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@ -177,12 +177,6 @@ MetaDAO proposed funding six months of futarchy research at George Mason Univers
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Drift Protocol, the most legitimate DeFi protocol on Solana by revenue ($19.8M annual fees, ~$95M FDV, 3.5x price-to-book), is reportedly considering migration to a MetaDAO ownership coin structure. This would represent the first case of an established, revenue-generating protocol adopting futarchy governance post-launch, rather than using it for initial capital formation.
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Drift Protocol, the most legitimate DeFi protocol on Solana by revenue ($19.8M annual fees, ~$95M FDV, 3.5x price-to-book), is reportedly considering migration to a MetaDAO ownership coin structure. This would represent the first case of an established, revenue-generating protocol adopting futarchy governance post-launch, rather than using it for initial capital formation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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Multiple X posts reference Robin Hanson's direct involvement with MetaDAO, with @Alderwerelt noting 'MetaDAO proposed funding futarchy research at George Mason Uni with Robin Hanson' and @position_xbt reporting 'MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson.' This confirms Hanson's ongoing engagement with MetaDAO's implementation beyond just theoretical origins.
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@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ MetaDAO's GitHub repository shows no releases since v0.6.0 (November 2025) as of
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---
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---
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[metadao-proposals-1-15]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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Proposal 5 noted that 'most reasonable estimates will have a wide range' for future META value under pass/fail conditions, and 'this uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' This is the mechanism explanation for why uncontested proposals see low volume—not apathy, but rational uncertainty about counterfactual valuation.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- MetaDAO confirms the manipulation resistance claim empirically
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- MetaDAO confirms the manipulation resistance claim empirically
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- MetaDAO evidence supports reserving futarchy for contested, high-stakes decisions
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- MetaDAO evidence supports reserving futarchy for contested, high-stakes decisions
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@ -29,12 +29,6 @@ MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cos
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---
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---
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[metadao-proposals-1-15]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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Proposal 5 quantified the cost: CLOB pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal, which cannot be recouped. At 3-5 proposals/month, annual costs were 135-225 SOL ($11,475-$19,125 at then-current prices). AMMs cost 'almost nothing in state rent.' This is the specific cost basis for the 99% reduction claim.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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- metadao.md
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- metadao.md
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@ -77,12 +77,6 @@ The 4-month development pause after FairScale (November 2025 to March 2026) sugg
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If Drift Protocol adopts MetaDAO ownership coin structure despite already being live and generating significant fees, it suggests futarchy is being chosen for governance quality and anti-rug guarantees rather than just fundraising mechanics. This challenges the assumption that adoption friction is primarily about capital formation complexity, indicating the governance layer itself has sufficient value to justify migration costs.
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If Drift Protocol adopts MetaDAO ownership coin structure despite already being live and generating significant fees, it suggests futarchy is being chosen for governance quality and anti-rug guarantees rather than just fundraising mechanics. This challenges the assumption that adoption friction is primarily about capital formation complexity, indicating the governance layer itself has sufficient value to justify migration costs.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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@wyatt_165 notes 'I've noticed a lot of confusion on CT around #Futarchy and #MetaDAO' and emphasizes the need to 'read the original articles and diving into Robin Hanson's ideas' to understand the mechanism, suggesting significant comprehension barriers exist even among crypto-native audiences.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- evidence of liquidity friction in practice
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- evidence of liquidity friction in practice
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@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ Polymarket's approach to manipulation resistance combines market self-correction
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---
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---
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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@linfluence acknowledges the mechanism works as designed: 'you and robin hanson are correct on the mechanics: single actor can swing the outcome if they are willing to commit meaningful capital' - this confirms that manipulation requires capital commitment that creates arbitrage opportunities, validating the theoretical defense mechanism.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] -- futarchy extends ownership alignment from value creation to decision-making
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- [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] -- futarchy extends ownership alignment from value creation to decision-making
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- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- futarchy is a continuous alignment mechanism through market forces
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- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- futarchy is a continuous alignment mechanism through market forces
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@ -4,9 +4,3 @@
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Seyf's near-zero traction ($200 raised) suggests that while participation friction (e.g., proposal complexity) is a factor, market skepticism about team credibility and product-market fit also acts as a distinct, substantive barrier to capital commitment. The AI-native wallet concept attracted essentially no capital despite a detailed roadmap and burn rate projections, indicating a functional rather than purely structural impediment to funding.
