rio: extract from 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 6)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
 
 Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-(extend) The Dean's List DAO treasury proposal (passed 2024-07-22) demonstrates futarchy governance applied to operational economic model changes with complex financial modeling, not just binary funding decisions. The proposal included detailed scenario modeling (FDV projections, volume analysis, price impact estimates) and passed governance despite requiring participants to evaluate quantitative assumptions (80% sell-off rate, 24% price elasticity estimates). This suggests futarchy participants can engage with treasury mechanism complexity when backed by numerical analysis, though the proposal's unvalidated assumptions (sell-off ratios, price impact calculations) were not challenged in governance voting, raising questions about whether trading volume reflects genuine evaluation or passive acceptance of detailed-looking proposals.
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/dao-tax-in-stablecoin-hedges-governance-token-volatility-for-treasury-operations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Dual-currency treasury structure with tax retained in stablecoins and contributor payments in governance tokens provides operational stability while creating token demand"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Dean's List DAO economic model proposal, 2024-07-18"
+created: 2024-03-11
+---
+
+# DAO tax in stablecoin hedges governance token volatility for treasury operations
+
+The Dean's List DAO model separates treasury reserves from contributor payments by retaining the DAO tax (20% of revenue) in USDC while converting the remaining 80% to $DEAN tokens for distribution. This creates a dual-currency treasury structure where operational reserves remain stable while token buybacks create market demand.
+
+The proposal explicitly states: "The DAO tax will remain in USDC to hedge against $DEAN price fluctuations." This addresses a structural problem in DAO treasury management: if the treasury holds only governance tokens, operational expenses become vulnerable to token price volatility. A 50% token price decline means 50% reduction in operational runway.
+
+By retaining tax revenue in the currency received (USDC), the DAO maintains predictable operational capacity regardless of $DEAN price movements. The 20% tax rate provides a buffer that accumulates in stablecoins while the 80% contributor payment flows through the token market.
+
+## Evidence
+
+In the worked example:
+- 2,500 USDC service revenue
+- 500 USDC (20%) retained in treasury as USDC
+- 2,000 USDC (80%) converted to $DEAN for contributor payments
+
+This creates two treasury pools:
+1. **Stable reserves**: USDC accumulation for operational expenses, infrastructure, and contingencies
+2. **Token flow**: Systematic buyback-and-distribute cycle that creates market activity
+
+The proposal does not specify what operational expenses the USDC reserves cover, but the structure implies: infrastructure costs, legal/compliance, emergency reserves, and expenses that cannot be paid in volatile tokens.
+
+## Mechanism Comparison
+
+This differs from three alternative approaches:
+
+**Pure token treasury**: All revenue converts to governance tokens. Maximum token demand, but treasury value fluctuates with token price. Used by early DAOs, often led to treasury crises during bear markets.
+
+**Pure stablecoin treasury**: All revenue retained as stablecoins, contributors paid in stablecoins. Maximum operational stability, but zero token demand from operations. Common in service DAOs that treat tokens as pure governance.
+
+**Proportional split**: Treasury holds same ratio as revenue (80% stablecoin, 20% token). Balanced approach but creates no systematic buy pressure.
+
+The Dean's List model is asymmetric: retain stability currency, flow through demand currency. This creates token demand without exposing operations to token volatility.
+
+## Unresolved Questions
+
+The mechanism assumes:
+- 20% tax rate provides sufficient operational runway (not validated in proposal)
+- USDC reserves don't need to be deployed for token price support during crashes
+- Contributors accept token payment despite volatility (80% immediately sell, suggesting preference for stablecoins)
+- The DAO can maintain service revenue flow to sustain both pools
+
