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166 changed files with 453 additions and 241 deletions
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: entertainment
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description: "Dropout describes the audience relationship on its owned platform as 'night and day' versus YouTube because subscribers actively chose to pay rather than being served content algorithmically, eliminating the competitive noise that defines social platform distribution"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Tubefilter, 'Creators are building their own streaming services via Vimeo Streaming', April 25, 2025; Dropout practitioner account"
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created: 2026-03-11
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depends_on:
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- "creator-owned streaming infrastructure has reached commercial scale with $430M annual creator revenue across 13M subscribers"
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- "established creators generate more revenue from owned streaming subscriptions than from equivalent social platform ad revenue"
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---
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# creator-owned direct subscription platforms produce qualitatively different audience relationships than algorithmic social platforms because subscribers choose deliberately
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Dropout characterizes the audience relationship on its owned streaming service as "night and day" compared to YouTube. The mechanism is structural, not preferential: on YouTube, a viewer watches because an algorithm surfaced the content in a feed competing with every other content creator on the platform. On a subscription service, a viewer watches because they actively decided to pay for access. The act of subscribing is a signal of intent that algorithmic delivery cannot replicate.
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This distinction has concrete economic and strategic implications. Algorithmic platforms create what Dropout describes as "algorithmic competition" — every piece of content competes against infinite alternatives served by the same recommendation engine. Owned subscription platforms eliminate this competition by definition: the subscriber has already resolved the choice. This shifts the creator's competitive challenge from "win the algorithm" to "retain the subscriber" — a fundamentally different optimization problem that favors depth and loyalty over virality.
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The owned-platform model also eliminates three structural dependencies that characterize ad-supported social distribution: (1) "inconsistent ad revenue" tied to advertiser market cycles, (2) "algorithmic platforms" whose surfacing decisions creators cannot control, and (3) "changing advertiser rules" that can demonetize entire content categories with little notice. Vimeo's infrastructure removes the technical burden, allowing creators to focus on subscriber retention rather than platform compliance.
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This claim connects to the deeper structural argument in [[streaming churn may be permanently uneconomic because maintenance marketing consumes up to half of average revenue per user]]. Corporate streaming services face churn because subscribers feel no identity connection to the platform — they subscribe for specific titles and leave when those end. Creator-owned streaming services benefit from the opposite dynamic: subscribers chose the creator, not a content library, and that choice reflects an existing loyalty that creates inherently positive switching costs. Since [[fanchise management is a stack of increasing fan engagement from content extensions through co-creation and co-ownership]], the subscription relationship represents level 3+ of the fanchise stack — loyalty that the creator has already earned before the subscriber signs up.
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The "night and day" characterization is a single practitioner's account and may reflect Dropout's unusually strong brand rather than a universal pattern. The confidence is experimental because the qualitative relationship difference is asserted but not systematically measured across multiple creators.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[streaming churn may be permanently uneconomic because maintenance marketing consumes up to half of average revenue per user]] — creator-owned subscription avoids the churn trap because subscriber motivation is identity-based not passive discovery
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- [[fanchise management is a stack of increasing fan engagement from content extensions through co-creation and co-ownership]] — the deliberate subscription act represents fans at level 3+ of the engagement stack, not passive viewers at level 1
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- [[creator-owned streaming infrastructure has reached commercial scale with $430M annual creator revenue across 13M subscribers]] — the infrastructure enabling this relationship model is now commercially proven
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- [[established creators generate more revenue from owned streaming subscriptions than from equivalent social platform ad revenue]] — the revenue premium is explained by the deliberate subscriber relationship this claim describes
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- [[social video is already 25 percent of all video consumption and growing because dopamine-optimized formats match generational attention patterns]] — the contrast case: social video optimizes for passive algorithmic consumption while owned streaming optimizes for deliberate subscriber engagement
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Topics:
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- [[web3 entertainment and creator economy]]
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: entertainment
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description: "Vimeo Streaming alone hosts 5,400+ creator apps generating $430M annual revenue across 13M subscribers as of April 2025, removing the 'how would creators distribute?' objection to the owned-platform attractor state"
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confidence: likely
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source: "Tubefilter, 'Creators are building their own streaming services via Vimeo Streaming', April 25, 2025; Vimeo aggregate platform metrics"
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created: 2026-03-11
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depends_on:
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- "the media attractor state is community-filtered IP with AI-collapsed production costs where content becomes a loss leader for the scarce complements of fandom community and ownership"
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- "media disruption follows two sequential phases as distribution moats fall first and creation moats fall second"
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---
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# creator-owned streaming infrastructure has reached commercial scale with $430M annual creator revenue across 13M subscribers
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The "but how would creators distribute without YouTube or Netflix?" objection to creator-owned entertainment assumes owned distribution requires building technology from scratch. Vimeo Streaming falsifies this. As of April 2025, Vimeo's creator streaming platform hosts 5,400+ apps, has generated 13+ million cumulative subscribers, and produces nearly $430 million in annual revenue for creators — on a single infrastructure provider.
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The scale matters for the attractor state thesis. Since [[the media attractor state is community-filtered IP with AI-collapsed production costs where content becomes a loss leader for the scarce complements of fandom community and ownership]] requires owned-platform distribution to be viable, these metrics confirm viability is no longer theoretical. The infrastructure exists now, operated by established creators including Dropout (Sam Reich), The Try Guys ("2nd Try"), and The Sidemen ("Side+"). Vimeo handles infrastructure, customer support, and technical troubleshooting — the operational burden that previously made owned-platform distribution prohibitive for creators without engineering teams.