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Seyf's near-zero traction ($200 raised) suggests that while participation friction (e.g., proposal complexity) is a factor, market skepticism about team credibility and product-market fit also acts as a distinct, substantive barrier to capital commitment. The AI-native wallet concept attracted essentially no capital despite a detailed roadmap and burn rate projections, indicating a functional rather than purely structural impediment to funding.
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```
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```
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[metadao-proposals-1-15]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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Proposals 7, 8, and 9 all failed despite being OTC purchases at below-market prices. Proposal 7 (Ben Hawkins, $50k at $33.33/META) failed when spot was ~$97. Proposal 8 (Pantera, $50k at min(TWAP, $100)) failed when spot was $695. Proposal 9 (Ben Hawkins v2, $100k at max(TWAP, $200)) failed when spot was $695. These weren't rejected for bad economics—they were rejected despite offering sellers massive premiums. This suggests participation friction (market creation costs, liquidity requirements, complexity) dominated economic evaluation.
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@ -13,12 +13,6 @@ The proposal explicitly disclosed that the new Autocrat program "was unable to b
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---
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---
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[metadao-proposals-1-15]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
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Proposal 2 explicitly acknowledged: 'Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with solana-verifiable-build. You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.' The proposal passed anyway, migrating 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the unverifiable program. This demonstrates MetaDAO prioritized iteration velocity over security guarantees in early stages.
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md
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- futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md
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- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
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- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
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@ -102,24 +102,6 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
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- **2026-03-22** — [[metadao-umbra-privacy-proposal]] Active: Umbra Privacy proposal at 84% pass likelihood with $408K conditional market volume, resolution pending
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- **2026-03-22** — [[metadao-umbra-privacy-proposal]] Active: Umbra Privacy proposal at 84% pass likelihood with $408K conditional market volume, resolution pending
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- **2026-03-23** — Funded six-month futarchy research engagement at George Mason University led by Robin Hanson to rigorously study market-based governance
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- **2026-03-23** — Funded six-month futarchy research engagement at George Mason University led by Robin Hanson to rigorously study market-based governance
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- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund futarchy research at GMU with Robin Hanson under discussion
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- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund futarchy research at GMU with Robin Hanson under discussion
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- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-george-mason-futarchy-research]] Proposed: Six-month futarchy research program at George Mason University led by Robin Hanson
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- **2026-03-23** — MetaDAO proposed funding six months of futarchy research at George Mason University led by Robin Hanson through tradable governance proposal
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- **2023-Q4** — [[metadao-marinade-vote-market]] Passed: Approved Marinade vote market development, later pivoted to Saber
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- **2024-Q1** — [[metadao-multi-option-proposals]] Failed: Multi-modal proposal development rejected
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- **2024-05-27** — Proposal 16 passed: Migrated Autocrat program to v0.2 with conditional token merging, rent reclamation, and reduced pass threshold from 5% to 3%
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- **2024-05-27** — Proposal 18 passed (29.6% TWAP): Approved convex founder compensation for Proph3t and Nallok (2% per $1B market cap, max 10% at $5B, 4-year cliff)
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- **2024-06-27** — Proposal 19 passed (12.9% TWAP): Authorized $1.5M fundraise by selling up to 4,000 META at minimum $375/token ($7.81M valuation)
