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30c56bdc4f rio: extract from 2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 06:03:52 +00:00
4 changed files with 40 additions and 64 deletions

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@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: "ORE's 4x to 6x LP boost increase shows futarchy can iteratively tune DeFi incentives through market-governed parameter changes"
confidence: experimental
source: "ORE community proposal via Futardio, 2024-10-22"
created: 2024-10-22
---
# ORE boost multiplier increase demonstrates futarchy-governed liquidity incentive calibration
ORE's proposal to increase the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x represents the first parameter change in a futarchy-governed DeFi incentive system, creating a live experiment in market-based liquidity calibration. The proposal explicitly frames the multiplier increase as a data-gathering exercise: "By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can gather more data from the market and better understand how changes to boosts multipliers affect the overall ORE liquidity network."
The proposal passed through MetaDAO's futarchy mechanism (Autocrat v0.3), marking the first time any boost multiplier had been changed since the system launched one week prior. This creates a before/after comparison for measuring how conditional markets price liquidity incentive changes.
The stated objectives reveal the experimental nature:
1. Increase TVL in ORE-SOL pool by counterbalancing LP risk with higher rewards
2. Gather data on how multiplier changes affect liquidity (boosts were only 1 week old at proposal time)
3. Introduce futarchy to the ORE community as a "low-risk testrun" before applying it to critical systems like supply function management
The third objective is particularly significant: the community explicitly views parameter tuning as a training ground for futarchy governance before deploying it on higher-stakes decisions. The proposal states: "Futarchy is still a very nascent technology and before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better. This proposal is intended to serve as a low-risk testrun for the ORE community to learn more about futarchy and how it works."
This suggests a graduated adoption path where mechanism confidence builds through lower-risk applications before deployment on supply function management and other critical systems.
The proposal acknowledges that "liquidity providers take on a lot of risk, especially for volatile trading pairs such as ORE and SOL" and frames the multiplier increase as an attempt to "counterbalance the risks" through incentive adjustment. This positions futarchy as a mechanism for continuous calibration of risk/reward ratios in DeFi, rather than one-time parameter setting.
## Evidence
- Proposal account: A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
- Created: 2024-10-22, passed: 2024-10-26 via MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.3
- First multiplier change since boost system launched (1 week prior)
- Three existing boost multipliers: ORE-SOL LP (4x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
- Proposal explicitly frames change as data-gathering: "gather more data from the market and better understand how changes to boosts multipliers affect the overall ORE liquidity network"
- Community views this as "low-risk testrun" before applying futarchy to "critical systems such as the supply function"
---
Relevant Notes:
- [[MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md]]
- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md]]
- [[optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-different-decisions-have-different-manipulation-risk-profiles.md]]
Topics:
- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