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This positions Vimeo Streaming as a "Shopify for streaming": infrastructure-as-a-service that enables creator-owned distribution without custom technology builds, analogous to how Shopify enabled direct-to-consumer brands to bypass retail distribution. Since [[value in industry transitions accrues to bottleneck positions in the emerging architecture not to pioneers or to the largest incumbents]], the infrastructure layer enabling owned distribution is a strategic position — one that did not exist at commercial scale a decade ago.
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The $430M figure is particularly significant because it represents revenue flowing *to creators* rather than being captured by platforms. This is a structural reversal from the ad-supported social model where platforms capture most of the value from creator audiences.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[the media attractor state is community-filtered IP with AI-collapsed production costs where content becomes a loss leader for the scarce complements of fandom community and ownership]] — this claim removes a key empirical objection to the attractor state
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- [[media disruption follows two sequential phases as distribution moats fall first and creation moats fall second]] — owned-platform infrastructure at scale is evidence the second phase has actionable distribution options
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- [[streaming churn may be permanently uneconomic because maintenance marketing consumes up to half of average revenue per user]] — creator-owned streaming infrastructure represents the alternative distribution model to churn-plagued corporate streaming
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- [[value in industry transitions accrues to bottleneck positions in the emerging architecture not to pioneers or to the largest incumbents]] — Vimeo Streaming occupies the bottleneck infrastructure position in the creator-owned streaming layer
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- [[creator and corporate media economies are zero-sum because total media time is stagnant and every marginal hour shifts between them]] — $430M in creator-owned streaming revenue is part of the ongoing reallocation from corporate to creator distribution
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Topics:
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- [[web3 entertainment and creator economy]]
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: entertainment
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description: "Dropout reports its owned subscription service is 'far and away' its biggest revenue driver despite having 15M YouTube subscribers, suggesting owned subscription revenue per engaged fan significantly exceeds ad-supported social revenue"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Tubefilter, 'Creators are building their own streaming services via Vimeo Streaming', April 25, 2025; Sam Reich (Dropout CEO) statement"
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created: 2026-03-11
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depends_on:
|
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- "creator-owned streaming infrastructure has reached commercial scale with $430M annual creator revenue across 13M subscribers"
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challenged_by:
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- "Dropout is an unusually strong brand with exceptional subscriber loyalty — most creators cannot replicate this revenue mix"
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---
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# established creators generate more revenue from owned streaming subscriptions than from equivalent social platform ad revenue
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Dropout has 15 million YouTube subscribers — a substantial audience by any measure — yet CEO Sam Reich characterizes the company's owned streaming service as "far and away" its biggest revenue driver. This inversion is economically significant: it implies that a smaller base of deliberate subscribers paying $6.99/month generates more total revenue than 15 million passive YouTube followers generating ad impressions.
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The arithmetic is revealing. If Dropout's owned streaming base is meaningfully smaller than 15 million (a reasonable assumption given opt-in subscription), the revenue-per-engaged-fan ratio heavily favors owned subscription. YouTube CPM rates for entertainment content typically range $2-10 per thousand views, while a subscriber paying $6.99/month generates ~$84/year in gross revenue before infrastructure costs. Even accounting for Vimeo's infrastructure fees, the subscription model captures dramatically more value per relationship.
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This aligns with [[when profits disappear at one layer of a value chain they emerge at an adjacent layer through the conservation of attractive profits]]: as ad-supported social platforms commoditized content distribution and drove down per-impression yields, the value migrated to direct subscription relationships where creators can price based on fan loyalty rather than algorithmic attention. The evidence is consistent with Dropout's pricing history — the service has raised its subscription cost only once ($5.99 to $6.99) since launch, suggesting stable demand that does not require aggressive discounting to retain subscribers.
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The counter-argument is that Dropout is an unusually strong brand with exceptional content quality (College Humor alumni, Dimension 20) and subscriber loyalty that most creators cannot replicate. The "far and away biggest revenue driver" claim may not generalize to mid-tier creators for whom YouTube ad revenue remains the primary monetization path. This is why the confidence is rated experimental rather than likely — the mechanism is plausible and the evidence from one prominent case is suggestive, but systematic cross-creator comparison data does not exist in this source.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[creator-owned streaming infrastructure has reached commercial scale with $430M annual creator revenue across 13M subscribers]] — context for the revenue model: owned infrastructure is now accessible to creators at Dropout's scale
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- [[streaming churn may be permanently uneconomic because maintenance marketing consumes up to half of average revenue per user]] — the subscription model at Dropout appears to avoid the churn trap that afflicts corporate streaming, suggesting a structural difference in subscriber motivation
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- [[creator and corporate media economies are zero-sum because total media time is stagnant and every marginal hour shifts between them]] — Dropout's revenue mix evidences the economic reallocation from platform-mediated to creator-owned distribution
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- [[when profits disappear at one layer of a value chain they emerge at an adjacent layer through the conservation of attractive profits]] — value migrated from ad-supported platform distribution to direct subscription relationships
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- [[fanchise management is a stack of increasing fan engagement from content extensions through co-creation and co-ownership]] — Dropout's streaming service operates at the subscription/direct-relationship tier of the fanchise stack
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Topics:
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- [[web3 entertainment and creator economy]]
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This is a proxy inertia story. Since [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predic
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-03-26-crfb-ma-overpaid-1-2-trillion]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The $600 billion in coding intensity overpayments from 2025-2034 confirms the scale of the upcoding problem that CMS chart review exclusion targets. MA plans see a 10% net payment increase from coding intensity even after CMS's current 5.9% adjustment, demonstrating that current adjustments are insufficient. CBO estimates that raising the minimum coding adjustment from 5.9% to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion, indicating that the upcoding problem is far larger than current policy responses address. This validates the premise that chart review exclusion is necessary but suggests it may be insufficient without concurrent benchmark adjustments.
