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@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ Contributing factors to prediction failure: play-money environment created no do
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## Challenges
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This was a play-money experiment, which is the primary confound. Real-money futarchy may produce different calibration through actual downside risk. The 84-day measurement window may have been too short for TVL impact to materialize. ETH price volatility during the measurement period confounded project-specific performance attribution.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Multi-modal proposals enable futarchic DAOs to make selection decisions across multiple alternatives: 'you can imagine a proposal to choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there's a conditional market on each applicant. Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this, but multi-modal proposals solve it quite well.' The proposal also suggests awarding 2nd and 3rd place prizes to the 2nd and 3rd highest trading contestants, demonstrating how ordinal ranking (who ranks highest) works better than cardinal estimation (what absolute score each deserves).
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Multi-modal proposals extend futarchy from binary Pass/Fail outcomes to N mutually-exclusive alternatives, each with its own conditional market that does not compete for liquidity"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "agrippa (futard.io proposal J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht), 2024-02-20"
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created: 2024-02-20
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---
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# Multi-modal futarchy proposals enable N-way selection by creating mutually-exclusive conditional markets without liquidity competition
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Futarchy as originally implemented in MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.1 supports only binary outcomes: Pass or Fail. Multi-modal proposals extend this architecture to support N mutually-exclusive outcomes, where one outcome is Fail and the rest are distinct alternatives. Each outcome gets its own conditional market.
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The key architectural insight is that conditional markets for mutually-exclusive outcomes do not compete with each other over liquidity. This means scaling from binary to N-way selection does not introduce new security or mechanism design considerations. As the proposal author states: "If you can maliciously get through 'proposal option 12', you could have also gotten through Pass in a binary proposal because conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity."
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The canonical use case is selecting among multiple applicants for a prize or grant. For example, selecting the first-place winner of the Solana Scribes contest could use a multi-modal proposal with one conditional market per applicant. Without multi-modal proposals, "a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this."
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Architecturally, there is no hard limit on the number of conditions in a conditional vault or outcomes in a proposal. The design scales to arbitrary numbers of alternatives.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal to MetaDAO (proposal #9, completed 2024-02-25, status: Failed) requesting 200 META across 4 milestones to develop multi-modal conditional vault program
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- Author (agrippa, lead developer on Solana Labs governance-ui) claims: "Architecturally speaking there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal"
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- Explicit security analysis: conditional markets do not compete over liquidity, so N-way selection introduces no new attack surface
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- Example use case: Solana Scribes contest first-place selection with conditional market on each applicant
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- Author's estimated value impact: +5% DAO value from "exponentially increased decision-making bandwidth in relevant cases"
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## Challenges
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- Proposal failed (completed 2024-02-25 with failed status), suggesting either insufficient market confidence or other priorities
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- No implementation exists; claim is based on architectural analysis, not deployed code
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- No empirical validation of the claimed +5% value impact
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- Scaling to very large N may face practical UX/liquidity constraints not addressed in proposal
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md]]
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- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md]]
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- [[optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-different-decisions-have-different-manipulation-risk-profiles.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "A mandatory draft period before conditional vault activation allows any community member to submit alternative outcomes, forcing direct market comparison and reducing wasteful provisions"
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confidence: speculative
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source: "agrippa (futard.io proposal J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht), 2024-02-20"
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created: 2024-02-20
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---
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# Multi-modal futarchy with draft stage enables permissionless proposal improvement by allowing alternative submission before market activation
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Pork barrel spending—the inclusion of wasteful provisions in proposals to secure votes—is a structural problem in governance. The proposal author suggests that multi-modal futarchy with a mandatory draft stage provides a mechanism to address it: before a conditional vault goes live, anyone can add alternative options to the same proposal.
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The mechanism works through competitive pressure. If a proposal includes wasteful spending, a community member can submit a cleaner alternative during the draft period. The market then prices both options, and the wasteful version trades at a discount relative to the efficient alternative. This creates an incentive structure where proposers must justify every provision or face market-driven rejection.
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The author describes this as "the primary mechanism" for cutting out pork and estimates it adds +5% to DAO value (equal to the decision bandwidth improvement from multi-modal proposals themselves).
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The draft stage architecture separates proposal formation from market activation, creating a window for permissionless improvement before capital commits to any outcome.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal author states: "for each proposal anyone makes, you could have a mandatory draft stage where before the conditional vault actually goes live anyone can add more alternatives to the same proposal. I think this would be really effective at cutting out pork"
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- Author claims draft stage is "the primary mechanism" for pork prevention
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- Estimated +5% DAO value from pork prevention (same magnitude as decision bandwidth improvement)
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- No implementation exists; proposal failed
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- Mechanism relies on game-theoretic assumption that market pricing creates sufficient deterrent against wasteful provisions
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## Challenges
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- Entirely theoretical with no deployed implementation or empirical validation
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- Proposal failed (2024-02-25), suggesting skepticism about value or feasibility
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- Draft stage adds complexity and delays decision execution
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- Assumes sufficient participation and market sophistication to generate meaningful alternatives during draft period
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- Assumes market pricing accurately reflects "waste" (subjective determination)
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- No analysis of how draft stage interacts with proposal spam or low-quality alternatives
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[multi-modal-futarchy-proposals-enable-n-way-selection-by-creating-mutually-exclusive-conditional-markets-without-liquidity-competition.md]]
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- [[optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-different-decisions-have-different-manipulation-risk-profiles.md]]
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- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ domain: internet-finance
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status: failed
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "agrippa (99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX)"
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proposer: "agrippa"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
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proposal_date: 2024-02-20
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resolution_date: 2024-02-25
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Proposal to develop multi-modal futarchy proposals allowing multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes beyond binary Pass/Fail for 200 META compensation"
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summary: "Proposal to develop multi-modal proposal functionality allowing multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes beyond binary pass/fail decisions"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,23 +19,23 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?
