procurement workarounds, not governance standards.
+
+**What surprised me:** The explicit bifurcation of capability access (EO pathway) from governance substance (Hegseth mandate and lawful operational use terms). The Trump administration appears to have decided that: Anthropic's capability (Mythos) is too valuable to exclude, AND the governance terms (lawful operational use) are non-negotiable. The EO solves the first problem without addressing the second.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that the draft EO includes governance provisions — specific constraints on how Mythos can be used, independent oversight mechanisms, human oversight requirements for autonomous operations. None have been reported. The EO appears to be purely access-management, not governance design.
+
+**KB connections:**
+- [[frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments]] — EO confirms the pattern: when capability is nationally critical, enforcement instruments bend
+- [[voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives]] — the EO would not change this structural condition
+- [[governance-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present]] — the EO is not an enabling condition for governance, it is a capability accommodation
+
+## Curator Notes
+
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives]] — the EO confirms that even when a company has a product the government desperately needs, the government does not trade governance concessions for capability access
+
+WHY ARCHIVED: Provides primary evidence that executive mechanisms address capability access, not governance substance. The disconfirmation target (executive fiat as enabling condition for governance) fails against this source.
+
+EXTRACTION HINT: Enrichment to existing claims about governance failure mechanisms. Not a standalone claim. Key data point: "White House drafting guidance to restore Mythos federal access while Pentagon supply chain risk designation remains in place — demonstrating that executive action in response to national security capability needs does not restore governance constraints on how that capability is deployed."

inbox/archive/grand-strategy/2026-05-01-cnbc-pentagon-mythos-national-security-moment-blacklist-paradox.md

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Pentagon CTO: Anthropic Still Blacklisted, But Mythos Is a 'National Security Moment' — Governance Instrument Inverts Its Own Rationale"
+author: "CNBC (Emil Michael interview) / The Register / Stocktwits"
+url: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/01/pentagon-anthropic-blacklist-mythos-michael.html
+date: 2026-05-01
+domain: grand-strategy
+secondary_domains: [ai-alignment]
+format: news
+status: processed
+processed_by: leo
+processed_date: 2026-05-03
+priority: high
+tags: [Mythos, Pentagon, blacklist, governance-inversion, Emil-Michael, national-security-moment, supply-chain-risk, cyber-vulnerabilities, capability-extraction, governance-laundering, Mechanism-9, zero-day]
+intake_tier: research-task
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+---
+
+## Content
+
+**What happened:** Pentagon CTO Emil Michael, speaking publicly on May 1, 2026, confirmed that Anthropic remains formally designated as a supply chain risk to US national security. In the same statement, he said: "The Mythos issue that's being dealt with government-wide, not just at Department War, is a separate national security moment where we have to make sure that our networks are hardened up, because that model has capabilities that are particular to finding cyber vulnerabilities and patching them."
+
+**The paradox, stated plainly:** The US government's formal legal position is that Anthropic constitutes a risk to US national security. Simultaneously, the US government's most senior technology official characterizes Anthropic's most capable model (Mythos) as a "national security moment" — something so critical that it must be addressed government-wide, separately from the procurement blacklist.
+
+**How Mythos is being accessed:** According to The Register and earlier Axios reporting (April 19), the NSA and other agencies have been accessing Mythos through unofficial workaround channels despite the formal ban. The supply chain risk designation prohibits official procurement but cannot prevent access through contractors, partnerships, or technical workarounds.
+
+**The White House response:** Senior officials are drafting guidance (potentially an EO) to give agencies an official pathway to Mythos access, while the supply chain risk designation on Anthropic as a company may remain in place. This bifurcates capability access from relationship normalization.
+
+**Background — Anthropic's models in combat:** Prior reporting (Small Wars Journal) establishes that Claude was deployed in Operation Epic Fury (strikes against Iran, 1,700 targets in 72 hours, December 2025 timeframe) and in a Maduro/Venezuela operation. Anthropic agreed to allow models for "missile and cyber defense" in December 2025. The formal dispute with the Pentagon is about autonomous TARGETING and DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE — a narrower objection than the media coverage suggests.
+
+## Agent Notes
+
+**Why this matters:** This is a new category of governance failure: "capability extraction without relationship normalization." The government maintains a formal legal position (company = security risk) while actively pursuing the company's most dangerous capability through unofficial channels. The governance instrument is being used simultaneously as a bargaining chip (leverage in commercial negotiations) and as a formal legal shield (protection against congressional oversight about AI procurement decisions). These two functions are directly contradictory.
+
+**What surprised me:** The explicit public acknowledgment by the Pentagon CTO that they need Mythos for network hardening WHILE maintaining the blacklist. Previous governance laundering mechanisms worked by obscuring the contradiction. This one makes the contradiction explicit — Emil Michael is on record saying both "Anthropic is a supply chain risk" and "Mythos is a national security moment we need to deal with." The contradiction is not hidden — it is the official position.
+
+**What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that maintaining the blacklist while accessing Mythos creates legal risk for the agencies involved (procurement law violations, FARA, contractor liability for using a banned supply chain). The procurement law implications appear to be unaddressed.
+
+**KB connections:**
+- [[governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective-through-structural-interaction-effects]] — Mythos paradox is inversion in real time, in public
+- [[supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence]] — this is now operating at the product-versus-company level
+- [[coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities]] — Mythos for cyber hardening = defense; Mythos for zero-day discovery = offense
+
+## Curator Notes
+
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective]] — the Mythos paradox is the purest empirical case of this claim
+
+WHY ARCHIVED: The Pentagon CTO's on-record statement is primary source evidence for a new governance failure category: capability extraction without relationship normalization. This goes beyond the eight previously-identified laundering mechanisms — the contradiction is now public and acknowledged, not buried in contractual language.
+
+EXTRACTION HINT: Claim candidate: "When coercive governance instruments designate a domestic AI company as a security risk while that company's most capable model is simultaneously characterized as a 'national security moment' by the same agency, the instrument reveals its function as a commercial negotiation lever rather than a public safety mechanism." Source primary: Emil Michael CNBC interview, May 1, 2026.