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CRFB analysis confirms that coding intensity generates $600 billion in overpayments over 2025-2034 despite the existing 5.9% CMS adjustment factor, with MA plans achieving a 10% net payment increase from coding practices. This validates that current coding adjustments are insufficient to close the arbitrage. The policy option to raise the minimum coding adjustment from 5.9% to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion, suggesting the 2027 chart review exclusion is part of a broader CMS strategy to close the coding arbitrage gap. The $260 billion trust fund impact from coding intensity alone demonstrates the fiscal stakes of the chart review policy and confirms that upcoding is a material driver of MA overpayments.
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---
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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: health
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description: "Prior authorization and narrow networks create self-selection bias that is legal but costly, accounting for $580B in MA overpayments"
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confidence: likely
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source: "Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget analysis of MedPAC data (2025-03-26)"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Favorable selection in Medicare Advantage is structural not fraudulent because plan design discourages high utilizers
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Favorable selection accounts for $580 billion in MA overpayments from 2025-2034, nearly equal to coding intensity overpayments, but operates through legal plan design choices rather than fraudulent billing. MA plans use prior authorization requirements and narrow provider networks to discourage care-seeking, which causes healthier beneficiaries to self-select into MA while sicker patients remain in traditional Medicare. This is a textbook case of structural misalignment where plans profit from selection rather than from making enrolled patients healthier.
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## Evidence
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**Scale and Mechanism:**
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- $580B in overpayments over 2025-2034 from favorable selection
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- 11% increased MA costs vs FFS in 2025 from favorable selection alone
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- Medicare HI Trust Fund impact: $250 billion
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- Beneficiary premium costs: $110 billion
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**How It Works:**
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- Prior authorization creates friction for high-utilizers (sicker patients who need frequent care)
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- Narrow networks limit access to specialists and certain providers, raising switching costs for patients with established care relationships
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- Healthier beneficiaries tolerate these restrictions because they use less care and face lower friction
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- Sicker beneficiaries avoid MA or disenroll, staying in traditional FFS Medicare where access is less restricted
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- MA plans receive risk-adjusted payments based on enrolled population health, but the population is systematically healthier than risk scores suggest due to selection bias
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## Why This Matters
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Unlike coding intensity (upcoding), favorable selection cannot be addressed through fraud enforcement or billing audits. It's a structural feature of how MA plans compete and manage costs through plan design. The policy debate focuses heavily on upcoding because it's illegal and prosecutable, but favorable selection is almost exactly as expensive and operates entirely within legal boundaries.
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This demonstrates [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]]—MA plans profit from selection, not from making enrolled patients healthier, which undermines the value-based care premise and creates perverse incentives against genuine care improvement.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]
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- [[CMS 2027 chart review exclusion targets vertical integration profit arbitrage by removing upcoded diagnoses from MA risk scoring]]
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- [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/health/_map]]
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: health
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description: "MA favorable selection operates through legal plan design features (prior authorization, narrow networks) that cannot be prosecuted as fraud despite generating $580B in overpayments"
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confidence: likely
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source: "Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Medicare Advantage Will Be Overpaid by $1.2 Trillion (2025-2034), March 2025; MedPAC analysis"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Favorable selection in Medicare Advantage is structural not fraudulent because plan design features that discourage care-seeking are legal quality management tools
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Medicare Advantage favorable selection generates $580 billion in overpayments over 2025-2034, yet this mechanism operates entirely within legal boundaries. Unlike coding intensity—where upcoding can constitute fraud—favorable selection results from plan design features that are explicitly permitted and often marketed as quality improvement.
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Prior authorization requirements and narrow provider networks create friction in care access that disproportionately deters sicker beneficiaries while appearing neutral. Healthier individuals tolerate these barriers because they seek care less frequently; chronically ill patients experience them as obstacles to necessary treatment and avoid MA plans accordingly. This self-selection mechanism produces an 11% cost differential versus traditional Medicare in 2025 without any illegal activity.
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The structural nature of favorable selection makes it resistant to enforcement-based solutions. MA plans can legitimately claim that prior authorization prevents unnecessary care and that narrow networks enable better care coordination. These are recognized quality management strategies in healthcare delivery. The selection effect is an emergent property of legal plan features, not a prosecutable scheme.
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This creates an asymmetry in policy responses: coding intensity can be addressed through audits, penalties, and higher adjustment factors, but favorable selection requires fundamental changes to MA payment methodology or plan design regulations. The $580 billion selection-driven overpayment is built into the system architecture, not layered on top through fraud.