+If revenue declines, the DAO faces a choice: reduce token buybacks (reducing price support) or reduce USDC reserves (reducing operational stability). The proposal does not address this tradeoff or specify minimum reserve thresholds.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[futarchy-governed-token-buybacks-create-constant-buy-pressure-when-revenue-flows-through-treasury-purchases.md]]
+- [[ownership-coin-treasuries-should-be-actively-managed-through-buybacks-and-token-sales-as-continuous-capital-calibration-not-treated-as-static-war-chests.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-token-buybacks-create-constant-buy-pressure-when-revenue-flows-through-treasury-purchases.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Revenue-linked token buybacks create net positive price pressure when structured to exceed contributor sell-offs, demonstrated by Dean's List DAO model"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Dean's List DAO economic model proposal, 2024-07-18"
+created: 2024-03-11
+---
+
+# Futarchy-governed token buybacks create constant buy pressure when revenue flows through treasury purchases
+
+The Dean's List DAO economic model demonstrates a mechanism where service revenue collected in stablecoins flows through systematic token purchases before distribution to contributors. By charging clients in USDC, using 80% of revenue to purchase $DEAN tokens, and distributing those tokens as payment while retaining 20% tax in USDC, the DAO creates structural buy pressure that exceeds sell pressure from contributors cashing out.
+
+In the proposed model, a 2,500 USDC service generates 2,000 USDC in token purchases (after 20% treasury tax). When 80% of recipients sell their tokens to cover expenses, the net effect is 20% more buy volume than sell volume per transaction cycle. The proposal projects this creates "always positive" price action where "the price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle."
+
+The mechanism addresses a core challenge in DAO token economics: how to create sustainable demand for governance tokens when contributors need stablecoins for expenses. Rather than paying directly in stablecoins (which creates no token demand) or paying in tokens from treasury reserves (which depletes holdings), the model forces revenue through the token market as systematic buybacks.
+
+## Evidence
+
+The Dean's List DAO proposal provides a worked example:
+- Service cost: 2,500 USDC
+- Treasury tax (20%): 500 USDC retained
+- Token purchase: 2,000 USDC buys 560,000 $DEAN
+- Distribution: 560,000 $DEAN to contributors
+- Sell pressure: 80% of recipients sell = 448,000 $DEAN
+- Net buy pressure: 560,000 bought vs 448,000 sold = 20% net buying
+
+The proposal models this on a DAO with 337,074 FDV and 500 USDC daily trading volume. Adding 400 USDC daily purchases (80% increase in volume) projects 24% price increase, minus 15% from sell pressure, yielding 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement for proposal passage. The proposal passed MetaDAO's futarchy governance on 2024-07-22, indicating market validation of the mechanism's viability.
+
+## Critical Assumptions
+
+The model's effectiveness depends on:
+1. **Contributor sell behavior**: Assumes 80% of token recipients immediately sell. If contributors hold more tokens, buy pressure increases but may not translate to price support if market depth is limited.
+2. **Market depth**: Small markets (500 USDC daily volume) may experience high slippage on systematic purchases, reducing effective buy pressure.
+3. **Revenue consistency**: Irregular revenue creates irregular buy pressure, potentially increasing volatility rather than creating stable price floors.
+4. **Price elasticity**: The model assumes 24% price increase from 80% volume increase, but this is an estimate not a market-tested relationship.
+5. **Competitive dynamics**: If multiple DAOs adopt identical models, synchronized buy pressure could create correlated volatility patterns.
+
+## Limitations
+
+This is a single implementation proposal, not yet executed. The mechanism has not been tested in production. The proposal does not address:
+- What happens if revenue declines below the level needed to sustain buy pressure
+- Whether the 80% sell assumption holds during bear markets when contributors may hold more
+- How the mechanism scales as the DAO grows and market depth increases
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md]]
+- [[ownership-coin-treasuries-should-be-actively-managed-through-buybacks-and-token-sales-as-continuous-capital-calibration-not-treated-as-static-war-chests.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md