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- **2024-08-03** — Proposal 20 passed (52.4% TWAP): Approved Q3 roadmap focusing on market-based grants, team building in SF, and UI performance improvements
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- **2024-08-14** — Proposal 21 failed (2.1% TWAP): Rejected Futardio memecoin launchpad development
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- **2024-08-31** — Proposal 22 passed (20.8% TWAP): Entered services agreement with Organization Technology LLC for $1.378M annualized burn
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- **2024-10-22** — Proposal 23 passed (14.1% TWAP): Hired Advaith Sekharan as founding engineer at $180k/year + 1% token allocation (237 META)
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- **2024-10-30** — Proposal 24 failed (1.7% TWAP): Rejected $150k USDC swap into ISC inflation-resistant stablecurrency
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- **2025-01-03** — Proposal 25 failed (0.2% TWAP): Rejected Theia's $700k OTC purchase of 609 META at $1,149.425/token (12.7% discount, 6-month lock)
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- **2025-01-27** — Proposal 26 passed (14.3% TWAP): Approved Theia's $500k OTC purchase of 370.37 META at $1,350/token (14% premium, 12-month linear vest)
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- **2025-01-28** — Proposal 27 failed (2.4% TWAP): Rejected 1:1000 token split and elastic supply migration
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- **2025-02-10** — Proposal 28 passed (8% TWAP): Hired Robin Hanson as advisor for 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years
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- **2025-02-26** — Proposal 29 passed (25.9% TWAP): Approved launchpad for futarchy DAOs with anti-rug treasury mechanics
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- **2024** — [[metadao-proposal-1-lst-vote-market]] Passed: Approved development of LST bribe platform as first profit-generating product
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## Key Decisions
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## Key Decisions
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| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
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| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
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|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
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|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
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@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
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---
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type: source
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source_type: x-research
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title: "X research: metaDAO Robin Hanson"
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date: 2026-03-23
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domain: internet-finance
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status: processed
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proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
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contribution_type: research-direction
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---
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@linfluence: i appreciate your + metadao's hard work on the current iteration. you and robin hanson are correct on the mechanics: single actor can swing the outcome if they are willing to commit meaningful capital
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@0xSrMessi: All good with all this projects trying to imitate MetaDAO
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Sorry but you don't have Robin Hanson
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@DmitriFedotov: 6/8 — My point?
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You don't need "insider access" or alpha groups.
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You just need to read the original source material (in my case, Robin Hanson's papers and the MetaDAO code) and connect the dots.
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A lit
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@wyatt_165: I’ve noticed a lot of confusion on CT around #Futarchy and #MetaDAO.
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After reading the original articles and diving into Robin Hanson’s ideas plus watching every @metaproph3t talk on @MetaDAOProject
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@toto_crypto00: 看到MetaDAO @MetaDAOProject https://t.co/VLHM2bqlXf 真是让我的微观经济学基因动了，我认为blockchain的存在就是为经济学各种理论模型提供落地和验证的可能性，而MetaDAO则是将经济学教授Robin Hanson @robinhanson最早在2000年提出的Futarchy 机制，变成web3中DAO的激励治理实验。并且MetaDAO可以说
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@8bitpenis: Bro, futarchy is literally "Vote on Values, Bet On Beliefs". So what you're talking about is literally futarchy in the way Robin Hanson envisioned it. Rn MetaDAO only has "Bet on Beliefs", but no "Vot
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@Alderwerelt: 6/10
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MetaDAO proposed funding futarchy research at George Mason Uni with Robin Hanson.