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## Evidence
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- $580 billion in favorable selection overpayments (2025-2034) per MedPAC data
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- 11% MA cost increase vs FFS in 2025 from selection effects
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- Prior authorization and narrow networks as legal, industry-standard plan design features
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- Selection mechanism operates through differential care-seeking behavior by health status
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- $250 billion trust fund impact, $110 billion beneficiary premium impact from selection alone
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- No fraud prosecution pathway for structural selection effects under current law
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## Challenges
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Some argue that if plan features are intentionally designed to deter sick beneficiaries, this could constitute discriminatory practice under ACA or Medicare regulations. However, proving intent versus legitimate quality management is extremely difficult, and these features are widespread across the MA industry as standard practice.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]
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- [[CMS 2027 chart review exclusion targets vertical integration profit arbitrage by removing upcoded diagnoses from MA risk scoring]]
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- [[four competing payer-provider models are converging toward value-based care with vertical integration dominant today but aligned partnership potentially more durable]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/health/_map]]
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@ -1,47 +1,42 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: health
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description: "MedPAC data projects MA overpayments split evenly between upcoding and healthier-patient selection, with structural implications for Medicare solvency"
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description: "MedPAC data shows MA overpayments split evenly between upcoding ($600B) and healthier-patient selection ($580B) over 2025-2034"
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confidence: likely
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source: "Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, based on MedPAC analysis (2025-03-26)"
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source: "Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Medicare Advantage Will Be Overpaid by $1.2 Trillion (2025-2034), March 2025"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Medicare Advantage overpayments total $1.2 trillion over 2025-2034 driven equally by coding intensity and favorable selection
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Medicare Advantage will overpay plans by $1.2 trillion from 2025-2034, with two equally large drivers: coding intensity ($600B) and favorable selection ($580B). This represents a structural transfer from taxpayers to MA plans, not a pricing error or fraud anomaly. The symmetry between these two mechanisms is critical because policy debate focuses on upcoding (illegal, prosecutable) while favorable selection (legal, structural) receives less attention despite being nearly identical in fiscal impact.
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Medicare Advantage plans will receive $1.2 trillion in overpayments relative to traditional Medicare between 2025 and 2034, according to CRFB analysis of MedPAC data. This overpayment splits almost evenly between two mechanisms: coding intensity ($600 billion) and favorable selection ($580 billion).
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Coding intensity generates $600 billion in excess payments despite CMS's 5.9% adjustment factor. MA plans achieve a 10% net payment increase from coding practices that make beneficiaries appear sicker on paper than their traditional Medicare counterparts with identical health status. This translates to $260 billion in Medicare HI Trust Fund costs and $110 billion in beneficiary premium increases.
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|
||||
Favorable selection contributes $580 billion through structural mechanisms that attract healthier beneficiaries. Prior authorization requirements and narrow provider networks discourage care-seeking behavior, causing healthier individuals to self-select into MA plans. This selection effect creates an 11% cost increase versus fee-for-service Medicare in 2025 alone, imposing $250 billion on the trust fund and $110 billion on beneficiaries through higher Part B premiums.
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The combined trust fund impact of ~$510 billion over the decade makes MA overpayments one of the largest single drivers of Medicare spending growth. CBO estimates that reducing MA benchmarks could save $489 billion, while raising the minimum coding adjustment from 5.9% to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion and substantially extend Medicare trust fund solvency.
|
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## Evidence
|
||||
|
||||
**Coding Intensity ($600B):**
|
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- Medicare HI Trust Fund impact: $260 billion
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||||
- Beneficiary premium costs: $110 billion
|
||||
- MA plans see 10% net payment increase from coding intensity even after CMS's 5.9% adjustment
|
||||
- CBO estimates raising minimum coding adjustment from 5.9% to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion
|
||||
- MedPAC data showing $1.2 trillion total overpayment projection (2025-2034)
|
||||
- Coding intensity: $600B total ($260B trust fund, $110B beneficiary premiums)
|
||||
- Favorable selection: $580B total ($250B trust fund, $110B beneficiary premiums)
|
||||
- 10% net payment increase from coding despite 5.9% CMS adjustment
|
||||
- 11% increased MA costs vs FFS in 2025 from favorable selection
|
||||
- CBO policy option: benchmark reduction saves $489B
|
||||
- CBO policy option: 20% coding adjustment reduces deficits by >$1T
|
||||
|
||||
**Favorable Selection ($580B):**
|
||||
- Medicare HI Trust Fund impact: $250 billion
|
||||
- Beneficiary premium costs: $110 billion
|
||||
- 11% increased MA costs vs FFS in 2025 from favorable selection alone
|
||||
- Mechanism: prior authorization and plan networks discourage care-seeking, causing healthier people to self-select into MA while sicker patients remain in traditional Medicare
|
||||
## Challenges
|
||||
|
||||
**Combined Fiscal Impact:**
|
||||
- Trust fund impact: ~$510 billion over decade
|
||||
- Beneficiary premium impact: ~$220 billion
|
||||
- CBO estimates reducing benchmarks could save $489 billion
|
||||
|
||||
## Why This Matters
|
||||
|
||||
The $1.2 trillion figure represents the scale at which MA's payment structure becomes a Medicare solvency issue. Combined with trust fund insolvency acceleration (now projected 2040), this creates a fiscal collision course. Unlike coding intensity, favorable selection cannot be addressed through fraud enforcement—it's a legal feature of how MA plans compete and manage costs through plan design.
|
||||
|
||||
This connects directly to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]—MA's payment structure creates incentives for risk selection rather than risk management, undermining the value-based care premise.
