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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrz
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proposal_date: 2024-10-22
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resolution_date: 2024-10-26
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity incentives and gather data on boost mechanism effectiveness"
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summary: "Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity and gather data on boost mechanism impacts"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,19 +19,38 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# ORE: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x
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## Summary
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This proposal increased the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL liquidity providers from 4x to 6x, one week after the initial launch of the boost mechanism. The proposal had three stated objectives: increase TVL in the ORE-SOL pool by offering greater incentives to offset LP risk, gather data on how boost multiplier changes affect liquidity, and introduce the ORE community to futarchy governance through a low-stakes operational decision.
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This proposal increased the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL liquidity providers from 4x to 6x, aiming to enhance liquidity depth by offering greater incentives that counterbalance the risks LPs face in volatile trading pairs. The proposal explicitly framed itself as a data-gathering exercise to understand how boost multiplier changes affect liquidity markets, and as a low-risk introduction to futarchy for the ORE community.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
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- **Resolution:** 2024-10-26 (4 days after proposal)
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- **Proposal Account:** A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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- **DAO Account:** 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
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- **Completed:** 2024-10-26
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## Context
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Boosts are ORE's native incentive mechanism for converting staked capital into "virtual hashpower" that multiplies mining rewards. At the time of this proposal (one week after boost launch), ORE supported three boost multipliers:
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- ORE-SOL LP: 4x
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- ORE-ISC LP: 4x
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- ORE: 2x
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The initial boost launch had already driven significant TVL increases in the targeted liquidity pools.
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## Objectives
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The proposal identified three explicit goals:
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1. **Increase TVL in ORE-SOL pool** — Higher multipliers offer greater incentives to counterbalance LP risk in volatile pairs, potentially increasing market depth
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2. **Gather mechanism data** — As the first-ever change to any boost multiplier, this would generate data on how multiplier adjustments affect liquidity behavior
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3. **Introduce futarchy to ORE community** — Explicitly positioned as a "low-risk testrun" for the community to learn futarchy mechanics before considering integration into critical systems like the supply function
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## Significance
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This represents futarchy being applied to DeFi protocol parameter tuning rather than just treasury or strategic decisions. The proposal explicitly frames itself as both an operational optimization and a governance learning exercise, with the team acknowledging futarchy is "still a very nascent technology" requiring organizational familiarity before integration into critical systems. The rapid 4-day resolution suggests either low contention or limited trading activity.
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy's application to operational parameter tuning rather than binary strategic decisions. The framing as a learning exercise ("gather data," "low-risk testrun") suggests the decision's value lay partly in mechanism familiarization rather than purely in the optimal multiplier level. This represents futarchy being used for incremental optimization and organizational learning, not just high-stakes governance.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[ore]] - governance decision on boost mechanism parameters
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- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
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- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] - example of futarchy on operational parameters
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- [[ore]] — parent entity, governance decision on boost mechanism
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- [[futardio]] — platform used for decision market
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- [[MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions]] — extends pattern to operational parameters
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- [[futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs]] — demonstrates indirect token-price reasoning through liquidity depth
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@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions.md", "futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Proposal is primarily operational/parametric with governance learning as explicit secondary objective. No novel mechanism claims warranted - the insight is that futarchy is being used for iterative DeFi parameter tuning, which enriches existing claims about adoption patterns and decision complexity. Created decision_market entity because it represents significant governance event with clear market resolution and stated strategic objectives beyond routine parameter adjustment."
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extraction_notes: "Single governance proposal for operational parameter tuning. No novel claims warranted — the mechanism (futarchy for boost multipliers) and the pattern (uncontested operational decisions) are already covered in existing claims. Created decision_market entity and enriched two existing claims about futarchy's application scope. The proposal's explicit framing as a 'low-risk testrun' for futarchy learning is significant context for understanding ORE's governance evolution."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ With the launch of boosts just over one week ago, ORE saw a significant rise in
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## Key Facts
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- ORE launched boost mechanism one week before this proposal (mid-October 2024)
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- ORE supports three boost multipliers: ORE-SOL LP (4x→6x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
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- Boosts convert staked capital into 'virtual hashpower' for mining rewards
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- Proposal passed 2024-10-26, 4 days after creation
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- Autocrat version 0.3 used for this proposal
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- ORE boosts launched one week before this proposal (mid-October 2024)
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- ORE supported three boost multipliers at proposal time: ORE-SOL LP (4x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
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- Proposal A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC was proposal #1 for DAO 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
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- Autocrat version 0.3 used for this decision
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- Proposal completed 2024-10-26, four days after creation
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