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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axy
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proposal_date: 2024-06-08
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resolution_date: 2024-06-11
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract talent and increase governance participation"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to attract 200 student contributors with 5% FDV increase condition"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,22 +19,25 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
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## Summary
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to 1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal required a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period to pass.
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at time of proposal) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal was structured as a conditional grant requiring a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period. The proposal passed, indicating market confidence that student engagement would drive sufficient value creation.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
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- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN (~1,300 USDC)
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- **Required FDV Increase:** 5% ($5,783)
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- **Target FDV:** $121,438
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- **Grant Amount:** 1,000,000 $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent)
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- **Success Condition:** 5% FDV increase ($5,783 increase required)
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- **Target Participants:** 200 University of Waterloo Blockchain Club members
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- **Estimated ROI:** $4.45 benefit per dollar spent (based on proposal model)
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation with explicit ROI metrics. The proposal framework calculated that each of the 200 students needed to contribute activities increasing FDV by approximately $28.92 to justify the allocation, projecting a benefit of $4.45 per dollar spent. The tokens were to be held in a multi-signature wallet for secure management.
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed talent acquisition and community grants. Rather than a simple token distribution, the proposal structured the grant as a conditional bet on whether university partnership would increase DAO valuation. The pass condition required measurable market impact (5% FDV increase) within a defined timeframe, making the grant accountable to token price performance rather than subjective governance approval.
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The proposal represents an early experiment in using conditional markets to evaluate community partnership investments, with measurable success criteria (5% FDV increase) rather than subjective governance voting.
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The proposal's economic model calculated that each of 200 students needed to contribute activities worth ~$28.92 in FDV increase to justify the $1,300 investment. The market's decision to pass suggests traders believed student engagement (dApp reviews, testing, social promotion, development) would exceed this threshold.
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This represents an early experiment in using futarchy for partnership and grant decisions, where traditional DAOs would use token-weighted voting without price accountability.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - governance decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform used
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism
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- [[deans-list]] - parent organization making the grant decision
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- [[futardio]] - platform enabling the conditional market governance
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used for this decision
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