|
||||
The favorable selection mechanism is structural rather than fraudulent, making it harder to address through enforcement. MA plans benefit from attracting healthier members through plan design features (prior authorization, narrow networks) that are legal and often presented as quality management tools.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
- [[CMS 2027 chart review exclusion targets vertical integration profit arbitrage by removing upcoded diagnoses from MA risk scoring]]
|
||||
- [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]]
|
||||
- [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]]
|
||||
- [[CMS 2027 chart review exclusion targets vertical integration profit arbitrage by removing upcoded diagnoses from MA risk scoring]]
|
||||
- [[anti-payvidor legislation targets all insurer-provider integration without distinguishing acquisition-based arbitrage from purpose-built care delivery]]
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[domains/health/_map]]
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ PACE represents the extreme end of value-based care alignment—100% capitation
|
|||
### Additional Evidence (extend)
|
||||
*Source: [[2025-03-26-crfb-ma-overpaid-1-2-trillion]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
|
||||
|
||||
MA overpayments of $1.2 trillion over 2025-2034 quantify the fiscal consequences of misaligned payment structures. Despite MA being positioned as value-based care, the payment system creates $600B in coding intensity incentives and $580B in favorable selection incentives—both of which reward risk avoidance and documentation gaming rather than health improvement. The 11% cost premium from favorable selection alone demonstrates that MA's payment structure incentivizes selection over care management. CBO estimates that reducing benchmarks could save $489 billion, and raising the coding adjustment from 5.9% to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion. This quantifies the cost of payment structures that 'touch value metrics' without bearing full risk—MA plans capture the upside from selection while taxpayers bear the downside of overpayment.
|
||||
The $1.2 trillion MA overpayment projection (2025-2034) demonstrates the fiscal consequences of partial risk transfer at the payment boundary. MA plans receive risk-adjusted capitated payments but the 5.9% coding adjustment is insufficient to offset the 10% net payment increase from coding intensity alone, creating a $600 billion transfer from taxpayers to plans through the payment mechanism. The favorable selection component ($580 billion) shows how plans profit from attracting healthier members while appearing to accept full risk—they bear the reputational risk of being caught with adverse selection but not the financial risk of actual health outcomes. Combined, these mechanisms extract $1.2 trillion over the decade through the gap between nominal risk-bearing (plans accept capitated payment) and actual financial exposure (plans control both coding and member selection). This exemplifies the payment boundary problem: plans touch the risk metric (capitation) but bear only partial financial risk (coding adjustments are insufficient, selection effects are legal).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: claim
|
||||
claim_id: seyf_intent_wallet_architecture
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
confidence: speculative
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- intent-based-ux
|
||||
- wallet-architecture
|
||||
- defi-abstraction
|
||||
- natural-language-interface
|
||||
created: 2026-03-05
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-05
|
||||
source:
|
||||
- inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-seyf.md
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Seyf demonstrates intent-based wallet architecture where natural language replaces manual DeFi navigation
|
||||
|
||||
Seyf's launch documentation describes a wallet architecture that abstracts DeFi complexity behind natural language intent processing. This architecture is from launch documentation for a fundraise that failed to reach its target, so represents planned capabilities rather than demonstrated product-market fit.
|
||||
|
||||
## Core architectural pattern
|
||||
|
||||
The wallet implements a three-layer abstraction:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Intent layer**: Users express goals in natural language ("I want to earn yield on my USDC")
|
||||
2. **Solver layer**: Backend translates intents into optimal DeFi operations across protocols
|
||||
3. **Execution layer**: Atomic transaction bundles execute the strategy
|
||||
|
||||
This inverts the traditional wallet model where users manually navigate protocol UIs and construct transactions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key architectural decisions
|
||||
|
||||
**Natural language as primary interface**: The wallet treats conversational input as the main UX, not a supplementary feature. Users describe financial goals rather than selecting from protocol menus.
|
||||
|
||||
**Protocol-agnostic solver**: The backend maintains a registry of DeFi primitives (lending, swapping, staking) and composes them based on intent optimization, not hardcoded protocol integrations.
|
||||
|
||||
**Atomic execution bundles**: Multi-step strategies (e.g., swap → deposit → stake) execute as single atomic transactions, preventing partial failures.
|
||||
|
||||
## Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
**No demonstrated user adoption**: The product launched as part of a futarchy-governed fundraise on MetaDAO that failed to reach its $300K target, raising only $200K before refunding. We have no evidence of production usage or user validation of the intent-based model.
|
||||
|
||||
**Solver complexity not detailed**: The documentation describes the solver layer conceptually but doesn't specify how it handles intent ambiguity, optimization trade-offs, or protocol risk assessment.
|
||||
|
||||
**Limited to Solana**: The architecture assumes Solana's transaction model. Cross-chain intent execution would require different primitives.
|
||||
|
||||
## Related claims
|
||||
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed-fundraising-on-metadao-shows-early-stage-liquidity-constraints-in-seyf-launch]] - The fundraising outcome for this product
|
||||
- [[defi-complexity-creates-user-experience-friction-that-limits-mainstream-adoption]] - The broader UX problem this architecture attempts to solve
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: claim
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
description: "MetaDAO's conditional token architecture fragments liquidity across pass/fail pools; a shared-base-pair AMM would let a single META/USDC deposit serve both pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC markets, reducing the capital required to keep conditional markets liquid."
|
||||
confidence: speculative
|
||||
source: "rio, based on MetaDAO Proposal 12 (futard.io, Feb 2025) — Proph3t's concept developed in collaboration with Robin Hanson"
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
depends_on:
|
||||
- "MetaDAO Proposal 12 (AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF) — Proph3t's description of shared liquidity AMM design"
|
||||
challenged_by:
|
||||
- "Shared liquidity between conditional token pairs could introduce cross-pool price manipulation vectors not present in isolated AMMs"
|
||||
- "Redemption mechanics may be incompatible with shared liquidity — winning conditional tokens must redeem 1:1 against underlying, which requires ring-fenced reserves"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Shared-liquidity AMMs could solve futarchy capital inefficiency by routing base-pair deposits into all derived conditional token markets without requiring separate capital for each pass and fail pool
|
||||
|
||||
[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] creates a structural capital problem: every active proposal fragments the token liquidity base. A DAO with 10 concurrent proposals needs liquidity in 20 separate AMMs (one pass, one fail per proposal). Each pool competes for the same depositor base. Thin markets in individual conditional pools mean noisy TWAP signals and higher manipulation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's Proph3t, in collaboration with Robin Hanson, has proposed a shared-liquidity AMM design to address this. The concept: people provide META/USDC liquidity once into a base pool, and that liquidity is accessible to both the pMETA/pUSDC market and the fMETA/fUSDC market simultaneously. Rather than siloing capital into separate pools per proposal universe, the underlying deposit serves as a shared reserve that conditional token markets draw against.