@@ -15,12 +15,6 @@ Living Capital replaces this with token economics that directly reward decision-
 
 The mechanism aligns with several core LivingIP principles. Since [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]], the token structure ensures that value flows to those who generate it rather than to intermediaries who merely facilitate access. Since [[blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement]], combining token-locked voting with blind mechanisms could further strengthen decision quality. Since [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]], the token emissions function as the ownership stakes that incentivize high-quality participation. The result is an investment governance model where authority is earned through demonstrated judgment rather than granted through capital contribution alone.
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-(extend) The Dean's List DAO model demonstrates token economics applied to service DAO compensation rather than just investment vehicles. Citizens receive $DEAN tokens as payment for work (dApp reviews) rather than stablecoin fees, aligning worker compensation with protocol success. The 80% sell-off rate (stated as assumption in proposal) suggests workers treat tokens as hybrid compensation: partially liquid income for immediate expenses and partially equity stake. This differs from pure fee-for-service (no equity alignment) and pure equity compensation (illiquid), creating a middle ground where workers can immediately liquidate majority of compensation while retaining minority stake. However, the high sell-off rate also indicates that token-as-compensation may not create strong meritocratic alignment if workers prioritize immediate liquidity over long-term protocol success.
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Dean's List DAO model demonstrates how USDC revenue converted to token buybacks creates net positive price pressure despite citizen sell-offs"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Dean's List DAO economic model proposal, 2024-07-18"
-created: 2024-07-18
----
-
-# Treasury buyback model creates net buy pressure by converting stablecoin revenue to governance token purchases despite distributed token sell-offs
-
-The Dean's List DAO economic model demonstrates a treasury mechanism where client revenue in USDC is systematically converted to governance token ($DEAN) purchases, creating structural buy pressure that the proposal claims exceeds sell pressure from token distributions. The model charges clients in USDC, allocates 20% to treasury as tax, and uses the remaining 80% to purchase $DEAN tokens from the market. These tokens are then distributed to DAO citizens as payment for work.
-
-In the documented example, a 2,500 USDC service generates 2,000 USDC in token purchases (buying 560k $DEAN), while DAO citizens sell approximately 80% of received tokens (448k $DEAN), creating net buy pressure of 112k $DEAN per cycle. The proposal states this creates "always positive" price action where "the price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle."
-
-The model projects that introducing 400 USDC daily buy volume (80% increase over baseline 500 USDC daily volume) would generate 24% upward price pressure, partially offset by 15% downward pressure from citizen sell-offs, resulting in net 5.33% FDV increase. This exceeds the MetaDAO TWAP 3% threshold requirement.
-
-The mechanism addresses a core DAO treasury problem: how to create sustainable token demand without depleting native token reserves. By maintaining the treasury tax in stablecoins while converting operational spending to market purchases, the model hedges against token price volatility while generating buy pressure.
-
-## Evidence
-- Dean's List DAO charges 2,500 USDC per dApp review
-- 20% (500 USDC) allocated to treasury in stablecoins
-- 80% (2,000 USDC) used for $DEAN market purchases
-- Citizens sell approximately 80% of received tokens
-- Net buy pressure claimed: 560k purchased - 448k sold = 112k $DEAN per cycle
-- Baseline daily volume: 500 USDC
-- Proposed daily buy volume: 400 USDC (80% increase)
-- Current $DEAN price at proposal: $0.00337
-- Current FDV at proposal: $337,074
-- Projected FDV after implementation: $355,028 (5.33% increase)
-- Proposal passed futarchy governance on 2024-07-22
-
-## Challenges
-
-The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stable sell-off ratios (80%). If citizen sell pressure increases or service demand decreases, the net buy pressure advantage disappears. The price impact calculations (24% up, 15% down) are estimates without empirical validation or citation of methodology. The model does not account for market depth changes as volume increases—slippage could reduce actual buy pressure effectiveness.
-
-The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests.md]]
-- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/deans-list-enhance-economic-model.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "Dean's List: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "IslandDAO"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp"
+proposal_date: 2024-07-18
+resolution_date: 2024-07-22
+category: "treasury"
+summary: "Proposal to charge clients in USDC, use 80% to purchase $DEAN tokens for contributor payments, retain 20% tax in USDC as treasury hedge"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dean's List: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
+
+## Summary
+
+The proposal restructured Dean's List DAO's payment flow to create systematic token buybacks. Instead of paying contributors directly in USDC or from token reserves, the DAO routes 80% of service revenue through $DEAN token purchases before distribution, while retaining 20% in USDC as operational reserves. The model projects this creates net positive buy pressure (20% more buying than selling per cycle) as contributors sell approximately 80% of received tokens.
+
+## Market Data
+
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** IslandDAO
+- **Resolution:** 2024-07-22
+- **Proposal Account:** 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
+
+## Financial Modeling
+
+The proposal included detailed projections:
+- **Current FDV:** $337,074
+- **Daily Volume:** $500
+- **Projected Daily Buybacks:** $400 (80% increase in volume)
+- **Estimated Price Impact:** +24% from buys, -15% from contributor sells
+- **Net FDV Increase:** 5.33% (exceeding 3% TWAP requirement)
+
+**Example Transaction Flow:**
+- Service cost: 2,500 USDC
+- Treasury tax: 500 USDC (retained)
+- Token purchase: 2,000 USDC → 560,000 $DEAN
+- Contributor distribution: 560,000 $DEAN
+- Estimated sell pressure: 448,000 $DEAN (80%)
+- Net buy pressure: 112,000 $DEAN (20%)
+
+## Significance
+
+This proposal demonstrates futarchy governance applied to complex token economics. The market validated a multi-variable financial model involving systematic buybacks, dual-currency treasury management, and projected price impacts. The mechanism addresses a core DAO challenge: creating token demand while contributors need stablecoin liquidity.
+
+The dual-currency structure (USDC reserves, $DEAN flow) separates operational stability from market-making activity. This is a novel approach to DAO treasury management that other service DAOs may adopt.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[deans-list]] — parent entity, treasury governance decision
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — governance mechanism used
+- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — contributor alignment through token compensation
+- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — systematic buyback implementation