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@ -8,13 +8,10 @@ parent_entity: "[[ore]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2"
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC"
proposal_account: "A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC"
proposal_number: 1
proposal_date: 2024-10-22
resolution_date: 2024-10-26
category: "mechanism"
summary: "First parameter change in ORE's boost system, increasing ORE-SOL LP multiplier from 4x to 6x to gather data on liquidity incentive calibration"
autocrat_version: "0.3"
summary: "Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity incentives and test futarchy governance"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---
@ -22,23 +19,21 @@ created: 2026-03-11
# ORE: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x
## Summary
This proposal increased the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL liquidity providers from 4x to 6x, marking the first parameter change since the boost system launched one week prior. The proposal explicitly framed the change as a data-gathering exercise to understand how multiplier adjustments affect liquidity, and as a low-risk introduction to futarchy governance before applying it to critical systems like supply function management.
This proposal increased the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL liquidity providers from 4x to 6x, strengthening incentives for capital provision in a volatile trading pair. The proposal served three objectives: increasing TVL in the ORE-SOL pool, gathering data on how multiplier changes affect liquidity behavior, and introducing futarchy governance to the ORE community through a low-stakes decision.
## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposer:** proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
- **Resolution:** 2024-10-26 (4 days after proposal)
- **Proposal Account:** A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
- **DAO Account:** 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
- **Duration:** 4 days (2024-10-22 to 2024-10-26)
## Significance
This represents the first use of futarchy for DeFi parameter tuning in the ORE ecosystem, establishing a pattern of graduated adoption where communities build mechanism confidence through lower-stakes operational decisions before deploying futarchy on critical governance questions. The proposal's educational framing positions it as a training ground for both the community and the governance mechanism itself.
This represents ORE's first futarchy-governed parameter change, marking the protocol's initial experiment with prediction market governance. The proposal explicitly positioned itself as educational infrastructure: "This proposal is intended to serve as a low-risk testrun for the ORE community to learn more about futarchy and how it works" before considering futarchy for "critical ORE systems such as the supply function."
The three stated objectives reveal the experimental nature: (1) increase TVL by counterbalancing LP risk, (2) gather data on how multiplier changes affect liquidity, and (3) introduce futarchy to the ORE community as preparation for higher-stakes applications.
The decision demonstrates futarchy adoption strategy: start with reversible operational parameters (LP incentives) to build community familiarity before applying the mechanism to irreversible protocol-level decisions.
## Relationship to KB
- [[ore]] - parent protocol
- [[metadao]] - futarchy infrastructure provider
- [[ore]] - first futarchy-governed decision
- [[futardio]] - governance platform
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used
- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] - confirms pattern
- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]] - educational stepping stone approach

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
---
type: entity
entity_type: company
name: "ORE"
domain: internet-finance
status: active
website: ""
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---
# ORE
## Overview
ORE is a Solana-based protocol with a native incentive mechanism called "boosts" that allows miners to stake select tokens for mining reward multipliers. The protocol supports boost multipliers for ORE-SOL LP (initially 4x, increased to 6x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), and ORE (2x). ORE adopted futarchy governance in October 2024 through Futardio, positioning parameter changes as educational stepping stones toward applying prediction market governance to critical protocol systems.
## Timeline
- **2024-10-15** — Launched boost mechanism with 4x multiplier for ORE-SOL LP, 4x for ORE-ISC LP, 2x for ORE staking
- **2024-10-22** — [[ore-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] proposed: first futarchy-governed parameter change
- **2024-10-26** — ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier increase to 6x passed, marking first successful futarchy decision
## Relationship to KB
- [[futardio]] - governance platform
- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] - ORE proposal confirms pattern
- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]] - gradual adoption strategy

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@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-11
claims_extracted: ["ore-boost-multiplier-increase-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquidity-incentive-calibration.md"]
enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"]
enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "Single proposal source. Primary extraction: one claim on futarchy-governed parameter tuning as graduated adoption mechanism. Two enrichments to existing futarchy claims. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and timeline entry for ORE parent entity. The proposal's explicit framing as a 'low-risk testrun' and data-gathering exercise is the key insight—shows communities using futarchy for operational decisions to build confidence before high-stakes governance."
extraction_notes: "First ORE futarchy proposal. No novel claims — the proposal confirms existing patterns about uncontested futarchy decisions and gradual adoption strategies. Created two new entities: the decision_market for the specific proposal and the parent ORE protocol entity. The proposal explicitly positions itself as educational infrastructure for futarchy adoption, which enriches the adoption friction claim."
---
## Proposal Details
@ -82,7 +81,8 @@ With the launch of boosts just over one week ago, ORE saw a significant rise in
## Key Facts
- ORE boost system launched approximately 2024-10-15 (one week before proposal)
- Three boost multipliers existed at proposal time: ORE-SOL LP (4x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
- Proposal A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC was proposal #1 for DAO 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
- Autocrat v0.3 was the governance version used
- ORE boost mechanism supports three token types: ORE-SOL LP (4x→6x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
- Boosts launched approximately one week before the 2024-10-22 proposal
- Proposal A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC was ORE's first futarchy-governed decision
- DAO account: 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
- Autocrat version: 0.3