|
||||
|
||||
The mechanism would work directionally: when a trader buys pass tokens (pMETA), the trade routes through the shared META/USDC reserve, and the AMM logic credits the appropriate conditional token while debiting the underlying. The pool doesn't need to hold conditional tokens as inventory — it holds the base asset and mints conditionals on demand against it.
|
||||
|
||||
If viable, this would make futarchy markets cheaper to bootstrap: a project launching with 10 concurrent governance proposals currently needs 10x the liquidity capital. Shared-base-pair liquidity could collapse that multiplier, making [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] easier to address at the liquidity dimension specifically.
|
||||
|
||||
The design is at concept stage — Proph3t noted it in Proposal 12 as something they want to write about with Hanson, not a completed mechanism. The technical challenge is maintaining correct conditional redemption guarantees (winning tokens must redeem 1:1 for underlying base tokens) while sharing the reserve. Cross-pool contamination — where fail token market losses could drain the reserve for pass token settlement — would need to be solved at the architecture level.
|
||||
|
||||
## Evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- MetaDAO Proposal 12 (Feb 2025, passed): "we've been thinking about a new 'shared liquidity AMM' design where people provide META/USDC liquidity and it can be used in pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC markets" — Proph3t, confirmed by proposal passing
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — source of the liquidity fragmentation problem (each proposal spawns two isolated AMMs)
|
||||
|
||||
## Challenges
|
||||
|
||||
- Shared reserves may be incompatible with the conditional redemption guarantee — winners must receive underlying tokens 1:1, which requires ring-fenced reserves per universe, not shared pools
|
||||
- Cross-pool risk: a large loss in fail token markets could deplete the shared reserve and impair pass token settlement, creating contagion
|
||||
- The concept is undeveloped — Proph3t flagged it as something to write about with Hanson, not a designed mechanism; this claim may be superseded by more detailed analysis
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — the architecture this would modify
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — liquidity fragmentation is one of those friction points
|
||||
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — shared-liquidity AMM is another round of simplification, this time for capital efficiency
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — platform this would improve
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
|
|||
date: 2023-11-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
|
|||
date: 2023-12-03
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TY
|
|||
date: 2023-12-16
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2
|
|||
date: 2024-01-12
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
|
|||
date: 2024-01-24
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4t
|
|||
date: 2024-02-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK
|
|||
date: 2024-02-13
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQ
|
|||
date: 2024-02-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxie
|
|||
date: 2024-02-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHh
|
|||
date: 2024-02-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVV
|
|||
date: 2024-02-26
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1Nc
|
|||
date: 2024-03-03
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9C
|
|||
date: 2024-03-13
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb
|
|||
date: 2024-03-19
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZ
|
|||
date: 2024-03-26
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj96
|
|||
date: 2024-03-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJb
|
|||
date: 2024-05-27
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/iPzWdGBZiHMT5YhR2m4WtTNbFW3KgExH2dRAsgWydPf
|
|||
date: 2024-05-27
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9jAnAupCdPQCFvuAMr5ZkmxDdEKqsneurgvUnx7Az9z
|
|||
date: 2024-05-30
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8AEsxyN8jhth5WQZHjU9kS3JcRHaUmpck7qZgpv2v4w
|
|||
date: 2024-05-30
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: null-result
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BMZbX7z2zgLuq266yskeHF5BFZoaX9j3tvsZfVQ7RUY
|
|||
date: 2024-06-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axyx7aywpGbd
|
|||
date: 2024-06-08
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4ztwWkz9TD5Ni9Ze6XEEj6qrPBhzdTQMfpXzZ6A8bGz
|
|||
date: 2024-06-14
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
|
|||
date: 2024-06-22
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3Az
|
|||
date: 2024-06-26
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G95shxDXSSTcgi2DTJ2h79JCefVNQPm8dFeDzx7qZ2k
|
|||
date: 2024-07-01
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Hda19mrjPxotZnnQfpAhJtxWvfC6JCXbMquohThgsd5
|
|||
date: 2024-07-01
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/16ZyAyNumkJoU9GATreUzBDzfS6rmEpZnUcQTcdfJiD
|
|||
date: 2024-07-01
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8X
|
|||
date: 2024-07-04