entities/internet-finance/deans-list-enhancing-economic-model.md

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "futard.io"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp"
-proposal_date: 2024-07-18
-resolution_date: 2024-07-22
-category: "treasury"
-summary: "Transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by systematic USDC-to-DEAN buybacks"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
-
-## Summary
-The proposal restructured Dean's List DAO's payment model to create constant buy pressure on $DEAN tokens. Instead of paying citizens directly in USDC, the DAO now uses 80% of client revenue to purchase $DEAN from the market and distributes those tokens as payment. The 20% treasury tax remains in USDC to hedge against price volatility. The model projects net positive price pressure because citizens sell only ~80% of received tokens, creating 112k $DEAN net buy pressure per 2,500 USDC service cycle.
-
-## Market Data
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** futard.io
-- **Resolution:** 2024-07-22
-- **Platform:** Futardio (MetaDAO Autocrat v0.3)
-
-## Mechanism Details
-- Service fee: 2,500 USDC per dApp review
-- Treasury allocation: 20% (500 USDC) in stablecoins
-- Buyback allocation: 80% (2,000 USDC) for $DEAN purchases
-- Projected citizen sell-off: 80% of received tokens
-- Net buy pressure: 20% of purchased tokens retained
-- Projected FDV impact: 5.33% increase (from $337,074 to $355,028)
-- Target: 6 dApp reviews per month (400 USDC daily buy volume)
-
-## Significance
-This proposal represents an operational treasury mechanism using futarchy governance to implement systematic token buybacks as a compensation model. Unlike simple buyback-and-burn programs, this model converts operational expenses into buy pressure while maintaining stablecoin reserves for volatility protection. The detailed financial modeling (FDV projections, volume analysis, price impact estimates) demonstrates how complex treasury decisions can navigate futarchy governance when backed by quantitative scenarios.
-
-The 80% sell-off assumption acknowledges that DAO workers need liquid compensation, creating a hybrid model between pure equity alignment and fee-for-service payments.
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[deans-list]] - treasury mechanism change
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance platform
-- [[treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases]] - mechanism claim

entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md

@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Topics:
 
 - **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
 
-- **2024-07-18** — [[deans-list-enhancing-economic-model]] proposed: transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by systematic buybacks (20% treasury tax in USDC, 80% used for market purchases)
-- **2024-07-22** — [[deans-list-enhancing-economic-model]] passed: economic model restructure approved via futarchy governance, implementing USDC-to-DEAN buyback mechanism with projected 5.33% FDV increase
+- **2024-07-18** — [[deans-list-enhance-economic-model]] proposed: restructure payment flow to route 80% of USDC revenue through $DEAN token purchases before contributor distribution, retain 20% as USDC treasury hedge
+- **2024-07-22** — [[deans-list-enhance-economic-model]] passed: futarchy markets validated economic model projecting 5.33% FDV increase through systematic buybacks

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["futarchy-governed-token-buybacks-create-constant-buy-pressure-when-revenue-flows-through-treasury-purchases.md", "dao-tax-in-stablecoin-hedges-governance-token-volatility-for-treasury-operations.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "token-economics-replacing-management-fees-and-carried-interest-creates-natural-meritocracy-in-investment-governance.md", "ownership-coin-treasuries-should-be-actively-managed-through-buybacks-and-token-sales-as-continuous-capital-calibration-not-treated-as-static-war-chests.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted one new claim on treasury buyback mechanisms creating net buy pressure through systematic revenue conversion. Enriched two existing claims with evidence on futarchy governance of complex treasury decisions and token-based compensation models. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated Dean's List timeline with proposal and resolution events. Source contains detailed financial modeling that demonstrates futarchy governance applied to operational economic changes, not just binary funding decisions."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted two novel claims about futarchy-governed treasury mechanisms: systematic buybacks creating net buy pressure, and dual-currency treasury structure hedging operational stability. Created decision_market entity for the proposal with detailed financial modeling. Enriched three existing claims with evidence of Autocrat handling complex economic proposals, token economics in service DAOs, and systematic buybacks as operational policy. Source contains significant mechanism design insights beyond typical governance proposals."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -155,9 +155,9 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- Dean's List DAO charges 2,500 USDC per dApp review (2024-07-18)
-- $DEAN price: $0.00337, FDV: $337,074, daily volume: $500 USDC (2024-07-18)
-- Dean's List DAO circulating supply: 100,000,000 $DEAN (2024-07-18)
-- Proposal account: 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
-- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Dean's List DAO FDV: $337,074 (2024-07-18)
+- Dean's List daily trading volume: $500 (2024-07-18)
+- $DEAN circulating supply: 100,000,000 tokens
+- $DEAN price: $0.00337 (2024-07-18)
+- Dean's List service pricing: 2,500 USDC per dApp review
+- Proposal passed 2024-07-22 via Autocrat v0.3