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Futarchy = markets decide policy. Novel for DAOs—could refine governance for Solana projects, making votes more
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@StrategicHash: @chainyoda @ethereum @eigencloud > Thats why devs created Aave, Gnosis, Aragon, Polymarket and futarchy
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Futarchy was created by Robin Hanson (a professor) and first implemented at scale my Metadao
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@SingularDAO: MetaDAO’s futarchy on Solana swaps one-token-one-vote for prediction markets tying token value to DAO assets. Umbra’s ICO crushed $750K; 4–5 more by Nov could 5x adoption. Robin Hanson’s brainchild (A
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@position_xbt: MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson, this engagement aims to rigorously study market-based go
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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "metadao-benevolent-dictatorship-reveals-futarchy-iteration-speed-bottleneck.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "metadao-treasury-burn-signals-shift-from-meta-payments-to-usdc-revenue-focus.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 3,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 10,
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"rejected": 3,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md:set_created:2026-03-23",
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"futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
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"futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat",
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"futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
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"metadao-benevolent-dictatorship-reveals-futarchy-iteration-speed-bottleneck.md:set_created:2026-03-23",
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"metadao-benevolent-dictatorship-reveals-futarchy-iteration-speed-bottleneck.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology",
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"metadao-benevolent-dictatorship-reveals-futarchy-iteration-speed-bottleneck.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate gov",
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"metadao-treasury-burn-signals-shift-from-meta-payments-to-usdc-revenue-focus.md:set_created:2026-03-23",
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"metadao-treasury-burn-signals-shift-from-meta-payments-to-usdc-revenue-focus.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fix",
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"metadao-treasury-burn-signals-shift-from-meta-payments-to-usdc-revenue-focus.md:stripped_wiki_link:ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"futarchy-amm-migration-solves-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-through-high-fees-and-required-proposer-deposits.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"metadao-benevolent-dictatorship-reveals-futarchy-iteration-speed-bottleneck.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"metadao-treasury-burn-signals-shift-from-meta-payments-to-usdc-revenue-focus.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-23"
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}
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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
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---
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type: source
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source_type: telegram
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title: "Telegram: @m3taversal — ok-can-you-give-me-the-full-text-for-the-robin-han"
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author: "@m3taversal"
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url: ""
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date: 2026-03-23
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domain: internet-finance
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format: conversation
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status: unprocessed
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priority: high
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intake_tier: directed
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rationale: "ok can you give me the full text for the Robin Hanson proposal now?"
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proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
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tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
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---
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## Conversation
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**@m3taversal:**
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ok can you give me the full text for the Robin Hanson proposal now?
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**Rio (response):**
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Here's what I have on it:
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META-036. Proposal to allocate $80,007 USDC from MetaDAO treasury to fund a six-month academic research engagement at George Mason University, led by Robin Hanson. The project would produce the first rigorous experimental evidence on whether decision-market governance actually produces better decisions, with around 500 participants.
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That's the summary level I have. I don't have the full proposal text verbatim. If you want the complete writeup you'd need to pull it from the MetaDAO proposals directly. The proposal account should be onchain if you want to dig into the raw submission.
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Worth noting this builds on the earlier proposal to hire Hanson as advisor (0.1% supply, 20.9 META, 2-year vest for mechanism design and strategy work), which passed separately. The GMU research grant is a distinct, later proposal focused specifically on experimental validation rather than advisory.
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## Agent Notes
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**Why archived:** Tagged exchange in ownership community.
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**Rationale from contributor:** ok can you give me the full text for the Robin Hanson proposal now?
|
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||||||
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
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**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.
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@ -7,16 +7,12 @@ url: ""
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date: 2026-03-23
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date: 2026-03-23
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||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
format: conversation
|
format: conversation
|
||||||
status: null-result
|
status: unprocessed
|
||||||
priority: high
|
priority: high
|
||||||
intake_tier: directed
|
intake_tier: directed
|
||||||
rationale: "that's not the proposal we were talking about. I'm clearly talking about the George Mason University grant proposal"
|
rationale: "that's not the proposal we were talking about. I'm clearly talking about the George Mason University grant proposal"
|
||||||
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
||||||
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
|
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
|
||||||
processed_by: rio
|
|
||||||
processed_date: 2026-03-23
|
|
||||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
|
||||||
extraction_notes: "LLM returned 0 claims, 0 rejected by validator"
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Conversation
|
## Conversation
|
||||||
|
|
@ -38,9 +34,3 @@ RESEARCH: MetaDAO George Mason University Robin Hanson futarchy research grant p
|
||||||
**Rationale from contributor:** that's not the proposal we were talking about. I'm clearly talking about the George Mason University grant proposal
|
**Rationale from contributor:** that's not the proposal we were talking about. I'm clearly talking about the George Mason University grant proposal
|
||||||
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
|
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
|
||||||
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.