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/xU6tQoDh3Py4MfAY3YPwKnNLt7zYDiNHv8nA1qKnxVM
|
|||
date: 2024-07-09
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BU8kQ7ECq8CJ9BHUZfYsjHFKPMGsF6oJn5d6b1tArdw
|
|||
date: 2024-07-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
|
|||
date: 2024-07-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8D
|
|||
date: 2024-08-03
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvT
|
|||
date: 2024-08-14
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/yTiRuoXWQVdVgbUJBU6J3FF1Sxnzy7FW7osqkkfMK6G
|
|||
date: 2024-08-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5TRuK9TLZ9bUPtp6od6pLKN6GxbQMByaBwVSCArNaS1
|
|||
date: 2024-08-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: null-result
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AKMnVnSC8DzoZJktErtzR2QNt1ESoN8i2DdHPYuQTMG
|
|||
date: 2024-08-27
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GugKjNpirFNaaRkEStRKGJPnutptsnTA3XuCJ8nwaVt
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8cnQAxS3WQXhD2eAjKSJ6wmBwaJskRZFYByMPKEhD1o
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/eNPP3Tm4AAyDwq9N4BwJwBzFD14KXDSVY6bhMRaBuFt
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AuNNyR4oU2zkG1sYBzJ3DJmyDzMKSmSW2yASorWenuC
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJ
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2LKqzegdHrcrrRCHSuTS2fMjjJuZDfzuRKMnzPhzeD4
|
|||
date: 2024-08-30
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH
|
|||
date: 2024-08-31
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/evGundfgMRZWCYsGF7GMKcgh6LjxDTFrvWRAhxiQS8h
|
|||
date: 2024-09-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: null-result
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8SwPfzKhaZ2SQfgfJYfeVRTXALZs2qyFj7kX1dEkd29
|
|||
date: 2024-10-10
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC
|
|||
date: 2024-10-22
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubA
|
|||
date: 2024-10-22
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Gp3ANMRTdGLPNeMGFUrzVFaodouwJSEXHbg5rFUi9ro
|
|||
date: 2024-10-30
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HiNWH2uKxjrmqZjn9mr8vWu5ytp2Nsz6qLsHWa5XQ1V
|
|||
date: 2024-11-08
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6LcxhHS3JvDtbS1GoQS18EgH5Pzf7AnqQpR7D4HxmWp
|
|||
date: 2024-11-13
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ApywwMrE9vkWiatZwQVU6wdvNsHrYZkhegNCV5XDZ8y
|
|||
date: 2024-11-21
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B4zpF4iHeF91qq8Szb9aD6pW1DrwSy6djD4QPWJQn3d
|
|||
date: 2024-11-21
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb
|
|||
date: 2024-11-21
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2QUxbiMkDtoKxY2u6kXuevfMsqKGtHNxMFYHVWbqRK1
|
|||
date: 2024-11-25
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/FXkyJpCVADXS6YZcz1Kppax8Kgih23t6yvze7ehELJp
|
|||
date: 2024-11-25
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4gaJ8bi1gpNEx6xSSsepjVBM6GXqTDfLbiUbzXbARHW
|
|||
date: 2024-12-02
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GBQZvZAeW8xUuVV5a9FJHSyttzY5fPGuvkwLTpWLbw6
|
|||
date: 2024-12-04
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DhY2YrMde6BxiqCrqUieoKt5TYzRwf2KYE3J2RQyQc7
|
|||
date: 2024-12-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/C2Up9wYYJM1A94fgJz17e3Xsr8jft2qYMwrR6s4ckaK
|
|||
date: 2024-12-16
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A74H61YqwsbwRczuErbUyh9kqG1A7ZbiE1W5hWZmT9f
|
|||
date: 2024-12-19
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK
|
|||
date: 2024-12-30
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CJW4iZPT14sVNzoc4Yibx1LbnY12sA75gZCP9HZk11U
|
|||
date: 2025-01-13
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
|
|||
date: 2025-01-14
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/3tApJXw2REQAZZyehiaAnQSdauVNviNbXsuS4inn8PA
|
|||
date: 2025-01-27
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CBhieBvzo5miQBrdaM7vALpgNLt4Q5XYCDfNLaE2wXJ
|
|||
date: 2025-01-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7FY4dgYDX8xxwCczrgstUwuNEC9NMV1DWXz31rMnGNT
|
|||
date: 2025-02-03
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DnDiyjAcmS3BNmNEJa2ydEbd6DgnddpkyVXJfngdRTz
|
|||
date: 2025-02-04
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4BTTxsV98Rhm1qjDe2yPdXtj7j7KBSuGtVQ6rUNWjjX
|
|||
date: 2025-02-06
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8qtWAAjqKhtEBJjdY6YzkN74yddTchH2vSc7f654NtQ
|
|||
date: 2025-02-10
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,14 +6,16 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELB
|
|||
date: 2025-02-10
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: processed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2025-02-10
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "futarchy-implementations-must-simplify-theoretical-mechanisms-for-production-adoption-because-original-designs-include-impractical-elements-that-academics-tolerate-but-users-reject.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
extraction_notes: "Governance proposal data showing MetaDAO's operational evolution. No novel claims—all insights enrich existing claims about futarchy implementation, mechanism simplification, and MetaDAO's platform development. The proposal demonstrates convergence on traditional advisory structures while iterating on futarchy mechanism design for capital efficiency."
|
||||
claims_extracted:
|
||||
- "shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets.md"
|
||||
extraction_notes: "Governance proposal data showing MetaDAO's operational evolution. One novel claim extracted: the shared-liquidity AMM concept for conditional markets (Proph3t + Hanson concept, not yet implemented). Remaining insights enrich existing claims about futarchy implementation, mechanism simplification, and MetaDAO's platform development. The proposal also demonstrates convergence on traditional advisory structures (Robin Hanson advisor hire via futarchy vote)."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal Details
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6TkkCy26HCqxWGt1QgfhFHc6ASikRjk74Gkk4Wfyd7w
|
|||
date: 2025-02-13
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ZYMaLKWn9PSLTX1entmqJUYBiCkZbRxeRz1tVvYwqy
|
|||
date: 2025-02-24
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/3rCNPg7wG1XCZBCWwjgjFgfhEySu2LhqeoU9KTUesTg
|
|||
date: 2025-02-24
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFke
|
|||
date: 2025-02-26
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EksJ2GhxbmhVAdDKP4kThHiuzKwjhq5HSb1kgFj6x2Q
|
|||
date: 2025-03-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/8MMGMpLYnxH69j6YWCaLTqsYZuiFz61E5v2MSmkQyZZ
|
|||
date: 2025-03-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HCHkdhiPh2q9LTyvUpfyfuybPHW7qg1T2vGtiJzGPrs
|
|||
date: 2025-03-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6mc1Fp6ds8XKA2jMzBDDhVwvY6ZCGg6SNqvHy4E6LS7
|
|||
date: 2025-03-05
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ priority: high
|
|||
tags: [medicare-advantage, overpayment, fiscal-impact, coding-intensity, favorable-selection, trust-fund]
|
||||
processed_by: vida
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-11
|
||||
claims_extracted: ["medicare-advantage-overpayments-total-1-2-trillion-over-2025-2034-driven-equally-by-coding-intensity-and-favorable-selection.md", "favorable-selection-in-medicare-advantage-is-structural-not-fraudulent-because-plan-design-discourages-high-utilizers.md"]
|
||||
claims_extracted: ["medicare-advantage-overpayments-total-1-2-trillion-over-2025-2034-driven-equally-by-coding-intensity-and-favorable-selection.md", "favorable-selection-in-medicare-advantage-is-structural-not-fraudulent-because-plan-design-features-that-discourage-care-seeking-are-legal-quality-management-tools.md"]
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk.md", "CMS 2027 chart review exclusion targets vertical integration profit arbitrage by removing upcoded diagnoses from MA risk scoring.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
extraction_notes: "Extracted two claims: (1) overall $1.2T overpayment structure and drivers, (2) favorable selection as structural mechanism. Enriched existing claims on payment boundary stalling and CMS chart review with fiscal scale data. The symmetry between coding intensity and favorable selection as equally large drivers is the key insight—policy focuses on fraud (coding) but selection is just as expensive and entirely legal."
|
||||
extraction_notes: "Extracted two claims: (1) the $1.2T overpayment headline with equal split between coding and selection, and (2) the structural/legal nature of favorable selection as distinct from fraud. Enriched two existing claims on payment boundaries and CMS coding policy. The favorable selection mechanism is the less-discussed half of MA overpayment and deserves standalone treatment because it cannot be addressed through fraud enforcement."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Content
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,9 +59,11 @@ EXTRACTION HINT: The favorable selection mechanism deserves its own claim — it
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- $1.2 trillion total MA overpayments projected 2025-2034 (MedPAC data)
|
||||
- $600B from coding intensity, $580B from favorable selection
|
||||
- Medicare HI Trust Fund impact: $510B combined ($260B coding, $250B selection)
|
||||
- Beneficiary premium impact: $220B combined ($110B each)
|
||||
- CBO benchmark reduction could save $489 billion
|
||||
- Raising coding adjustment to 20% could reduce deficits by over $1 trillion
|
||||
- MA overpayments: $1.2 trillion total (2025-2034)
|
||||
- Coding intensity: $600B ($260B trust fund, $110B beneficiary premiums)
|
||||
- Favorable selection: $580B ($250B trust fund, $110B beneficiary premiums)
|
||||
- Current CMS coding adjustment: 5.9%
|
||||
- MA plans net payment increase from coding: 10%
|
||||
- MA cost increase vs FFS from selection (2025): 11%
|
||||
- CBO benchmark reduction savings estimate: $489B
|
||||
- CBO 20% coding adjustment deficit reduction: >$1T
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoot
|
|||
date: 2025-03-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/2dvNKyxKzVuUMcd89wzfuYjX2RKbJps2Srqu4mJ7LEg
|
|||
date: 2025-04-22
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,14 @@ date: 2025-04-25
|
|||
domain: entertainment
|
||||
secondary_domains: []
|
||||
format: article
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: processed
|
||||
processed_by: clay
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-11
|
||||
claims_extracted:
|
||||
- creator-owned-streaming-infrastructure-has-reached-commercial-scale-with-430M-annual-creator-revenue-across-13M-subscribers
|
||||
- established-creators-generate-more-revenue-from-owned-streaming-subscriptions-than-from-equivalent-social-platform-ad-revenue
|
||||
- creator-owned-direct-subscription-platforms-produce-qualitatively-different-audience-relationships-than-algorithmic-social-platforms-because-subscribers-choose-deliberately
|
||||
enrichments: []
|
||||
priority: high
|
||||
tags: [creator-economy, owned-distribution, vimeo, platform-infrastructure, dropout, sidemen, try-guys]
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/35mgLHTJYhyEWjsLHDd4jZNQ6jwuZ4E214TUm1hA8vB
|
|||
date: 2025-07-02
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/C61vTUyxTq5SWwbrTFEyYeXpGQLKhRRvRrGsu6YUa6C
|
|||
date: 2025-08-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/9kx7UDFzFt7e2V4pFtawnupKKvRR3EhV7P1Pxmc5XCQj"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-06
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/2rYvdtK8ovuSziJuy5gTTPtviY5CfTnW6Pps4pk7ehEq"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-14
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/6c1dnggYNpEZvz4fedJ19LAo8Pz2mTTvT6LxySYhpLb
|
|||
date: 2025-10-15
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/E7kXdSdZrjVFDkLb6V7S8VihKookPviRJ7tXVik9qbdu"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-18
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/4h248CdXdeWtxWnHxEPqa5ruYZaEwXRZPyDFYnndbzpR"
|
|||
date: 2025-10-20
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: entity-data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
|
||||
event_type: launch
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more
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Reference in a new issue