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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69Pz
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proposal_date: 2024-03-26
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resolution_date: 2024-03-31
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category: "strategy"
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summary: "Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders with authority over retroactive compensation, business operations, and contributor management for three months to accelerate decision-making."
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summary: "Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders with authority over compensation, operations, and business decisions for three months to accelerate execution."
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,35 +19,40 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
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## Summary
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This proposal appointed Proph3t and Nallok as Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M) from proposal finalization through June 30, 2024, to accelerate MetaDAO's execution speed. The proposal allocated 1,015 META and 100,000 USDC to cover four months of retroactive compensation (December 2023 - March 2024) and three months of forward-looking compensation (April - June 2024), averaging 145 META and $14,000 per month.
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This proposal appointed Proph3t and Nallok as Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M) from proposal finalization through June 30, 2024, to accelerate MetaDAO's execution speed and handle business operations outside the slow proposal process. The proposal requested 1,015 META and 100,000 USDC for retroactive compensation (December-March) and forward-looking compensation (April-June).
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Proposal Number:** 14
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- **Completed:** 2024-03-31
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.1
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## Authority Granted
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The BDF3M role included:
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- Retroactive compensation for all contributions prior to the proposal
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- Managing ongoing business operations including off-chain proposal process, project management, and expenses
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- Retroactive compensation for all prior MetaDAO contributions
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- Managing ongoing business operations and project management
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- Steering the off-chain proposal process and compensating proposers
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- Handling expenses and operational requirements
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- Improving security and efficacy of the core futarchy mechanism
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- Compensation for current contributors including incentive-based components
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- Authority to make exceptional use grants for MetaDAO's code licenses
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- Monthly community updates
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- Providing monthly community updates
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- Making exceptional use grants for MetaDAO's code licenses
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## Compensation Structure
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- Average 145 META and $14,000 per month per person
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- Funds distributed from multisigs rather than DAO treasury directly
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- META likely issued in 5-year locked form
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## OKRs
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- Execute faster: Complete 10 GitHub issues per week
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- Handle retroactive compensation within 1 week of passing
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- Perform operations compensation for April-June 2024
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- Handle retroactive compensation within 1 week of passage
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- Oversee creation of new landing page
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- Perform operations compensation for April-June 2024
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## Significance
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This proposal represented a critical governance transition for MetaDAO, acknowledging that the futarchy proposal process was "too slow and costly" for operational decisions at that stage. The proposers estimated that failure would decrease MetaDAO's probability of success by more than 20%, framing it as an existential decision. The META tokens were likely issued in 5-year locked form, and funding came from multisigs rather than directly from the DAO treasury for technical reasons.
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This proposal represented a critical governance transition where MetaDAO acknowledged that pure futarchy was too slow for operational decisions at its current stage. The proposal itself stated that failure would decrease MetaDAO's probability of success by more than 20%, indicating high perceived stakes. The temporary shift to benevolent dictatorship created a hybrid governance model where strategic decisions remained futarchic while operational execution became centralized.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] - governance decision establishing interim leadership structure
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- [[proph3t]] - appointed as co-leader
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- [[nallok]] - appointed as co-leader
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- [[futardio]] - platform where proposal was executed
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- [[metadao]] - governance structure evolution
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- [[proph3t]] - appointed leader
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- [[nallok]] - appointed leader
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - the mechanism this proposal temporarily bypassed for operational decisions
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