|
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Key Facts
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO has a George Mason University / Robin Hanson futarchy research grant proposal under discussion as of March 23, 2026
|
|
||||||
- The George Mason University grant proposal is distinct from the Ranger liquidation claim proposal
|
|
||||||
- Rio's knowledge base did not previously contain structured data on the GMU/Hanson grant proposal
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -4,13 +4,9 @@ source_type: x-research
|
||||||
title: "X research: metaDAO Robin Hanson"
|
title: "X research: metaDAO Robin Hanson"
|
||||||
date: 2026-03-23
|
date: 2026-03-23
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
status: enrichment
|
status: unprocessed
|
||||||
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
||||||
contribution_type: research-direction
|
contribution_type: research-direction
|
||||||
processed_by: rio
|
|
||||||
processed_date: 2026-03-23
|
|
||||||
enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
|
|
||||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@linfluence: i appreciate your + metadao's hard work on the current iteration. you and robin hanson are correct on the mechanics: single actor can swing the outcome if they are willing to commit meaningful capital
|
@linfluence: i appreciate your + metadao's hard work on the current iteration. you and robin hanson are correct on the mechanics: single actor can swing the outcome if they are willing to commit meaningful capital
|
||||||
|
|
@ -35,11 +31,3 @@ Futarchy = markets decide policy. Novel for DAOs—could refine governance for S
|
||||||
Futarchy was created by Robin Hanson (a professor) and first implemented at scale my Metadao
|
Futarchy was created by Robin Hanson (a professor) and first implemented at scale my Metadao
|
||||||
@SingularDAO: MetaDAO’s futarchy on Solana swaps one-token-one-vote for prediction markets tying token value to DAO assets. Umbra’s ICO crushed $750K; 4–5 more by Nov could 5x adoption. Robin Hanson’s brainchild (A
|
@SingularDAO: MetaDAO’s futarchy on Solana swaps one-token-one-vote for prediction markets tying token value to DAO assets. Umbra’s ICO crushed $750K; 4–5 more by Nov could 5x adoption. Robin Hanson’s brainchild (A
|
||||||
@position_xbt: MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson, this engagement aims to rigorously study market-based go
|
@position_xbt: MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson, this engagement aims to rigorously study market-based go
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Key Facts
|
|
||||||
- Robin Hanson originally proposed futarchy in 2000
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO has proposed funding futarchy research at George Mason University with Robin Hanson
|
|
||||||
- The research engagement would be for six months
|
|
||||||
- Multiple X users reference reading Robin Hanson's original papers to understand MetaDAO's implementation
|
|
||||||
- @8bitpenis notes that MetaDAO currently only implements 'Bet on Beliefs' but not 'Vote on Values' from Hanson's original futarchy design
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -5,14 +5,10 @@ title: "MetaDAO Proposals 1-15 — Full Proposal Text"
|
||||||
date: 2026-03-23
|
date: 2026-03-23
|
||||||
domain: internet-finance
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
format: governance-document
|
format: governance-document
|
||||||
status: enrichment
|
status: unprocessed
|
||||||
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
|
||||||
contribution_type: research-direction
|
contribution_type: research-direction
|
||||||
tags: [metadao, governance, proposals, decision-markets]
|
tags: [metadao, governance, proposals, decision-markets]
|
||||||
processed_by: rio
|
|
||||||
processed_date: 2026-03-23
|
|
||||||
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md", "amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
|
|
||||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO Proposals 1-15
|
# MetaDAO Proposals 1-15
|
||||||
|
|
@ -1425,15 +1421,3 @@ For technical reasons, no META nor USDC would come directly from the DAO\'s trea
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Although we make no hard commitments, the META would likely be issued in 5-year locked form, as described here.
|
Although we make no hard commitments, the META would likely be issued in 5-year locked form, as described here.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Key Facts
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 1 estimated Marinade vote market would generate $135k-$150k annual revenue at 10-30% revshare
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 3 estimated Saber vote market at $1 vote trade volume per $50 TVL based on Curve/Aura data
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 5 noted CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 6 used 4/6 multisig: Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, BlockchainFixesThis
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 11 Dutch auction started 50% above spot, lowered 5% every 24h if >6% above spot
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 13 budgeted $96k for FaaS MVP: $15k contracts, $10k audit, $32k UI, $13k data services, $26k PM
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO circulating supply was 14,530 META as of Feb 2024, 17,421 as of March 2024
|
|
||||||
- MetaDAO treasury held 982,464 META before Proposal 12 burn
|
|
||||||
- Realms has 293 DAOs as of Proposal 13 financial projections
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue