|
|
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axy
|
|
|
|
|
proposal_date: 2024-06-08
|
|
|
|
|
resolution_date: 2024-06-11
|
|
|
|
|
category: "grants"
|
|
|
|
|
summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to foster collaboration and attract talent"
|
|
|
|
|
summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club conditioned on 5% FDV increase"
|
|
|
|
|
tracked_by: rio
|
|
|
|
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
|
@ -19,23 +19,25 @@ created: 2026-03-11
|
|
|
|
|
# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Summary
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal allocated 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at the time) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club. The stated goal was to strengthen partnership, attract top talent from the club's 200 student members, and increase participation in Dean's List DAO governance. The proposal passed with a condition that the partnership should result in a 5% increase in the DAO's fully diluted valuation (FDV) over a 5-day trading period.
|
|
|
|
|
Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at proposal time) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal was structured as a conditional grant requiring a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) over a 5-day trading period. The proposal passed, completing on 2024-06-11.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Market Data
|
|
|
|
|
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
|
|
|
|
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
|
|
|
|
|
- **Trading Period:** 5 days
|
|
|
|
|
- **Completed:** 2024-06-11
|
|
|
|
|
- **Token Amount:** 1,000,000 $DEAN
|
|
|
|
|
- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
|
|
|
|
|
- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN
|
|
|
|
|
- **USD Equivalent:** $1,300 USDC
|
|
|
|
|
- **DAO FDV at Proposal:** $115,655
|
|
|
|
|
- **Required FDV Increase:** $5,783 (5%)
|
|
|
|
|
- **Estimated Benefit per Dollar:** $4.45
|
|
|
|
|
- **Required FDV Increase:** 5% ($5,783)
|
|
|
|
|
- **Starting FDV:** $115,655
|
|
|
|
|
- **Target FDV:** $121,438
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Proposal Rationale
|
|
|
|
|
The proposal argued for a 4.45:1 benefit-to-cost ratio, estimating that 200 student members would collectively drive sufficient engagement (dApp reviews, testing, social promotion, development) to increase FDV by the required amount. The model assumed each student needed to contribute activities worth approximately $28.92 in FDV increase.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Significance
|
|
|
|
|
This proposal represents an early example of futarchy-governed grants allocation where the decision was explicitly tied to a measurable market outcome (5% FDV increase). The proposal framed the grant as a strategic investment with quantified expected returns, calculating that each of the 200 students needed to contribute activities worth approximately $28.92 in FDV increase. The tokens were to be held in a multi-signature wallet for secure management.
|
|
|
|
|
This represents an early example of futarchy-governed university partnership grants, where token allocation is conditioned on measurable market outcomes rather than subjective deliverables. The proposal explicitly framed student engagement as a capital formation strategy, treating educational partnerships as FDV-accretive investments rather than pure community building.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Relationship to KB
|
|
|
|
|
- [[deans-list]] - parent organization making the grant
|
|
|
|
|
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
|
|
|
|
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism used
|
|
|
|
|
- [[deans-list]] - parent DAO governance decision
|
|
|
|
|
- [[futardio]] - platform used for conditional market governance
|
|
|
|
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism
|
|
|
|
|
|