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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axy
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proposal_date: 2024-06-08
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resolution_date: 2024-06-11
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract talent and increase governance participation"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract 200 students with projected 5% FDV increase"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,22 +19,22 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
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## Summary
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to 1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal required a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period to pass.
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal argued this would strengthen partnership, attract skilled talent, and increase DAO governance participation. Success condition required 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation ($115,655 baseline) over a 5-day trading period.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
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- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN (~1,300 USDC)
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- **Required FDV Increase:** 5% ($5,783)
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- **Target FDV:** $121,438
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- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN (~$1,300 USDC)
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- **Target FDV Increase:** $5,783 (5% of $115,655)
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- **Projected ROI:** $4.45 benefit per dollar spent
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation with explicit ROI metrics. The proposal framework calculated that each of the 200 students needed to contribute activities increasing FDV by approximately $28.92 to justify the allocation, projecting a benefit of $4.45 per dollar spent. The tokens were to be held in a multi-signature wallet for secure management.
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation where partnership value is measured through token price impact rather than subjective evaluation. The proposal explicitly modeled expected FDV increase per student ($28.915 average) and required market validation of the partnership's value through conditional token trading. The pass outcome indicates market belief that 200 university blockchain club members would generate sufficient engagement, development, and promotion to increase DAO valuation by more than the grant cost.
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The proposal represents an early experiment in using conditional markets to evaluate community partnership investments, with measurable success criteria (5% FDV increase) rather than subjective governance voting.
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The proposal also illustrates how futarchy handles cultural/community spending by treating brand equity and talent pipeline as quantifiable token price inputs rather than unmeasurable soft benefits.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform used
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism
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- [[deans-list]] - parent organization governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform used for futarchy implementation
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- [[futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs]] - mechanism demonstrated
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