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2 changed files with 23 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -69,22 +69,28 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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*Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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*Source: 2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
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LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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*Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-02-22-futardio-launch-salmon-wallet]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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Salmon Wallet presented strong alignment with futarchy principles (transparency, anti-rug, community ownership) and had established product-market fit (building since 2022, real users), yet the launch went to refunding status. This suggests participation friction rather than fundamental market rejection of the project's value proposition.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/4WnHCy8swMZ67B1DBDdx9WUag5RP4EYUvsvqi68VoyQR"
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date: 2026-02-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
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event_type: launch
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-16
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enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Launch Details
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@ -77,3 +81,12 @@ This ICO is the ownership layer. Token holders become co-governors of Salmon's t
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- Token mint: `2LR1NTuTT4X9EX5sEQ34QfnBBxdFzsgQomL1FZXumeta`
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- Version: v0.7
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- Closed: 2026-02-23
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## Key Facts
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- Salmon Wallet has been building in public since 2022
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- Salmon Wallet attempted to raise $350,000 through futard.io on 2026-02-22
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- The Salmon Wallet launch closed on 2026-02-23 with 'Refunding' status
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- Launch address: 4WnHCy8swMZ67B1DBDdx9WUag5RP4EYUvsvqi68VoyQR
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- Token symbol: 2LR
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- Platform version: v0.7
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