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## Summary
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Proposal by agrippa to develop multi-modal proposal functionality for MetaDAO's Autocrat program, enabling proposals with N mutually-exclusive outcomes rather than binary Pass/Fail. Requested 200 META distributed across 4 milestones: immediate payment upon passage, completion of conditional vault program, integration with futarch, and frontend implementation. The proposal included a 5-member multisig council (Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire) to assess milestone completion.
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Proposal by agrippa to develop multi-modal proposal functionality for MetaDAO, enabling proposals with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes beyond the existing binary pass/fail structure. Requested 200 META compensation distributed across four development milestones, with completion assessed by a 3/5 Squads multisig.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Failed
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- **Proposer:** agrippa
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- **Proposer:** agrippa (99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX)
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- **Proposal Account:** J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht
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- **Proposal Number:** 9
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- **Created:** 2024-02-20
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- **Completed:** 2024-02-25
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.1
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## Significance
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This proposal represents an attempt to expand futarchy's decision-making architecture beyond binary choices. The author estimated the feature would add +12.1% to DAO value through increased decision bandwidth (+5%), pork barrel prevention (+5%), innovation hype (+2%), and fee revenue (+0.1%). The failure suggests either skepticism about these value claims, concerns about implementation complexity, or competing priorities for development resources.
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This proposal represented an important mechanism design expansion for futarchy implementation. Multi-modal proposals would enable selection decisions across multiple alternatives (e.g., choosing contest winners, comparing multiple strategic options) rather than just binary pass/fail votes. The proposer estimated this would add +12.1% value to MetaDAO by exponentially increasing decision-making bandwidth (+5%), addressing pork barrel problems through draft stages (+5%), creating governance innovation hype (+2%), and enabling fee collection from other protocols (+0.1%).
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The proposal also introduced the concept of a draft stage for multi-modal proposals where community members could add alternatives before market activation, positioning this as "the primary mechanism" for preventing wasteful spending in governance.
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The proposal included novel governance structure: milestone-based payment (50 META per milestone) assessed by a 5-member Squads multisig (Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire), with each multisig member receiving 2.5 META for participation.
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Despite the technical merit and detailed implementation plan, the proposal failed, suggesting either market skepticism about the value proposition, concerns about the developer's ability to deliver, or competing priorities for DAO resources.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] - governance mechanism proposal
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- [[futardio]] - platform where proposal was submitted
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - the program this proposal aimed to extend
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- [[metadao]] - parent organization
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- [[MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window]] - mechanism being extended
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- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]] - use case for multi-option proposals
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@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
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- **2026-03** — Pine Analytics Q4 2025 quarterly report published
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- **2024-02-18** — [[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]] failed: Pantera Capital's $50,000 OTC purchase proposal rejected by futarchy markets
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- **2024-02-20** — [[metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals]] failed: Proposal to develop multi-modal proposals with N mutually-exclusive outcomes for 200 META rejected by markets
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- **2024-02-20** — [[metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals]] proposed: agrippa proposes developing multi-modal proposal functionality for 200 META across 4 milestones
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- **2024-02-25** — [[metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals]] failed: multi-option proposal development rejected by conditional markets
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## Key Decisions
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| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
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|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
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@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["multi-modal-futarchy-proposals-enable-n-way-selection-by-creating-mutually-exclusive-conditional-markets-without-liquidity-competition.md", "multi-modal-futarchy-with-draft-stage-enables-permissionless-proposal-improvement-by-allowing-alternative-submission-before-market-activation.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Failed proposal to extend MetaDAO's Autocrat program to multi-modal proposals. Two claims extracted on mechanism design (decision bandwidth expansion and pork prevention). Enrichments added to existing futarchy implementation and adoption friction claims. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself and updated metadao timeline. Author's background and value estimates preserved as key_facts rather than claims since they're self-reported and unverified."
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extraction_notes: "Failed proposal for multi-modal proposal development. Primary extraction is the decision_market entity capturing the governance event. Three enrichments added: (1) milestone payment structure details for Autocrat implementation, (2) confirmation of simplification principle in production futarchy, (3) extension of relative selection capability with concrete use case examples. No new claims extracted - the value proposition (+12.1% DAO value) is self-reported speculation from proposer, not validated evidence. Developer credentials and background are factual but not claim-worthy."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -116,7 +115,7 @@ I would be very excited to join this futarchic society as a major techinical con
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## Key Facts
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- agrippa led development on Solana Labs governance-ui (Realms frontend) for one year as of 2024-02-20
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- agrippa developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of precogparty reference implementation (FTX grant-funded)
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- MetaDAO circulating supply was 14,416 META as of 2024-02-20
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- Proposed multisig council: Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire (2.5 META each for participation)
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- Agrippa led development on Solana Labs governance-ui (Realms frontend) for one year prior to proposal
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- Agrippa developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of precogparty (FTX grant-funded)
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- Agrippa met Proph3t in Greece December 2023 for 3-hour discussion on MetaDAO and futarchy
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