auto-fix: strip 3 broken wiki links

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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md

@@ -28,10 +28,16 @@ The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliab
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+Dean's List DAO treasury de-risking proposal passed with market pricing showing 5-20% FDV increase ($500k to $525k-$600k) based on financial stability improvements. The proposal explicitly modeled how converting volatile assets to stablecoins would impact token price through increased survival probability (50% to 90%) and market confidence, demonstrating that futarchy markets can price operational stability as a token price input.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
@@ -57,10 +57,16 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+Dean's List treasury de-risking proposal passed despite requiring 3% TWAP threshold, with projected impact of 5-20% FDV increase well above the minimum. The proposal's clear economic case (40 percentage point survival probability increase) and straightforward value proposition overcame participation friction, suggesting that sufficiently compelling proposals can succeed even with friction barriers.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW
 date: 2024-12-02
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -122,3 +126,11 @@ This strategy ensures financial stability while signaling prudence to investors,
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-12-05
 - Ended: 2024-12-05
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Dean's List DAO treasury valued at $75,000-$87,000 at $350 SOL (excluding DEAN token)
+- Proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass (FDV threshold of $515,000 from $500,000 base)
+- De-risking modeled as increasing survival probability from 50% to 90% (40 percentage point increase)
+- Projected FDV impact range: $525,000 (5% increase) to $600,000 (20% increase)
+- Proposal completed December 5, 2024 after 3-day voting period